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PART I: INTRODUCTION AND EXISTING LITERATURE 
1. Introduction 
How do politicians use policies strategically for their own political benefit and 
to achieve long-term political goals, and how does such strategic behavior in-
fluence the design of policies? Answering these questions is crucial for under-
standing key dynamics, challenges, limitations and opportunities of public 
policy making, for explaining strategic choices policy makers make when they 
design new policies and political struggles they engage in with their oppo-
nents.  
Recent attempts by Republicans to demobilize public sector unions and to 
undercut the Democratic Party’s political base in several U.S. states offer a 
good example of the political phenomenon this dissertation investigates: the 
long-term strategic design of public policies by policy makers. In fact, the 
case has recently also received attention from scholars of policy feedback (cf. 
Anzia and Moe 2016; Hertel-Fernandez 2018), who study how policies influ-
ence subsequent politics but typically do not inquire systematically whether 
or to what degree policy makers have tried to shape these effects strategically. 
When researchers want to analyze long-term strategic policy making, they 
must draw an important distinction, namely between long-term political ef-
fects of public policies and short-term substantive effects. In the given exam-
ple, short-term substantive effects of public labor policies pushed by Republi-
cans concern the ways in which unions interact with the state, how they collect 
dues, and how they recruit and retain members. That is, they concern the sub-
stance matter, the actual issue, problem or field that the policy is intended to 
regulate. Researchers must separate these short-term substantive effects ana-
lytically from long-term political effects of the policies, which – as Hertel-Fer-
nandez discusses – policy makers can try to design strategically to achieve 
long-term goals. The long-term political effects concern public sector unions’ 
political clout, the mobilization of their members, and, thus, the strength and 
viability of an important base of the Democratic Party. In Hertel-Fernandez’s 
powerful formulation, Republicans essentially try to use the feedback effects 
of public labor policy as a “political weapon” against the Democrats.  
Further examples help underline the distinction between short-term sub-
stantive and long-term political effects of policies and demonstrate the preva-
lence of long-term strategic policy making in different political contexts. Take 
U.S. Social Security. Here, policy makers tried to bind their political succes-
sors through strategic political choices they made during the design of the pro-
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gram. As Jacobs (2010) argues, policy designers chose a funded, actuarial pro-
gram because they wanted to prevent their successors from exploiting the pro-
gram and using it to cultivate constituencies and win votes. The funded actu-
arial program would help them achieve this goal because it does not use cur-
rent payroll contributions to finance current social expenditures but saves 
them to cover the costs of future outlays. 
Or take the political struggle for a reform of the U.S. immigration system. 
Here, Democrats advocate for legislation that creates a path to citizenship 
while Republicans take a more restrictive stance on who and how many should 
be “allowed in”. The Democrats’ plans would not only legalize millions of ille-
gal immigrants and integrate them into the U.S. labor market and social secu-
rity system. It would also add millions of new voters to the political system 
who are traditionally affiliated with the Democrats and, thus, empower the 
party systematically in the long term. 
Research on the effects of policies on politics emerged in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s primarily in the United States, but the phenomenon of long-term 
strategic policy making and the strategic design of feedback effects is not ex-
clusive to the U.S. context with its highly polarized party system, or to major 
political issues like immigration reform. German health policy making is an-
other fitting, yet quite different case. In German health politics, policy making 
is characterized by a quick succession of piecemeal reforms rather than by par-
adigmatic policy changes that would define the policy field for decades. As 
Döhler (1995) shows, also in and through piecemeal reforms, policy makers 
can act as “architects of political order” and strategically design policies that 
create, rearrange or destroy structures of interest representation. That is, 
through the strategic design of policies, policy makers can try to engineer the 
effects that health policies have on the strategies and preferences of interest 
groups. For example, they can strengthen federal and regional health fund as-
sociations as negotiators in order to tame competition between individual 
funds and in the long term balance out unequal bargaining relations between 
providers and health funds that result in cost increases.  
Long-term strategic policy making is also not exclusive to the field of social 
policy, the traditional focus of policy feedback research. Take a final example 
from renewable energies policy. Here, early and modest feed-in tariffs can 
support the emergence of new industries and foster the creation of new actor 
coalitions under the radar of politically powerful big utilities (cf. Schmidt et al. 
2018). Once the big utilities identify their new opponents, they can already 
draw on a solidified power base while the big utilities’ own support base has 
started to erode. Renewable energy policies can be locked in, and policy mak-
ers can achieve long-term political goals by strategically designing policies and 
their feedback effects. 
10 
The Architectural Policy Design Perspective 
These are only a few of many possible examples. They demonstrate that policy 
makers frequently use or attempt to use policies strategically in order to 
achieve long-term political goals (cf. also Anzia and Moe 2016). The disserta-
tion argues that is it necessary to develop an analytical toolkit for studying 
these attempts systematically in order to be able to explain crucial dimensions 
of public policy making, in particular policy makers’ strategic choices during 
policy design and patterns and dynamics of strategic policy design and policy 
feedback processes. The literatures on policy feedback and on policy design, 
whose job it would be to provide such an analytical toolkit, fail to do so and do 
not pay sufficient attention to the phenomenon of long-term strategic policy 
making. Instead, the policy design literature focusses analytically on how pol-
icies can be designed instrumentally to solve objective policy problems, and 
the policy feedback literature focusses analytically on which feedback effects 
policies produce without investigating the agential sources of these effects (cf. 
chapter 1 for a substantial discussion). In consequence, both literatures strug-
gle to capture, understand and explain long-term strategic policy making. 
To remedy these deficits, the dissertation puts forward the concept of archi-
tectural policy design and develops an analytical approach for investigating 
long-term strategic policy making. In brief, this architectural policy design 
perspective understands public policies as “rules of the game” that prescribe 
and proscribe behavior and shape the lives and interactions of citizens and 
organizations. Policies are arenas of conflict in which actors constantly try to 
(re-)shape and (re-)interpret rules and bend these towards their priorities and 
preferences. Actors do this because policies are tools of power that shape, re-
structure, and reconfigure political processes in meaningful ways through pol-
icy feedback effects. Policy makers can therefore use policies strategically to 
gain power and control, further their political interests and achieve political 
goals in the long term.  
The design of policies, policy instruments and specific rules and stipulations 
matters for future policy development because it shapes what feedback effects 
emerge from a policy. Policy makers have an acquired aptitude or working un-
derstanding of the effects different policy designs produce and can therefore 
act strategically in the design of policies. They try to design policies that bring 
about beneficial policy feedback effects in order to gain power, achieve policy 
goals in the long term and be electorally successful in the short term. Policy 
makers’ strategic design attempts therefore shape future policy developments 
via policy feedback effects. Policy makers’ design strategies themselves are 
structured by situational contexts of policy making according to which policy 
makers review, revise and reform the goals they want to achieve and strategies 
they follow to do so. 
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Existing Puzzles and Research Question 
As analytical approach, the architectural policy design perspective addresses 
a number of puzzles concerning long-term strategic policy making. Its purpose 
is in particular to explain patterns and dynamics of long-term strategic policy 
making and strategic choices policy makers make during policy design. The 
existing literature struggles to explain these key aspects of public policy mak-
ing because it fails to understand the role of strategic action in policy feedback 
processes and policy design dynamics and because it lacks an analytical toolkit 
that can capture, understand and explain it.  
In consequence, the literature struggles to answer basic questions about 
public policy making. Why do policy makers choose one policy design over 
another even though both designs might be instrumental in pursuing the same 
policy goal? What reasons do policy makers have for such choices, and what 
role do strategic considerations of policy feedback effects play in these deci-
sions? Remember the example of renewable energy policies: a variety of policy 
instruments (e.g. feed-in tariffs, direct subsidies, CO2 emission caps, taxation) 
can lead towards the targeted policy goal and increase the share of renewable 
energies of total energy mix, but how can one explain why policy makers 
choose one over another? Are choices between policy instruments only a mat-
ter of assumed instrumentality, of efficient and effective problem solution, as 
the analytical focus of the policy design literature would suggest? Or aren’t 
they also political choices – choices in relation to which policy makers strate-
gically consider the long-term political implications of different reform de-
signs? 
A key puzzle for the literature is how policy makers weigh short-term sub-
stantive and long-term political benefits during policy design, when they pri-
oritize one over the other or how they try to maximize both. Relatedly, why are 
policy makers willing to give up certain elements of a policy design but not 
others in negotiations with their political opponents, i.e., which political fights 
do they pick and which compromises do they accept? The literature often ap-
proaches these puzzles by looking at policy making as the result of the relative 
political strength of political actors, interest group politics and institutional 
characteristics like veto barriers or gate-keeping. The dissertation under-
stands these factors as important conditions of public policy making that 
shape the outcomes of policy design processes. However, explanations that do 
not take into account policy makers’ design strategies are often underdeter-
mined. They may be able to explain general directions of public policy making 
but not “within-design choices”, i.e. not the specific design elements, instru-
ments, stipulations and policy wordings policy makers choose. Understanding 
those choices, however, is essential for explaining which feedback effects pol-
icies generate and how policy makers can design them strategically. 
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The literature also cannot explain how, under what conditions, or to what 
degree policy makers are actually successful in strategically designing policies 
and anticipating policy feedback effects in order to achieve long-term policy 
goals. Regarding the introductory example, why could Republicans success-
fully attack the political clout of public sector unions in recent years and actu-
ally demobilize their membership and weaken Democrats systematically? 
Again, institutional factors that structure the legislative process and give Re-
publicans leeway to impose union-hostile legislation, and the political balance 
of power between Democrats and Republicans are important parts of the ex-
planation. But how did Republicans actually do it? Institutional and contex-
tual factors might open windows of opportunity, but policy makers need to 
exploit these strategically to achieve long-term political goals. The puzzle is 
then how “talented” policy makers are in doing so? How good are they at using 
policies to make politics? How extensive or limited is their understanding of 
long-term political consequences that emerge from different policy designs? 
What types of effects do policy makers have on their mind and how do they try 
to design those strategically? 
These puzzles demand inquiry. The dissertation takes up the task and poses 
a research question that carves out the problem at heart. Concretely, the dis-
sertation asks whether and how policy makers strategically try to shape pol-
icy feedback effects during policy design and how such attempts influence the 
design of policies. 
Theory Building in Abductive Research 
Addressing the outlined puzzles requires a particular analytical approach to 
the investigation of public policy making. It also requires a particular ap-
proach to the research process itself. The dissertation is based on an abductive 
conceptualization of the research process that is geared to build theory. The 
goal is not to fill a specific, well-circumscribed gap in the literature, but to ex-
plore an untrodden path and investigate an analytically neglected phenome-
non for which the literature does not provide a theoretical or methodological 
toolkit. 
The review of the existing literature presented in chapter 1 therefore follows 
the problematization framework. The problematization framework helps the 
researcher to develop new theories and frameworks because it explains defi-
cits in the existing literature by identifying and challenging underlying as-
sumptions in the literature instead of trying to spot or construct gaps in it. 
Based on this, the dissertation develops a new theoretical and methodological 
framework of architectural policy design, presented in chapters 3 and 1. The 
theoretical framework combines different elements of the existing literature 
as analytical lenses in novel ways and, thus, directs the analytical attention to 
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the phenomenon of interest: architectural policy design. The methodological 
framework then develops a novel procedure for case selection in theory build-
ing research and explains how to identify and choose relevant cases for the 
empirical investigation of architectural policy design. Furthermore, it dis-
cusses in detail what types of data material and empirical evidence to look for 
and how to process and analyze gathered data. The theoretical and methodo-
logical framework are then applied in two case studies of German public policy 
making in chapters 6 and 7, whose outcomes and implications are discussed 
in chapters 8 and 9. 
Literature problematization, theoretical and methodological framework, 
case studies and the discussion of outcomes and implications are presented 
sequentially but are tightly intertwined in the actual research process and co-
constitutive of each other. In abductive research, theorizing and empirical 
analysis are not two distinct steps in the research process, but they are two 
sides of the same coin and elements of one and the same research act. In this 
vein, the central concept and the analytical framework of architectural policy 
design are as much preconditions as they are products of the dissertation.  
A Preview of the Dissertation’s Contribution 
The dissertation contributes to the existing literature by explaining a key di-
mension of public policy making, the long-term strategic design of public pol-
icies, and by providing an analytical toolkit for its investigation. In particular, 
the dissertation makes two contributions: 
First, the dissertation finds that policy makers do in fact consider and try to 
strategically design feedback effects when designing policies. More specifi-
cally, it finds that policy makers anticipate different types of effects in different 
policy design situations based on their working understanding of policy feed-
back effects and they try to maximize both short-term and long-term political 
benefits when designing policies.  
Second, the dissertation finds that the existing literature relies implicitly or 
explicitly on problematic assumptions about the nature of policy makers and 
policy making and that it therefore has not developed an analytical toolkit for 
the investigation of long-term strategic policy making. The theoretical and 
methodological framework of architectural policy design provides a solution 
to this problem that can improve our understanding of patterns and dynamics 
of public policy making and explain policy makers’ strategic decisions during 
policy design. 
Through these contributions, the dissertation is able to provide relevant in-
sights into dynamics of long-term strategic policy making. It shows that policy 
makers consider inward-oriented feedback effects (i.e. feedback effects of a 
policy on its own further development) in paradigmatic policy making because 
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their primary focus is on designing a stable, resistant policy that will endure 
future political attacks. In incremental policy making, policy makers consider 
outward-oriented feedback effects (i.e. feedback effects of a policy on other 
policies/issues/policy fields) because they aim to create a beneficial reform 
process. Since policy makers link anticipated feedback effects to particular de-
sign elements, the analytical focus on architectural policy design strategies can 
explain the strategic choices policy makers make during design, which con-
flicts they engage in and which compromises they are willing to accept.  
The dissertation also shows that policy makers are neither strategic master-
minds nor only interested in winning the next election. Typically, policy mak-
ers try to maximize both long-term and short-term political benefits by care-
fully designing policies that bring about beneficial feedback effects while help-
ing win elections. In a weak bargaining situation, policy makers may accept 
necessary compromises to contain political damage and simultaneously try to 
influence policy design so that it creates favorable political dynamics for 
reaching their long-term policy goal. In a strong bargaining position, policy 
makers not only celebrate a short-term victory but also try to design policies 
to be resistant to future retrenchment. 
Hence, the dissertation also highlights that researchers risk drawing false 
conclusions when they do not investigate design processes and policy makers’ 
long-term design strategies. Policy makers may “give in” in a political debate 
if they are in a weak bargaining position, but they can hold on to their original 
policy goal and try to influence policy design deliberately in order to achieve 
this goal in the long run via strategically designed policy feedback effects that 
are intended to create political dynamics in their favor. Researchers should 
therefore be careful when deducting policy makers’ actual policy goals quickly 
from the positions they take during political debates and negotiations and in-
vestigate their design strategies in detail in order to understand what their 
long-term goals are. Doing so can also help researchers uncover when policy 
makers accept short-term losses in order to achieve long-term goals and to 
avoid misinterpreting strategic decisions of policy makers in the design of pol-
icies. 
The Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is presented in four parts. Part I includes the introduction 
(chapter 1) and the problematization of the existing literature (chapter 1). Part 
II develops the theoretical and methodological framework of architectural pol-
icy design (chapters 3 and 1). Part III applies the framework and presents two 
case studies of German public policy making (chapters 6 and 7). Part IV dis-
cusses relevant theoretical, methodological and empirical implications of the 
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dissertation (chapter 8) and concludes with a discussion of its main contribu-





2. Problematization of the Literature 
The dissertation contributes to the emerging body of research on policy feed-
back and policy design. Treated separately, neither the policy feedback nor the 
policy design literature offers an agency-centered analytical perspective on 
and an explicit conceptualization of long-term strategic policy making that 
takes policy makers’ considerations of policy feedback effects into account. 
The policy feedback literature typically ignores or contests the idea of inten-
tional, long-term policy design and treats policy feedback effects as unin-
tended side effects of policy making (e.g. Pierson 1993, 2000b). The policy 
design literature in the policy sciences focusses on the rational, knowledge-
based selection of means and instruments in order to achieve desired substan-
tive policy outcomes but sidelines non-instrumental, political considerations 
of policies’ effects on political dynamics in a policy field (e.g. Howlett and 
Mukherjee 2014, 2017). The few policy design studies in public policy lack an 
agential perspective, especially an awareness of differences in design strate-
gies based on policy makers’ party affiliation or political-ideological orienta-
tion, and explicit conceptualizations of the role and impact of policy makers’ 
strategic considerations of policy feedback during and on policy design (e.g. 
Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1997, 2005; Soss 1999; Soss and Schram 2007). 
The literature is therefore not able to explain the key dimension of public 
policy making outlined by the research question presented in chapter 1, 
namely whether and how policy makers strategically try to shape policy feed-
back effects during policy design and how such attempts influence the design 
of policies. Hence, it fails to understand the role of agency in policy feedback 
processes and to enrich our understanding of real-word political struggles 
around policy design and the strategic choices policy makers face during de-
sign. For example, the literature cannot tell us why policy makers choose one 
design over another, even though both designs might pursue the same policy 
goal, and what reasons they might have for their choice. It also cannot tell us 
how policy makers weigh potential long-term and short-term political benefits 
and political and instrumental motivations during policy making, when they 
prioritize one over the other or try to maximize both, and why policy makers 
might be willing to give up certain elements of a policy design but not others 
in negotiations with their opponents. Lastly, the literature cannot tell us how 
and under what conditions policy makers are actually successful in strategi-
cally designing policies and anticipating policy feedback effects to achieve 
long-term policy goals and when they fail in doing so.  
In order to identify the sources of these shortcomings and develop the the-
oretical and analytical toolkit of the literature further, this chapter takes a crit-
ical perspective on the existing literature on policy feedback and policy design. 
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It follows the problematization approach to identify and challenge underlying 
assumptions in the existing literature (Alvesson and Sandberg 2011a, 2011b, 
2013). Based on this, the chapter develops two analytical claims that will be 
substantiated in the empirical investigation in Part III.  
First, it argues that paying attention to feedback effects can help remedy the 
functionalist bias in policy design studies, improve our understanding of the 
potentials, challenges, political struggles, and real-world patterns of strategic 
policy design, and develop a clear concept of long-term, strategic policy mak-
ing and an analytical framework for policy design studies that takes antici-
pated policy feedback effects into account.  
Second, the chapter argues that disaggregating policies into policy instru-
ments and design characteristics and investigating in detail design processes 
can give us a better understanding of how policy feedback effects emerge and 
whether and how policy makers can (try to) design these intentionally. 
The chapter is able to develop these claims because the combination of the 
policy design and policy feedback perspective yields specific benefits, despite 
the literatures’ individual shortcomings. The policy design perspective shifts 
the policy feedback literature’s focus from policies as broad categories and 
bundles of different instruments and tools to policy design elements and char-
acteristics and, thus, helps unveil how policy feedback effects emerge and how 
actors can (attempt to) design them intentionally through strategic policy de-
sign. Furthermore, it helps to focus more on policy makers’ decisions during 
design processes than on contextual factors that may bring about feedback ef-
fects and shape policy development. The policy feedback perspective can ren-
der the policy design literature more political by counterbalancing its func-
tionalist bias on instrument selection with attention to the political conse-
quences of policies and therefore help explain the political struggles around 
instrumentation and policy design. 
Based on the critical review and subsequent combination of elements of 
both perspectives, the dissertation develops an explicit concept of architec-
tural policy design and analytical framework that takes policy makers’ consid-
erations of policy feedback into account. The dissertation is therefore part of 
recent scholarly efforts to bring the combined advantages of the policy feed-
back and policy design perspective to the forefront of public policy studies and 
advances our understanding of critical choices policy makers make during pol-
icy design. 
The structure of chapter 1 is as follows. Before the literature review, the next 
two subsections introduce problematization as a distinct approach to engag-
ing with existing literature in theory-building research and describe how the 
approach is applied in the dissertation. Section 2.1 discusses the policy feed-
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back literature and its historical-institutionalist foundations. Section 2.2 dis-
cusses the policy design literature in the policy sciences and in public policy. 
Section 2.3 discusses the emerging research field on policy feedback and pol-
icy design. Section 2.4 summarizes the lessons learned and presents two ana-
lytical claims that kick off the development of the theoretical and methodolog-
ical framework of architectural policy design in chapters 3 and 1. 
Problematization in Abductive Research 
The purpose of the problematization approach is to provide a “methodology 
for identifying and challenging assumptions underlying existing literature” 
(Alvesson and Sandberg 2011a: 247) in order to enable researchers to develop 
more interesting and influential theories that advance knowledge on a specific 
subject matter (ibid. 2011a, 2011b, 2013). Hence, the approach aims to provide 
methodological underpinnings for Davis’ (1971, 1986) famous thesis that 
“what makes a theory notable, and sometimes even famous, is not only that it 
is seen as true but also, and more important, that it is seen as challenging the 
assumptions underlying existing theories in some significant way”(Alvesson 
and Sandberg 2011a: 247). Problematization is therefore a common first step 
in abductive research processes that have the goal of developing new theories 
(cf. section 4.1 for a more extensive discussion of abduction). 
Basically, to problematize means, the “endeavor to know how and to what 
extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of what is already 
known” (Foucault 1985: 9, in Alvesson and Sandberg 2011a: 253). As distinct 
approach to the engagement with existing literature, problematization is par-
ticularly critical towards so-called gap-spotting. In many fields of social sci-
ence, gap-spotting is the dominant form of engagement with existing litera-
ture and finds expression in formulations like “extends this literature”, “ad-
dresses this gap in the literature”, “fills this gap”, “points at themes that others 
have not paid particular attention to” or “calls for more empirical research” 
(cf. Alvesson and Sandberg (2011a: 247) for original references). The purpose 
of gap-spotting is to fill identified gaps, i.e., to add something to an existing 
body of literature instead of identifying and challenging underlying assump-
tions in that literature and formulating new, original research questions and 
theories.  
The point is not to disqualify gap-spotting as a research strategy. Gap-spot-
ting research can make important contributions through crucial incremental 
and systematic additions to the literature and through identifying smaller and 
more significant gaps in existing research. Gap-spotting and problematization 
are also not mutually exclusive. Often, gap-spotting includes some form of 
problematization, while problematization necessitates a qualified scrutiny of 
the existing literature. However, gap-spotting is weak in terms of facilitating 
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the critical engagement with existing literature that challenges assumptions 
and leads to new, original research questions and theories.  
Anzia and Moe's (2016) recent work on strategic policy making is a good 
example for the shortcomings of gap-spotting and the unexploited potential 
of the problematization approach. The authors make a similar claim as above, 
namely that “the strategic dimension [of policy making] has gone almost en-
tirely unexplored, and even the most basic questions have gone unstudied” 
(ibid.: 763, 775). They give a cogent empirical motivation and puzzle for their 
research on Republicans’ use of labor law to undercut the Democrats’ political 
base, sketch out potential contributions of the introduction of agency into pol-
icy feedback research, and argue convincingly that policy makers will often 
have incentives to at least try to design policies strategically.  
However, the authors fail to engage with the existing literature more pro-
foundly and to identify the reasons for the literature’s neglect of long-term 
strategic policy making. In consequence, they can only make theoretical prop-
ositions on the specific research question they investigate (collective action 
problems in strategic policy design) and propose questions for “an untapped 
research agenda” (ibid.: 775), e.g. whether policy makers are aware of their 
opportunities to design policies strategically, that future research can address. 
However, because they do not challenge assumptions underlying the existing 
literature, the authors are not able to develop or at least sketch out a theoreti-
cal and analytical framework for this new, untapped research agenda. They 
are not able to identify and lay out how such a framework should differ from 
previous ones that failed to see and investigate the strategic dimension of pol-
icy making and, hence, they are not able to advance the theoretical and con-
ceptual toolkit of policy feedback research substantially.  
For theory-building research, it is therefore advisable to follow explicitly a 
different approach in the engagement with existing literature. Gap-spotting 
may often “only” be a communication strategy and not a true depiction of ac-
tual research processes that may include more problematization than can be 
read from the published text, and researchers have manifold reasons to adopt 
a gap-spotting rhetoric in the communication of their research irrespective of 
how research was conducted. Yet, as Alvesson and Sandberg correctly assess, 
“assumption-challenging research is of limited value if it is not clearly shown 
in the published research text” (Alvesson and Sandberg 2011a: 250-1; cf. also 
the discussion of abduction in section 4.1). 
Both abduction and problematization aim to improve researchers’ ability to 
participate in the research community with theoretical and conceptual contri-
butions but are not new best-practice prescriptions for how researchers ought 
to do research. Instead, they are helpful tools for researchers for reflecting 
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upon how they conduct research in their daily work, for developing methodo-
logical guidelines, especially for early phases of research that emphasize the-
ory-building and concept formulation, and for communicating research to the 
broader research community. 
The Guidelines of the Problematization Approach and Their Application in 
the Dissertation 
The problematization approach makes two specific contributions to the en-
gagement with existing literature that the dissertation takes advantage of. 
First, it describes a continuum of assumptions that can underlie existing liter-
ature on which the dissertation draws to identify assumptions underlying the 
policy feedback and policy design literature. Second, it suggests work steps 
researchers can consider when problematizing literature. The dissertation 
draws on this advice especially in the selection of reviewed literature. 
The dissertation problematizes in-house and root metaphor assumptions 
in the policy feedback and policy design literature (Alvesson and Sandberg 
2011a: 254-5). “In-house assumptions exist within a particular school of 
thought in the sense that they are shared and accepted as unproblematic by 
its advocates” (ibid.), as for example the image of policy making as inherently 
complex and exceeding policy makers’ cognitive capacities for the strategic de-
sign of long-term feedback effects. Root metaphor assumptions “are associ-
ated with broader images of a particular subject matter” (ibid.) underlying ex-
isting literature, for example the depiction of policy makers as notoriously my-
opic.  
Problematization differs from literature reviews for gap-spotting research, 
also regarding the selection of the reviewed literature. In particular, problem-
atization is not concerned with covering all relevant research on the subject 
matter. Instead, and as applied in the dissertation, the review can be narrower 
and more targeted, e.g. based on an in-depth reading of authoritative reviews, 
key texts or seminal studies. Assumptions can be identified, e.g., by scrutiniz-
ing internal debates in a field or related fields or by producing or drawing in 
“counter-metaphors” (e.g. myopic politicians vs. far-sight, policy-oriented 
politicians). After identifying underlying assumptions, researchers should 
first ask whether challenging an assumption has the potential to advance the-
ory and produce new empirical insights, e.g. by asking whether an assumption 
contributes to a good understanding of the subject matter, and then try to de-
velop an alternative assumption.1  
                                               
1 Alvesson and Sandberg also suggest that researchers should consider challenged assump-
tions in relation to their audience and research politics (e.g., who benefits and loses from 
challenging an assumption or how to challenge an assumption without upsetting dominant 
21 
Coming up with alternative assumptions is a creative, rather than a predict-
able, or technical process, in which the researcher can draw on existing criti-
cal, reflexive literature. According to Alvesson and Sandberg (ibid.: 258), com-
ing up with alternative assumptions involves in particular a dialectical inter-
rogation between different theoretical stances and the domain of literature 
targeted. The dissertation applies a broader abductive approach that under-
stands creativity as inherent in the research process and theoretical and em-
pirical research as part of the same research act (Tavory and Timmermans 
2014: 128; cf. section 4.1). Hence, the dissertation also understands problem-
atization as an ongoing feature of the abductive research process, meaning 
that the researcher can revisit and revise the problematization of the literature 
throughout the research process.2 
The following sections present the problematization of the existing litera-
tures on policy feedback and policy design that leads to two specific analytical 
claims, which the dissertation investigates empirically in Part III based on a 
novel theoretical and methodological framework developed in continuation of 
the analytical claims in Part II of the dissertation. 
2.1 The Policy Feedback Literature and Its Historical-Institutionalist 
Foundation 
The first domain of literature/field of research this chapter reviews is the pol-
icy feedback literature. Research on policy feedback dynamics has grown rap-
idly in the past two decades.3 The concept of policy feedback is closely tied to 
historical-institutionalist scholarship. In essence, it describes how policies can 
shape, restructure, and reconfigure political processes in meaningful ways 
(Skocpol 1995: 58), i.e., how “new policies create new politics” (Pierson 1993: 
595). The following sections discuss the historical-institutional background of 
                                               
groups). Lastly, researchers can attempt to evaluate a newly developed, alternative assump-
tion along Davis’ (1971) classification of “That’s obvious”, “It’s absurd” and “That’s interest-
ing” before publishing their research.  
2 Alvesson and Sandberg (2011a) link problematization more narrowly to the formulation of 
research questions and do not discuss the broader implications and utility of problematiza-
tion for abductive research processes.  
3 Cf. e.g.: Béland and Hacker (2004); Béland (2010); Campbell (2012); Edmondson et al. 
(2018); Hacker (2002, 2004a, 2004b); Hacker and Pierson (2010); Jacobs and Weaver 
(2010, 2014); Jordan and Matt (2014); Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen (2014); Maor 
(2014a); Mettler (2002); Mettler and Soss (2004); Mettler and Welch (2004); Moynihan 
and Soss (2014); Oberlander and Weaver (2015); Ostner (2010); Patashnik (2003); 
Patashnik and Zelizer (2013); Pedriana and Stryker (1997); Pierson (1993, 2000c, 2000a, 
2003, 2004); Steensland (2006); Skogstad (2017); Stryker and Wald (2009); Weaver 
(2010); Weaver (2015). For further references, see the review articles by Béland (2010) and 
Campbell (2012). 
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policy feedback research, problematize the policy feedback literature more 
specifically, and review recent historical-institutionalist approaches to the 
study of policy development. 
Traditional Historical-Institutionalist Approaches to Explaining 
Institutional and Political Development 
The neglect of agency and long-term strategic policy making in the policy feed-
back literature is closely linked to its historical-institutionalist heritage, which 
is therefore discussed first.4 Three elements of this heritage help explain why 
the policy feedback literature shows weaknesses in addressing questions of 
agency and long-term strategic design: the dominance of punctuated equilib-
ria models, the close association of policy feedback effects with periods of in-
stitutional stability during which structural factors shape political and institu-
tional development, and the focus on demonstrating feedback effects instead 
of explaining their emergence through agency-oriented, institutionally 
grounded approaches. 
Traditionally, historical institutionalists have relegated the formative im-
pact of agency on political and institutional developments to critical junctures 
(cf. e.g. Capoccia 2015, 2016a; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007).5 The impact of 
agential forces on political and institutional development itself is part of the 
very definition of critical junctures as “relatively short periods of time during 
which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will 
affect the outcome of interest” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348). Hence, 
critical junctures are understood as “moments of openness for radical institu-
tional change, in which a broad range of options are available and can plausi-
bly be adopted” (Capoccia 2016a: 99). 
Researchers have used the concept of critical junctures extensively in par-
ticular to explain the historical development of institutions. In doing so, they 
have helped popularize and substantiate models of punctuated equilibria that 
describe long phases of stability interrupted by brief episodes of abrupt change 
                                               
4 Reviews of historical institutionalism are manifold, see e.g. Amenta (2012); Bell (2011, 
2017); Fioretos et al. (2016); Hall and Taylor (1998); Hall (2010); Hay and Wincott (1998); 
Immergut and Anderson (2008); Steinmo (1992, 2008); Thelen (1999); Thelen and Steinmo 
(1992); Thelen (2002). The discussion in this section limits itself to characteristics of the 
historical-institutionalist tradition that contribute to the neglect of agency and long-term 
strategic policy making in the policy feedback literature.  
5 Pierson (2006) argues convincingly that there are good reasons to treat public policies as 
institutions, as rules of the game that structure political life. This chapter frequently refers 
to institutional and political development in order to highlight that the historical-institu-
tionalist approach also applies to the study of policies and policy making (see also section 
3.1). 
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(cf. e.g. Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Thus, researchers have linked the con-
cept of critical junctures with the concept of path-dependency that describes 
processes characterized by positive, self-reinforcing feedback effects that hold 
institutional and political arrangements stable. The concept of policy feedback 
is therefore strongly associated with periods of institutional and political sta-
bility during which structural factors uphold the status quo, while agency is 
considered to have a causal influence only in relatively brief periods of mo-
mentous political, social, or economic upheaval (Capoccia 2016a: 92).  
In consequence, the literature uses the concept of policy feedback as an an-
alytical tool to describe and identify different mechanisms of institutional re-
production, dynamics of increasing returns, or network effects as structural 
dynamics. Hence, researchers follow prominent claims to “demonstrate these 
effects rather than assume them” (Pierson 2004: 72) and “apply rather than 
invoke them” (Thelen 1999: 391) but do not seek to understand how these ef-
fects emerge from an institutionally shaped, political landscape. In fact, 
Conran and Thelen (2016: 56) argue that critical juncture accounts – although 
deeply engrained in the historical-institutionalist tradition – are actually non-
institutionalist because institutions “appear to emerge from a largely non- or 
pre-institutional landscape”.  
In sum, the historical-institutionalist tradition predisposes policy feedback 
research towards neglecting agency and long-term strategic action analytically 
because of the dominance of punctuated equilibrium models, the association 
of feedback effects with periods of institutional stability, and the focus on 
demonstrating feedback effects instead of explaining their emergence. 
Problematizing the Policy Feedback Literature  
The concept of policy feedback itself has received attention in excellent review 
articles that lay out the foundational research program of policy feedback re-
search (Pierson 1993; cf. also 2000b, 2006), describe the historical-intellec-
tual roots of the concept (Béland 2010) and discuss current research agendas 
(Campbell 2012; Mettler and Soss 2004). In a seminal World Politics article 
in 1993 (and following publications6), Pierson forcefully translated earlier an-
tecedents of the concept and different research streams into a research pro-
gram on policy feedback that shapes the field until today and serves as com-
mon reference point for the literature. While lacking the label of policy feed-
back,7 the idea that policy influences politics has been around for much longer 
                                               
6 Cf. Pierson (2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005). 
7 Some authors (e.g. Ingram et al. 2007; Schneider and Sidney 2009) propose to use the term 
feed forward effects “as we are talking about how policy changes the dynamics of future po-
litical action” (Schneider and Sidney 2009: 108). However, this position has not established 
itself in the literature and the dissertation therefore uses the term policy feedback or policy 
24 
though. Schattschneider (1935), Lowi (1964) and Wilson (1973) recognized 
how policies made their own politics long before a wave of historical-institu-
tionalist research brought the concept of policy feedback to the center stage of 
public policy research (cf. e.g. Amenta 1998; Evans et al. 1994; Pierson 1996, 
2001, 2004; Skocpol 1995, 2015; Steinmo 1992; Stephens 1979; Weaver and 
Rockman 1993; Weaver 2000; Weir et al. 1988). 
The following problematization of the policy feedback literature takes its 
point of departure in authoritative reviews of the field in order to carve out 
assumptions that are broadly shared in the literature, underlie the vast theo-
retical and empirical work on policy feedback, and contribute to its neglect of 
agency and long-term strategic policy making. For this purpose, the problem-
atization draws on Pierson’s 1993 article and later additions (2000b, 2006), 
newer review articles by Béland (2010), Campbell (2012) and Mettler and Soss 
(2004), and relevant recent additions to the policy feedback field by Jacobs 
and Weaver (2014; cf. also Weaver 2010), which significantly extended the 
scope of the policy feedback research program.  
In a nutshell, the review argues that policy feedback research is character-
ized by two underlying assumptions: politicians are notoriously myopic and 
mostly think about the next election rather than long-term effects of policies 
(e.g. Anzia and Moe 2016: 766; Pierson 2000b); and politics and policy mak-
ing are inconceivably complex and exceed policy makers’ cognitive capacities 
due to, e.g., information overload, short-termism and complex policy net-
works (e.g. Jacobs 2016; Pierson 2000b). 
In consequence, the policy feedback literature largely treats policy feedback 
dynamics as coincidental side effects of policy making and often offers expla-
nations of policy change or stability that are underdetermined and cannot ex-
plain specific policy choices because they neglect the role of agency and long-
term strategic policy making. Hence, the literature neither investigates nor 
sufficiently explains the potentials, challenges, political struggles, and real-
world patterns of long-term strategic policy making. Furthermore, it cannot 
sufficiently explain either where feedback effects of policies emerge from 
within a policy or when slight modifications in policy design can make the cru-
cial difference for which effects are created because it usually treats policies as 
broad categories and rarely delves into the specificities of policy design. 
                                               
feedback effects. Campbell (2012) and Jordan and Matt (2014) furthermore point out that 
many works on policy feedback “show the feed but not the back (or they just assume the 
back)” (Campbell 2012: 347) and argue that the research field should move from investigat-
ing effects to loops (Jordan and Matt 2014: 231). 
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Policy Feedback as Unintended Side-Effect of Policy Making 
Until today, the policy feedback literature is largely organized along the dis-
tinction between material effects, when policies confer resources and/or cre-
ate incentives, and interpretive effects, when policies structure meaning and 
information, on three kinds of actors: the government and bureaucratic elites, 
interest groups, and the mass public (Pierson 1993). More recently, the litera-
ture has acknowledged other relevant distinctions that describe how policies 
make politics in different ways, in particular the distinction between self-un-
dermining and self-reinforcing feedback effects (Jacobs and Weaver 2014; 
Oberlander and Weaver 2015; Weaver 2010). Typically, the literature also fo-
cuses on policies as rather broad analytical categories, e.g. as programs or pol-
icy regimes, and rarely delves into the specificities of policy design and policy 
instrumentation (e.g. May and Jochim 2013; Weaver 2010; cf. for a similar 
criticism: Jordan and Matt 2014: 235).  
However, as other authors have recently pointed out, the field has failed to 
explore a key dimension of inquiry, namely when and how politicians (try to) 
use policies strategically to make politics and create or foster such feedback 
effects (Anzia and Moe 2016). This is because of the field’s intellectual back-
ground in historical institutionalism discussed above, its opposition to the 
standard model of the policy process that treats policies as outcome of politics 
and pervasive images of politicians and policy making.  
In his programmatic article on policy feedback research, Pierson (1993) 
made frequent references to the role of policy design in bringing about certain 
feedback effects. For example, he points to the importance of visibility and 
traceability in creating lasting support for a policy (ibid.: 619, 622). Similar 
discussions are offered later by Mettler and Soss (2004) and Campbell (2012). 
However, all authors fail to acknowledge and explore the potential of under-
standing policy design as a strategic process with intentional policy choices 
and considerations of policy feedback effects. Pierson’s (1993: 624) seminal 
discussion, for example, relegates the idea of intentional design to a footnote.  
In consequence, the literature does not investigate whether or how policy 
makers can intentionally design policy feedback dynamics. Instead, the liter-
ature typically discusses policy design as an outcome and the adopted policy 
as a whole and almost isolated from the strategic design process that ante-
ceded it. This is largely because the literature takes a post-behavioralist, his-
torial-institutionalist standpoint that views policies as rules of the game and 
causes of political processes but not as the outcome of those processes (e.g. 
Pierson 1993: 595-6; cf. also Béland 2010). In doing so, the literature force-
fully puts policies as causal influences on politics on the public policy research 
agenda and argues that policies should become the “starting points as well as 
the end points of analysis” (Skocpol 1995: 58). Unfortunately, the literature 
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treats policies almost as free-floating, given entities whose origins in strategic 
policy design processes are not explored systematically even though these are 
important for understanding a key dimension of policy feedback, namely how 
politicians can use policies strategically to make politics, and for understand-
ing the strategic choices political actors face and make during policy design. 
In a later, widely cited discussion of the effects of institutions and policies, 
Pierson (2000b) makes three explicit arguments against long-term strategic 
policy design, namely that policy makers may not act intentionally, that they 
have short time horizons, and that feedback effects will often be unanticipated. 
Pierson thereby reinforces an image of politicians as myopic and of politics 
and policy making as inconceivably complex. First, he argues that policy mak-
ers’ choices may often not serve means-end instrumentality but instead follow 
a logic of appropriateness as put forward by sociological institutionalism. 
While the extent to which a logic of appropriateness motivates action remains 
disputed, according to Pierson, there is significant reason to doubt that policy 
makers are exclusively or predominantly motivated by instrumental concerns. 
Second, Pierson highlights the problem of short time horizons. Due to the 
logics of electoral politics, politicians will mostly be interested in short-term 
effects of policies. At the same time, Pierson questions whether possibilities to 
lengthen time horizons (e.g. credible commitment, overlapping generations 
models) will be as effective in politics as in economics. Lastly, Pierson points 
to cognitive challenges in policy making. Increased social complexity and pol-
ities involving increasing interactions among an increasing number of people 
characterize modern policy making, while politicians face scarcities of reliable 
information, the need to delegate important decisions, and time constraints in 
decision making. Overall, Pierson’s discussion paints a picture of politicians 
as notoriously and necessarily myopic actors and of politics as inconceivably 
complex, which is mirrored by a policy feedback literature that fails to tackle 
the role of agency and long-term strategic policy making.  
Béland’s (2010) more recent discussion of the historical-intellectual roots 
of policy feedback research confirms the above characterization of assump-
tions underlying policy feedback research. Béland discusses both early and re-
cent perspectives on policy feedback effects. For early perspectives, he distin-
guishes between research on state building, interest groups and lock-in ef-
fects. According to Béland, the state-building literature focusses on “how pol-
icies transform or expand state capacities” (ibid.: 570); interest group litera-
ture on how “new policies affect the social identities, goals, and capabilities of 
groups that struggle or ally in politics” (Skocpol 1992: 58; in ibid.: 572); and 
literature on lock-in effects focusses on how policy constrains future policy 
development through, e.g., network and coordination effects, commitments 
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and vested interests. All three research streams stem from historical-institu-
tionalist thinking and show the same negligence of institutional origins and 
the role of agency in institutional/policy design and instead treat policies as 
given entities and examine their effects. The same goes for the more recent 
perspectives on policy feedback that investigate the impact of private institu-
tions, how political participation of individuals is directly affected by policies 
and ideational and symbolic legacies of existing policies shape policy making. 
Campbell (2012) cogently assesses the state of policy feedback research, in 
particular in regard to mass politics, but equally leaves out the question of 
strategic policy making and role of agency in bringing about policy feedback 
effects. In another widely cited review, Mettler and Soss (2004) begin their 
attempt to bridge the gap between political behavior and policy feedback re-
search by asking whether “choices among different types of public policy mat-
ter for the vitality and functioning of democratic politics” (ibid.: 55, italics 
added). Subsequently, the authors make various arguments about how poli-
cies shape mass politics and which elements of policy designs are important 
for this influence on mass politics. However, they never take their initial ques-
tion literally and discuss design choices. That is, the authors do not ask about 
policy makers’ motivations for choosing certain policy designs over others and 
the role potential policy feedback effects might play in this choice. 
There are two key reasons for the neglect of agency and long-term strategic 
policy making in policy feedback research identified by the above problemati-
zation of the literature. First, the intellectual backdrop of policy feedback re-
search can explain a part of the problem. Policy feedback research explicitly 
positions itself against standard approaches to public policy that treat “public 
policy as a product developed through a series of stages – agenda setting, for-
mulation, implementation, and evaluation – that mirror the basic model of 
systems theory” (Mettler and Soss 2004: 59, italics added) and instead looks 
at policies as causes of political developments (Pierson 1993). This orientation 
is intensified because policy feedback research follows the post-behavioralist 
turn in historical institutionalism that emphasizes structural constraints on 
individual actors rather than investigating the influence of those actors on po-
litical processes (Pierson 1993: 595-6) (cf. also the above discussion). Second, 
pervasive images of politics and politicians have permeated policy feedback 
research from its beginning. These images depict politics and politicians as 
notoriously myopic, potentially irrational, and cognitively overwhelmed by 
the complexities of policy making and potentially unreliable, yet vast amounts 
of information on potential policy effects. 
Taken together, these factors have made the policy feedback literature treat 
policy feedback effects largely as coincidental, unintended side effects of pol-
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icy making and ignore long-term strategic policy design analytically. The lit-
erature does not investigate when or how policy makers consciously and stra-
tegically choose between different policy designs because of the specific feed-
back effects these policies produce, but instead often only seeks to explain un-
der which conditions feedback effects occur. The policy feedback literature 
thereby misses not only the crucial role of agency in policy feedback processes 
but also fails to enrich our understanding of public policy making, the real-
world political struggles around policy design and the strategic choices policy 
makers face during design. 
More recent contributions to the field confirm these deficits. The most sig-
nificant advancement in policy feedback research in the last decade concerns 
conceptualizations of self-undermining feedback effects, most convincingly 
advocated by Jacobs and Weaver (2014; cf. also Oberlander and Weaver 2015; 
Skogstad 2017; Weaver 2010). The authors discuss “longer-term processes 
that […reshape] the underlying distribution of interests and policy preferences 
among elites and the mass public” (Jacobs and Weaver 2014: 13) but focus 
solely on effects that are unanticipated and not predicted by policy makers and 
are therefore silent on the potential origins of such feedback effects in strategic 
policy design. Similarly, Skogstad (2017) and Weaver (2010) discuss how self-
reinforcing and self-undermining feedback effects can be present in one and 
the same process of policy development. However, the authors focus solely on 
how policy designs and contextual factors bring about policy feedback 
(Skogstad) or on the balance between self-undermining and self-reinforcing 
feedback effects (Weaver) without inquiring whether or to what degree actors 
try to strategically design those.  
These recent developments demonstrate that the policy feedback literature 
has not yet overcome the problem of neglecting agency and long-term strate-
gic policy design (section 2.3 discusses the few noteworthy exceptions in the 
field). A similar evaluation can be made for recent historical-institutionalist 
approaches to political and institutional development, as the next section 
shows. 
Recent Historical-Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Institutional 
and Political Development 
Turning towards newer developments in historical institutionalism and ask-
ing whether or how those might help the policy feedback literature to over-
come its weaknesses, the answer is mixed. In fact, recent developments show 
that scholars have recognized the deficits of historical institutionalism and the 
limitations of punctuated equilibrium models in explaining political and insti-
tutional developments and especially phenomena of gradual political and in-
stitutional change (e.g. Hacker 2004b, 2005; Hacker et al. 2013; Mahoney and 
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Thelen 2010b, 2015; Rocco and Thurston 2014; Streeck and Thelen 2005b; 
Thelen 2004).  
On one side, the new sub-field investigating dynamics of gradual institu-
tional change has popularized a power- and conflict-oriented approach to in-
stitutions that understands institutions as arenas of political conflict and sites 
of political contestation (cf. Conran and Thelen 2016; Mahoney and Thelen 
2010a). From this perspective, institutions are constantly reshaped and rein-
terpreted by groups that struggle for power and try to bend institutions to their 
priorities and preferences. Institutions are vulnerable and objects of piece-
meal modification, and their shape, nature and impact are subject to the in-
fluence and power of different actors (Capoccia 2016a: 101-2). This under-
standing of institutions bears the seeds for powerful, institutionally grounded, 
yet agency-focused analytical perspectives on institutional and political devel-
opments and therefore informs the development of a theoretical framework of 
architectural policy design in chapter 3. 
On the other side, the gradual change literature falls short of taking ad-
vantage of these potentials and instead falls back on a dualistic understanding 
of institutionalized structures and institutional agents and prioritizes struc-
tural/institutional explanations over agential ones. This is because the litera-
ture ultimately treats actors merely as mediating factors between struc-
tural/institutional forces (in particular levels of veto barriers and institutional 
discretion) and the outcomes it investigates (patterns of gradual institutional 
change). Conran and Thelen (2016: 65) describe this attempt fittingly when 
stating that the literature tries “to inject agency into institutional accounts 
[…]”. Hence, the literature asks “how prevailing structures influence the kinds 
of strategies most likely to succeed in specific institutional contexts” (ibid.) 
and develops “propositions concerning the specific characteristics of the ex-
isting institution and of the broader political environment under which one 
mode of change is more likely to emerge than others” (ibid.). The most prom-
inent example is Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010a) work on gradual institutional 
change, where the authors theorize four types of change agents that suppos-
edly drive different types of gradual change. In the explanatory model, how-
ever, these change agents lack real explanatory power in themselves since they 
are conceptualized as mediators or “intervening step through which the char-
acter of institutional rules and political context [operationalized as the level of 
veto barriers and the level of institutional discretion in the authors theoretical 
model] do their causal work” (ibid.: 28; italics added). Hence, while the au-
thors aim to ascribe agents a crucial explanatory role in change processes, the 
explanatory leverage remains on the level of structural/institutional factors.  
In sum, this means that recent developments in historical institutionalism 
can contribute a power- and conflict-oriented understanding of institutions to 
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policy feedback research interested in the role of agency and long-term stra-
tegic policy making that the historical-institutionalist literature itself and re-
cent policy feedback literature, however, have failed to take full analytical ad-
vantage of so far.  
Summary: Myopic Policy Makers, the Complexity of Policy Making, and 
Historical-Institutionalist Baggage as Hurdles to Investigating Agency and 
Long-Term Strategic Policy Making 
The problematization of the policy feedback literature has shown that the lit-
erature is characterized by two underlying assumptions that portray politi-
cians as notoriously myopic and politics and policy making as inconceivably 
complex and exceeding policy makers’ cognitive capacities. These underlying 
assumptions lead to an understanding of policy feedback dynamics as coinci-
dental side effects of policy making and to a neglect of the role of agency and 
long-term strategic policy making in feedback processes. The policy feedback 
literature’s intellectual foundation in historical institutionalism reinforces 
these tendencies because historical institutionalism has traditionally associ-
ated the concept of policy feedback with periods of institutional stability per-
petuated by structural/institutional forces. Newer historical-institutionalist 
approaches provide a useful power- and conflict-oriented conceptualization of 
institutions that can inform institutionally-grounded and agency-focused ap-
proaches to the study of policy feedback effects. However, also the recent his-
torical-institutionalist literature fails to develop explanatory approaches that 
grant political actors real causal influence on policy development and instead 
stick to the emphasis on structural/institutional explanations. 
The policy feedback literature is therefore not able to explain important 
puzzles highlight in chapter 1. It cannot explain if and how policy makers (try 
to) use policies strategically to make politics, i.e. if and how they (try to) shape 
particular political dynamics via policy feedback effects. It does not investigate 
and cannot explain when or how policy makers strategically choose between 
different policy designs because of the specific feedback effects these policies 
produce and instead only seeks to explain under which conditions feedback 
effects occur. Hence, the policy feedback literature fails to understand the role 
of agency in feedback processes and to enrich our understanding of real-word 
political struggles around policy design and the strategic choices policy mak-
ers make during design.  
For example, the literature does tell us why policy makers choose one design 
over another, even though both designs might pursue the same policy goal, 
what reasons they might have for their choice, and how attempts to shape pol-
icy feedback effects strategically via policy design might influence this choice. 
It also does not tell us how policy makers weigh potential long-term and short-
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term political benefits during policy making, when they prioritize one over the 
other or try to maximize both, and why policy makers might be willing to give 
up certain elements of a policy design but not others in negotiations with their 
opponents. Lastly, the literature does not tell us how and under what condi-
tions policy makers are actually successful in strategically designing policies 
and shaping policy feedback effects to achieve long-term policy goals. 
2.2 The Policy Design Literature in the Policy Sciences and in Public 
Policy 
Similar to the policy feedback literature, the policy design literature has expe-
rienced a significant growth in recent years.8 The following review distin-
guishes between a policy design literature in the policy sciences and a policy 
design literature in public policy and focusses on contributions/aspects in 
both literatures relevant for the understanding of the strategic design of policy 
feedback effects.9 For the policy design literature in the policy sciences, the 
review problematizes a pervasive image of policy making as rational, 
knowledge-based selection of means and instruments in order to achieve de-
sired substantive policy outcomes. This image of policy making leads to a nar-
row conceptualization of policy design that sidelines non-instrumental, polit-
ical considerations of policies’ effects on political dynamics in a policy field 
and therefore an analytical neglect of long-term strategic policy making (e.g. 
Howlett and Mukherjee 2014, 2017). For the policy design literature in public 
policy, the review acknowledges that political implications of different policy 
designs, e.g. on democratic participation and citizen’s’ attitudes, are a central 
theme in the literature. However, it criticizes the fallback on contextual factors 
in explaining design choices and the conceptual and explanatory negligence of 
policy makers’ strategies during policy design (e.g. Schneider and Ingram 
1993, 1997; Soss and Schram 2007). 
                                               
8 Cf. for the policy sciences, e.g.: Bason (2014); Capano (2017); Capano and Lippi (2017); 
Chindarkar et al. (2017); Colebatch (2017); Dryzek (2008); Eliadis et al. (2005); Howlett 
(2011, 2013, 2014); Howlett and Lejano (2012); Howlett and Mukherjee (2014, 2017); 
Howlett et al. (2015); Jordan and Matt (2014); Linder and Peters (1989, 1990); May (2003); 
Mintrom and Luetjens (2016); Turnball (2017). Cf. for public policy, e.g.: Ingram et al. 
(2007); Schneider and Ingram (1990); Schneider and Ingram (1993, 1997, 2005); Schneider 
and Sidney (2009); Soss (1999); Soss and Schram (2007). For further references, see the 
review articles by Howlett and Lejano (2012); Howlett (2014); Howlett et al. (2015); Howlett 
and Mukherjee (2017); Schneider and Sidney (2009). 
9 For a broader discussion of the policy design literature, see especially the review articles in 
the footnotes above. 
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In consequence, the policy design literature as a whole lacks a suitable con-
cept of strategic policy making that captures policy makers’ long-term strate-
gies and their considerations of policy feedback effects during policy design. 
As the policy feedback literature, the policy design literature is therefore not 
capable of explaining important aspects of public policy making and the real-
world strategic choices policy makers face during policy design. 
The Policy Design Literature in the Policy Sciences 
In the policy sciences, a vast literature aims to explain policy design and the 
choice of policy instruments. In recent years, the concept has enjoyed increas-
ing popularity, has been developed further and applied widely (see references 
in footnote 8). The origins, meaning and application of the concept have been 
discussed thoroughly in authoritative reviews, which form the basis of the fol-
lowing problematization (Schneider and Sidney 2009; Howlett and Lejano 
2012; Howlett 2014; Howlett et al. 2015; Howlett and Mukherjee 2017). Rep-
resentative of the field, Howlett and Mukherjee (2017: 140) define policy de-
sign as 
the purposive attempt by governments to link policy instruments or tools to the 
goals they would like to realize. The study of policy design focuses on these tools, 
their advantages and disadvantages and better understanding the processes 
around their selection and deployment in order to improve policy-making efforts 
and outcomes. 
On the positive side, the policy design literature in the policy sciences offers a 
more fine-grained perspective on policy making (both the process of design 
and its outcome) than the policy feedback literature. As discussed above, the 
latter often treats policies as rather broad analytical categories, rarely delves 
into the specificities of policy design and therefore leaves instrumentation – 
i.e. the specific techniques or means through which governments attempt to 
attain their goals (Linder and Peters 1990; cf. Salamon and Elliott 2002: 19ff) 
– in the shadow (Jordan and Matt 2014: 235). 
On the negative side, the literature is characterzied by an idealized image of 
policy making as highly rational, instrumental, problem-solving-oriented 
process, a neglect of political design considerations (which have only recently 
received more attention in the literature), and a normatively laden, false 
contradiction between political and instrumental orientations during policy 
design. Combined, these characteristics prevent the literature from 
investigating and conceptualizing policy makers’ real-world strategic choices 
during policy design and whether and how policy makers try to anticipate 
long-term policy effects and maximize both long-term political gains and 
substantive policy outcomes. 
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The policy sciences literature understands policy design both as noun, i.e. 
the policy as outcome of the policy-making process, and as verb, i.e. the pro-
cess of policy making itself (May 2003). That means that the concept of policy 
design includes a substantive component that relates to alternative arrange-
ments that potentially solve a policy problem and a procedural component 
that relates to activities that aim to secure some level of agreement among the 
actors involved in formulating, deciding and administering the policy 
(Howlett and Lejano 2012: 360-1). Importantly, the purpose of the conceptual 
distinction between design processes and design outcomes is for researchers 
to be able to, at least conceptually, divorce the design of a policy from the pro-
cess that brought it about (Howlett and Mukherjee 2014: 59). In doing so, re-
searchers can “imagine a more instrumental world and […] consider or pro-
mote design alternatives” (ibid.) even when real-world design processes are 
more political or interest-driven.  
Hence, the policy design literature in the policy sciences works with a 
strong, idealized image of policy making as a rational, knowledge-based pro-
cess for the selection of means and instruments for problem-solving that side-
lines real-world, non-instrumental, political considerations of policies’ effects 
on political dynamics in a policy field. Consequently, the policy design litera-
ture is characterized by a functionalist orientation even though real-world pol-
icy design is not only an instrumentally oriented but also a deeply political 
process (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007: 2-3). The literature conceives public 
policy pragmatically as a political and technical approach to solving problems 
via instruments, and the research often focusses on the effectiveness of instru-
ments and on which of the readily available instruments is best for problem 
solving (ibid.). 
Policy design studies in the policy sciences therefore focus analytically on 
policy makers’ rational assessment of available solutions to problems and in-
vestigate whether actors rely on prior knowledge in selecting the “right” in-
strument, but they analytically neglect policy makers’ more political consider-
ations in design processes. Howlett and Mukherjee (2014) tellingly refer to 
situations in which political considerations “outweigh” instrumental motiva-
tions in policy making as instances of “non-design” (italics added), mentioning 
bargaining, corruption or clientelism, log-rolling, and electoral oportunism as 
forms of such non-design. Furthermore, the authors posit an antagonism 
between intrumental orientations in “policy-driven” and “politically driven” 
design processes susceptible to purely interest-driven or political motivations 
and logics. In this understanding, policy makers have to choose between 
following either instrumental or political design considerations because the 
two are understood as opposites. From a normative standpoint, the literature 
then considers instrumental policy design to be “good” design and political 
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policy design to be “poor” design (Capano 2017; Howlett and Mukherjee 
2014). Thus, the policy design literature not only reinforces an idealized image 
of policy making as highly rational, instrumental, problem-solving-oriented 
process but also supports a normatively laden, false contradiction between 
political and instrumental orientations in policy design. This prevents it from 
investigating policy makers’ real strategic choices and political struggles 
during policy design, where policy makers can aim to maximize both long-
term political gains but also optimize short-term substantive policy effects (cf. 
section 3.2 on the distinction between short-ter substantive and long-term 
political orientations). 
These deficits in the policy design literature in policy sciences are 
particularly unfortunate since authors in the field – although few – have 
outlined an alternative perspective on policy design. For example, Lascoumes 
and Le Gales stress that policy instruments are never neutral. Instead,  
instruments really are institutions, as they partly determine the way in which the 
actors are going to behave; they create uncertainties about the effects of the bal-
ance of power; they will eventually privilege certain actors and interests and ex-
clude others; they constrain the actors while offering them possibilities; they drive 
forward a certain representation of problems (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007: 9; 
cf. Salamon and Elliott 2002: 19ff). 
In essence, the authors suggest an institutionalist perspective on policy instru-
ments similar to how the policy feedback literature understands policies (typ-
ically, though, policies as a whole and broader analytical category). From this 
perspective, policy instrumentation and policy designs are always objects of 
political contestations because they (re-)structure the future process and re-
sults of policy making (Salamon 2001: 1627-8). Such a perspective calls for 
fine-grained analyses of the political considerations, e.g. regarding policy 
feedback effects, policy makers have during policy design and their relation to 
instrumental orientations in real-world policy design situations. However, 
this political perspective on policy design has not found broad recognition in 
the policy sciences literature, which instead sticks to the problematic image of 
policy design as a rational, instrumental, knowledge-based activity aimed at 
solving substantive policy problems.  
The Policy Design Literature in Public Policy 
Within the field of public policy, there is a small number of studies character-
ized by a more political understanding of policy design (e.g. Schneider and 
Ingram 1993, 1997, 2005; Soss 1999; Soss and Schram 2007). Soss and 
Schram (2007: 111) summarize this political perspective on policy design 
nicely: 
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Like good chess players, lawmakers must often “think two moves ahead” when 
designing policy. As they gauge how a new policy will affect relevant social prob-
lems, strategic politicians also consider its potential to mobilize or mollify the op-
position, create pressures for further action, appease or outrage the party faithful, 
redistribute political resources, change the terms of political debate, and so on. In 
the iterative game of politics, it pays to design policies in ways that yield ad-
vantages in the next round. As a result, policies must be analyzed, not only as ef-
forts to achieve expressed social and economic goals but also as forms of political 
action designed to enhance particular actors’ abilities to achieve long-term politi-
cal goals. (italics added) 
This literature shows a more balanced perspective on policy design in that it 
acknowledges the inherently political character of design processes and theo-
retically allows instrumental and political motivations to shape policy design 
jointly. It thereby articulates a perspective on policy making closer to the con-
cept of architectural policy design presented in chapter 3.10 However, the lit-
erature fails to develop this promising starting point analytically and empiri-
cally and to provide a conceptual toolkit and explanatory frameworks that take 
an agential perspective on policy design and that can help investigate long-
term strategic policy making and considerations of policy feedback effects dur-
ing policy design. 
Schneider and Ingram’s (1993; cf. also 1997) work is a prominent example 
of this. The authors propose a powerful theory of social constructions of target 
groups embedded in and shaped by policy designs and discuss relevant polit-
ical implications of public policies, for example who wins and who loses or 
how participation levels and political orientations among target populations 
are affected by different policy designs. They also provide well-defined con-
cepts of target populations and social constructions and offer an insightful dis-
cussion of the role of social constructions in public policy making and of how 
they influence political agendas and instruments choice.  
However, while the authors convincingly show the political implications of 
design decisions in relation to social constructions, their framework does not 
unpack the black box of political decision making during policy design. 
Schneider and Ingram convincingly lay out which design choices seem logical 
for rational, instrumental policy makers in certain situations based on existing 
social constructions and the power of target groups and considering policy 
makers’ electoral and instrumental motivations. However, the policy makers 
remain “empty” and exchangeable because the theory does not account for 
different political policy design strategies that can vary between policy makers 
                                               
10 In fact, Schneider and Ingram (1997: 2) also use the allegory of architecture in their sem-
inal work on social construction of target populations but do not develop a concept of policy 
makers’ architectural behavior during policy design. 
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of different parties or with different political goals or political-ideological ori-
entations. Hence, the theory is not capable of explaining the policy makers’ 
political maneuvering during policy design and why policy makers of one party 
might favor one design and those of another party another design. When it 
comes to policy design choices, the explanations therefore fall back on struc-
tural/environmental factors, and a political, agential perspective on policy de-
sign is not developed. 
Soss and Schramm’s (2007) work shows similar deficits. The authors go one 
step further than Schneider and Ingram in developing an agential perspective 
on policy design but eventually also focus on contextual characteristics as ex-
planatory factors for policy feedback dynamics rather than investigating the 
causal impact of policy makers’ design strategies on policy designs and policy 
development. They conduct a convincing investigation of policy makers’ “use 
of policy design as a conscious political strategy” (p.111), of how parties try to 
strategically achieve long-term political goals through the strategic crafting of 
policy and how policy makers try to shape policy feedback effects.  
However, they only consider policy makers’ strategic anticipations regard-
ing mass feedback effects and, hence, exclude numerous other strategic con-
siderations that policy makers can have regarding the impact of policies on 
interest groups and elected officials. Moreover, the authors only discuss the 
policy design strategy of one party in one case. They are therefore not able to 
contrast opposing design strategies, carve out how strategic considerations of 
different feedback effects shape policy makers’ design strategies, and how pol-
icy design strategies affect political negotiations and adopted policy designs. 
Eventually, the authors propose a framework that explains why certain policy 
designs might produce – depending on the visibility and traceability of the 
policy – mass feedback effects, but do not explain which role different policy 
design strategies play during policy design processes and for bringing about 
policy feedback effects.  
Summary: Instrumental Politicians and the Fallback on Contextual Factors 
in the Explanation of Design Choices as Hurdles to Investigating Policy 
Makers’ Real-World, Strategic Decisions in Policy Making 
The problematization of the policy design literature in the policy sciences has 
shown that the literature is characterized by an idealized, normatively laden 
idea of policy making as rational, knowledge-based processes aimed at solving 
policy problems effectively. This leads to a narrow conceptualization of policy 
design that sidelines non-instrumental, political considerations during design 
and a false antagonism between instrumental and political considerations that 
prevents the literature from investigating analytically and explaining real-
world strategic choices policy makers have to make during policy design. The 
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policy design literature in public policy is more political in that it understands 
policies as tools actors can use strategically to create particular political ef-
fects. However, the literature does not develop an agential perspective on pol-
icy design that investigates different types of policy design strategies policy 
makers may follow and the causal influence of these strategies on the eventual 
policy designs/adopted reforms and subsequent policy development.  
As for the policy feedback literature, the consequence of these problems in 
the policy design literature(s) is that it is not able to explore a key dimension 
of public policy making, namely if and how policy makers (try to) design poli-
cies strategically to make politics. The policy design literature does not inves-
tigate and cannot explain when or how policy makers strategically choose be-
tween different policy designs because of the political effects these policies 
produce and instead seeks to understand design choices as instrumentally mo-
tivated. Hence, the policy design literature fails to understand the role of po-
litical choices during policy design and to enrich our understanding of real-
word political struggles around policy design and the strategic choices policy 
makers make during design. For example, the literature does not tell us why 
policy makers choose one design option over another, even though both might 
be instrumental for pursuing the same policy goal, or why they might be will-
ing to give up certain elements of a policy design but not others in negotiations 
with their opponents. It does not tell us what political reasons policy makers 
have for their design choices and how considerations of feedback effects influ-
ence these, how policy makers weigh instrumental and political considera-
tions in policy making, and if or when they prioritize one over the other or how 
they try to maximize both. Lastly, the literature does not tell us how and under 
what conditions policy makers are actually successful in strategically design-
ing policies and shaping policy feedback effects to achieve long-term policy 
goals. 
2.3 The Emerging Research Field on Policy Feedback and Policy 
Design 
Soss and Schramm’s (2007) work is an early contribution to an emerging re-
search field that combines the policy feedback and policy design perspective 
in the investigation of public policy making (e.g. Anzia and Moe 2016; Jordan 
and Matt 2014; Maor 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Schmidt et al. 2018). An implied 
demand of this new field is that when researchers combine analyses of policy 
feedback with a more fine-grained policy design perspective, they should not 
treat policy designs only as outcomes of political processes that create or shape 
feedback effects. They should also investigate policy designs as processes dur-
ing which strategic considerations of policy feedbacks figure and develop con-
cepts and analytical frameworks for the analysis of such strategic public policy 
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making. Despite advances, the literature has not yet been able to fulfill this 
demand, and the dissertation therefore advances the literature by providing a 
theoretical and methodological framework of architectural policy design for 
the analysis of long-term strategic policy making. 
So far, only a few scholars have explicitly combined the policy feedback and 
policy design perspective, but typically, they do not anchor policy feedback in 
specific policy design characteristics. Maor (2014a, 2014b), for example, dis-
cusses the role of policy feedback in the growth of policy bubbles. Policy bub-
bles are real or perceived policy overreactions that “impose objective and/or 
perceived social costs without producing offsetting objective and/or perceived 
benefits,” (Maor 2012: 232) and that are “reinforced by positive feedback over 
a long period of time” (ibd.). Maor suggests that the potential drivers of posi-
tive feedback are grounded in human behavior but fails to link this to specific 
policy design characteristics. He suggests that “bursts of public optimism” or 
self-perpetuating good reputation can be rooted in psychological and socio-
psychological processes like overconfidence and human herding but does not 
discuss how these processes can be provoked through strategic policy design, 
and whether these effects are strategically considered during policy formula-
tion.  
In another recent study, Schmidt et al. (2018) investigate how policies can 
be intentionally designed to be sticky. The authors develop a model of the pol-
icy process in which positive feedback processes contribute to policy persis-
tence and show how two elements of a policy design, intensity and specificity, 
contribute to policy stickiness. Yet, the prescriptive model suggests how poli-
cies could be intentionally designed to be sticky, but the authors do not inves-
tigate whether policies are or were intentionally designed to be sticky, and how 
such strategic considerations influence policy design.  
Jordan and Matt (2014) offer the most explicit treatment of the intentional 
policy design. In a qualitative study, the authors trace forward the develop-
ment of EU climate policy and the effects that emerge (or fail to emerge) from 
the policy design. They show how repeated attempts by the EU Commission 
to “nurture positive policy feedbacks by inserting policy adhesion mechanisms 
to drive technological change were continually bargained down by opponents 
and/or thwarted by exogenous trends in the economy” (p. 242). Despite stra-
tegic design intentions, desired feedback effects therefore did not emerge. Yet, 
the authors demonstrate that the original policy design did affect subsequent 
policy development. It provided an explicit revision mechanism that well-
equipped policy entrepreneurs could use to replace the original policy instru-
ment with a new one while exploiting interpretive effects of the original policy 
instrument, in particular information flows that highlighted its failure. How-
ever, Jordan and Matt focus more on tracing forward potential policy feedback 
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effects during the approximately 10-year design and redesign process. In do-
ing so, the authors pay less attention to the initial stage of policy design and 
do not map out in detail the configuration of actors’ interests and motivations, 
policy makers’ competing policy design strategies and anticipations of policy 
feedback effects linked to particular policy instruments or design elements. 
Lastly, Anzia and Moe (2016) provide a sharp assessment of the literature’s 
failure to investigate how policy makers can use policies strategically to make 
politics (however without problematizing relevant assumptions underlying 
the existing literature and advancing it theoretically; see the introduction to 
chapter 1). The authors argue convincingly that policy makers will often have 
incentives to try to design policies strategically and thereby lay out an im-
portant research venue for researchers interested in policy feedback and pol-
icy design. However, the theoretical framework the authors propose focusses 
mainly on whether policy makers have more incentives to use policies strate-
gically when effects are policy-specific as opposed to when they concern the 
larger structure of partisan politics. In their empirical analysis, the authors 
then investigate quantitatively the strategic use of labor law by Republicans 
and Democrats and point to collective action problems parties face when they 
want to use policy strategically to their benefit. However, the authors do not 
discuss design processes, policy makers’ motivations, competing party strate-
gies or anticipations of feedback effects during policy design. In a related study 
of Republican’s attempts to use public labor law as a “political weapon” to de-
mobilize public sector unions and weaken Democrats’ political base, Hertel-
Fernandez (2018) equally focuses on the effects of enacted legislation on un-
ion clout and public employees’ political participation but does not engage in 
a deeper analysis of design processes and policy makers’ strategies in the de-
sign process. 
Despite the promising development in the literature and the increased in-
terest in combining the policy feedback and policy design perspective, the lit-
erature falls short of providing conceptual, theoretical and methodological 
tools for the analysis of long-term strategic policy making and for considera-
tions of policy feedback effects during policy design. The following section 
briefly summarizes the key messages of the discussion of the existing litera-
ture, points out what questions and puzzles the literature therefore fails to ex-
plain and presents two analytical claims developed on this basis. 
40 
2.4 The Deficits of the Policy Feedback Literature and the Policy 
Design Literature and the Promise of Combining Both 
Perspectives 
The problematization of the existing literature on policy feedback and policy 
design has identified crucial limitations in regards to a key dimension of in-
quiry in public policy summarized in the dissertation’s research question, 
which asks whether and how policy makers use policies strategically to further 
particular political dynamics via policy feedback effects, and how such at-
tempts influence policy design. Due to pervasive images of politicians as my-
opic, policy making as incomprehensibly complex, and policy design as a ra-
tional, instrumental process, the literature does not provide an analytical per-
spective and toolkit for investigating when or how policy makers consciously 
and strategically choose between different policy designs because of the spe-
cific feedback effects these policies produce.  
Hence, the literature fails to analytically and empirically understand the 
role of agency in policy feedback processes and to enrich our understanding 
of real-word political struggles around policy design and the strategic choices 
policy makers face during design. For example, the literature cannot tell us 
why policy makers choose one design over another, even though both designs 
might be instrumental in pursuing the same policy goal, and what reasons they 
might have for their choice. It cannot tell us how policy makers weigh potential 
long-term and short-term political benefits and instrumental and political 
motivations during policy making, when they prioritize one over the other or 
try to maximize both, and why policy makers might be willing to give up cer-
tain elements of a policy design but not others in negotiations with their op-
ponents. Lastly, the literature cannot tell us how and under what conditions 
policy makers are actually successful in strategically designing policies and 
anticipating policy feedback effects to achieve long-term policy goals and 
when they fail in such attempts.  
Nevertheless, the combination of the policy feedback perspective with the 
policy design perspective provides an excellent starting ground for the devel-
opment of a theoretical and methodological framework for the analysis of 
long-term strategic policy making and for answering the research question 
posed in chapter 1. As noted above, when researchers combine both litera-
tures, they should not treat policy designs merely as outcomes of political pro-
cesses that potentially create feedback effects but also as processes during 
which strategic considerations of policy feedbacks figure. If they do that, the 
policy feedback and policy design literature can inform each other regarding 
the importance of instrumentation and design characteristics for policy feed-
back and the potentials for long-term strategic policy design.  
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The literature review leads to two analytical claims: First, it argues that 
paying attention to feedback effects can help remedy the functionalist bias in 
policy design studies, improve our understanding of the potentials, chal-
lenges, political struggles, and real-world patterns of strategic policy design, 
and help us develop a clear concept of long-term, strategic policy making and 
an analytical framework for policy design studies that take anticipated policy 
feedback effects into account.  
Second, disaggregating policies into policy instruments and design charac-
teristics and investigating in detail the design process can give us a better un-
derstanding of how policy feedback effects emerge and whether and how pol-
icy makers can (try to) design these intentionally.  
This is because the policy design literature can shift the policy feedback lit-
erature’s focus from policies as broad categories to policy design elements and, 
thus, help us investigate how policy feedback effects emerge and how policy 
makers can try to design them strategically. The policy feedback perspective 
helps render the policy design more political by counterbalancing its function-
alist bias on instrument selection with attention to the political consequences 
of policies and the political struggles around instrumentation and policy de-
sign. 
Next, chapter 3 develops a theoretical framework of architectural policy de-
sign for the investigations of long-term strategic policy design and policy mak-
ers’ considerations of policy feedback effects during policy design, which helps 
answer the research question posed in chapter 1. 
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PART II: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL 
FRAMEWORK OF ARCHITECTURAL POLICY DESIGN 
Part II of the dissertation develops an analytical approach for the investigation 
of long-term strategic policy making. The approach helps address the deficits 
in the literature identified in chapter 1 and answer the research question in-
troduced in chapter 1, which asks whether and how policy makers strategi-
cally try to shape policy feedback effects during policy design and how such 
attempts influence the design of policies. It provides an analytical perspective 
that enables researchers to investigate long-term strategic policy making and 
to focus in particular on policy makers’ strategic use of policies to make poli-
tics. Chapter 3 first develops a theoretical framework of architectural policy 
design. The theoretical framework combines elements of the historical-insti-
tutionalist tradition and the policy feedback literature with elements of the 
policy design perspective and additionally introduces the strategic-relational 
approach to structure and agency. It also defines key terms and discusses rel-
evant assumptions underlying the approach. In sum, the theoretical frame-
work makes agency and long-term strategic action in policy feedback dynam-
ics and policy design processes analytically visible, tangible, and open to cate-
gorization and classification in empirical analyses. Chapter 1 develops a meth-
odological framework that guides the empirical investigation of architectural 
policy design. The methodological framework discusses the logic of abductive 
research processes and lays out a script for the selection of cases, the collection 
of empirical material and the process and methods of data analysis. 
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3. Theoretical Framework  
The concept of architectural policy design is the core of the theoretical frame-
work. In short, architectural policy design means intentional policy making of 
strategic, reflexive, power-conscious, policy-driven and goal-oriented policy 
makers who aim to shape society in the long term by realizing policy goals that 
motivate their action. Policy making and policy makers’ preferences, goals and 
actions are always influenced by the effects of previous policy, and considera-
tions of such effects influence policy design. Policy makers are not master 
strategist but have a working understanding of the political implications of 
different policy designs. They engage in architectural policy design because 
they want to gain political advantages and decrease the chance that their de-
cisions are overturned after just one electoral cycle. They thereby steer and 
guide future policy makers’ courses of action via policy feedback effects.  
Thus, the concept of architectural policy design puts policy makers’ long-
term strategic action in the center of public policy studies and therefore ena-
bles researchers to better understand conceptually and explain empirically 
how policies affect politics. In doing so, the theoretical framework addresses 
important deficits in the literature that chapter 1 problematized, advances the 
theoretical toolkit of the policy feedback and policy design literature and al-
lows researchers to explain the real-world political struggles of long-term pol-
icy making and the strategic design choices policy makers face during policy 
design better. 
The structure of chapter 3 is as follows: Section 3.1 presents the five core 
elements of the theoretical framework. The five elements can be understood 
as analytical lenses the researcher can use to look at the object of investigation. 
Together they form the architectural policy design perspective. The five ele-
ments are: (1) the understanding of public policies as institutions, (2) the un-
derstanding of institutions and policies as arenas of constant political conflict, 
(3) the understanding of politics as process structured in space and time, (4) 
the focus on strategic action as a driver of policy design, and (5) the im-
portance of situational contexts of policy design. Section 3.2 discusses relevant 
terms of the architectural policy design framework and assumptions regarding 
policy makers’ motivations during policy design and their capability to design 
policies strategically, which underlie the approach. Section 3.3 concludes the 
chapter with a brief summary of the theoretical framework.  
In developing the theoretical framework, the dissertation follows 
Rueschemeyer’s (2003: 317-8) understanding of theoretical frameworks as 
largely consisting of problem formulations, conceptualizations, and the rea-
sons given for these. They may contain but are not primarily collections of 
testable hypotheses. They are problem-specific and immediately preparatory 
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to testable explanatory propositions because they spell out theoretical expec-
tations that prepare causal analysis by pointing to factors that are likely to be 
relevant for a certain outcome.11 
The development of theoretical frameworks follows abductive reasoning 
that aims to allow judgements about the relative pursuitworthiness of differ-
ent theories and understands empirical and theoretical cogitation as one and 
the same research act (cf. section 4.1). Theoretical frameworks develop 
throughout the research process and are revised and reformulated as new the-
oretical and empirical insights arise. The following presentation of the five 
lenses of the architectural policy design perspective and of underlying as-
sumptions and important terms is therefore simultaneously a presentation of 
initial theoretical starting points and of results of the empirical and theoretical 
work conducted for the dissertation. 
3.1 The Five Lenses of the Architectural Policy Design Perspective 
The theoretical framework combines elements from the historical-institution-
alist tradition and policy feedback research with elements of the policy design 
perspective and adds the strategic-relational approach to structure and 
agency. Combined, the five analytical lenses form the architectural policy de-
sign perspective, which can be summarized as follows: 
The architectural policy design perspective understands public policies as “rules 
of the game” that prescribe and proscribe behavior and shape the lives and inter-
actions of citizens and organizations. Institutions and policies are arenas of con-
flict in which political actors constantly try to (re-)shape and (re-)interpret rules 
and bend these towards their priorities and preferences. They do so because poli-
cies are tools of power that shape, restructure, and reconfigure political processes 
in meaningful ways through policy feedback effects. Hence, policy makers can use 
policies strategically to gain power and control, further their own interests and 
achieve policy goals in the long term.  
The design of policies, the instruments they include and the specific rules and 
stipulations they spell out matter for future policy development because they 
shape what feedback effects can emerge from policies. Policy makers have a work-
ing understanding of the effects different policy designs further and therefore act 
strategically in the design of policies. They try to design policies that bring about 
beneficial policy feedback effects in order to gain power and achieve policy goals 
in the long term and be electorally successful in the short term. Policy makers’ 
strategic action therefore shapes future policy developments through strategically 
                                               
11 Mayntz and Scharpf (1995: 40) offer a similar perspective and understand “analytical ap-
proaches” like the architectural policy design approach as “research heuristic that directs 
scientific attention towards particular aspects of reality”. 
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designed policies that shape policy feedback effects. Policy makers’ design strate-
gies themselves are structured by the situational context of policy making accord-
ing to which policy makers review, revise and reform the goals they want to 
achieve and strategies they follow to do so. 
The architectural policy design perspective allows researchers to identify 
policy makers’ long-term strategies in policy design, to evaluate the impact of 
agency on policy feedback processes and to explain how policy makers can use 
policies to shape politics. Applying the framework makes different design 
strategies analytically tangible and classifiable. The following sections present 
the five lenses of the architectural policy design perspective in more detail. 
Figure 3.1 gives an overview the five lenses of the architectural policy design 
perspective. 
Figure 3.1: The Five Lenses of the Architectural Policy Design Perspective 
 
Lens 1: Public Policies as Institutions 
Viewing public policies as institutions is essential for the architectural policy 
design perspective because it provides a frame of reference for analyzing the 
effects policies have on politics, i.e. effects policy makers can strategically at-
tempt to design in order shape future political development and achieve long-
term policy goals. 
For public policy researchers, there are good reasons to treat public policies 
as institutions. In formal terms, one can understand institutions as “either a 
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single or complex set of rules which govern the interaction of political actors, 
i.e. guiding principles which both prescribe and proscribe behavior and are set 
out in the form of prescription – either formally established or tacitly under-
stood” (Stacey and Rittberger 2003: 860). In less formalized terms, institu-
tions are the “rules of the game” (North 1990) that shape the lives and inter-
actions of citizens and organizations. As Pierson (2006: 115) points out, most 
of the politically generated rules of the game that “directly help to shape the 
lives of citizens and organizations in modern societies are, in fact, public poli-
cies”. 
The institutionalist view on public policies is at the very heart of the policy 
feedback literature. As discussed above, at the outset of the policy feedback 
research program is the claim that policies can shape, restructure, and recon-
figure political processes in meaningful ways (Skocpol 1995: 58), i.e. that “new 
policies create new politics” (Pierson 1993: 595; cf. section 2.1). That means 
not more and not less than that policy feedback research assumes that public 
policies have effects similar to those we usually attribute to institutions. Public 
policies reward and punish particular behaviors, for example through eligibil-
ity criteria for social benefits. They shape preferences and interests by creating 
incentives for particulars behaviors, e.g. by defining which behavior or criteria 
qualify one for certain services or benefits and which exclude one. And they 
shape ideas and (self-)perceptions by defining the roles, rights, and status of 
different individuals, groups and organizations in society, e.g. by defining 
whether one is deserving or undeserving of services, benefits, rights, special 
protection, or other things. 
In the field of labor law, which the two cases investigated in Part III belong 
to, the state sets rules – in the form of public policies – for the hiring and firing 
of employees, for employee participation in firm management and economic 
decision making, for occupational health and safety, for types and levels of 
benefits to which employees are entitled (or not) in case of sickness, unem-
ployment, or other work or life risks, etc. Through public policies, the state 
shapes the business strategies of employers, affects their economic success, 
affects unions’ bargaining tactics, and shapes employees’ interests, their ma-
terial status, and feelings of deservingness, recognition and equal treatment. 
The extensive research on policy feedback in the last two decades has em-
pirically demonstrated the “institutional” effects of public policies, in recent 
years especially regarding feedback effects on the mass public, and has shown 
the fruitfulness of analyzing public policies as institutions (e.g. Campbell 
2012, 2003, 2002; Mettler 2002; Mettler and Soss 2004; Mettler and Welch 
2004; Soss and Schram 2007; cf. section 2.1). 
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Lens 2: Institutions and Policies as Arenas of Constant Political Conflict 
and Instruments of Power 
Adding to the above, it is essential for the architectural policy design perspec-
tive to view policies as instruments of power and as constantly contested in-
stitutions – or arenas of constant political conflict – because this helps expose 
the different, often opposed goals and interests policy makers pursue and un-
derstand what decisions they make during policy design. 
Like institutions, policies have crucial effects on the lives, interests and ma-
terial well-being of citizens and organizations and are therefore constantly 
contested. In recent years, historical institutionalists have advanced a concep-
tualization of policies and institutions as arenas of conflict in which actors 
constantly try to (re-)shape, (re-)interpret and bend rules towards their prior-
ities and preferences (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a; Streeck and Thelen 2005a; 
cf. Conran and Thelen 2016; Moe 2005; Pierson 2016).12 They locate sources 
of institutional and political change not only in “external shocks” or irritations 
coming from the environment of institutions and policies as previous ap-
proaches to explaining institutional and policy change did (e.g. Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993, 2002) but see them also within constantly contested institu-
tions and policies themselves.  
Furthermore, they understand institutions and policies as distributional in-
struments laden with power implications (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a). Insti-
tutions and policies are “fraught with tensions because the inevitably raise re-
source considerations and invariably have distributional consequences” (ibid.: 
8) among different groups of actors. Institutions and policies therefore be-
come instruments of power, and political contestation is not only a battle to 
gain control over political authority but also “a struggle to use political author-
ity to institutionalize advantage – that is, to lay the groundwork for future vic-
tories” (Pierson 2016: 131; cf. Moe 2005). Through policies and institutions, 
policy makers can gain “positional power” (Nørgaard 1997: 72). That is, poli-
cies become instruments of control and influence that help policy makers 
achieve their ultimate policy goals (Nørgaard 1997: 14-7, 71-2). 
Hence, policy makers have strong incentives to engage strategically in pol-
icy design because the right policy design can advance their interests in the 
short term and in the long term through policy feedback effects. Strategically 
designing policy does not only mean that policy makers have particular pref-
erences for policies as a whole and that they would rather implement one pol-
icy than another. As the policy design literature emphasizes, policies consist 
of a variety of instruments, tools, and specific regulations that together make 
                                               
12 Cf. e.g. Hall and Taylor (1996) for a discussion of major approaches to the study of insti-
tutions.  
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up the policy and define which effects emerge from it. Because policies are 
results of ambiguous political compromises between actors with differing in-
terests, goals and motivations, and because environments change rapidly and 
create new interests, incentives and coalitions, the individual elements of pol-
icies do not always further the same political dynamics. Hence, policies may 
contain or develop competing or contradictory logics and not always privilege 
one group clearly over another. The nature of policies and institutions as po-
litical compromise and the possibility of “external irritations” then means that 
they rest on shifting coalitional dynamics between political actors. Therefore, 
their meaning, application and enforcement often remain contested also after 
adoption because political coalitions may be fragile, the “winners” of policy 
making may lose power or allies and “losers” may gain influence or new sup-
porters (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a). 
Understanding policies as ambiguous, constantly contested political com-
promises and as instruments of power directs one’s attention to the different 
goals policy makers pursue during policy design, the strategies they follow and 
the decisions they make to achieve these goals in the long term despite typi-
cally necessary compromises with political opponents in the short term.  
Lens 3: Politics as a Process Structured in Space and Time 
From the two elements discussed above follows the third element of the theo-
retical framework. The architectural policy design perspective understands 
politics as a process structured in space and time because this helps capture 
the intertemporal effects of policies and understand how policy makers’ strat-
egies and the policy designs they choose not only shape immediate outcomes 
but also impact political processes in the long term.  
The understanding of politics as a process structured in space and time is 
at the heart of the historical institutionalist tradition and an important back-
ground foil for the concept of policy feedback, which more specifically de-
scribes pathways through which intertemporal effects of policies on politics 
occur (cf. e.g. Mahoney et al. 2016; Pierson 2000c, 2004; Thelen 2000; cf. 
section 2.1). As Hall (2016: 31) puts it, “in addition to examining how events 
affect the immediate outcome of interest, […historical institutionalism] con-
siders how they restructure the institutional or ideological settings so as to 
condition outcomes at later periods in time.” Accordingly, politics is better 
captured in “moving pictures” that situate a given outcome within a broader 
temporal framework than in “snapshots” based on cross-sectional data 
(Pierson 2000c, 2004; Thelen 2000). 
Hence, historical institutionalists acknowledge the impact of particular eco-
nomic, social, and political structures in which actors are embedded on polit-
ical action and are interested in how the impact of these structures unfolds 
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and plays out over time. They have therefore developed multiple approaches 
and concepts for the study of timing and sequence in policy and institutional 
development. Early and still dominant concepts were critical junctures (e.g. 
Capoccia 2015, 2016a; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Krasner 1984) and path 
dependence (e.g. Bednar et al. 2012; Clemens and Cook 1999; Garud et al. 
2010; Greener 2005; Pierson 2000a, 2000c; Page 2006), which have recently 
been supplemented by other conceptualizations of intertemporal causality like 
reactive sequences (Daugbjerg 2009; Howlett 2009; Mahoney 2000; 
Mahoney et al. 2016; Rixen and Viola 2014).  
The architectural policy design perspective adopts historical-institutional-
ists’ “time-sensitive” approach to politics in that it is interested in how policy 
makers’ policy design choices affect political developments further down the 
line. Following the historical-institutionalist approach is thereby especially 
helpful because it highlights implications of policies at different points in time 
– especially immediate, substantive policy effects emphasized by the policy 
design literature against more long-term, political consequences emphasized 
by the policy feedback literature – and policy makers’ motivations in the pur-
suit of short- and long-term political benefits.  
Lens 4: Strategic Action as Driver of Policy Making 
At the center of the architectural policy design perspective is the understand-
ing of strategic action as a driver of policy making. Here, the architectural pol-
icy design perspective introduces an important new element to the policy feed-
back and policy design literature. The focus on strategic action is the crucial 
response to the problematization of the existing literature. The problematiza-
tion has shown that both the policy design and the policy feedback literature 
are not able to analytically tackle issues of agency and long-term strategic ac-
tion in policy feedback dynamics and policy design process and therefore fail 
to explain real-word political struggles around policy design and the strategic 
choices policy makers make during design (cf. chapter 1). Putting strategic ac-
tion in the analytical focus helps remedy these weaknesses. Moreover, it ad-
vances historical institutionalism’s understanding of structure and agency and 
prevents researchers from “having to choose” between structural/contextual 
explanations (recently, the literature has highlighted in particular the level of 
veto barriers and institutional discretion (Mahoney and Thelen 2010b), cf. 
section 2.1) and agential explanations, as traditional approaches to structure 
and agency suggest. 
To be able to focus analytically on strategic action, the architectural policy 
design framework draws on the strategic-relational approach developed by 
Jessop and Hay (Hay 2002: 89-134; Jessop 1990, 1996; 2001; cf. Figure 2, 
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below). Contrary to much of the existing literature, the strategic-relational ap-
proach views the distinction between structure and agency to be purely ana-
lytical. Ontologically, both structure and agency are simultaneously present in 
any given situation and completely interwoven in practice. Hence, the termi-
nology of the structure/agency debate itself, which implies an analytical and 
ontological dichotomy, is misleading. The strategic-relational approach there-
fore replaces the abstract theoretical terms of structure and agency with the 
better fitting conceptual terms strategically selective context (i.e. the policy 
design situation, for example characterized by the impact of previous policies, 
institutional discretion and veto barriers) and strategic actor (i.e. policy 
maker), which enable researchers to “concentrate instead upon the dialectical 
interplay of structure and agency in real contexts of social and political inter-
action” (Hay 2002: 127). The existence of strategically selective contexts and 
strategic actors is relational and dialectical, meaning that the two are mutually 
constitutive and their interaction, which yields strategic action, is not reduci-
ble to the sum of contextual and agential factors.  
Figure 3.2: The Formulation of Architectural Policy Design Strategies in 
Public Policy Making from a Strategic-Relational Perspective 
 
Note: Adapted from Hay (2002: 131). 
 
Introducing this terminology is more than a conceptual exercise because it 
comes with a key benefit: it puts strategic calculation (formulation of policy 
design strategy by policy maker in specific policy design situation) and strate-
gic action (negotiations and decisions in design processes) at the center of 
analyses of public policy making and policy development. Strategic action is 
yielded by the interplay of strategic actors and strategically selective contexts. 
Strategy is then “intentional conduct oriented towards the environment in 
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which it is to occur. It is the intention to realize certain outcomes or objectives 
which motivates action” (Hay 2002: 129). This action must be informed by a 
knowledgeability and strategic assessment of the relevant contextual factors 
in order to have any chance of realizing the underlying intentions.  
Hence, strategic actors/policy makers are, as in rational-choice institution-
alism, modelled as conscious, reflexive and strategic. They act strategically 
and seek to realize complex, contingent and often changing goals in contexts 
that favor certain strategies over others. Their preferences are, unlike what 
rational-choice institutionalism suggests, not fixed or determined by material 
circumstances but constantly reviewed, revised and reformed over the course 
of time as material or ideational influences change. Similarly, monitoring the 
consequences of their actions, strategic actors/policy makers can modify or 
revise their chosen means, as well as potentially their original intentions upon 
which the choice of means was based. Policy design strategies are therefore 
not fixed, given paths of action, but situationally given (see Lens 5, below).  
Strategic actors/policy makers are situated in contexts that can be modelled 
largely in institutionalist terms, meaning that contexts are structured by for-
mal and informal rules and procedures that guide human behavior and ascribe 
benefits and costs to different kinds of action. These contexts are strategically 
selective because they favor certain strategies over others in the interplay with 
strategic actors’/policy makers’ goals. A strategically selective context is an 
“unevenly contoured terrain which favors certain strategies over others and 
hence selects for certain outcomes while militating against others. Over time, 
such strategic selectivity will throw up a series of systematically structured 
outcomes” (Hay 2002: 129), i.e. the social scientifically interesting patterns 
researchers are interested in explaining and understanding. 
In sum, the strategic-relational approach changes the analytical focus in the 
study of public policy making in a key respect because it puts policy makers’ 
strategic action and the formulation of policy design strategies in the center of 
public policy analysis.13 Figure 3.2, over, illustrates how strategic actors/policy 
                                               
13 Another approach that tries to overcome the dichotomy between structure and agency and 
replace it with a “dual perspective” on actors and institutions is the “actor-centered institu-
tionalism” approach developed by Mayntz and Scharpf (1995; cf. Scharpf 1997). While actor-
centered institutionalism shares similarities with the analytical approach developed here, 
e.g. in regards to the conceptualization of actors, the institutionalist perspective or the em-
phasis on situational contexts, Mayntz and Scharpf eventually prioritize institutional expla-
nations over actor- or (strategic) action-based explanations. The authors suggest that re-
searchers can often deduce “action orientations” from institutional and situational contexts 
and only if actors did not act as predicted should researchers delve into actors’ actual moti-
vations and orientations. Only in periods of crisis do situational and individual factors gain 
more importance while institutional contexts lose their guiding functions (ibid.: 66-67). 
Hence, the authors replicate institutionalists’ focus on structural/institutional explanations 
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makers embedded in strategically selective contexts/policy design situations 
formulate policy design strategies and, based on these, negotiate and make 
decisions in design processes. Such strategic action has repercussions for both 
the strategically selective context (e.g. through a partial transformation of con-
textual structures) and the strategic actors (e.g. through enhanced knowledge 
and strategic learning), which one can try to understand by drawing on the 
policy feedback literature’s conceptualizations of different types of feedback 
effects (e.g. resource and incentive effects or ideational effects). 
Lens 5: The Importance of Situational Contexts of Policy Making 
The fifth element of the theoretical framework highlights the importance of 
situational contexts of policy making because explanations of long-term stra-
tegic policy making need to be sensitive to their particular political, economic 
and societal environment, to institutional structures, and to actor constella-
tions. 
Historical institutionalists are traditionally interested in contextualized, 
mid-range theories that try to explain concrete empirical phenomena in 
bounded populations rather than in grand theories like structuralism or func-
tionalism that aim to explain society as a whole (Thelen 1999). Hence, the ex-
planations they produce are often limited to particular times, regions, policy 
fields, etc. Furthermore, as Falleti and Lynch (2009) emphasize, causation lies 
in the interaction between identified mechanisms and relevant contextual at-
tributes of a particular setting. Theory-building and the identification of 
“transportable” mechanisms and concepts therefore necessitate attention to 
contextual attributes that are likely to affect the functioning or meaning of the 
mechanisms involved in the causal process (ibid.). In the study of long-term 
strategic policy making, it is therefore important to identify conceptually and 
empirically these relevant contextual attributes that select for and militate 
against certain policy design strategies in particular settings instead of aiming 
for generalistic explanations of long-term strategic policy making.  
Contextual attributes highlighted by recent historical-institutionalist ap-
proaches to the study of policy development as causal factors explaining policy 
change are the level of veto barriers in the political environment and the level 
of institutional discretion of an institution or policy that is to be changed 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010a). Both elements can be seen as important deter-
minants of how “permissive” a particular situation is to change, where low 
veto barriers and high levels of discretion create permissive situations and 
                                               
and push the explanatory weight of agential factors to critical junctures (similar to punctu-
ated equilibrium models) instead of focusing on strategic action that emerges in situational 
contexts based on the interplay of strategic actors and strategically selective contexts. 
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high levels of veto barriers and low levels of discretion less permissive situa-
tions. In the empirical analysis, the dissertation will pay particular attention 
to these contextual attributes. In contrast to the existing literature (cf. chapter 
1), however, the architectural policy design perspective does not see such con-
textual attributes as main causal factors that explain change. Instead, it inves-
tigates how they contribute to the particular strategies that particular policy 
makers following particular policy goals develop in policy design situations 
characterized by different levels of veto barriers and institutional discretion. 
Using the language of the strategic-relational approach, one can think of 
policy development as a sequence of strategic action (policy design negotia-
tions and decisions) and strategic calculation (formulation of architectural 
policy design strategies) by strategic policy makers (strategic actors) embed-
ded in particular policy design situations (strategically selective context). Such 
a temporally disaggregated view on policy development also allows for varia-
tion in the policy design strategies policy makers follow and therefore more 
realistic concepts and fitting analyses of policy design processes during which 
policy makers often adapt their goals and strategies to new contextual devel-
opments (cf. section 8.2).  
Hence, situation becomes a central category in the analysis of public policy 
making. While not explicated by Hay and Jessop, the assumptions underlying 
the strategic-relational approach presuppose a temporally disaggregated per-
spective on policy development that pays attention to the processual, dialecti-
cal interplay between strategic actors/policy makers and strategically selective 
contexts/policy design situations.14 This disaggregation is also necessary be-
cause human action does not follow “predefined ends, but particular ends-in-
view emerge concretely out of situations,” as Joas (1996, in Jackson 2005: 
231-2) emphasizes it in his criticism of simple, teleological means-end-
schemes of intentional action. Jackson (2005: 231-2) explicates further that  
[e]nds-in-view are based on judgements and assumptions about the type of situ-
ation and the possible actions that flow from it. Conversely, the situation itself is 
not a fixed objective given. Situations are interpreted and defined in relation to 
our capacities for action. Starting from the situation, action follows a series of var-
ious ends-in-view that remain relatively undefined at first, but are specific 
through ongoing reinterpretation and decisions about means. Actors test out and 
revise their course of action as each end-in-view itself becomes a means for a fur-
ther end-in-view. Means and ends flow in a continuous stream – the distinction 
between them is only an analytical and temporal one. 
                                               
14 Cf. also Mayntz and Scharpf (1995) for a similar emphasis on situation as concept captur-
ing contextual attributes relevant for action.  
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In the analysis of long-term strategic policy making, one must therefore allow 
for variation in strategic action on the temporal dimension because policy de-
sign strategies are situationally defined by conscious, reflexive, policy-driven 
and strategic policy makers. 
Summary: The Concept of Architectural Policy Design 
The five analytical lenses presented above circumscribe the architectural pol-
icy design perspective. In sum, they allow the formulation of a core concept 
that describes and defines the kind of empirical phenomenon the dissertation 
aims to investigate (cf. section 4.2.3 for how such phenomena can be identified 
empirically). This core concept is termed architectural policy design and can 
be defined as follows.  
Architectural policy design describes the intentional design of policies by policy 
makers that are strategic, reflexive, power-conscious, policy-driven and goal-ori-
ented. Policy makers want to realize the policy goals that motivate their action in 
the long term in order to shape society in the long term. What policy designs they 
choose and what preferences, goals, strategies and actions policy makers take is 
always influenced by the effects of previously adopted policies. Policy makers’ 
considerations of such effects influence in turn the strategies they follow and the 
designs that emerge from design processes. Policy makers are not masterminds 
who follow grand design strategies, but they have a working understanding of the 
political implications of different policy designs based on the different elements 
and instruments these designs combine. Policy makers engage in architectural 
policy design because they want to gain political advantages and minimize the 
chance that their decisions and policies are overturned after the next election. In 
consequence, their strategic action produces policy designs that steer and guide 
future policy makers’ courses of action via policy feedback effects. 
To reiterate, the theoretical framework of architectural policy design and the 
core concept formulated based on it are not meant to spell out testable hy-
potheses. As a loose, yet problem-specific framework, the architectural policy 
design perspective guides the empirical analysis of long-term strategic policy 
making in Part III (cf. Miles et al. 2014: ch. 2). It shapes data generation by 
suggesting to the researcher where to look and what to look for (cf. chapter 1), 
and it allows mid-range theories to develop in the course of the abductive re-
search process (cf. chapter 8).  
3.2 Key Terms and Underlying Assumptions of the Architectural 
Policy Design Framework 
The problematization of the existing literature in chapter 1 demonstrated that 
it is important that researchers are aware of assumptions underlying theoret-
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ical frameworks if they want to encourage a productive dialogue between dif-
ferent theoretical approaches and advance theory development. This section 
therefore makes transparent and discusses two important assumptions under-
lying the architectural policy design framework, namely assumptions concern-
ing policy makers’ motivations during policy design and concerning their ca-
pability to design policy strategically. Before the discussion of the two assump-
tions, the next section defines key terms of the framework. 
Key Terms 
In the formulation of the core concept and the five lenses of the architectural 
policy design perspective as well as in the empirical analysis in Part III, a num-
ber of analytical terms are used that will briefly be defined below (in alphabet-
ical order): 
Long-Term political (policy feedback effect/strategic consideration): Long-
term/political refers to consequences of policies on politics (policy feedback ef-
fects) or anticipations thereof that materialize not immediately after reform adap-
tion, or whose vigor only accumulates over a longer period. The literature typically 
thinks of policy feedback effects as long-term effects and uses the concept to cap-
ture intertemporal causality in policy development. While it makes sense to think 
of policy feedback effects as effects that often materialize only in the long term, 
analytically it is more appropriate to think of them as effects than are of a political 
character.15 The political character of a feedback effect refers to the impact of a 
policy on subsequent politics, i.e. its power-political implications and whether it 
redistributes resources (e.g. rights, benefits) or reconfigures political landscapes 
(e.g. actors’ networks, resources, interests or ideas). By shaping future politics, an 
adopted policy becomes an instrument of control and influence that helps achieve 
long-term policy goals. Long-term political effects can also be thought of as indi-
rect effects of a policy on a policy goal via shaping politics. Long-term political 
effect is used synonymously with policy feedback effect and is the opposite of 
short-term substantive effect (see below). Since the literature commonly refers to 
policy feedback effects as long-term effects, the dissertation adapts this terminol-
ogy and uses long-term to describe long-term/political/indirect effects of poli-
cies.  
 
Policy design situation: Policy design situations are the material and idea-
tional settings in which policy making takes place. As contexts, they can be mod-
elled largely in institutionalist terms, i.e. as structured by formal and informal 
rules and procedures that guide human behavior and ascribe benefits and costs to 
                                               
15 In that sense, policy feedback is a temporal concept, but not necessarily a long-term con-
cept. Hertel-Fernandez (2018) makes a similar distinction between long-term political and 
short-term substantive effects but uses the terms immediate/first-order and knock-
on/downstream/second-order effects. 
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different kinds of action. Policy design situations are strategically selective and 
favor certain strategies over others in the interplay with policy makers’ substan-
tive policy goals. They are “unevenly contoured terrain[s] which favor[] certain 
strategies over others and hence select[] for certain outcomes while militating 
against others. Over time, such strategic selectivity will throw up a series of sys-
tematically structured outcomes” (Hay 2002: 129). 
 
Policy design: Policy design can refer to the outcome of policy design (the 
adopted policy) or the process of strategic policy formulation by policy makers 
who aim to realize policy goals in the short and long term. Policy design becomes 
architectural if and when long-term political considerations (see above) are ana-
lytically and empirically identifiable in the strategies policy makers develop and 
follow (cf. concept formulation in section 3.1). 
 
Policy maker: Policy makers are conscious, reflexive and strategic actors who 
seek to realize complex, contingent and often changing goals. They are policy-
driven and aim to shape society by realizing policy goals in the long run. Policy 
makers can use policies as instruments of power to achieve their long-term goals 
(see discussion of Underlying Assumptions, below). Their preferences are not 
fixed or determined by material circumstances, but policy makers constantly re-
view, revise and reformulate them as material and ideational influences change. 
Monitoring the consequences of their actions, policy makers can modify or revise 
their chosen means as well as their original intentions upon which the choice of 
means was based. Analytically, the dissertation focusses on collective actors like 
parties or organized interests as policy makers.16 Primarily in the presentation of 
                                               
16 The dissertation focusses on parties and organized interest groups as collective actors be-
cause the collective identity and interests, the shared political-ideological heritage and ori-
entation, and the strategic relation to other parties and organized interest groups to a large 
degree determines how individual actors as representatives of collective actors behave. For 
Germany (the empirical context of the study; cf. section 4.2), parties can be characterized as 
stratarchical, meaning that “organizational units within parties can possess a significant de-
gree of autonomy, and that simple hierarchical paradigms no longer represent the reality of 
party structures” (Carty 2004: 7; cf. Bukow and Poguntke 2013: 187; Mair 1994; Poguntke 
1994). Hence, parties as collective actors are themselves composed of smaller-sized collec-
tive actors that define the political strategies of their members/followers. Parties’ capacity 
for strategic action as collective actors depends largely on the existing convergence of policy-
relevant perceptions and preferences among its members and the capacity for conflict reso-
lution (Scharpf 1997: 59). The researcher should decide based on her knowledge of the case 
and context whether it is reasonable to treat parties as collective actors or whether to focus 
on important sub-groupings within a party or on important individual, influential members. 
Like parties, organized interest groups can be treated as collective actors. Even more than 
parties, organized interest groups are groups of like-minded people who share interests in a 
particular policy field or societal, economic or political context and are often efficiently or-
ganized to represent these interests in public policy making.  
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the case studies in Part III, the term may also refer to individual actors/members 
of parliament.  
 
Short-Term substantive (policy feedback effect/strategic consideration): 
Short-term substantive refers to the effects of a policy in relation to its policy goal, 
i.e. the substantive outcome of a policy in its policy field (e.g. the effects on job 
activation policies on unemployment numbers). Short-term substantive policy ef-
fects can also be understood as direct policy effects since they refer to how suc-
cessful or unsuccessful a policy is in achieving the substantial policy goal it was 
designed to achieve, whereas indirect effects achieve a policy goal via shaping pol-
itics (see Long-Term political, above). Empirically, substantive policy effects may 
also only materialize or accumulate in the long term (e.g. the effects of economic 
policies on economic growth or of environmental policy on the level of CO2 emis-
sions). Since the literature commonly refers to policy feedback effects as long-
term effects, the dissertation uses short-term/substantive effects as contrasting 
concept. 
 
Strategy: Strategy is defined as the “intentional conduct oriented towards the 
environment in which it is to occur. It is the intention to realize certain outcomes 
or objectives which motivates action” (Hay 2002: 129). Policy design strategy is 
then the goal-oriented, policy-driven conduct of policy makers in policy design 
situations. 
 
Working understanding: A working understanding describes policy makers’ 
acquired aptitude to anticipate policy feedback effects. Policy makers face sub-
stantial practical and cognitive challenges in correctly anticipating the overall 
long-term effects of a policy reform on future political development. Through their 
political and legislative experience, policy makers develop heuristics and acquire 
an aptitude, talent or sense that helps them anticipate which type(s) of effect(s) 
different elements of a policy design might or might not bring about. Policy mak-
ers themselves may be more or less aware of their own aptitude to do so and can 
draw on external expertise to improve or extend it. A working understanding does 
not mean that policy makers are political masterminds who follow grand strate-
gies of policy design, but that policy makers make specific links between individ-




The theoretical framework of architectural policy design rests on two assump-
tions regarding policy makers’ motivations during policy design and their ca-
pacity for long-term strategic policy design. In order to allow for a productive 
dialogue with the existing literature, this section makes these assumptions ex-
plicit. 
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What Drives Policy Makers during Policy Design: Policy, Power, 
and Elections 
The political architecture framework is based on a view on policy makers as 
power-oriented, policy-driven agents who aim to achieve certain social out-
comes that public policies can generate or facilitate. As Jacobs (2011: 32) 
notes, politicians may pursue or cling to public office, but they do so “for the 
unparalleled opportunity that office holding provides to shape society via state 
action.”  
Hence, policy makers can follow two motivations during policy design: 
maximize electoral gains (short-term) or maximize policy gains (long-term).17 
The architectural policy design framework posits that in a typical policy de-
sign situation policy makers will try to maximize both short-term and long-
term gains and therefore focusses on these types of policy design situations.  
Figure 3.3 illustrates the occurrence of architectural policy design in such 
typical policy design situations. In practice, policy design strategies may devi-
ate towards more electorally oriented policy making (resembling electoral op-
portunism) or towards more policy-oriented policy making (resembling ideal-
istic or deceitful policy design) because policy makers need to make compro-
mises with political opponents or adapt to situational contexts (e.g. public 
opinion, issue salience) that render adaptions in their strategy necessary. De-
sign decisions may also maximize only one of the two gains while affecting the 
other one negatively. In principle, one can assume that policy makers’ typical 
orientation in policy making is to maximize both short-term electoral and 
long-term policy gains, even though the simultaneous realization of both can 
be challenging. 
 
                                               
17 Because most of the social outcomes policy makers aim to shape can only be affected in 
the long term (e.g. poverty, climate change, economic growth), the orientation towards pol-
icy gains qualifies as long-term orientation. See also Anzia and Moe (2016), who emphasize 
that interest groups will in many instances pressure policy makers to focus on policy out-
comes and not only electoral outcomes.  
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Figure 3.3: Policy Makers’ Motivations during Policy Design 
  
 
In practice, this means that policy makers want to design policies that help 
them achieve policy goals, shape society according to their views and prefer-
ences, and help them be electorally successful in the next election. Even when 
substantive policy goals could be reached in the short term before an upcom-
ing election, policy-driven policy makers are likely interested in ensuring the 
realization of their policy goals not just during their own term but also in the 
long term (Moe 1990; cf. Jacobs 2010). Hence, policy makers will try to ensure 
that their policies are not revoked by the next government, that they have a 
long “political half-life”. Policy makers are thus policy-driven and power-ori-
ented actors. They can try to use policy in order to gain “positional power” 
(Nørgaard 1997: 72). Power-oriented policy makers can use policies as instru-
ments of control and influence in order to achieve their ultimate policy goals 
(Nørgaard 1997: 14-7, 71-2). 
The pursuit of long-term policy gains therefore gives policy makers incen-
tives to pursue strategic, architectural policy design. In agency-based termi-
nology, this means that policy makers’ strategic action has a “projective ele-
ment” that captures their attempts to anticipate and shape the power and be-
havioral implications of policies on future actors and future trajectories of ac-
tion (cf. Araujo and Harrison 2002; Emirbayer and Mische 1998). Through 
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the strategic design of policies, policy makers shape these future trajectories, 
steer, constrain or empower future actors to follow or abstain from certain 
paths of action, to make certain choices or adopt certain strategies that are in 
line with their own intent. This means that political actors can intentionally 
design policies in ways that, in institutionalist terms, reward certain actions 
with benefits and punish others with costs. They can operate as “architects of 
political order” (Döhler 1995) who deliberately create strategically selective 
contexts that privilege the endurance of their own policies over alternative pol-
icies. 
This view of policy makers is in contrast to the policy design literature’s ide-
alized description of policy makers as highly instrumental and rational. In-
deed, policy making is a rational, knowledge-based process, but policy makers 
do not only seek to design effective policies that solve objective problems. Pol-
icy makers’ instrumental efforts are steered by the long-term policy goals, ide-
als and strategic considerations, and influenced by electoral and power-polit-
ical considerations. The “architectural” view of policy makers is also in con-
trast to the policy feedback literatures’ depiction of policy makers as notori-
ously myopic. Indeed, policy makers are interested in winning the next elec-
tion and in holding office, but they do so for a “larger purpose” and the 
achievement of policy goals and ideals, which the policy feedback literature 
tends to neglect. 
Hence, the architectural policy design framework adopts a balanced and re-
alistic view on the motivations that policy makers follow during policy design, 
which enables it to investigate the role of agency in design processes and policy 
feedback dynamics and to explain the real-world political struggles, strategic 
choices and compromises policy makers make during policy design.  
What Capabilities Do Policy Makers Have for Long-Term 
Strategic Policy Design: A Working Understanding of Policy 
Feedback Effects 
Policy makers may have reasons to design policies strategically, but that does 
not mean that they are always capable of doing so and that they succeed in 
their long-term strategic design attempts. The architectural policy design 
framework builds on the concept of a working understanding of policy feed-
back effects (see also above) in order to explain how capable policy makers are 
in anticipating and strategically designing the long-term, political implica-
tions of policies. The concept of working understanding itself has emerged 
from the abductive research process and is informed by the empirical and the-
oretical analysis of the two cases presented in Part III. 
In essence, a working understanding means that policy makers have an ac-
quired aptitude to anticipate policy feedback effects, e.g. which actors benefit 
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or lose from a policy, which incentives for mobilization they provide, which 
ideas and ideals they promote or weaken, through their professional experi-
ence as policy maker. 
This does not mean that policy makers are political masterminds or grand 
strategists. Policy makers face substantial practical and cognitive challenges 
in correctly anticipating such effects, e.g. because policy making is an inher-
ently complex process with many involved stakeholders and because of the 
need to delegate important decisions and the implementation of policies. The 
dissertation suggests that these challenges are particularly strong in the case 
of self-undermining feedback effects because these effects require greater cog-
nitive capacities, can be unpredictable, and do not match policy makers’ am-
bition to extend the “political half-life” of “their” policy. In contrast, policy 
makers’ working understanding seems more attuned to positive feedback ef-
fects because they are interested in achieving and protecting the policy goals 
that motivate their action in the long term and therefore focus such positive 
feedback effects (cf. above and section 8.1.1). Furthermore, as discussed 
above, long-term policy goals are not the only motivation policy makers follow 
during policy design, and their attempts to be strategic, the time and effort 
they can spend on devising clever long-term strategies may be dampened by 
short-term electoral considerations. 
However, through the political and legislative experience that policy makers 
gain during their professional work life, they acquire aptitude, talent or sense 
to strategically design policies. The more experience policy makers have, the 
more developed their working understanding will be. Policy makers can also 
draw on external expertise (e.g. lobbyists, consultants, legal experts) to im-
prove their aptitude. Policy makers’ aptitude helps them anticipate which 
type(s) of effect(s) different policy design might or might not bring about. 
Since the effects of policies as a whole are harder to anticipate than those of 
individual policy elements or instruments, policy makers’ anticipations likely 
concern the effects of individual design elements or instruments.  
Policy makers themselves may be more or less aware of their own aptitude 
to do so. The more aware they are, the more they might act as grand strategists 
who try to make sense of the different effects a policy design might facilitate 
and to combine those strategically to achieve the overall desired outcome. The 
less policy makers are aware of their own aptitude, the more they will only 
implicitly draw on heuristics they developed through their experience when 
designing policy.  
While the dissertation is able to claim that policy makers’ working under-
standing is more developed in regards to positive, self-reinforcing policy feed-
back effects than to negative, self-undermining effects, future research should 
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try to empirically determine differences in the capabilities of policy makers to 
anticipate different types of feedback effects described in section 8.1.2. 
3.3 Summary 
The architectural policy design perspective developed above provides a theo-
retical and analytical approach to investigating long-term strategic policy 
making and answering the dissertation’s research question, namely whether 
and how policy makers strategically try to shape policy feedback effects during 
policy design and how such attempts influence the design of policies. 
Taking the problematization of the existing literature as a point of origin, 
the architectural policy design framework combines different elements of the 
policy feedback and the policy design literature with the strategic-relational 
approach. It understand public policies as institutions that prescribe and pro-
scribe behavior and shape the lives and interactions of citizens and organiza-
tions. Due to their distributional consequences, policies are arenas of constant 
political conflict that actors try to bend towards their own priorities and inter-
ests. Because policies shape, restructure and reconfigure political processes, 
power-conscious policy makers can use them as instruments of control and 
influence to further their own interests and achieve policy goals in the long 
term. Policy makers are embedded in particular policy design situations, and 
try to design policies strategically and to include design elements and instru-
ments they assume will bring about policy feedback effects that are beneficial 
to them, i.e. that help them achieve long-term policy goals and be electorally 
successful in the short-term. Through strategic policy design, policy makers 
therefore shape future policy development. 
The theoretical framework allows the formulation of a core concept of ar-
chitectural policy design, which describes and defines the phenomenon the 
dissertation investigates. Architectural policy design means intentional policy 
making by strategic, reflexive, power-conscious, policy-driven and goal-ori-
ented policy makers who aim to shape society in the long term by realizing 
policy goals that motivate their action. Policy making and policy makers’ pref-
erences, goals and actions are always influenced by the effects of previous pol-
icy, and considerations of such effects influence policy design. Policy makers 
are not master strategist, but they have a working understanding of the polit-
ical implications of different policy designs. They engage in architectural pol-
icy design because they want to gain political advantages and minimize the 
chance that their decisions are overturned after just one electoral cycle. They 
thereby steer and guide future policy makers’ courses of action via policy feed-
back effects. 
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The architectural policy design framework lays out a theoretical perspective 
on long-term strategic policy making targeted at answering the research ques-
tion developed in chapter 1, which asks whether and how policy makers stra-
tegically try to shape policy feedback effects during policy design and how such 
attempts influence the design of policies. The following chapter develops a 
methodological framework for the empirical investigation of architectural pol-
icy design that translates the theoretical perspective into a hands-on analytical 
strategy. It develops guidelines for the identification and selection of cases of 
architectural policy design, a strategy for the collection and identification of 
relevant empirical materials, and a strategy for the process and methods of 
data analysis. 
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4. Methodological Framework 
This chapter lays out the methodological framework developed and followed 
in this dissertation and discusses how architectural policy design can be in-
vestigated empirically. The chapter is divided into four sections: Section 4.1 
outlines the overall methodological approach and discusses the abductive 
logic of research and how it is reflected in the dissertation. Section 4.2 de-
scribes the process of case selection. Section 4.3 discusses the collection of 
empirical material, and section 4.4 concludes the chapter with a discussion of 
the process and methods of data analysis and types and interpretation of evi-
dentiary material. 
4.1 An Abductive Methodological Approach 
The central goal of the dissertation is to build theory. It is based on an abduc-
tive approach to the conduct of social science research, and the abductive na-
ture of the dissertation is reflected throughout the different chapters of the 
book. The methodological framework reflects the abductive approach from the 
engagement with existing literature to the selection of cases for the empirical 
investigation, the collection of empirical material, the process and methods of 
data analysis, and the conclusions and implications drawn from the study. Be-
fore section 4.2 discusses the more specific task of case selection, this section 
introduces the concept of abduction as an apt depiction and conceptualization 
of the research process and discusses how the abductive logic is reflected in 
the dissertation. 
Abduction as a Way of Conceptualizing the Research Process 
Abduction, as a way of conceptualizing research processes, can be character-
ized by two core elements: first, problematization as a starting point; second, 
a non-linear, unpredictable research process. Originally, the concept of abduc-
tion goes back to Charles Peirce, for whom it “is the process of forming an 
explanatory hypothesis” (Pierce 1934a: 171-21, in Swedberg 2014a: 101). The 
emphasis is not only on the explanation itself but “on the process of coming 
up with an explanation or how to get there” (Swedberg 2014a: 101). The con-
cept of abduction breaks with the ideal-typical dichotomy of induction and de-
duction that seemingly describes all possible ways of doing social science re-
search and of relating theory and empirics to each other. According to this 
dichotomy, the researcher either moves inductively from empirics to theory, 
i.e., from the particular case to the general law, or she moves deductively in 
clear and identifiable steps from theoretical reasoning to empirical tests of hy-
potheses.  
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Abduction, in contrast, is often interpreted as describing a constant oscilla-
tion between theory and empirics. Research moves “in an iterative-recursive 
fashion between what is puzzling and possible explanations for it” (Schwartz-
Shea and Yanow 2012: 27; cf. also Bates 1998: 15-17). In the researcher’s daily 
work, these iterative-recursive movements between theoretical reasoning and 
empirical observation become closely intertwined and cannot simply be re-
flected in either inductive or deductive terms. Understood like this, abduction 
points especially to the practical problems of disentangling analytically sepa-
rate steps within the process of research.  
Going beyond this “soft interpretation” of the concept of abduction, one can 
understand abduction as a conceptual and analytical critique of the very dis-
tinction between induction and deduction, between a rigorous, scientific con-
text of justification and a context of discovery in which researchers somehow 
come up with new ideas (Tavory and Timmermans 2014: 6).18 For example, 
Tavory and Timmermans argue that “creativity is inherent in the research pro-
cess” and that “any division of labor between creativity and the rigorous check-
ing of theories against observations is empirically wrong: researchers theorize 
on the go” (ibd.). Instead, “justification and discovery are part of the same re-
search context” (ibd.: 121), and the strict division between the two needs to be 
overcome.  
This is, first, because the idea of a dualism between theory and empirics, 
and the pressure to translate research processes into deductive or inductive 
steps, make researchers struggle in their daily work, where the real research 
process poses itself as much more messy, chaotic, and unpredictable than the 
ideal-typical conceptions of induction and deduction. Second, it prevents re-
searchers from being able to communicate well how new ideas and theories 
arise. As Tavory and Timmermans go on, “the problem of theory currently is 
not that there is too much of it, but that it is considered a distinct subfield, and 
something that only established scholars play with. […But] theory should not 
replace or be replaced by empirical research; it is part of the same act.” (ibd.: 
128)  
Overall, the concept of abduction is therefore a more apt conceptualization 
of real-world research processes than ideal-typical inductive and deductive 
models of research. It is not a new best-practice prescription for how research-
ers ought to do research but helps researchers reflect upon how they conduct 
                                               
18 Others, like Swedberg (2014a), hold on to the distinction between a context of discovery 
and a context of justification and draw on the concept of abduction to try to understand and 
conceptualize what happens in the context of discovery and how social scientists build the-
ory. 
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research in their daily work, develop systematic methodological guidelines es-
pecially for the early phases of their research that emphasize theory building 
and concept formulation, and improve their ability to participate in the re-
search community with theoretical and conceptual contributions.  
The first core element of the abductive conception of research processes 
emphasizes that research starts from a puzzle, a surprise, or a tension that the 
researcher seeks to explicate and make “less surprising” (ibd.: 27-28). For ex-
ample, a research puzzle can concern how foreign fighters influence the inter-
nal dynamics of civil wars (Schwampe 2018) or how pupils’ health identities 
are formed and transformed in the encounter with teachers and health policies 
in the public school (Cecchini 2018). This dissertation investigates the puzzle 
of long-term, strategic policy design and asks whether and how policy makers 
strategically try to shape policy feedback effects during policy design and 
how such attempts influence the design of policies.  
The surprises that motivate research can emerge from a misfit between 
what researchers expect to find in a case or data and what they actually ob-
serve. What researchers then typically do is to model the existing literature in 
a way so that they can identify – and close – a corresponding gap. An alterna-
tive way that better reflects what often triggers research is problematization. 
As discussed and illustrated in chapter 1, problematization means that the re-
searcher identifies and challenges underlying assumptions in existing re-
search. In this dissertation, challenged assumptions concern the image of pol-
icy makers as notoriously myopic and of public policy making as inconceivably 
complex in the policy feedback literature, and the image of policy making as a 
rational, knowledge-driven, highly instrumental process in the policy design 
literature (cf. chapter 1). Often, researchers do not make these problematiza-
tions explicit but instead choose to communicate their research as closing a 
gap (Alvesson and Sandberg 2011a, 2011b). The concept of abduction high-
lights that research processes do not have to start from an atheoretical point 
rooted solely in empirical observation (as in inductive research) or purely from 
logical reasoning on the theoretical level disconnected from empirical obser-
vation (as in deductive research processes). Instead, research is in a constant 
dialogue with existing research and problematizes generalizations produced 
by others. Therefore, “[t]heorizing is not the end, but part of a process of in-
tellectual dialogue” (Tavory and Timmermans 2014: 128). 
The second core element of abduction emphasizes that research does not 
follow pre-given steps, that it is not linear and does not lead towards an ex-
ante known goal. Dubois and Gadde (2002: 556) describe research as a “non-
linear, path-dependent process of combining efforts with the ultimate objec-
tive of matching theory and reality”. Path-dependent here means that depend-
ing on which pieces the researcher adds to solve a puzzle, different patterns or 
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solutions form. At the same time, research processes have “no obvious pat-
terns. Our efforts to match theory and reality can take us in various directions. 
There is never one single way of matching. On the other hand, it can be argued 
that some ways turn out to be better than others are. This is a result of the 
process and cannot be known in advance” (ibd.). Hence, abduction highlights 
that decisions we make early on in our research, e.g. during case selection or 
data generation, greatly influence later outcomes and the implications we 
draw (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 30-31). The constant matching effort 
is not a series of discrete inductive and deductive steps, but “the researcher is 
simultaneously puzzling over empirical materials and theoretical literature” 
(ibid.: 27, italics added). Both theory and empirics develop throughout this 
process, and especially in the early phases research might not be based on 
clear-cut concepts and hypotheses. For example, researchers frequently have 
to choose cases while they develop, modify, and adapt their concepts and the-
oretical propositions, a challenge that section 4.2 addresses explicitly. 
The Abductive Fingerprint in this Dissertation 
This dissertation and its methodological framework reflect the abductive con-
ception of research processes in multiple ways: First, chapter 1 problematized 
the existing literature on policy design and policy feedback. It tried to make 
criticism towards important assumptions in the literature explicit in order to 
facilitate a better dialogue between this study, previous research and future 
research rather than “merely” carving out a gap and adding this project to a 
fixed body of pre-existing research.  
Second, chapter 3 did not develop a set of precise hypotheses to be tested 
through empirical investigation but formulated an initial theoretical frame-
work and concept of architectural policy design. This framework guides the 
empirical investigation. It is open to “surprises” and new insights gained dur-
ing the research process, which lead to refinement or reformulation rather 
than disproof and discard. As mentioned in chapter 3, the theoretical frame-
work can therefore also be understood as a result of the dissertation and not 
only as a precondition for its conduct. Third, section 4.2 develops a procedure 
for case selection for research that aims to build theory and that is based on 
an initial framework and concept rather than on clear, narrow, testable hy-
potheses.  
Fourth, the collection, selection and analysis of empirical material, dis-
cussed in sections 4.3 and 4.4, emphasize the value and instrumentality of em-
pirical material and evidence for theory-building purposes rather than for the 
understanding of the particular cases that are investigated. Fifth, the case 
studies presented in Part III of the dissertation are not conducted as historical 
analyses of the two cases but in order to develop theoretical implications and 
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to reformulate and refine the initial theoretical framework. Of course, in doing 
so the dissertation does shed new light and does offer a new understanding of 
the two cases in comparison to existing analytical and theoretical frameworks. 
Section 8.3 discusses the new understandings of the two cases and highlights 
and exemplifies the empirical benefits of applying the developed analytical 
and theoretical framework.  
Sixth and lastly, the core result of the dissertation therefore does not lie in 
distinct empirical knowledge about the two particular cases that were studied 
or in generalized claims about empirical relations in a particular universe of 
cases, but in developing distinct theoretical and analytical implications. These 
implications, presented in chapter 8, comprise a typology of different policy 
feedback effects anticipated by policy makers in different policy design situa-
tions and a discussion of conditions for long-term strategic policy design. 
These will hopefully inform future research on policy feedback and policy de-
sign, be applied or “tested” in different empirical contexts and increase our 
understanding of the investigated instances and contexts, raise criticism from 
other scholars, and be developed further. 
4.2 Case Selection 
This section develops a procedure for case selection for research that is in its 
early phases and aims at theory building, i.e. when concepts are formulated 
and expectations developed, and it shows how this procedure was applied in 
the dissertation. Swedberg calls this stage of research a prestudy and argues 
that prestudies should be given distinct and sizeable space in the overall re-
search process, but he does not give any advice on how to select cases or em-
pirical material for these prestudies (Swedberg 2014a: 26).19 Chapter 3 devel-
oped an initial theoretical framework that can guide empirical investigations 
of a research question that asks whether and how policy makers strategically 
try to shape policy feedback effects during policy design and how such at-
tempts influence the design of policies. The chapter also put forward a concept 
of architectural policy design that describes the phenomenon of interest as 
“intentional policy making by strategic, reflexive, conscious, policy-driven and 
goal-oriented policy makers who aim to shape society in the long term by re-
alizing policy goals that motivate their action”. With this initial research ques-
tion and key concept being formulated, the next step is to develop both further 
through engagement with increasingly consciously chosen literature and 
through empirical studies that can improve the understanding of and insight 
                                               
19 Swedberg also notes that the boundary between prestudy (more aimed at developing con-
cept, hypotheses and theories) and main study (following a more rigorous research design 
and aimed at answering a specific research question) is often fluent (Swedberg 2014a: 27). 
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into architectural policy design and help concept (re-)formulation and theory 
building.  
However, identification and selection of one or more good cases for these 
empirical studies face two problems. First, one cannot easily observe the cause 
(policy makers’ strategic considerations of policy feedback) or a positive or 
negative outcome (strategically designed policy) without conducting at least a 
pilot study on each case, which makes case selection based on an independent 
or dependent variable impossible. Second, case selection cannot be based on 
an expected mechanism since the empirical investigation is not based on a 
specific hypothesis regarding the how of architectural policy design.  
These problems are not unique to the investigation of architectural policy 
design but are characteristic of research that cannot draw on established, pre-
cise concepts, hypotheses, causal models, etc. from the literature and, there-
fore, aims and needs to build theory and formulate concepts in the simultane-
ous engagement with theory and empirics. The next section discusses in more 
detail typical case selection strategies presented in the case study literature 
and why they are insufficient when the challenge is to select one or more cases 
in the early stages of research when concepts and hypotheses are being devel-
oped or cause and outcome are unobservable.  
4.2.1 The Existing Literature on Case Selection 
The aim of this section is not to provide a full review of the extensive case study 
literature but to give a coarse depiction of common case selection strategies 
and case study types and to carve out their deficits regarding case selection in 
abductive, theory-building research.20 It is organized around the common dis-
tinction between idiographic (inductive or theory-guided) case studies, plau-
sibility probes, process tracing, hypothesis-testing case studies, and hypothe-
sis-generating case studies (cf. e.g. Levy 2008). 
Idiographic Case Studies 
Idiographic case studies come in two different forms: The first type are idio-
graphic, inductive case studies, common for example in historical research. 
They lack an explicit theoretical framework that guides the investigation but 
focus on a specific case they aim to explain in its totality, presenting all possi-
ble aspects of the particular case and their interconnections. The analytical 
value of these descriptions can be limited when no attempts are made to ana-
                                               
20 For more extensive discussions of case study methods, cf. e.g., Beach and Pedersen 
(2016a); Blatter and Haverland (2012); Byrne and Ragin (2009); Eckstein (1975); Ragin and 
Becker (2000); Rohlfing (2012); Seawright and Gerring (2008); Yin (2012, 2014, 2016). 
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lytically abstract from the particular case to more general patterns of causa-
tion or co-constitution. Consequently, this type of case study may not offer 
explicit lessons for research that aims to build theory and concepts.  
Grounded theory, more common in sociology and ethnology, also follows 
an inductive approach. The researcher starts the investigation without theo-
retical preconceptions but deliberately builds theory through deep immersion 
in the data “from the ground up” through systematic conceptualization and 
constant comparison with similar and distinct research areas (Tavory and 
Timmermans 2014: 9-19; cf. Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978, 1992, 
1995). Huge emphasis is placed on coding techniques, memoir practices, and 
similar tools for fieldwork and the handling of large amounts of qualitative 
data (e.g. Charmaz 2014). However, grounded theory does not give advice on 
how to select cases in the first place, and the idealized entering of the empirical 
field without theoretical preconceptions hinders the conceptualization of an 
adequate process for theory building. Tavory and Timmermans argue that 
denying or suppressing prior theoretical knowledge disables the researcher 
from relating different theoretical concepts to each other or from identifying 
tensions between existing theories and empirical observations from which 
new insights can arise. Grounded theory therefore sidelines theory and ampli-
fies existing notions of the world by broadening the database without telling 
the researchers which objects to focus on and how to link them to each other 
(2014: 9-19; Timmermans and Tavory 2012). Inductive idiographic case stud-
ies therefore offer little advice on how to systematically select cases in the con-
text of discovery. 
The second type of idiographic case studies, theory-guided case studies, 
does not renounce theoretical preconceptions but uses these as guidelines in 
the investigation of a case. As Levy points out, “social scientists’ explicit and 
structured use of theory to explain discrete cases often provides better expla-
nations and understandings of the key aspects of those cases than do less 
structured historical analyses” (2008: 4-5). However, two caveats remain: 
First, the process of theorizing and coming up with theoretical explanations is 
usually not explicated and communicated analytically. While it is “the con-
stant dialogue between theory and evidence that constitutes the comparative 
advantage” (Rueschemeyer 2003: 312) of such studies, it is often the reader’s 
tasks to retrospectively recreate what took place in the research process. Sec-
ond, theory-guided case studies typically start with a particular case that is 
worth studying due to its historical importance and utilize existing theory to 
explain this case. Therefore, the literature does not give advice on how to sys-
tematically select cases when research is not motivated by one specific case 
but by a broader puzzle or phenomenon of interest or by tensions between 
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theoretical arguments, an unsatisfactory review, or a problematization of ex-
isting research. 
Plausibility Probes 
Plausibility probes are similar to pilot studies in experimental research de-
signs; they help sharpen hypotheses, refine the operationalization or meas-
urement of variables, or test the suitability of a case for research before start-
ing costly fieldwork or quantitative data collection. They are nomothetic in 
their orientation since the purpose of the probes is to advance a broader the-
oretical argument (Eckstein 1975; Levy 2008). The middle position of plausi-
bility probes in-between hypothesis-testing and hypothesis-generating case 
studies has recently contributed to their rising popularity. However, Levi crit-
icizes that they often serve as a residual category and that the label is used too 
often and too loosely as a legitimizing device in reaction to growing demands 
for theoretically and methodologically self-conscious research practices. Fur-
thermore, the literature on plausibility probes is typically silent on how to se-
lect cases for probing theoretical arguments and instead presupposes a clear 
hypotheses that is to be probed and an already given case (i.a. Beach and 
Pedersen 2016a: 288-9; Eckstein 1975). 
Process Tracing 
Similar to plausibility probes, process-tracing studies are often driven by a 
strong interest in accounting for a specific outcome (Beach and Pedersen 
2013: 156) and therefore do not discuss case selection strategies since the case 
is already given. For other variants of process-tracing studies, i.e. theory-test-
ing and theory-building process-tracing, methodological advice on case selec-
tion does exist. However, here case selection is based on results of existing 
large-N analysis or on knowledge about a population of cases and the presence 
or non-presence of causes and outcomes (Beach and Pedersen 2013: ch. 8). 
Hence, for theory-building research, where concept formulation is still ongo-
ing and where cause and outcome are not yet defined, process-tracing meth-
odology offers no insights into how to select cases. 
Hypothesis-Testing Case Studies 
Similar to plausibility probes, hypothesis-testing case studies are increasingly 
common in qualitative research that aims to perform valid, reliable tests of 
theoretical arguments. The generalizability of causal claims is often the central 
concern in such studies, with causal inference following a probabilistic rea-
soning that infers from a representative case or sample to a population of cases 
delimited by scope conditions. Therefore, methodological advice focusses in 
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particular on how to define scope conditions as narrowly as necessary (in or-
der to make valid inferences) and as broadly as possible (in order to make 
good, broad generalizations).21 Case selection strategies are an explicit ele-
ment of the research designs. In particular, research designs deal with issues 
like selection bias, the number of cases, and the choice of good cases for com-
parison. Case selection on the dependent variable is, for example, often con-
sidered a frequent source of selection bias, and several counter-measures are 
suggested to alleviate the problem (Levy 2008: 8-9). For the selection of com-
parable cases, it is crucial to correctly identify independent and potential 
causal variables, causal configurations of variables, and the dependent varia-
ble (Levy 2008).  
Hence, the advice given requires a high level of certainty and clarity of the-
oretical expectations as a precondition that researchers typically have not 
achieved in the early stages of their research. In simple terms, when the 
cause(s) of the phenomenon of interest is not identified yet, when scope con-
ditions are unclear and no clear hypotheses formulated, it is not possible to 
pick cases according to the above rules. This is not to say that these rules are 
of no use at all. On the contrary, they should be followed when the researcher 
aims to test a hypothesis by means of a (comparative) case study. However, 
researchers typically start engaging with cases and empirical material before 
they have formulated a clear hypothesis, but the literature gives no advice for 
case selection in this phase of research. 
The literature on hypothesis-testing case studies does, however, still offer 
some lessons for case selection in the early phases of research. A common se-
lection strategy for hypothesis-testing studies is the choice of most-likely cases 
which “show a relatively high probability of confirming the proposition under 
scrutiny” (Rohlfing 2012: 84). Beach and Pedersen note that it is more suitable 
to speak of cases in more or less conducive circumstances in case-based re-
search that relies on ontological determinism and not ontological probabilism 
(Beach and Pedersen 2016a: 47-48; cf. also Schneider and Ingo 2013). While 
the concept of the “most-likely” case suggests a need for high certainty and 
clear theoretical expectations, it is possible to transfer the basic logic to the-
ory-building research that is in the process of formulating concepts and devel-
oping theoretical expectations. That means that even without clear proposi-
tions in the form of precise hypotheses, the researcher always carries some 
theoretical hunches or vague assumptions, and these theoretical expectations 
can guide the identification of promising cases, i.e. cases in conducive circum-
stances, that we investigate at the early stages of our research. In other words, 
                                               
21 Cf. for detailed discussions of different case selection procedures Levy (2008); Rohlfing 
(2012); Seawright and Gerring (2008). 
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case selection in theory-building research should aim to identify cases where 
the roughly described phenomenon of interest is expected to be present, even 
when clear hypotheses on causal relations, mechanisms or scope conditions 
cannot be formulated yet. As will be shown below, this requires fleshing out 
the initial concept of the phenomenon of interest and of conducive conditions 
in order to identify potential causes, related phenomena, or scope conditions 
that in turn help identify and define more precisely instances of the phenom-
enon of interest. 
Hypothesis-Generating Case Studies 
The purpose of hypothesis-testing case studies is, according to Levy, to suggest 
“additional explanatory and contextual variables, causal mechanisms, inter-
action effects, and scope conditions” (2008: 5). Often, they are deviant cases 
that do not conform to an existing theory but help “refine and sharpen existing 
hypotheses in any research strategy involving an ongoing dialogue between 
theory and evidence. A theory guides an empirical analysis of a case, which is 
then used to suggest refinements in the theory, which can then be tested on 
other cases […]” (ibd.). Hence, the starting point of research lies in an already 
established theory with clear propositions that can be refined, sharpened, or 
amended. Since hypothesis-generating case studies follow deductive research 
designs that necessitate clear concepts and hypotheses before engagement 
with the empirics, the literature does not offer much advice for researchers in 
the context of discovery.  
Other interpretations of hypothesis-generating case studies fall back on in-
ductive research designs. For example, Rohlfing defines hypothesis-generat-
ing case studies as building hypotheses “from scratch“ when the researcher 
develops a hypothesis “only after exploratory process tracing” (2012: 9) and 
without drawing on elaborated theory. Here, the problem is that this inductive 
approach to theory building or hypothesis generation neither offers advice on 
case selection nor provides an adequate conceptualization of research in the 
context of discovery. 
Summary 
The discussion of the existing literature has shown that it does not give ade-
quate guidance on how to select cases in the early stages of research when 
concepts and theories are built. It follows either the logic of scientific confir-
mation in deductive research designs or the inductive building of “grounded 
theories” from empirical observations. Deductive research designs reduce the 
emergence of new theoretical expectations to spontaneous flashes of wit or 
unpredictable inspiration. They help researchers conduct an investigation 
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once concepts are formed and hypotheses formulated, but not when these pre-
conditions are not fulfilled. Inductive research designs either do not aim at 
developing theory beyond the particular case, or they fall short in giving advice 
on how to select cases and in conceptualizing an adequate process of scientific 
work that facilitates theory building. Often, they assume that the case is al-
ready given when the research design is developed.  
Many researchers will acknowledge that the discussed case selection proce-
dures are ideal-types that do not necessarily reflect how research is conducted 
in real life, and that researchers in fact often do work in an abductive way. This 
is certainly true, and as pointed out above, the argument is not that abduction 
is a new prescription for how to do research, but that it is a more apt descrip-
tion of real research processes, and that it is important to make these abduc-
tive processes more explicit. This may not only be important for reaching a 
better understanding of how a particular theory came to be, what inspired the 
author, and how her ideas developed throughout the process. More generally, 
it is important for a better understanding of how theory building works and 
for being able to create systematic guidelines that can help, for example, case 
selection in abductive research.  
Many seminal works in political science have produced insightful and rich 
theories that inspired an abundance of subsequent research, but they are ra-
ther silent on important aspects of the research design/research process. For 
example, Baumgartner and Jones’ seminal work Agendas and Instability in 
American Politics (1993) draws on a variety of case studies of different policy 
issues but does not allow the reader to comprehend and retrace the process of 
how those cases (and not others) were selected and came to be part of the 
study and process of theorizing.22 This criticism is not meant to discredit the 
value of Baumgartner and Jones’ work. Yet, more transparency and better 
communication of the process of theory-building behind this insightful work 
would be of great value to the research community.  
For case study researchers, the conclusion of this section is that there is am-
ple advice for systematic case selection in ideal-typical deductive research de-
signs, but no guidance on how to select cases in an abductive research process 
and in the early phases of research when the researcher starts engaging with 
empirical material while developing concepts and theoretical expectations.  
Nevertheless, two lessons can be learned from the existing literature: First, 
theory-guided, idiographic case studies describe a dynamic research process 
that oscillates between theory and evidence and that has the potential to build 
novel theory, but the process is not made analytically explicit. Second, case 
                                               
22 The book has been criticized for having “little rationale for the selection of cases” (Cohen 
1994: 1165). 
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selection in the early phases of research can be informed by a relaxed version 
of most-likely/most conducive case studies. 
4.2.2 A New Approach to Case Selection in Theory Building Research 
Since the existing case study literature does not do so, this section develops 
guidelines for systematic case selection in the early phases of research. First, 
the concept of instrumental case studies is introduced; then, the theory-
guided selection of positive instrumental cases developed and suggested. The 
subsequent section shows how the guidelines were applied in this dissertation. 
The case selection procedure developed and presented here can be seen as a 
friendly addition and practical guide to what Ragin describes as “casing” (cf. 
e.g. Ragin 2000: esp. ch. 2; Ragin and Becker 2000; Ragin 2009). In Ragin’s 
words,  
[…] “casing” is a more-or-less routine research act, especially in the social sci-
ences. Researchers “case” their evidence in order to bring closure to difficult issues 
in conceptualization and research design and thus allow analysis to proceed. Em-
pirical evidence is infinite in its complexity, specificity, and contextuality. Casing 
focuses attention on specific aspects of that infinity, highlighting some aspects as 
relevant and obscuring others. For example, it matters greatly whether a set of 
actions by a group of individuals is characterized as “dissonance reduction,” “col-
lective behavior,” “collective action,” “resource expenditure” by a “social move-
ment organization,” or “incipient institutionalization.” Different casings provide 
different blinders, different findings, and different connections to theory, research 
literatures, and research communities. Casing locates research in the vast domain 
of social science, linking it to the efforts of some researchers and severing its con-
nections with others (Ragin 2009: 523-24). 
In short, this dissertation understands casing as the continuous, interlinked 
process of concept formulation, population delimination and the formulation 
of causal expectations. That means that cases, or casings, are momentary 
snapshots of the ongoing process of concept formulation and reformulation 
that characterizes research processes. Concept formulations are momentarily 
fixed definitions of what does (and does not) constitute a case and therefore 
define the (again momentarily fixed) borders of the case population. As Ragin 
also highlights, while many social science-relevant populations are preconsti-
tuted (e.g. by population surveys), others must be theoretically defined and 
constituted by the researcher. The question of cases and populations is there-
fore not only an issue of classification but also of theoretical advancement. 
This is also because there is a close interplay between concept formulation and 
population definition and causal analysis in case studies, meaning that a 
“causally relevant feature of a case can be interpreted as a condition for the 
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operation of a cause or as a cause” (Ragin 2000: 56). For example, in this dis-
sertation, initially theorized indicators that are meant to describe and identify 
the core phenomenon of interest and help case selection (cf. section 4.2.3, Step 
2) will later on be discussed as potential conditions for architectural policy 
design (cf. chapter 8).  
The Concept of Instrumental Case Studies 
The concept of instrumental case studies was originally proposed by Stake 
(Grandy 2010; Stake 1994, 1995). According to Stake, a case study is instru-
mental when the case or cases studied are vehicles, i.e. instruments, for a dif-
ferent purpose. The instrumental case serves to “provide insight into a partic-
ular issue, redraw generalizations, or build theory. In instrumental case stud-
ies the case facilitates understanding of something else” (Grandy 2010: 474).  
Instrumental cases play a supportive role in addressing the puzzle, tension, 
or surprise that motivated the research or in problematizing the existing liter-
ature. The investigation does not aim to deductively test a priori defined hy-
potheses but to produce novel theoretical implications, develop new hypothe-
ses, and yield new theoretical and empirical insights during the course of the 
research. The case and its contexts are therefore examined in depth and de-
scribed in rich detail in order to create opportunities for a better understand-
ing of the phenomenon of interest. The focus of the case study is known be-
forehand and does not emerge inductively from the case, but an evolving the-
oretical framework and the empirical investigation guide each other. Hence, 
the case is not chosen by its historical significance or a deductive logic of hy-
pothesis testing but through careful theoretical consideration of learning op-
portunities about the phenomenon of interest.  
Similar to the way that abduction is not a prescription of how to do research 
but a more apt description of real research processes (see discussion section), 
the concept of instrumental case studies is a more apt description of how many 
researchers think about the case(s) they study. Again, Baumgartner and Jones’ 
work (1993) is a useful example. While the authors, as mentioned above, do 
not allow for much insight into the process of case selection, their approach 
qualifies well as instrumental. As the authors themselves briefly note, they 
chose a wide variety of issues (i.e. cases) that showed the phenomena they 
were interested in, and this choice was guided by the availability of good, care-
ful case studies that allowed them to discuss several issues over longer periods 
and to be able to be sensitive to the many details that can be important to pol-
icy development (ibid.: 23). In following this strategy, Baumgartner and Jones 
chose cases that were instrumental for their theory building.  
Reflecting on case study research from the perspective of the instrumental 
case study, it is possible to think more clearly about which role the case plays 
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in the overall research process and how it can be systematically selected. The 
concept of instrumental case studies highlights that the motivation for re-
search neither rests within one particular case (as in idiographic case studies 
or Rohlfing’s understanding of hypothesis-generating case studies), nor is it 
based purely in theoretical reasoning (as in deductive, hypothesis-testing case 
studies or Levi’s understanding of hypothesis-generating case studies). It 
points out that the role of the case often lies in between those two extremes. 
The particular case is not elementary to motivate the inquiry, but it is a case 
of something bigger, a population that is defined and redefined throughout 
the casing process. It represents a conceptual interest, a puzzle or tension be-
tween theories and empirical observation, or a problematic assumption in the 
literature that the researcher challenges. Cases are, especially when one builds 
theory, not chosen deductively based on clear and precise concepts and hy-
potheses but according to theoretical hunches and vague concepts, which are 
developed through theoretical and empirical readings that inspire our case se-
lection. The early engagement with a case then shapes the subsequent re-
search path and the coevolution of the theoretical framework and empirical 
database. In that sense, the case itself also shapes what it is a case of.23 
Guidelines for Systematic Case Selection in the Context of Discovery 
Case selection should therefore be based on a careful theoretical consideration 
of potential learning opportunities a case might provide. In contrast to con-
ventional views on case selection, the instrumental case is not selected to rep-
resent an a priori defined population of cases but to maximize learning oppor-
tunities about the phenomenon of interest. Case selection is therefore not a 
problem of correct sampling, representativeness, and generalizability but of 
population definition and concept formulation. In order to maximize learning 
opportunities, positive cases are selected. These cases are expected to show 
the phenomenon of interest as well as assumed potential causes, affinitive 
phenomena or mechanisms that the researcher is interested in investigating 
or has hunches about.  
Here, the approach is similar to the concept of most conducive case envi-
ronment that will most likely “produce” the phenomenon of interest. The cru-
cial difference between the selection of positive cases in theory-building re-
search and traditional most likely/most conducive case studies is the absence 
of precise theoretical propositions for positive cases. Instead, a positive case 
                                               
23 More precisely, one could say that the case (meaning the empirical phenomenon looked 
at) influences the casing (meaning the momentarily fixed formulation of what analytical con-
cept the empirical phenomenon represents) and therefore what it is a case of (meaning what 
population of cases it belongs to). 
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in theory-building research relies on vague concepts and theoretical hunches 
that are specified in and through the process of case selection or casing itself. 
In practice, this means a five-step process of case selection, which will be il-
lustrated empirically in section 4.2.3. In abstract terms, the five steps can be 
described as follows below. Table 4.1 summarizes the five steps of the case se-
lection process in a concise overview. 
Table 4.1: A Systematic Guideline for the Selection of Positive, Instrumental 
Cases 
Step 1 Clarify main concept and underlying assumptions 
Step 2 Develop indicator list through cursory literature reviews 
Step 3 Systematize/categorize indicators 
Step 4 Develop evaluation scheme 
Step 5 
Systematically evaluate cases through cursory literature reviews and select best 
evaluated cases for in-depth study 
Step 1: Clarify main concept and underlying assumptions 
The researcher builds her knowledge of the phenomenon of interest in the 
early and cursory engagement with empirical and theoretical/conceptual lit-
erature in order to develop an open, initial concept, a list of potentially related 
phenomena, causes, mechanisms, scope conditions, etc. 
Step 2: Develop indicator list through cursory literature reviews 
The initial concept helps the researcher increasingly to refine her theoretical 
hunches and limit the number of potential cases to investigate via observable 
scope conditions, mechanisms, causes, etc. In the process of refining the initial 
concept through readings of abstract as well as more and more case-specific 
literature, the researcher develops a list of observable indicators that are as-
sumed to help identify positive cases of the phenomenon of interest. Indica-
tors do not have to be identified across all readings and potential cases but 
may only appear relevant in one specific context. However, at the end of this 
step of the case selection process, the researcher summarizes a list of indica-
tors that all potential cases will be confronted with. 
Step 3: Systematize / categorize indicators 
The researcher systematizes or categorizes the list of indicators in a meaning-
ful way depending on the research topic. 
Step 4: Develop evaluation scheme 
The researcher develops an evaluation scheme that indicates how cases are 
evaluated based on their scores on different indicators, e.g. as suitable, prom-
ising or ideal cases for further empirical investigation of the phenomenon of 
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interest. The key dimension for categorizing different cases is their instrumen-
tality for investigating the phenomenon of interest in further empirical re-
search. Typically, the more indicators a case scores positively on, the more in-
strumental it is for learning about the phenomenon of interest.  
Step 5: Systematically evaluate potential cases through cursory literature 
reviews and select best evaluated cases for in-depth study (includes 
consideration of pragmatic research constraints) 
The researcher evaluates potential positive cases for empirical investigation 
based on the list of indicators. Potential positive cases have been identified 
earlier in the case selection process, especially in Step 1 and Step 2, when the 
researcher engages with theoretical and empirical literature related to the 
phenomenon of interest. In particular, vague scope conditions help to distin-
guish between irrelevant cases and potentially positive cases. The evaluation 
of potentially positive cases is not intended to measure each case on each in-
dicator in a definite way but to qualify a potential case based on a cursory 
reading of case-specific literature. The result of Step 5 is a list of potentially 
positive cases ranked according to their instrumentality for learning about the 
phenomenon of interest. The type of case study and related selection proce-
dure is therefore termed positive instrumental case study.  
Step 5 also includes the consideration of pragmatic research constraints 
that delimit the range of “selectable” cases. For example, such pragmatic con-
siderations can pertain to language qualifications or the accessibility of em-
pirical material (archives, interviewees, etc.). Ultimately, these pragmatic con-
siderations reflect the researcher’s ambition to find the most conducive em-
pirical material for her study. That is, when the researcher is interested in the 
internal procedures of policy making, archives might offer more accessible 
material and better evidence on instances dating further back in time than on 
recent instances, for which material might be classified. Pragmatic limitations 
and considerations during case selection might also have an impact on the im-
plications that can be drawn from the investigation. For example, if the re-
searcher chooses Germany or Austria due to language considerations, she 
should evaluate the results of the investigation carefully and discuss whether 
characteristics of these countries (e.g. parliamentary system, corporatism) 
should be interpreted as potential scope conditions.  
Summary 
In response to a critical evaluation of the existing literature on case studies 
and case selection, the above sections have developed a concept of positive 
instrumental case studies and proposed guidelines for systematically select-
ing such cases. The guidelines can be understood as a friendly addition and 
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practical explication of what Ragin has called “casing”. In a nutshell, research-
ers are advised to select positive cases that likely show the phenomenon of 
interest as well as potential, vague causes, mechanisms, or affinitive phenom-
ena. The researcher can use her initial concept of the phenomenon of interest 
in order to develop a set of indicators that help identify likely positive cases 
and rate their instrumentality for empirically investigating the phenomenon 
of interest. Indicators are developed through readings of theoretical and em-
pirical literature, with the researcher constantly oscillating between theory 
and empirics, and help the researcher quickly evaluate instances of the phe-
nomenon of interest in cursory literature reviews. Cases can then be sorted 
into categories of suitable, promising, or ideal cases for further empirical in-
vestigation of the phenomenon of interest and, hence, for gaining a deeper 
understanding of it and developing more precise theoretical propositions.  
The case selection strategy has been applied in this dissertation and makes 
a general contribution to the literature. The contribution lies in providing a 
strategy for systematic case selection in theory-building research, for which 
the existing literature gives no methodological advice. The literature follows 
either the logic of scientific confirmation in deductive research designs or the 
inductive building of “grounded theories” from empirical observation. For 
case study researchers, this means that there is ample advice on how to sys-
tematically select cases in ideal-typical deductive research designs or as what 
type of case study a given study can be qualified. However, researchers have 
no guidance on how to select cases in in reality often quite messy research 
processes. Researchers also have no guidance on case selection for early 
phases of research, when researchers start engaging with empirical material 
while developing concepts and theoretical expectations.  
By developing new methodological advice for systematic case selection in 
theory-building research, the methodological framework of this dissertation 
improves our ability to develop new theories, frameworks, and concepts. It 
responds to a growing awareness among social scientists that the ability to 
produce new theories and to communicate the process behind theory building 
is limited.24 The approach therefore demands, facilitates, and supports more 
self-awareness about consequential decisions made in early phases of research 
and advances the growing literature on abductive reasoning. It emphasizes 
that abduction should not be understood as a new, prescriptive approach to 
doing research better but as a more apt description of how most researchers 
                                               
24 See, e.g., Alvesson and Sandberg (2011a, 2011b); Carleheden (2016); Dubois and Gadde 
(1999, 2002, 2014); Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009); Kilduff (2006); LePine and Wilcox-
King (2010); McKaughan (2008); Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012); Swedberg (2012, 
2014b, 2014a, 2016); Tavory and Timmermans (2014); Timmermans and Tavory (2012). 
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already do research. Specifically, it adds to the literature on abduction-sys-
tematic guidelines for case selection that fit the core elements of abductive 
reasoning well.  
4.2.3 Applying the Approach in the Investigation of Architectural Policy 
Design 
This section illustrates how the outlined case selection strategy was applied to 
identify positive instrumental cases for the study of architectural policy de-
sign. 
Step 1: Clarify main concept and underlying assumptions 
Since the concept of architectural policy design describes a mode of policy 
making that, without further theorizing, might occur in almost any case of 
public policy making, the challenge was first to identify irrelevant cases and 
demarcate the universe of potential cases by carving out some underlying as-
sumptions of the concept. Through reading of theoretical and empirical liter-
ature, two preconditions that were implicit in the concept could be identified: 
the intentionality and capability of political actors in policy making. First, pol-
icy feedback needs to be the result of intentional action and not a side effect 
or unintended consequence of policy making. This is in contrast to most exist-
ing literature on policy feedback and poses a challenge since actors’ intention-
ality cannot simply be read retrospectively from the resulting feedback effects. 
Second, the idea of architectural policy design requires that actors are capable 
of designing policies intentionally. They need to have the capability and invest 
time and effort in strategically designing policies and policy feedback (cf. 
chapter 3). This capability can, e.g., be reduced when policy making happens 
in a “state of emergency” under extraordinary or unanticipated circumstances 
like natural disasters or abrupt economic crises.  
Step 2: Develop indicator list through cursory literature reviews 
While this demarcation helped to think more clearly about what architectural 
policy design is, it still did not help to narrow down the number of cases suffi-
ciently to identify suitable cases for empirical studies. In a second step, a num-
ber of indicators were theorized that could help to evaluate at a first cursory 
look whether an instance of policy making might show elements of architec-
tural policy design, i.e., whether it might be a case of architectural policy de-
sign. In other words, indicators were supposed to help assess whether a case 
is a positive case and instrumental in studying architectural policy design. 
Each indicator can be seen as representing a question that instances of policy 
making could be confronted with in cursory literature reviews in order to de-
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termine whether they might show elements of architectural policy design. Ta-
ble 4.2, p. 84, provides an overview of all indicators grouped in dimensions 
and sub-dimensions (see Step 3). Additionally, it lists a guiding question for 
each indicator that potential cases of political architecture were confronted 
with in initial rounds of case evaluation. A detailed description of the individ-
ual indicators can be found in the Appendix, p. 274. In brief, the indicators 
addressed aspects of policy makers’ resources during policy making, of the po-
tential impact of a reform, and of the political conflict characterizing the re-
form debate. More specifically, the indicators addressed policy makers’ level 
of funding or financial means they can draw upon during policy making, the 
qualifications and capability of policy makers and their staff, the political net-
works policy makers are part of and their access and inclusion in formal deci-
sion-making processes, and the political pressure that policy makers might be 
able to create. Furthermore, the indicators addressed the degree of redistribu-
tion caused by a policy, the degree to which a policy reconfigures and reshapes 
the political landscape, the timing of a policy reform, electoral considerations 
of policy makers regarding whether or to what degree a policy is vulnerable to 
future withdrawal, and whether political alternatives/different reform pro-
posal are debated. 
Step 3: Systematize/categorize indicators 
In the next step, the 16 indicators were grouped into three dimensions: a re-
source dimension, a conflict dimension, and an impact dimension. The re-
source dimension is related to political actors’ capability for architectural pol-
icy design, and its indicators helped evaluate how capable and resourceful po-
litical actors are in terms of long-term, strategic policy making. Specifically, 
indicators in the resource dimension ask whether political actors possess re-
sources that enable them to conduct long-term, strategic policy design, cov-
ering four kinds of resources (financial resources, personnel, networks/ access 
to formal decision-making, and creation of political pressure). Taken together, 
the four indicators in the resource dimension should give a good impression 
of the resources political actors possess regarding long-term, strategic policy 
design in concrete cases of policy making. Partially, the indicators can overlap 
in certain cases, for example regarding funding and personnel. At the same, 
time they allow for a differentiation between different kinds of resources that 
political actors might possess. 
The conflict and impact dimension related to political actors’ intentionality 
and the indicators helped evaluate the likeliness of intentional, long-term pol-
icy design. The impact dimension specifically asks how likely it is that a policy 
will affect the future development in the policy field. This complex question 
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can be broken down into three sub-dimensions that look at redistribution (ac-
cess and level of social benefits/social rights), reconfiguration (how a reform 
might affect political actors’ resources as discussed in the resource dimen-
sion), and timing (whether there is a window of opportunity for a reform). 
Combined, the three sub-dimensions and their nine indicators in the impact 
dimension should give a good impression of whether a policy is likely to affect 
the future development in a policy field. Importantly, it needs to be reiterated 
that the goal is not to definitely assess the exact, future effects of a policy but 
to get a sense of and grip on what effects could potentially flow from a policy 
and could be considered by policy makers. The conflict dimension tries to as-
sess whether or to what degree a policy is vulnerable to future withdrawal. 
In particular, it asks whether actors fear losing control over “their policy” (by 
being voted out of government or excluded from decision-making processes) 
and how contested a reform is (i.e. whether there are political alternatives and 
how salient a reform is to voters).  
In sum, the 16 indicators served as a valuable guide in cursory investiga-
tions of potential cases (cf. Appendix, p. 274, for a detailed description of all 
indicators, dimensions and sub-dimensions). They were not meant to meas-
ure cases precisely on different dimensions or variables but to help get a grip 
of “what might be going on in a case” and to evaluate and sort cases according 
to how promising they seemed for closer investigation in empirical studies 
that would support and facilitate theory development. All indicators were 
identified through simultaneous theorizing and engagement with empirics 
throughout the case selection process.  
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Table 4.2: Indicator List for the Evaluation of Potential Cases of Architectural 
Policy Design 
Dimension Sub-dimension Indicator 
Resources 









Funding: Can actors financially afford to devise policies 
and/or evaluate policy drafts? 
- 
Personnel: Are actors capable/qualified to devise and/or 
evaluate policy drafts? 
- 
Networks: Are actors included or heard in formal 
decision-making processes? 
- 
Politics: Can actors create political pressure on formal 
decision makers? 
Impact 
Is the policy 
likely to affect 
future 
developments 
in the policy 
field? 
Redistribution 




Benefit access: Does the reform affect or change citizens’ 
access to benefits? 
Social rights: Does the reform affect or change citizens’ 
social rights? 
Benefit level: Does the reform affect or change levels of 
benefits? 
Reconfiguration 
Is the policy likely 
to reconfigure the 
political 
landscape? 
Funding: Does the reform affect or change the financial 
base of an agency or organized interests? 
Personnel: Does the reform affect or change bureaucratic 
or organizational capacities? 
Networks: Does the reform affect or change decision-
making procedures? 
Politics: Does the reform affect or change mobilization 
prospects or patterns? 
- 
Timing: Does a “window of opportunity” allow for 
unusually far-reaching policy reform? 
Conflict 





Do actors fear 
losing power over 
“their” policy? 
Electoral: Do actors fear being voted out of positions with 
formal decision-making power? 
Network: Do actors fear being excluded from formal 
decision-making processes? 
Contestation 
How contested is 
the policy issue? 
Policy alternative: Are there viable alternatives that 
could replace the policy? 
Issue salience: Is the issue of high importance to voters? 
 
Step 4: Develop evaluation scheme 
Figure 4.1 illustrates how these indicators helped evaluate and categorize 
cases of policy making. The square box comprised all potential cases of politi-
cal architecture, that is, all instances of policy making that fulfilled the two 
basic preconditions of intentionality and capability (Step 1). Cases that were 
positively evaluated on several or all indicators from all dimensions consti-
tuted ideal cases. Cases that were positively evaluated on a majority or all in-
dicators from two dimensions but negatively on all indicators from the third 
dimension constituted promising cases. Cases that were positively evaluated 
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on only a few indicators from one dimension and none of the others consti-
tuted suitable cases. 
Figure 4.1: Categorizing Potential Cases of Architectural Policy Design 
 
Step 5: Systematically evaluate potential cases through cursory literature 
reviews and select best evaluated cases for in-depth study (includes 
consideration of pragmatic research constraints) 
In the final step, relevant instances of policy making were evaluated using the 
complete list of indicators. Relevant means that the cases fit pragmatic re-
search limitations and that they became prominent during the case selection 
process. For pragmatic reasons, the universe of potential cases was limited to 
Germany and the period from 1966 to 1985. Case selection was limited to Ger-
man public policy making due to language proficiency and geographical prox-
imity. The considered period was set to begin (counting backwards) in 1985 
and end in 1966. The year 1985 was chosen because records in the archives of 
political parties and the German parliament are available only 30 years after 
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their manufacture (cf. section 4.3). The year 1966 was chosen to limit the pe-
riod to a manageable length and ensure variation regarding government coa-
litions, respectively government-opposition constellations.25  
Important policy reforms of those years were identified by reading litera-
ture on policy making in Germany from 1966 to 1985 (e.g. Borowsky 2002; 
Faulenbach 2011; Pape 1982; Pridham 1977; Rummel 1969; Wewer et al. 1998; 
Zohlnhöfer 2001). The literature typically discusses reforms that are consid-
ered key achievements or failures of the respective government or that created 
or reflected intense political debates and conflicts. For evaluating the instru-
mentality of these repeatedly mentioned reforms for further empirical inves-
tigation, more targeted, reform-specific literature or excerpts were drawn 
upon in cursory reviews. In total, nine such important reforms were reviewed 
as potential instances of architectural policy design. For each reform, a brief 
description of the policy content and the political context and an indicator-by-
indicator evaluation of the reform was prepared. The nine case evaluations 
can be found in the Appendix, p. 278. Table 4.3, below, summarizes the re-
sults. Four reforms were evaluated as “promising to ideal”, three reforms as 
“promising” and two reforms as “suitable to promising”.  
For the first case study, one of the reforms with the highest evaluation, the 
Codetermination Act of 1976, was selected to study architectural policy design 
in a case/context that is expected to be most conducive. Later in the research 
process, the Pay Continuation Act of 1969 was selected as a second case. This 
act was chosen because of its medium-level evaluation and, thus, increased 
diversity and potentially allowed for new learning opportunities and insights 
due to its lower evaluation than the Codetermination Act while still ensuring 
that the phenomenon of interest could likely still be studied. Furthermore, the 
Pay Continuation Act was selected because it is from the same policy field as 
the Codetermination Act (labor/industrial relations). This makes it easier to 
present the two cases and their historical and political-institutional context in 
a stringent manner and to focus on the policy design situation itself when com-
paring both cases since “context noise” is reduced. A short description and in-
troduction to both cases can be found at the beginning of each case study in 
chapters 6 and 7. Indicator-by-indicator evaluations of both cases are included 
in the Appendix, p. 278. 
  
                                               
25 From 1966 to 1969, Germany was ruled by a Grand Coalition of Christian Democrats and 
Social Democrats; from 1969 to 1982 by Social Democrats and Liberals; and from 1982 to 
1998 by Christian Democrats and Liberals. 
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Table 4.3: Evaluation of Potential Cases of Architectural Policy Design 


























































































































































































































 Funding ++1 ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ o ++ + 
Personnel ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ - ++ + 
Networks ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++ 
































Benefit access ++ -- -- -- ++ ++ -- -- -- 
Social rights ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ -- ++ 
Benefit level + -- -- -- ++ ++ -- -- -- 
Funding ++ ++ -- ++ ++ -- - ++ ++ 
Personnel -- ++ ++ - -- - - ++ ++ 
Networks -- + ++ - -- -- -- ++ ++ 
Mobilization o ++ ++ ++ + - - -- + + 







Electoral o ++ o + ++ + ++ -- ++ 
Network o ++ ++ o -- o ++ -- ++ 
Policy alterna-
tive 
++ ++ ++ o ++ o ++ o + 
Issue salience + ++ ++ ++ ++ o ++ -- o 
Overall evaluation o2 + + o + o - - o 
Notes: 1) Indicator evaluation: ++ = positive, + = positive to ambiguous, o = ambiguous, – = 
negative to ambiguous, -- = negative; 2) Overall case evaluation: + = ideal, +o = promising to 
ideal, o = promising, -o = suitable to promising, – = suitable; 3) Grey shaded columns show 
the two selected cases. 
 
4.3 The Collection of Empirical Material 
The next step after case selection concerns the collection of empirical material, 
in particular the identification of potential data sources and the selection of 
relevant material. As discussed previously, both steps are interlinked since an 
awareness of the availability and accessibility of potential data sources affects 
case selection, and case selection affects the definition and demarcation of po-
tentially relevant data sources. 
In principle, one can base the investigation of architectural policy design 
strategies on two types of empirical material. First, the researcher can inves-
tigate architectural policy-design strategies “in the here and now”, that is, 
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where, while and when they unfold or shortly thereafter. In order to do so, the 
researcher can for example conduct interviews with policy makers (broadly 
understood as actors actively involved in the legislative process or actors who 
have a stake in a reform) or execute a participatory study, e.g. take part in 
parliamentary committee meetings during the legislative process. Such stud-
ies enable the researcher to look at recent or unfolding instances of public pol-
icy making and to get direct access to involved actors’ immediate experiences, 
evaluations and personal views on the process of policy design in order to 
study architectural policy design. 
The second type of empirical material pertains to more “historical” cases of 
architectural policy design, that is, instances of public policy making that date 
further back in the past and where data collection via interviews faces greater 
challenges in the recollection of past events, opinions, strategic considera-
tions, etc. In contrast to the above, the researcher can then base the investiga-
tion on written records (which are often not available for more recent cases) 
and collect relevant material, e.g., in archives of involved institutions, per-
sonal collections, secondary literature, or media outlets/archives. Such stud-
ies enable the researcher to go back in time and investigate long passed but 
nevertheless interesting or relevant instances of public policy making and to 
base the investigation on material that may be, to some degree, less “subjec-
tive” but more “objectified” (e.g. transcripts of committee meetings produced 
by stenographic staff in parliament or official policy documents). 
The objective of this chapter is not to enter into a lengthy discussion of the 
benefits and pitfalls of archival versus interview-based research26 or to rate 
the two alternatives or qualify one as generally superior, since both options 
have their own inherent strengths and weaknesses, challenges and opportuni-
ties. While the empirical investigation conducted for this dissertation is solely 
based on written, archival records, it is always up to the responsible researcher 
to decide which collection strategy suits the research project best. Further-
more, the two options are not mutually exclusive. Studies of more recent 
events can also be based on written, archival material if available, and studies 
of past policy making can include retrospective interviews if involved actors 
can be recruited.  
For this dissertation, the “archival route” was chosen in order to base the 
investigation on a broad empirical foundation and to have a wide range of 
cases to choose from. Therefore, the study is primarily based on a large num-
ber of primary archival records collected in three archives in Germany: the 
Archive for Christian-Democratic Policy (ACDP) in St. Augustin, the Archive 
                                               
26 Cf. e.g. Frisch et al. (2012); Thies (2002); McCulloch (2004) on archival research in polit-
ical science and Gubrium (2012) on interview-based research. 
89 
of Social Democracy (AdsD) in Bonn, and the Parliamentary Archives of the 
German Bundestag in Berlin (PA). For matters of completeness, it should be 
mentioned that the empirical study is also based on a large array of secondary 
literature on the 1969 Pay Continuation Act and the 1976 Codetermination Act 
(respectively, the topics pay continuation and codetermination) and on the 
political and socio-political context of policy making in Germany in the 1960s 
and 1970s.27,28 
For both data collection strategies, a key challenge lies in investigating pol-
icy makers’ strategies and intentions in policy design. This is because policy 
makers’ long-term, strategic goals cannot necessarily be read off the material 
easily, and the researcher needs to constantly ask herself how intentional pol-
icy makers’ actions or decisions are and how explicit policy makers are about 
their long-term goals and strategies. For example, one should ask whether 
parties or MPs have a reason to hide specific long-term goals or intentions, 
maybe because they impose losses on an important constituency, or whether 
they are open and frank about them because these effects lie in a distant future 
or are too difficult to understand and grasp for the public. One could also ask 
whether policy makers would put these goals and strategies in writing (and if 
so, where or how they would do so) and whether they would talk about them 
during the design process or only in hindsight, maybe because they are politi-
cally too controversial.  
Again, this chapter does not claim that one data collection strategy is gen-
erally superior to the other but acknowledges that different strategies can be 
used to address and cope with these challenges in both interview-based and 
archival research. Section 4.3.2 discusses how the chosen “archival route” re-
sponds to the challenge of investigating policy makers’ long-term goals, strat-
egies, and intentions. Furthermore, section 4.3.2 evaluates the extent and 
quality of the generated data pool and discusses how the specific selection of 
relevant material affects the conclusions drawn from the empirical analyses. 
Before that, section 4.3.1 gives an overview of the material accessed in the 
three archives and the selection strategies applied to identify and collect rele-
vant material. 
                                               
27 See Sager and Rosser (2016) on the importance of secondary literature in historically ori-
ented political science research.  
28 All quotes of non-English secondary literature and archival material presented in the dis-
sertation have been translated or paraphrased by the author. 
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4.3.1 Data Sources: Available and Selected Material 
This section gives a brief description of archives accessed during field trips 
and of the material collected there. Exhaustive lists of the accessed material 
can be found in the Appendix, p. 265.  
The Parliamentary Archives of the German Bundestag 
The Parliamentary Archives of the German Bundestag collects all documents 
related to acts announced in the Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt, 
BGBl.) in so-called “act documentations” (Gesetzesdokumentationen), i.e. 
documentations of the legislative process of an act. These documentations 
contain five types of material:  
(1) All publicly available material like protocols of plenary discussions (verbatim), 
printed matters of the Bundestag, e.g. act proposals, motions to amend and ques-
tions to the government and government replies.  
(2) All documents of parliamentary working groups in which the proposed act was 
discussed and which are typically not available to the public, for instance protocols 
of working group meetings (verbatim or condensed) and expert hearings,29 mo-
tions to amend, resolutions, and working documents like synopses of competing 
drafts.  
(3) Protocols (verbatim or condensed) and resolutions from the second chamber 
of parliament, the Bundesrat, both of its general plenary assembly and of involved 
working groups.  
(4) A broad range of policy papers, press releases, correspondence, and submis-
sions made by interest groups either during the formal policy making process or 
as part of their public relations work.  
(5) Selected press material on the issue that were not explicitly mentioned during 
the legislative process but are important in the public discussion.  
In the process of case selection described above, nine such documentations 
were accessed. The volume ranged from one to 16 bound volumes, each con-
taining approx. 250-500 pages of material (cf. Appendix, p. 265, for an over-
view). In the selection of relevant material, priority was given to documents 
from types 1 to 3. Plenary discussions were collected completely as well as 
draft acts and motions to amend introduced to parliament. Protocols from 
working groups were collected completely for the leading working group, for 
other working groups only longer protocols of more extensive discussions 
were collected, but not protocols of meeting with a more administrative char-
acter (e.g. discussions of meeting agenda or timelines). For types 4 and 5, a 
selection of material was collected. The focus was placed on material from/ 
                                               
29 Protocols of expert hearings are in some instances made publicly available if the working 
group makes the expert hearing open to the public. 
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about important interest groups like unions or employers’ federations (e.g. 
DGB, BDI, BDA) instead of material from/about individual unions or employ-
ers’ organizations (e.g. DAG, ULA, craft associations), which was only col-
lected when the individual union or branch played an especially important 
role (e.g. the interest organization of managerial employees). Material col-
lected in the Parliament Archives proved especially important and fruitful in 
the investigation of the 1976 Codetermination Act but only produced few in-
sights into strategic policy design strategies in the 1969 Pay Continuation Act. 
In order to counter this imbalance, material on the Pay Continuation Act was 
prioritized higher in the party archives (cf. section 4.3.2 and section 4.4).  
Archives of Political Parties in Germany 
Archives of the political parties are another major source of empirical mate-
rial. All major parties in Germany run archives that collect, preserve, and 
make accessible material from the parties, their parliamentary groups, and 
various other party groupings or affiliated organizations on the federal, state 
or local level. Material can include, e.g., transcripts of meetings or result pro-
tocols, position papers, drafts and working papers, speeches, personal and of-
ficial correspondence, memos, press clippings, press releases, legal docu-
ments, and public relations material. Both archives also hold printed tran-
scripts of all meetings of the parties’ parliamentary groups. However, these 
materials were not collected in the archives since they are almost completely 
available in edited volumes published by the Kommission für Geschichte des 
Parlamenatirsmus und der Politischen Parteien e.V., KGParl (see Appendix, 
p. 272, for a full list of these publications) and/or as pdf-files via the website 
fraktionsprotokolle.de (last access: December 2017). The volume and system-
atics of classification in the archives – and therefore the accessibility of mate-
rial – can vary drastically from archive to archive and can depend on, e.g., the 
covered time frame or the organizational unit. As a rule of thumb, documents 
are more easily accessible through systematic classification of the inventory 
the more recent they are and the more professionalized the organizational unit 
was. Furthermore, accessibility to material can be limited by practical user 
guidelines defined by the archives. For example, both archives visited for this 
dissertation limit the number of copies or scans users may make and, thus, 
limit the amount of material that can be analyzed in depth once the archive 
visit is completed.  
The sheer volume of available material and the practical limitations in ac-
cessing it necessitate a thought-through search strategy. In both archives, the 
same search strategy was applied. Relevant material was identified via 
searches in digital databases or printed indexes of the inventory. Primary 
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search words were Lohnfortzahlung/Lohnfortzahlungsgesetz (pay continua-
tion/pay continuation act) and Mitbestimmung/Mitbestimmungsgesetz (co-
determination/codeterminatin act), secondary search words were Lohnpolitik 
(wage politics), Krankenversicherung/Krankenversicherungsreform (health 
insurance/health insurance reform), and specifications of codetermination 
like paritätisch (based on parity) or überbetrieblich (corporate).  
Due to the breadth of the topics pay continuation and codetermination, 
which affected the fields of social policy, labor policy, health policy, and indus-
trial relations, and due to the long duration of the political debates from the 
early Federal Republic until the adoption of acts in 1969 respectively 1976, not 
all identified material was physically accessed. For example, a search for the 
keyword Lohnfortzahlung in the archive of the Confederation of German 
Trade Unions, DGB, which is part of the Archive for Social Democracy (AdsD), 
gives more than 100 hits that direct the user to binders with approx. 50-250 
pages of material each; of which some address the topic Lohnfortzahlung. 
Therefore, identified material was strategically selected based on four consid-
erations:  
(1) Material with clear hits for the primary key words, i.e. where pay continuation 
or codetermination were at the center of the archival record and not a minor issue, 
were preferred since they were expected to contain a wide variety of very issue-
specific documents. Such material could include documentations on pay continu-
ation or codetermination or of commissions set up to discuss these reforms/top-
ics. 
(2) Material that was chronologically closer to the adoption of the acts or the sec-
ond and third plenary debates in the Bundestag were preferred over material fur-
ther away from those dates since the former was expected to reflect the political 
conflicts over the adoption and design of the policies more clearly.  
(3) Material related to actors or groups with a stake in the reforms and/or exper-
tise on the issue (e.g. the different party wings within the Christian Democrats, 
party or parliament working groups/commissions) were preferred over material 
of groups that were less affected by and more distant from the political issue, since 
they were expected to include particularly clear expressions of opinions on and 
evaluations of competing policy designs.  
(4) Material on pay continuation was given slightly more weight in party archives 
than material on codetermination, since the analysis of documents from the Par-
liamentary Archives (which was conducted first) had been more conclusive for the 
Codetermination Act than for the Pay Continuation Act. Material on pay continu-
ation was therefore more necessary to fill gaps in the parliamentary material and 
give additional insights into the policy design process. 
After an initial familiarization with material of different kinds (e.g. personal 
collections, correspondence, commissions, protocols), time periods, and or-
ganizational unis (e.g. national party, intra-party groupings, parliamentary 
93 
working groups), the selection strategy was continuously updated during ar-
chival visits in order to discover documents with the highest value for the em-
pirical investigation. For example, personal collections of politicians identified 
as important during early stages of archive visits were included in the search 
for relevant material later on during the visit. The accessed material was then 
skimmed to identify documents that gave insight into political positions and 
strategies regarding the reforms and their policy design and to discard docu-
ments that only repeated information already covered by other material, were 
unrelated to pay continuation of codetermination, or, e.g., were of more ad-
ministrative character like committee invitations. The selected material was 
then copied for further analysis. 
The sections below give a brief overview of the material accessed in the ar-
chives of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, in particular 
which organizational units of the two parties the material belonged to. Ex-
haustive lists of all accessed material can be found in the Appendix, p. 265. 
The Archive for Christian-Democratic Policy, ACDP 
The Archive for Christian-Democratic Policy (ACDP) in St. Augustin holds the 
material of the Christian Democrats as well as personal collections and mate-
rial of important groupings within the party, e.g. the Christian Democratic 
Employees’ Association (Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft, 
CDA), the Discussion Group Small- and Medium-Sized Business (Diskussion-
skreis Mittelstand, DKM) and the Small- and Medium-Sized Business Associ-
ation of CDU/CSU (Mittelstands- und Wirtschaftsvereinigung der CDU/ 
CSU, MIT). The accessed material can be grouped into seven categories (cf. 
Appendix, p. 265, for a complete list of accessed material):  
(1) Material from the national party, e.g. related to working groups, the CDU lead-
ership, the social policy department, or issue-specific documentation;  
(2) Material of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, esp. meeting protocols;  
(3) Material from working group IV on family, youth, health, labor, and social af-
fairs of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, esp. issue-specific collections of ma-
terial;  
(4) Material from the party’s employee wing, the Christian Democratic Employ-
ees’ Association (Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft, CDA), e.g. on 
their annual meetings, board meetings, working groups, or chairmen;  
(5) Material from the Small- and Medium-Sized Business Association of 
CDU/CSU (Mittelstands- und Wirtschaftsvereinigung der CDU/CSU, MIT), e.g. 
on their annual meetings and ad-hoc commissions;  
(6) Material from the Discussion Group Small- and Medium-Sized Business 
(Diskussionskreis Mittelstand, DKM), the MIT’s affiliate in the CDU/CSU parlia-
mentary group, esp. issue-specific collections;  
94 
(7) Material from personal collections of politicians who played important roles 
in the party or its subgroupings or in the debates on pay continuation and code-
termination: Franz Deus (trade unionist and chair of working group IV); Adolf 
Müller (chair of the parliament working group on social policy from 1956 to 1969 
and vice-chair and chair of the CDA group of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group 
from 1972 to 1987); Klaus Scheufelen (founding member of the Economic Council 
of Germany (Wirtschaftsrat der CDU e.V.), an independent organization repre-
senting the interests of small- and middle-sized firms with close ties to the CDU); 
Gerhard Schröder (minister in the federal government in different positions from 
1953 to 1969); Franz-Josef Wuermeling (minister in the federal government from 
1953 to 1962) and Otto Zink (CA chairman in the state of Hesse). 
The Archive of Social Democracy, AdsD 
The Archive of Social Democracy (AdsD) holds the collection of the SPD as 
well as a large collection of material on the German labor movement, includ-
ing material from the German Trade Union Confederation, DGB. The material 
accessed in the AdsD can be grouped into five categories (cf. the Appendix, p. 
265, for a complete list of all accessed material):  
(1) Material from the German Trade Union Confederation, in particular from its 
social policy division on the issue of pay continuation, as well as material from the 
federal board of the DGB and correspondence on codetermination;  
(2) Material from the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag, in particular 
meeting protocols and material from the office of chairman Herbert Wehner;  
(3) Material from the parliamentary group’s working group III on economic policy 
on codetermination;  
(4) Material from working group IV on social policy on codetermination and 
health insurance/pay continuation; and  
(5) Material from the executive board of the SPD, in particular its meetings and 
commissions. 
The Archive of Liberalism, ADL, and the Archive for Christian-
Social Policy, ACSP 
The Liberal party’s and the Christian Democrats’ sister party CSU’s30 archives 
were excluded from the collection of empirical material for the following rea-
sons. First, while the CSU runs its own archives, both parties form a common 
parliamentary group in the German parliament, and material from the Chris-
tian Democrats’ archive gives sufficient insight into the positions and role of 
CDU/CSU in the political and legislative process prior to the 1969 Pay Contin-
uation Act and the 1976 Codetermination Act. Second, the Liberals’ archive is 
considerably smaller and contains less material, and the party played almost 
                                               
30 See footnote 46 in chapter 5. 
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no role in the design process around the Pay Continuation Act, which was the 
focus of material collection in party archives. For the Codetermination Act, 
material collected in the Parliament Archives gives sufficient insight into the 
Liberals’ positions and design strategies.  
Lastly, much of the collected material does not only present the respective 
authors’ position, strategy, etc., but also the respective authors’ assessment of 
other actors’ positions, strategies, etc. For example, internal memos written 
by party staff in the Christian Democrats’ party headquarter also report on the 
situation in the Liberal party, what positions it articulated, and what strategies 
it seemed to follow. While such “indirect” reports from the Christian Demo-
crats on the Liberals are not as close to the source as one could wish (i.e. writ-
ten by the Liberals themselves), they are not generally biased. Such internal 
documents can generally be seen as honest attempts to correctly describe and 
assess the positions and strategies of the Liberals so that the Christian Demo-
crats themselves can react appropriately to the situation, adapt their own 
strategy, etc. Hence, material from the Christian and Social Democrats archive 
can also be used to gain knowledge on and investigate the Liberals’ policy de-
sign strategies.31 
4.3.2 Evaluation of the Generated Data Pool32 
Table 4.4, p. 100, gives an overview of where and how much material was col-
lected for each of the selected cases. The total data pool covers approx. 2,000 
pages of copied material from the three archives. Additionally, digitalized 
transcripts of all parliamentary debates on the Pay Continuation Act and the 
Codetermination Act were retrieved via the Parliamentary Material Infor-
mation System, DIP.33 Transcripts of parliamentary group meetings of Social 
Democrats, Christian Democrats and Liberals were retrieved via the Kommis-
sion für Geschichte des Parlamenatirsmus und der Politischen Parteien e.V., 
KGParl, either as edited book volumes or in digitalized versions.34 The table 
also roughly indicates what share of the total material was collected in which 
archive and on what case. In brief, the investigation of the Codetermination 
Act was built on more material from the Parliamentary Archives than from 
each of the party archives, whereas the investigation of the Pay Continuation 
                                               
31 Similarly, material from Social and Christian Democrats on each other was included in the 
case studies. 
32 The term “data pool” is used instead of database to avoid the misunderstanding that a 
digitally searchable database was generated. 
33 Website: http://www.bundestag.de/en/documents/parliamentary_documentation (last 
access: March 2017). 
34 Website: https://fraktionsprotokolle.de/ (last access: December 2017). 
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Act was based on more material from the party archives, especially the Chris-
tian Democrat archives, than from the Parliamentary Archive. In total, a close 
to equal amount of material on each of the cases and around 50 percent more 
material from the party archives than from the Parliamentary Archives (ratio 
3 to 2) was used in the empirical analysis. Furthermore, slightly more material 
from the Christian Democrats’ archive than from the Social Democrats’ ar-
chive was used (ratio 3 to 2).  
Hence, the theoretical claims produced in Part IV might reflect this slightly 
uneven division in the way that they might be more stereotypical for the way 
Christian Democratic policy makers think about architectural policy design 
than how Social Democratic policy makers think about it. As discussed in sec-
tion 4.1, research processes are not pre-defined but influenced by decisions 
made throughout the research process. Hence, decisions, constraints and op-
portunities coming up during the collection of material influence the conclu-
sions drawn from the investigation.  
Yet, there is little reason to believe that the theoretical implications drawn 
from the empirical investigation and the typology of feedback effects consid-
ered by policy makers (see Part IV) are systematically biased in a way that they 
only represent how policy makers from a particular party think about long-
term, strategic policy making. First, the difference between the amount of ma-
terial from Christian Democrats and Social Democrats is not exorbitant and 
there is sufficient material from the Social Democrats alone (approx. 500 
pages from their archive plus material from the Parliamentary Archive) to al-
low for a productive investigation of the Social Democrats’ policy design strat-
egy. Second, while the two parties differ in many respects (cf. chapter 5.2), 
both had a stake in the political debate and were interested in the outcome in 
the short and long run. The Social Democrats’ motivation might have been 
more driven by ideology or belief, especially since both reforms concerned pol-
icy areas of central importance to the party, and the Christian Democrats’ mo-
tivation might in some respects have been more pragmatic (e.g. to get the co-
determination topic off the political agenda and hold on to government 
power). However, the Christian Democrats also faced complicated internal de-
bates between its different party wings that represented a broad ideological 
spectrum of positions of codetermination and pay continuation and for which 
the issues had high salience. Hence, both parties had an interest in the short- 
and long-term implications of the reforms and the slightly smaller volume of 
archival material on the Social Democrats should not lead to one-sided or “un-
even” conclusions.  
It is, however, generally possible that policy makers do not always take con-
siderations of policy feedback effects into account when designing a policy (cf. 
section 3.2). This could be due to the resources they have available (knowledge 
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about previous/other reforms or policy fields, assistance by professional staff, 
etc.) or because electoral considerations might outweigh long-term consider-
ations in particular situations. However, the empirical analysis indicates that 
policy makers try to “maximize” long-term effects even when short-term con-
siderations limit their freedom of action (cf. also section 3.2). While Part IV 
discusses potential conditions for long-term strategic policy design, the inves-
tigation of these conditions is not the key focus of this dissertation and should 
be a topic of future research. 
A key challenge mentioned earlier concerns the investigation of policy mak-
ers’ strategies and intentions, with the particular question being whether and 
how the collected archival material gives insight into policy makers’ design 
strategies at the time. Here, the variety of material collected in the three ar-
chives offers a crucial advantage. The key distinction can be drawn between 
“public” material and “internal” material. First, public material includes par-
liamentary debates, press statements, interviews, etc., as well as transcripts 
from parliamentary committees. Material from parliamentary committees is 
not truly public since committee debates are usually not open to the public, 
but in all mentioned materials policy makers make statements to an audience, 
i.e. the general public and/or political opponents.  
In assessments of policy makers’ strategies, this material must be inter-
preted with care since policy makers’ might have multiple objectives when ar-
ticulating their goals and strategies in front of an audience. For example, if 
policy makers want to win public support or threaten their political opponent, 
extensive case knowledge helps to evaluate public statements of policy makers 
and to try to distinguish between a potential public “façade” and true inten-
tions and strategies.  
The second kind of material – internal material – is particularly helpful in 
this regard. The extensive material collected in the archives of Social and 
Christian Democrats contains numerous internal memos, correspondence be-
tween party officials, committee reports etc., that is, material that the parties 
produced only for internal use and that was never meant to be read by some-
one outside the party. In these documents, the authors, be they individual MPs 
or party groupings, typically try to provide an honest, truthful assessment of 
their own and/or other parties’ goals, strategies, conflicts, and debates in or-
der to develop an appropriate response to the strategic situation as it presents 
itself. Hence, for these kinds of material, the authors have no incentive to hide 
or distort their intentions, goals, and strategies. The broad data pool with di-
verse types of documents therefore provides good opportunities to investigate 
policy makers’ strategies and intentions, which is nevertheless a challenging 
research endeavor. 
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Regarding the quality of the gathered data base, external and internal 
source criticism are important criteria (Sager and Rosser 2016). From the per-
spective of external source criticism, the collected material is considered to 
generally be authentic. The data base consists mainly of documents written 
directly by important actors in the policy design process, e.g. members of the 
involved parliament committees, key representative from parties, government 
or interest organizations (e.g. party secretaries, ministers, union leaders, 
heads of formal party wings) or by the institutions/collective actors them-
selves. Most documents refer directly to the policy design process of the two 
acts and only few represent more general policy statements.  
Internal source criticism concerns the credibility and certainty of sources. 
Here, it is assumed that the collected documents generally give a truthful rep-
resentation of policy makers’ assessment of the situation and their strategic 
policy design considerations and that they do not contain false or deceiving 
statements. In the interpretation of the material, the investigation has never-
theless taken into account that statements made during political processes can 
intentionally overemphasize or understate particular aspects, for example due 
to electoral considerations. However, most of the analyzed documents have 
not been generated for a public audience but for internal use within the party 
or parliament, limiting the extent of such “tampering”.  
Regarding the credibility and certainty of the used sources, it is also im-
portant to emphasize that the dissertation’s goal is to build theory and not to 
conduct a historical study of the two acts. The goal of the latter would typically 
be a detailed, empirically rich account of the unfolding of the design process 
that gives insight into, e.g., the role of particular policy makers during this 
process. In contrast to this, the goal of the former is to produce theoretical 
implications, meaning for example theoretical claims (or hypotheses) regard-
ing architectural policy design or conditions that influence it in certain ways, 
or the formulation of ideal types of architectural policy design strategies. The 
credibility and certainty of the used sources therefore concern whether they 
give a truthful account of or insight into policy makers’ strategic policy design 
considerations. Again, the general assumption is that the used material does 
not contain false or deceiving statements.  
Furthermore, the goal of theory building also renders policy makers’ state-
ments about the intentions, goals and strategies of other actors a valuable 
source of information. For example, a historical study could not easily make a 
claim about policy maker A’s policy design strategy based on a statement made 
by policy maker B on policy maker A’s strategy. From the perspective of theory 
building, such a statement gives valuable insight into the strategic considera-
tions that policy makers in general might have when designing policies. 
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Hence, the dissertation is also able to base its empirical analysis and conclu-
sions on these kinds of “indirect” sources on policy makers’ strategic policy 
design considerations.35 
Overall, the collected material from the Parliamentary Archives and the ar-
chives of political parties forms a broad and unique data pool that offers 
unique insights into the political and legislative processes leading up to the 
adoption of the 1969 Pay Continuation Act and the 1976 Codetermination Act. 
First, they make it possible to trace the development of a bill from the first 
ministerial or parliamentary group draft via several rounds of working group 
discussions, amendments and potential revisions up to its final adoption in 
the Bundestag. Hence, the design process and modifications of individual par-
agraphs and the exact policy wording can be reconstructed in detail.  
Second, the material gives insight into the positions of different parties, in-
dividual MPs, and interest groups on the content and goals of a bill, its policy 
design, and the individual stipulations it contains. Thus, beyond the technical 
reconstruction of the legislative process, the material also helps a more polit-
ical reconstruction of the activities and motives of involved policy makers, that 
is, of the political-architectural strategies of policy makers. 
Third, the immersion in the archival material allows the researcher to gain 
a deep understanding of the cases beyond isolated, citable facts and informs 
the political-architectural interpretation and evaluation of the cases as well as 
further theorizing on architectural policy design (cf. Part IV). 
Furthermore, the large number of primary sources and the density of the 
archival records on codetermination and pay continuation make it possible to 
build a data pool that in this form is not comparable to other methods of data 
generation, e.g. via secondary literature on the cases or retrospective inter-
views. Some qualifications are warranted, however: first, due to the amount of 
the material available in the archives, the empirical investigation was not 
based on an analysis of all available material in the archives but of an inten-
tionally and strategically biased selection of relevant material, as described 
above. Hence, the empirical investigation cannot, and does not, claim to pro-
vide a full account of the development of both cases as historical analyses 
would do but primarily serves the purpose of theory building. Second, the 
analysis excludes potential additional data sources, such as interviews with 
policy makers involved in both cases or documents from the Federal Archives 
of Germany (Bundesarchiv) where ministerial documents are collected. These 
omissions are, however, justifiable.  
                                               
35 Where the empirical analysis contains empirical claims about policy maker’s architectural 
policy design strategies, it makes visible whether those claims are based on such “indirect” 
sources. 
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First, generating interview data poses two challenges: the long time lag 
since the adoption of the reform, which might affect recollection, and the lim-
ited number of policy makers still alive. Second, ministerial documents are not 
expected to offer information that is not already covered by the material in 
party and the Parliamentary Archives since these archives also collect a great 
deal of official correspondence between ministries, MPs, and interest organi-
zations, and of legal documents on policy drafts, evaluations, and synopsis 
produced by ministerial staff. Third, and finally, as in any other research pro-
ject, limited time and personal and financial resources pose restrictions to the 
duration and extent of data generation. 
Table 4.4: Overview of Collected Material by Archive and Selected Case 
Archive and Practical Limitations 
for Archive Users 
Material on 
Codetermination 





Unlimited number of copies 
27.5% / 550pp1 10 / 200 37.5 / 750 
ACDP (Christian Democrats) 
“Appropriate” number of copies / scans 
12.5 / 250 25 / 500 37.5 / 750 
AdsD (Social Democrats & DGB) 
Max. 500 copies / scans per project 
12.5 / 250 12.5 / 2502,3 25 / 500 
Total 52.5 / 1050 47.5 / 950 100 / 2000 
Notes: 
1) Numbers indicate the approximate share of the total empirical material and the number of 
pages collected on the respective case in the respective archive. 
2) Material of the party executive board (Parteivorstand) was not searchable via the key word 
Lohnfortzahlung (pay continuation) and therefore not accessed. 
3) Access to documents of the parliamentary groups’ executive board (Fraktionsvorstand) was 
not granted for this dissertation. 
 
4.4 Data Analysis 
The following section discusses how the generated data pool was analyzed 
throughout the empirical investigation. Section 4.4.1 discusses the overall pro-
cess and methods of data analysis; section 4.4.2 discusses more concretely the 
different types of evidentiary material that substantiate the presentation and 
interpretation of the case studies in Part III of the dissertation. 
4.4.1 Methods and Process of Data Analysis 
The data pool described above was generated and investigated in multiple 
rounds of analysis. Table 4.5, below, gives an overview of the process of the 
empirical investigation conducted for this dissertation. First, and simultane-
ous to engaging in the literature, an initial pre-study of the Works Constitution 
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Act of 1972 was conducted based on material available online from the Parlia-
mentary Archives in order to inform the formulation of the initial theoretical 
framework. Then, material on nine initially considered cases was collected in 
the Parliamentary Archives. After the final selection of the first case study, the 
material on the Codetermination Act was analyzed. After this first case study, 
a second case was chosen and material from the Parliamentary Archives ana-
lyzed. In order to gain a deeper understanding of both cases, and because the 
material on the Pay Continuation Act from the Parliamentary Archives did not 
yield conclusive results, additional material was collected in party archives 
and analyzed subsequently. After the analysis of this new material, the previ-
ously collected material from the Parliamentary Archives on both cases was 
re-analyzed. At the end of the empirical investigation, the results of both case 
studies were reviewed and interpreted from a comparative perspective.  
Table 4.5: Overview of the Process of the Empirical Investigation 
Work step Concerned cases Approx. time frame 
Pre-study  
based on online material from Parl. Archives 
Works Constitution case 09/16-02/17 
Collection of material  
in the Parl. Archive (ca. 3.300 pages) 
Nine cases 
(cf. section 4.2) 
12/16 
Final case selection, first case Codetermination case 02/17 
Analysis of material Codetermination case 02/17-10/171 
Final case selection, second case Pay Continuation case 10/17 
Analysis of material  
from the Parl. Archive 
Pay Continuation case 10/17-11/17 
Collection of material  
in party archives, ca. 1250 pages 
Pay Continuation and Co-
determination case 
12/17 
Analysis of material  
from party archives 
Pay Continuation case 01/18-03/18 
Re-analysis of material  
from Parl. Archives 
Pay Continuation case 02/18-03/18 
Analysis of material  
from Party Archives 
Codetermination case 03/18-05/18 
Re-analysis of material  
from Parl. Archives 
Codetermination case 03/17-05/18 
Comparative analysis and interpretation  
based on all material 
Pay continuation and co-
determination case 
04/18-06/18 
Notes: 1) break from 04/17-07/17 
Analysis of Material from the Parliamentary Archives and Party Archives 
The analysis of the material collected in the Parliamentary Archives proceeded 
in four steps from an initial, open reading towards a closer, systematic reading 
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of informative extracts of the material and condensed notes. During this pro-
cess, analytical categories were developed and continuously refined similar to 
procedures of open and focused coding in qualitative content analysis (cf. e.g. 
Bryant and Charmaz 2007; Charmaz 2014). Since most material was only 
available in print, the analysis was conducted by hand. 
Table 4.6, below, gives a brief summary of the four analytical steps. The in-
vestigation first started with an initial, open reading of plenary debates of the 
draft bills as well as on expert hearings (if conducted) and selected working 
group meetings of the leading working group. Those documents were chose 
because they were expected to give a good impression of the general debate 
and conflict lines and policy makers’ arguments for or against certain pro-
posals. Second, the same material was analyzed more thoroughly through a 
systematic, close reading. During this reading, extensive notes of the material 
were written, analytical categories developed, crucial, informative parts of the 
material identified and “extracted” and less informative material discarded.  
Table 4.6: Overview of the Process of Data Analysis (Material from the 
Parliamentary Archives) 
Analytical steps Purpose/Outcome 
Initial, open reading 
plenary debates of the draft bills, expert hearings, 
selected working group meetings of the leading 
working group 
Develop impression of general political 
debate, conflict lines, policy makers’ 
arguments; develop analytical categories 
Close reading 
(same material as above) 
Compose notes; develop and refine analytical 
categories; extract informative and discard 
uninformative material 
Reading of legalistic material 
draft bills, motions to amend, legal synopses 
produced by parliament staff, printed working group 
matters  
Develop overview of competing policy 
designs and design elements 
Systematic, focused reading 
extracted material, composed notes, additional 
working group protocols and submissions/position 
papers by interest groups 
Refine analytical categories; identify key 
policy design elements and anticipated long-
term implications of reform proposals; 
identify argumentative links between policy 
design elements and long-term implications 
 
In a third step, documents of a more legal character (e.g. draft bills, motions 
to amend, legal synopses produced by parliament staff, printed working group 
matters) were analyzed, summarized, and compared in order to develop an 
overview of the competing policy designs. In the fourth and final analytical 
step, the extracted material and composed notes were revisited based these 
overviews and the initial analytical categories and more focused analytical cat-
egories were developed. Additionally, protocols of working group meetings, 
submissions and position papers made by interest groups were included in the 
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analysis in order to develop overviews of different actors’ positions on com-
peting policy designs and their elements. Throughout the different steps of the 
analysis, the analytical categories were refined in an attempt to identify argu-
mentative links between policies’ long-term consequences and specific ele-
ments of the reform drafts. Analytical categories focused on, e.g., characteris-
tics of the policy proposals and anticipated long-term implications of policy 
proposals or their elements.  
Similar to the procedure applied in the Parliamentary Archives, the col-
lected material from party archives was first subject to an initial, open reading, 
which was, however, informed by the knowledge and analytical categories de-
veloped through the analysis of material from the Parliamentary Archives. 
Therefore, all material was included already in this first step. Informative ma-
terial was extracted, less informative material discarded. In a second step, the 
material was subject to a closer, systematic reading that supplemented and 
complemented the analysis of parliamentary documents and the overviews of 
competing policy designs and positions on policy designs. During this reading, 
extensive notes of the material were written and analytical categories devel-
oped further. The third step is similar to the last step in the analysis of the 
material from the Parliamentary Archives. 
Table 4.7: Overview of the Process of Data Analysis (Material from Party 
Archives) 
Analytical steps Purpose / Outcome 
Initial, open reading  
(informed by analysis of materials from the Parl. 
Archives) 
all material 
Develop and refine analytical categories; 
extract informative and discard 
uninformative material 
Close reading 
(informed by analysis of materials from the Parl. 
Archives) 
all material 
Compose notes; develop and refine analytical 
categories 
Systematic, focused reading 
extracted material, composed notes, additional 
working group protocols and submissions/position 
papers by interest groups 
Refine analytical categories; identify key 
policy design elements and anticipated long-
term implications of reform proposals; 
identify argumentative links between policy 
design elements and long-term implications; 
4.4.2 Types, Interpretation and Use of Evidentiary Material 
The final section of the methodological framework presents and discusses the 
types and interpretation of evidentiary material the subsequent case studies 
are based on. The key objective in the investigation of the collected data pool 
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is to carve out policy makers’ strategic, long-term intentions and considera-
tions in the design of policies.36 Ideal evidence could be, for example, a policy 
makers’ statement that “We need to include policy instrument A in the reform 
because it will help us to achieve goal B in the long run via mechanism C, even 
though it will cost us D in the short run”. Such a statement, made for instance 
at an internal meeting or in correspondence with fellow policy makers, would 
clearly show an intention to achieve a specific long-term goal, it would show 
how the policy maker thinks this goal would be achieved (i.e. a type of policy 
feedback), and it would even show that the policy maker prioritizes this long-
term goal higher than some short-term benefits. Irrespective of whether the 
anticipated mechanism or long-term goal is achieved, such material would be 
ideal evidence for theorizing which strategic considerations policy makers 
have, which types of feedback effects they consider, and which architectural 
policy design strategy they follow.  
Types of Evidentiary Material 
However, policy makers’ intentions are hard to study and can rarely be “read 
off” the material at hand in such a simple matter, no matter how extensive the 
empirical data pool is. The empirical investigation draws on “direct” and “in-
direct” evidentiary material. In the interpretation of both types of evidentiary 
material and of policy makers’ strategies and intentions, one needs to keep in 
mind the distinction between “public” and “internal” material discussed in 
section 4.3.2. 
First, “direct” evidentiary material is used when attempting to uncover pol-
icy makers’ strategic intentions through statements that these policy makers 
made about themselves. Statements about policy makers’ long-term goals are 
in fact manifold and occur in all types of investigated documents (e.g. policy 
paper, plenary debate, working group protocol). For example, Social Demo-
crats rightly admit in a parliamentary debate that the reform of pay continua-
tion aims at “equal treatment of workers and salaried employees in case of 
sickness.”37 Equally easy to uncover are the policy designs (and their elements) 
that policy makers favor. They can be investigated simply by reading the offi-
cial reform proposal/draft act introduced into parliament,38 or they can be in-
vestigated via plenary debates or working group meetings where reform pro-
posals are discussed in detail. Statements that give insight into how policy 
makers link a particular element of a reform proposal to a long-term policy 
                                               
36 Here, “policy makers” means both individual and collective actors (e.g. parties, party wing, 
interest groups). Cf. section 3.2. 
37 BT-PA, Drs. V/227, p. 12514A. 
38 E.g. BT-PA, Drs. V/3985; BT-PA, Drs. V/3985. 
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goal via a specific process or mechanism they expect will unfold after the re-
form has been implemented are more rare. The following two statements from 
documents of the working group on social policy of the Christian Democrats’ 
parliamentary group give a good example:  
The Christian Democrats’ proposal [which included particular cost sharing 
measures discussed earlier in the document] offers the opportunity to gain expe-
riences and makes it easier for the legislative to pass further reform steps in the 
next legislative period as part of a permanent reform process.39 
It must be noted that a contribution refund scheme has the disadvantage, com-
pared to direct co-payments, that it has a lower impact on the respective decisions 
made by the insured in case of sickness, because the use of medical services and 
its financial impact on the insured fall apart temporarily. However, the contribu-
tion refund scheme is the more practical procedure in a benefits-in-kind system 
and can contribute to the transition towards a reimbursement system with direct 
co-payments.40 
Here, the statements show that a specific policy design element (contribu-
tion refund scheme) and kind of mechanism (gaining experience) links this 
reform to an intended long-term outcome (further reform steps in a perma-
nent reform process; transition towards a reimbursement system with direct 
co-payments). Based also on additional knowledge of the political debate and 
the goals of Christian Democrats, the following informed interpretation of the 
statements is possible: “The Christian Democrats’ long-term goal was to 
transform the statutory health insurance from a benefits-in-kind structure to 
a reimbursement structure with cost sharing. In achieving this goal, the Chris-
tian Democrats strategically selected certain cost-sharing measures over oth-
ers. In particular, they chose to pursue a contribution refund scheme over di-
rect co-payments, even though the latter would be more effective in the short 
run. The Christian Democrats’ anticipation was that the introduction of at 
least this cost-sharing measure would increase policy makers’ experience with 
cost-sharing measures and, thus, facilitate the introduction of more cost shar-
ing in the future, which would contribute to the achievement of the Christian 
Democrats’ overall goal in the long run.”  
The second type of evidentiary material is “indirect” in the sense that it tries 
to show policy makers’ strategic intentions through statements policy makers 
make about each other, i.e., statements that policy makers from one party, or 
one side of the political debate, make about policy makers from another party, 
or another side of the debate. When made in public or in direct negotiations 
                                               
39 ACDP, 08-005-061/1; Argumentation paper, 12.04.1969. 
40 ACDP, 08-005-092/3; On the reform of health insurance, no date. 
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with the other party (e.g. in parliament committees), such statements are typ-
ically accusatory. For example, in the debate about codetermination, a Social 
Democrat argues that the “actual political goals and purposes” of the Christian 
Democrats were to give the “small and smallest splinter groups in companies 
[…] a special advantage via low [election] quota.”41 Specifically, the Social 
Democrats feared that marginal, ineffective splinter groups would gain seats 
in electoral committees or supervisory boards and that this would empower 
small employee associations like the ULA, hinder employee representation via 
big union federations like the DGB, and, thus, make effective codetermination 
of the whole workforce improbable.  
Such “indirect” evidentiary material must be clearly labelled when one 
makes statements about the policy design strategies of the “accused” party, 
and contextual knowledge must be drawn into the interpretation and evalua-
tion of whether the accusation has a solid basis. Despite these challenges in 
the use of “indirect” evidence, the material provide valuable information on 
what elements of a policy design (here: low election quota) policy makers link 
to particular effects of a reform (weakening of big union federations and effec-
tive codetermination) and is therefore highly informative for theorizing archi-
tectural policy design strategies. Furthermore, indirect statements cannot be 
used to assess the goals and strategies of not only the “accused” party but also 
of the accuser who typically reveals his or her own goals and strategies when 
accusing the counterpart. In the example above, the Social Democrat’s state-
ment suggests that his own preference is not to give power and influence to 
small “splinter groups” but to big trade unions and union federations like the 
DGB.  
The Use of Evidentiary Material 
Both examples demonstrate that long-term strategic considerations can be 
carved out of the collected material especially after one has familiarized one-
self deeply with the respective case. Examples like the above are used through-
out the empirical investigation as evidentiary material that substantiates the 
analysis and interpretation of the two cases. In some instances, a snippet of 
material is easy to identify as evidence; in others, interpretation relies more 
on immersion in the empirical material and the case-specific knowledge 
gained through it. Similarly, some interpretations and analytical conclusions 
have a more stable base in evidentiary material than others where the inter-
pretation is more bold. Therefore, the empirical investigation is presented in 
                                               
41 PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 49: Bundestag plenary debate, 2nd and 3rd reading of Code-
termination Act, 18.03.1976, p. 16025. 
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a transparent way that should enable the reader to evaluate and assess the 
narrative and conclusions that are presented.  
The value of evidentiary material is determined by the degree to which it 
facilitates the development of analytical insights. Hence, the empirical analy-
sis is not primarily concerned with counting specific statements that illustrate 
an analytical point or with discussing in depth the uniqueness or certainty of 
evidence from a process-tracing perspective (cf. e.g. Beach and Pedersen 2013, 
2016a). While both aspects were considered in the interpretation and use of 
evidentiary material, the primary concern regarded the instrumentality of the 
material for developing theory. The subsequent case studies and Part IV of the 
dissertation reflect this concern by highlighting the analytical conclusions that 
can be drawn from the analysis rather than the particular empirical knowledge 
about the two analyzed cases.  
The cases are therefore mostly based on “supporting” evidence, that is, evi-
dence that supports the theoretical claim that policy makers do consider long-
term implications of policy design and that gives insight into how they do so. 
This is because the primary goal of the dissertation is to develop a theory of 
architectural policy design and to derive analytical insights into policy makers’ 
strategic long-term considerations from the empirical investigation. In simple 
terms, one can only learn about the how of long-term considerations in policy 
design when studying long-term consideration, not when studying, for exam-
ple, short-term considerations. As Beach and Pedersen put it, “one does not 
go moose hunting in Manhattan. If one wants to have any chance of shooting 
a moose, one should go hunting where they can in principle be present, such 
as the backwoods of Alaska or Maine” (Beach and Pedersen 2016b: 28). Con-
sequently, while moose hunting, one looks for traces (supporting evidence) of 
moose on the ground, where one would find them, and not for birds’ nests in 
the trees. The reliance on supporting evidence also reflects the asymmetric 
causal claims case-based research typically relies on. Consequently, the as-
sumption that policy makers’ strategic, long-term considerations lead to a spe-
cific policy design does not mean that the absence of these considerations 
leads to the absence of this policy design or that these considerations are the 
only potential cause for this policy design (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 24-26).  
While empirical claims about the investigated cases are not the core objec-
tive of the dissertation, it does put forward such claims. When it does so, it 
tries to formulate these claims convincingly and to include potentially con-
trary evidentiary material. Empirical arguments are then based on analytical 
narratives and a sort of twofold counterfactual reasoning, meaning that policy 
makers could have set different priorities in the policy design process and that, 
had they done so, the final reform would have had a different design (Bates 
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1998: ch. 1; Capoccia 2015; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). Importantly, ana-
lytical narratives need not be exclusive because different narratives can fit the 
empirical data and be internally coherent. Instead of aiming for simple falsifi-
cation, the strategy is therefore to combine and subsume different explana-
tions, when possible, rather than to arbitrate between them (Bates 1998: 17). 
In the presentation of the case studies, the dissertation therefore tries to allow 
the reader to evaluate how much confidence they can have in the presented 
narrative and conclusions and to evaluate those in relation to competing nar-
ratives. Overall, the case studies therefore emphasize and highlight empirical 
evidence that supports the claim that policy makers do strategically consider 
long-term effects of different policy designs. They do so to substantiate the 
problematization of the existing literature presented in chapter 1, to highlight 
that these considerations play an important role in policy design, and to find 
out how they do so. Yet, as outlined in the theoretical framework in chapter 3, 
the dissertation does not theoretically assume and claim that these consider-
ations are the sole driver of policy making under any and every circumstance. 
Next, Part III of the dissertation presents two case studies of German public 
policy making that apply the architectural policy design framework on the two 




PART III: EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
Part III of the dissertation comprises two case studies of architectural policy 
design that investigate the policy design processes of the Codetermination Act 
of 1976 and the Pay Continuation Act of 1969. The presentation of each case 
follows an identical template that the next paragraphs briefly introduce.  
Each case study investigates the research question introduced in chapter 1, 
which asks whether and how policy makers strategically try to shape policy 
feedback effects during policy design and how such attempts influence the 
design of policies. The case studies start with an introductory section that pre-
sents the policy issue at stake in general terms and in the German context. 
Furthermore, the introductory sections point out the significance of architec-
tural policy design in codetermination and pay continuation politics and give 
overviews of the argument and contribution of each case study (6.1 and 7.1). 
Next are sections that describe the history of the respective policy field prior 
to the adoption of the investigated reform and the key characteristics of the 
Codetermination Act and the Pay Continuation Act (6.2 and 7.2). Sections 6.3 
and 7.3 then outline the political goals and programmatic positions of the 
three key parties (Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Liberals) on the 
two policy issues.  
The subsequent sections 6.4 and 7.4 form the core of the empirical analysis 
and present the architectural policy design strategies in the two cases. They 
respond in particular to the second analytical claim made in chapter 1 of the 
dissertation, which argued that the disaggregation of policies into policy in-
struments or design elements and the fine-grained investigation of design pro-
cesses helps us understand better how policy feedback effects emerge and 
whether and how policy makers can (try to) design these intentionally. The 
sections investigate in detail the architectural policy design strategies that pol-
icy makers followed during policy design:  
First, they give an overall characterization and juxtaposition of the overall 
policy design strategies that Christian Democrats and Social Democrats (re-
spectively, the Social Democratic-led coalition with the Liberals)42 followed. 
Second, they “dissect” these strategies into their individual elements and show 
in great empirical detail how policy makers linked specific elements of the pol-
icy designs to specific, anticipated policy feedback effects. While sections 6.4 
and 7.4 first present overall design strategies and then dissect these, the in-
vestigative procedure was the other way around. Individual elements of the 
                                               
42 For different, case-specific reasons, the Liberals are not attributed distinct architectural 
policy design strategies in either case study (cf. sections 6.1.1 and 7.1.1 for further discus-
sion). 
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design strategies were investigated first; then, analytically derived overall de-
sign strategies were imposed on the empirical material (cf. also section 3.2 on 
working understanding).  
Following the fine-grained empirical analyses of the different elements of 
the design strategies, sections 6.5 and 7.5 “zoom out” of these micro-political 
details to offer a broader perspective on and discussion of how the identified 
policy design strategies played out during the political skirmishing around the 
design of the two acts. The sections discuss, for example, which compromises 
parties made, how considerations of policy feedback effects influenced the 
choice of design, and which policy designs eventually emerged from the de-
bates. The two sections complete the presentation of the case studies and re-
spond in particular to the first analytical claim made in chapter 1, which ar-
gued that attention to feedback effects helps remedy the functionalist bias in 
policy design studies and improves our understanding of the potentials, chal-
lenges, political struggles, and real-world patterns of strategic policy design. 
Following the two case studies, Part IV concludes the dissertation with a 
discussion of the methodological, empirical and theoretical implications of the 
dissertation that will also set the lessons learned in the two instrumental case 




5. The Empirical Context 
Before diving into the empirical investigation of the Pay Continuation and the 
Codetermination Act, this chapter briefly describes the context of policy mak-
ing in the 1960s and 70s in Germany43. It does so because it is important to 
provide foundational knowledge of the empirical context that is necessary to 
follow the case analyses in the subsequent chapters. The chapter comprises 
three sections: Section 5.1 provides a brief characterization of the zeitgeist of 
the 1960s and ‘70s and lays the base for an understanding of how the broader 
societal and political climate of the time influenced parties’ political agendas 
in both reform debates and how these agendas were translated into concrete 
reform proposals. Section 5.2 discusses the structure of the party system in 
the 1960s and 1970s and the role of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats 
and Liberals as key public policy makers in order to understand determinants 
of parties’ strategic behavior and the parties’ relations to each other. The final 
section 5.3 discusses two relevant characteristics of the political-institutional 
context of policy making identified in the historical institutionalist literature 
(cf. section 2.2), namely the levels of veto barriers and institutional discretion. 
In doing so, it provides a background for understanding how these political-
institutional characteristics shaped the policy makers’ decision-making envi-
ronments.  
5.1 The Context of Public Policy Making in the late 1960s and early 
1970s 
The Pay Continuation Act of 1969 and the Codetermination Act of 1976 were 
passed only seven years apart from each other. The zeitgeist surrounding both 
political debates is therefore similar in most respects and the following de-
scription mainly focusses on the mid-1960s to mid-1970s.44 During this brief 
period, both debates culminated and – as history later showed – important 
legislation was passed, even though both policy issues had been debated since 
the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949.  
The ‘older’ of the two reforms, the Pay Continuation Act of 1969, was one of 
the last acts passed under Germany’s first so-called grand coalition, a govern-
ing coalition formed by the two big people’s parties CDU/CSU and SPD. The 
coalition was in office from 1966 to 1969 and commanded an impressive 90 % 
                                               
43 For reasons of simplicity, Germany refers to the Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. the 
Western part of the divided Germany after 1945. 
44 Cf. for a broader discussion of the political, economic, and societal developments during 
the 1960s and 1970s: e.g. Borowsky (1985, 2002); Ellwein (1989); Müller and Meyers (1996); 
Rummel (1969); Schmoeckel (1991); Schmollinger (1980); Solms (2014). 
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majority in the Bundestag, leaving the liberal FDP with roughly 10 % of the 
seats as the only party in the opposition ranks. The coalition also commanded 
a majority in the second chamber of parliament, the Bundesrat, which gave it 
considerable political power (cf. the discussion of veto barriers in section 5.3) 
and allowed it to pass a number of substantial economic and fiscal policies. 
Among them a constitutional reform that rearranged the responsibilities and 
financial relationships between the federal government and the states to the 
benefit of the former, whose financial capacities and political competencies 
were extended. 
At the beginning of the coalition’s turn in 1966, Germany faced an unex-
pected economic downturn, which was partly the very reason for the collapse 
of the previous conservative-liberal government and the formation of the 
grand coalition. In reaction to this, the new government, which for the first 
time since 1949 included the Social Democrats, followed a more Keynesian 
approach to economic and social policy making. In contrast to the previously 
followed ordo-liberal approach, Keynesianism believed in the state’s ability 
and obligation to intervene in and steer economic development in a joint effort 
with capital and labor. Unions therefore played a more important role and had 
more influence on social and economic policy making than before. An im-
portant instrument of German Keynesianism was the so-called “concerted ac-
tion” (Konzertiere Aktion), an informal discussion group consisting of repre-
sentatives of federal government and state government, the federal bank, un-
ions, employer federations and researchers, formed in 1967. The concerted ac-
tion, though never institutionalized, represented the belief that economic 
growth, price stability, balanced trade and high employment levels could be 
guaranteed through a joint, corporatist effort of the state, labor and capital.45 
The mid-1960s to mid-1970s can therefore be characterized as a period of 
exceptional labor movement strength that opened a window of opportunity 
for labor-friendly economic and social policies. Politically and publically, un-
ions’ and Social Democrats’ goals of granting more rights and benefits to work-
ers therefore stood a better chance of being fulfilled than in previous years, 
when the Christian Democrats and their liberal-conservative coalition part-
ners held government power. The Christian Democrats and the Liberals, on 
the other side, faced a zeitgeist that was less and less compatible with their 
own political orientation (cf. section 5.2). The Christian Democrats therefore 
had to make difficult programmatic compromises so that they would not lose 
too much public support. In the Liberal party, a group of young reformists 
                                               
45 The concerted action came to an end 10 years after its formation in 1977/78, when union 
representatives left the group in reaction to the employer federation’s legal suit against the 
Codetermination Act of 1976 (Müller and Meyers 1996: 379).  
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came to influence, steered the party on a social-liberal path and thereby pre-
pared it for a reform-oriented government coalition with the Social Demo-
crats.  
Despite the growing influence of the political left in the late 1960s, the grand 
coalition was not one of major social policy reforms. In fact, the Pay Continu-
ation Act is rather an exception in this regard and the government’s record is 
more characterized by an emphasis on economic policies. Driven by the pop-
ular Social Democratic Minister of Economic Affairs, Karl Schiller, these pol-
icies led to a quick recovery of the German economy with growth rates jump-
ing above 5 % again in the late 1960s. Despite this success, the government’s 
strong position in parliament, and an agreement on important policy issues, 
the grand coalition was not the preferred choice of any of the political parties, 
and conflicts between the coalition partners increased over the years. Already 
before the coalition came into office in 1966, Social Democrats and Liberals 
had negotiated a potential social-liberal coalition and mainly dismissed this 
option due to its slim, though present majority in parliament. Facilitated by 
the Liberals’ programmatic turn to social liberalism, the late 1960s then 
showed that both parties could find political compromises on many relevant 
policy issues. Furthermore, the grand coalition’s reputation and popularity 
suffered from the lack of an effective opposition in parliament and rising con-
cerns about democratic stability and accountability under a 90 % majority 
government. It therefore also contributed to the emergence of the so-called 
extra-parliamentary opposition (Außerparlamentarische Opposition, APO), 
which bundled various societal demands for “inner reforms”, e.g. a democra-
tization of the educational system. 
Consequently, the grand coalition only lasted one term, and after the 1969 
election, Social Democrats and Liberals formed a new social democratic-lib-
eral government that stayed in office for 13 years until 1982. The new govern-
ment under chancellor Brandt commenced its term with an ambitious agenda 
of inner reforms covering a broad range of policy fields and a new orientation 
in the politics towards the East (Ostpolitik), but it rested on a slim 12-seat ma-
jority and faced substantial criticism from within, especially among the Liber-
als. By 1972, the conflicts over the politics towards the East had diminished 
the government’s majority to only two seats due to several defectors, and an 
early parliamentary election was therefore announced. To the surprise of 
many observers, the election clearly confirmed the social democratic-liberal 
coalition, and both partners could increase their share of votes. The coalition 
now commanded a comfortable majority in parliament and could further pur-
sue its reform agenda. In the field of social policy, the government had already 
implemented important reforms like the Works Constitution Act of 1972 dur-
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ing its first term. After the successful elections of 1972, the reform of codeter-
mination was then one of the government’s key projects. It introduced draft 
bill into parliament in 1974, but the negotiations between the coalition part-
ners and with the opposition stretched over two years until 1976, when the 
Codetermination Act was eventually passed. 
Overall, the zeitgeist of the 1960s and ‘70s can be characterized as a “social 
awakening” of an encrusted, conservative society and a slowly opening win-
dow of opportunity for the political left, which aimed to broadly modernize 
German economy, society and politics. For the first time in the Federal Re-
public, the political left shared government responsibility on the federal level 
and could push labor-friendly policies from within the Social Democratic-led 
government. Outside government, unions’ political demands became increas-
ingly accepted in the mass public, and union representatives gained more in-
fluence on public policy making through the adoption of a Keynesian approach 
to social and economic policy making. These developments had important 
consequences for the structure of the Germany party system, the role of the 
three major parties, the Christian Democrats, Social Democrat and Liberals, 
the relations between the parties, and the parties’ contexts for strategic deci-
sion-making. 
5.2 The Party System and the Role of Christian Democrats, Social 
Democrats and Liberals  
The German party system of the mid-1960s to mid-1970s was dominated by 
the three parties: the Christian Democrats46 as a people’s party on the center-
right of the political spectrum, the Social Democrats as a people’s party on the 
center-left, and the Liberals as a small, ideologically more flexible party in the 
middle, which was important for forming majority coalitions. The following 
three sections give a brief overview of the parties’ political-ideological roots, 
important aspects of their internal organization, and their strategic decision-
making environment from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. 
                                               
46 In federal parliament, the Christian Democrats (CDU) form a common parliamentary 
group with the CSU (Christian Social Union of Bavaria), called CDU/CSU or Union. Both 
parties cooperate based on a “non-compete clause”, meaning that the CSU partakes in local, 
state, and federal elections only in Bavaria, the CDU in the 15 other states (prior to 1990: 10 
states plus West Berlin). In this dissertation, the analysis focusses on the CDU as the bigger 
of the two “sister parties” and only discusses the CSU explicitly when it is necessary for the 
understanding of the debates on codetermination and pay continuation, for example 
if/when the positions of CDU and CSU diverged gravely or if/when conflicts with the CSU 
influenced CDU/CSU’s overall strategy. For reasons of simplicity, the dissertation uses the 
term Christian Democrats when discussing the behavior of the CDU/CSU parliamentary 
group in the federal parliament. 
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The Christian Democrats: The “Natural Government Party” on the 
Defense47 
The discussion of the zeitgeist already pointed out that the Christian Demo-
crats were a governing party on the defense, struggling to retain political room 
for maneuver in the light of an opposition that was steadily growing stronger. 
In this process, the programmatic discussions on pay continuation and code-
termination further challenged the party in finding compromises between its 
different wings and preserving party unity, so that it would not lose a consid-
erable share of their followers.  
In early post-war Germany, the Christian Democrats quickly became the 
dominant party in German politics. It united socially conservative Catholics 
with liberal-conservative Protestants and thereby bridged the former denom-
inational divide and established a powerful center-right party. Christian Dem-
ocrats also prided themselves on being responsible for the successful rebuild-
ing of Germany, a revived and even thriving economy, and the integration into 
a free Europe and the Western Alliance. This founding myth of the CDU un-
derpinned its electoral success, supported by a population averse to political 
experiments and paradigmatic reforms. The CDU therefore developed into a 
chancellor party (Kanzlerpartei) that showed a strong orientation towards 
and reliance on the chancellery and the government, while the internal struc-
ture and organization of the party and its membership base were rather weak. 
From the first federal election in 1949 until 1969, the CDU headed different 
government coalitions (with a brief interregnum of single party governance), 
most of which included the Liberals. Twenty years of continuous Christian 
Democratic government responsibility let many view the CDU as the “natural 
government party”, a perception many of its higher representatives still 
shared even after being voted out of government in 1969 following the grand 
coalition. However, already in the 1960s, the CDU’s main competitor, the So-
cial Democrats, experienced a continuous rise in voter popularity reflected in 
improved election results, while the Christian Democrats’ decline slowly set 
in. Only in the mid-1970s, after having lost another federal election in 1972, 
did the Christian Democrats’ party establishment start to acknowledge that 
the party had lost touch with societal developments during the 1960s and 
failed to adapt to changed realities and modern political trends. 
                                               
47 Cf. on the Christian Democratic Party’s origins, ideological roots, historical development, 
and political goals: e.g. Bösch (2002); Haungs (1990); Hintze (1995); Kleinmann (1993); 
Kohl et al. (1993); Pridham (1977); Walter et al. (2014); Zolleis (2008). The following dis-
cussion is primarily based on Haungs (1990); Kleinmann (1993); Pridham (1977); Zolleis 
(2008) and archival materials. 
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The history and self-perception of the CDU as the government party in-
creased the challenges it faced when it was voted out of government in 1969 
and attempted a programmatic and organizational reform. In the early oppo-
sition years until 1972, the parliamentary group of the CDU developed into the 
party’s center of power that viewed itself and acted like a government in re-
serve. The CDU as an independent party organization – regardless of its role 
in government, chancellery and parliament – only gained in importance when 
reformists around the later Chancellor Kohl became more influential in the 
wake of the 1972 election defeat. Kohl, who became CDU chairperson in 1973, 
pushed both organizational and programmatic reforms and turned the CDU 
into a modern people’s party that some observers characterized as fundamen-
tally different from the “early” CDU. 
The Christian Democratic party was therefore not used to conflictual pro-
grammatic debates up until the early 1970s. Instead, the party was character-
ized by a kind of “negotiating decision making” (Aushandlungsdemokratie) 
(Zolleis 2008: ch. 6) that tried to preserve party unity by finding compromises 
that pleased the important party groupings, i.e. the employee wing (CDA) and 
the employer wing (MIT, DKM), and united them behind their government. 
Both the pay continuation and the codetermination debate posed challenges 
to this mode of decision-making.  
In summary, the Christian Democrats in the mid-1960s to mid-1970s can 
be characterized as a governing party on the defense. Split into an employee 
and an employer wing, the party used to preserve its unity through the shared 
focus on its government responsibility. In the wake of the election defeats of 
1969 and 1972, the party strengthened its own organizational base independ-
ent of ministries and chancellery, and growing membership numbers meant a 
more majoritarian way of decision making, putting the employer wing at an 
advantage over the employee wing. This shift was also reflected in the debates 
on pay continuation and codetermination, which were characterized by strong 
internal conflicts. In the latter, the employer wing could more easily enforce 
its stance on codetermination due to its strength in numbers. In the former, 
the employee wing could use its strategical advantage to pressure the em-
ployer wing and the party majority into a pay continuation-friendly agree-
ment.  
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The Social Democrats: From the Opposition Benches to Government 
Power48 
In contrast to the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats enjoyed a steady 
growth in popularity in the early Federal Republic and increased their election 
results by more than a half between 1949 and 1972, from just below 30 % to 
45 %. Established already in 1863, the Social Democratic Party is Germany’s 
oldest political party with a continuous history since the German Empire 
(Deutsches Kaiserreich).  
The Social Democrats were traditionally a classic mass party that integrated 
its working class members in a tight net of associations and clubs. Because the 
party historically did not have much influence in state structures (as opposed 
to the Christian Democrats as a natural government party), it had to rely on 
its own organizational strength as working class party to increase its political 
influence. Only in 1966 did the Social Democrats join government for the first 
time since the establishment of the Federal Republic under a Christian Dem-
ocratic-led grand coalition. Three years later, in 1969, the Social Democrats 
led a successful election campaign and formed a government coalition with 
the Liberals.  
The Social Democrats’ organizational strength and programmatic homoge-
neity were supported by the fact that no other left-wing party managed to es-
tablish itself in the party system of the early Federal Republic, which left the 
Social Democrats as the only influential party on the political left. Throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s, however, the party was challenged by the beginning dis-
appearance of classic worker milieus due to industrialization and automation 
and the success of the welfare state. In 1959, the Social Democrats reacted to 
those new realities and drastically reformed their party program in order to 
get on par with the Christian Democrats in terms of election results. The Social 
Democrats turned away from Marxist lines of thinking and instead accepted 
the success of the social market economy, which laid the foundation for the 
party’s later successful economic policy in the grand coalition. At the same 
time, the party strongly emphasized codetermination and the strengthening 
of unions and the labor movement as key political goals and fought for these 
goals during the debates around the Pay Continuation Act and the Codetermi-
nation Act.  
                                               
48 Cf. on the Social Democrats origins, ideological roots, historical development, and political 
goals: e.g. Arend (1975); Bahr (1980); Braunthal (1994); Decker (2017); Faulenbach (2011); 
Klönne (1999); Miller (1978); Miller and Potthoff (1981); Müller-Rommel (1982); Ott (1978); 
Schmitt (1990). The following discussion is primarily based on Decker (2017); Schmitt 
(1990). 
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Overall, the Social Democrats can be characterized as a traditional working 
class party that fought for classic workers’ issues like codetermination and pay 
continuation. While struggling with a waning working class milieu, the Social 
Democrats successfully approached new voter segments in the 1960s and 
made their way into government and chancellery. Putting strong emphasis on 
programmatic debates and having experienced various split-offs historically, 
the Social Democrats nevertheless stood comparatively united on their core 
policy issues such as pay continuation and codetermination.  
The Liberals: Programmatically and Ideologically Flexible “Party of Second 
Choice”49 
In addition to Christian and social democracy, liberalism is historically seen 
as the third big political movement in Germany’s political landscape. Before 
World War II, the liberal movement was strongly fragmented, but after 1945, 
the liberal FDP successfully incorporated two important streams of liberalism: 
national-conservative liberals, who historically emphasized the goal of Ger-
man unity over fulfilling liberal democratic values and achieving parliamen-
tary democracy, and progressive liberals, whose emphasis lay vice versa. The 
FDP did so by not developing a strong and unified party program uniting both 
wings, but by demonstrating an ideological vagueness and organizational 
weakness on the federal level that allowed the subordinate state parties to fol-
low different political trajectories. The competing party wings only agreed on 
a cohesive party program in 1957, which was based on a formal compromise 
that emphasized the rights of responsible citizens to self-fulfillment and self-
determination.  
The party’s programmatic core, however, continued to stay vague and open 
to different interpretations, and the party often concealed its internal conflicts 
by allowing one or the other party wing to dominate the party’s political posi-
tion in a certain policy field. Economic and social policy, the policy domain 
under which pay continuation and codetermination fall, was a stronghold of 
the national conservatives, who emphasized capitalist and market principles, 
represented business and employers’ interests and mistrusted the influence of 
unions.  
While the FDP remained relatively small in terms of election results and 
parliament seats, it nevertheless gained exceptional influences over German 
                                               
49 Cf. on the Liberals’ origins, ideological roots, historical development, and political goals: 
e.g. Albertin (1980); Broughton and Kirchner (1984); Dittberner (1987, 2005); Kirchner and 
Broughton (1988); Kirchner (2009); Vorländer (1990). The following discussion is primarily 
based on Dittberner (1987); Kirchner and Broughton (1988); Vorländer (1990). 
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politics and government. This was due to its role as “majority maker” (Mehr-
heitsbeschaffer; a small party needed by a bigger party to reach an absolute 
majority in parliament) and the successful incorporation of the competing 
streams of liberalism into one, ideologically flexible party. Since absolute ma-
jorities are rare in the German parliament, the Liberals became an indispen-
sable coalition partner whose influence in government coalitions often ex-
ceeded the party’s strength in terms of election results. Only from 1966 to 1969 
could the party not capitalize on its strategic middle position but was relegated 
to the opposition benches during the grand coalition government of Christian 
and Social Democrats.  
The brief years on the opposition benches gave the party time to reorient 
itself programmatically. During the late 1960s, the internal power balance had 
tilted towards the progressive wing who led the party on a social-liberal path, 
most famously manifested in the Freiburg theses, the party program adopted 
in 1971.50 With the traditional division of labor in the party, the conservative 
party wing still dominated the party’s economic and social policy profile, 
which often brought the Liberals in conflict with their coalition partner, the 
Social Democrats.  
Overall, the Liberals can be characterized as a “party of second choice” 
(Dittberner 1987) that Christian or social democratically-leaning voters stra-
tegically voted for in order to bring one of the big parties in government and 
at the same time provide for an opposition within the government against ei-
ther Christian or Social Democrats, as in the debate on codetermination. The 
Liberals’ influence on government policies therefore often exceeded its real 
strength in numbers and overplayed the relative weakness of the party’s own 
membership base. Only during the grand coalition from 1966 to 1969 were the 
Liberals close to irrelevant for public policy making.  
5.3 The Political-Institutional Context of Public Policy Making in 
Germany 
Parties’ political strategies are not only circumscribed by their political-ideo-
logical roots, their internal modes of decision making and their relations to 
each other, but also by the political-institutional context of policy making. As 
mentioned in chapter 1, two characteristics of the political-institutional con-
text are identified in the literature as particularly important in shaping pro-
cesses of institutional and policy change: the level of veto barriers and the level 
                                               
50 Social liberalism denotes the attempt to combine liberal and left political ideologies, em-
phasizing that the freedom of the individual must not be reduced to legally guaranteed rights 
of freedom, but that individual freedom must be translated into equal opportunities in eve-
ryday life. 
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of institutional discretion defined by previous policies. The two following sec-
tions discuss the two characteristics in the above order for both the pay con-
tinuation and the codetermination case.  
The Level of Veto Barriers 
The concept of veto barriers signifies whether actors have institutional or ex-
tra-institutional means of blocking change. Veto barriers can derive from par-
ticularly powerful veto players in a political system, e.g. institutional veto play-
ers like chambers of parliament or constitutional courts, or partisan veto play-
ers like parties in government coalitions. Alternatively, they can derive from 
veto points, that is, points in the legislative chain of decisions at which agree-
ment is needed (Immergut 1990; Tsebelis 2002). If there are actors that pos-
sess means to block policy change, veto barriers are high; if not, veto barriers 
are low.  
The Constitutional Court 
From a comparative perspective, observers have often characterized the Ger-
man political system as one with rigid institutional constraints, a semi-sover-
eign state with intertwined politics and a consensual democracy (Katzenstein 
1987; Lijphart 1999; Scharpf et al. 1976). The most prominent veto players in 
the German political system are the second chamber of parliament, the Bun-
desrat, and the constitutional court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht.51 The lat-
ter, Germany’s highest court, can function as a “conditional veto player” 
(Kneip 2011: 225) ex post facto.52 Once the Bundestag passes a law, opponents 
can challenge it in front of the court, which then evaluates the law’s constitu-
tionality. Hence, the court can be strategically ‘used’ – typically by the oppo-
sition or interests groups who oppose a law passed by government – as a 
downstream institutional veto player. Frequently, threats “to go to Karlsruhe” 
(Wesel 2004), where the court is physically located, are already made during 
political debates in order to discourage the government from pursuing certain 
legislation and to “prepone” the veto power of a potential court trial into the 
process of policy formulation.53 
                                               
51 In a coalition government, the parties in government can formally be considered (partisan) 
veto players as well. However, since they are also agenda setters, this terminology can be 
misleading (Merkel 2003: 6). 
52 Kneip (2011: 225) refers to the Bundesverfassungsgericht as a “conditional veto player” or 
“triggered veto player” since the court cannot become active by itself, but needs to be acti-
vated by other actors. 
53 This phenomenon is also referred to as a “passive judicialization” of policy-making (Kneip 
2011: 223; cf. also Landfried 1994).  
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In the case of the Codetermination Act, the constitutionality of the govern-
ment’s proposal was subject to intense debate among policy makers and legal 
scholars (Faulenbach 2011: 442).54 In particular, the employer federation BDA 
publicly questioned the act’s constitutionality.55 Since an expert hearing in 
parliament did not bring clarity, the conflict was never resolved and the BDA 
eventually challenged the act in front of the constitutional court after parlia-
ment passed it. In doing so, the BDA’s main goal was less to see the act re-
pealed by the court than to have the court set clear constitutional limits to any 
potential further extension of codetermination rights. However, in 1979, the 
court decided against the plaintiffs and declared the act compatible with the 
Grundgesetz, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic (Borowsky 2002). Despite 
the government’s success in court, the continued debate on the constitution-
ality of the act functions as an early limitation to what the government per-
ceived as possible in the codetermination reform and led the government to 
revise its reform draft substantially between 1974 and 1976.56 
In contrast to the Codetermination Act of 1976, the constitutionality of the 
Pay Continuation Act was never challenged and the constitutional court 
therefore did not play the role of an actual or preponed veto barrier.  
The Second Chamber of Parliament 
The second important veto player mentioned above was the second chamber 
of parliament, the Bundesrat. In the legislative process, the Bundesrat’s ap-
proval of legislation passed by the Bundestag is necessary in approximately 
every second case, depending on the substance of the respective law.57 Since 
                                               
54 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 30: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, public expert hearing, 16.10.1974; Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 
lfd. 31: Bundestag committee on labor and social policy, public expert hearing, 04.11.1974; 
Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd.33: Bundestag committee on labor and social 
policy, public expert hearing, 07.11.1974 
55 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 30 (supplementary document): statement 
of the Employer Federation’s (BDA) working group on codetermination, 06.12.1974, p. 12-
14. 
56 Bundestag Printed Matter 07/2172: government proposal for Codetermination Act, 
29.04.74; Bundestag Printed Matter 07/4787: Bundestag committee on labor and social pol-
icy, revised pro-posal for Codetermination Act, 23.02.1976; Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 
4000 VII 400 lfd. 17 (supplementary document): legal synopsis about changes between dif-
ferent reform proposals, 28.01.1974; Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 41: le-
gal synopsis about changes between different reform proposals, 16.2.1976. 
57 Historically, the Bundesrat’s approval has been necessary for slightly over half of the bills 
passed by the first chamber, the Bundestag. For the other half of the bills, the Bundesrat can 
object to legislation coming from the Bundestag, but this objection can be outvoted by the 
Bundestag in a second vote (Merkel 2003: 5-7; cf. Heyer 2015; Website: 
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majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat are often not in agreement, and 
since major legislation typically necessitates approval by the Bundesrat, Ger-
many has previously been referred to as a “grand coalition state” in which So-
cial Democrats and Christian Democrats are often forced to cooperate, even 
when they do not form a government together (Schmidt 2015).58 As Merkel 
(2003: 5-6) emphasizes, it is therefore important to determine the veto power 
of the Bundesrat in each case depending on the policy field or issue, since the 
second chamber is not a consistent veto player.  
In the case of the Pay Continuation Act, the government actually consisted 
of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, who had a clear majority in 
both chambers of parliament. Furthermore, no specific state interests were at 
stake in the case of pay continuation, which would potentially set an SPD- or 
CDU-governed state in opposition to the federal government, and the nature 
of the act would only have allowed the Bundesrat to delay its adoption but not 
to block it. Hence, the Bundesrat effectively did not play the role of a veto 
player. 
In the case of the Codetermination Act, the question of whether the Bun-
desrat’s consent to the act was necessary was subject to disagreement between 
government and opposition. The Christian Democratic opposition held a 
slight majority in the Bundesrat, which it could potentially use to try to force 
the government to make concessions if the act was declared to require the 
Bundesrat’s consent. Naturally, the government wanted to avoid this situation 
and therefore negated that the second chamber’s consent was necessary for 
passing the act in its initial proposal.59 While the Bundesrat, in its statement 
to the government proposal, declared it viewed the act as requiring consent, 
the government subsequently replied that this was not the case since its sub-
stance matter was within the prerogatives of the Bundestag.60,61 Importantly, 
the government could draw on established jurisprudence that was in support 
                                               
https://www.bundesrat.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/statistik/gesamtstatistik.html 
(last access: Maj 25, 2018)). 
58 Merkel notes, though, that political parties have developed “enormous creativity in split-
ting up single bills strategically [into parts that require consent and part that do not] to avoid 
their introduction into the Bundesrat” (2003: 5-6).  
59 Bundestag Printed Matter 07/2172: government proposal for Codetermination Act, 
29.04.74. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Historically, the Bundesrat has frequently taken the position that acts (like allegedly the 
1976 Codetermination Act) that change a previous act that required the consent of the Bun-
desrat also require the consent of the Bundesrat. However, according to the constitutional 
court and established jurisprudence, not all such acts require the Bundesrat’s consent. In-
stead, the act itself must be evaluated in terms of whether it necessitates consent by the Bun-
desrat. 
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of its position. Since the final Codetermination Act was eventually passed with 
the support of the Christian Democratic opposition after the government had 
revised its proposal, the dispute on the Bundesrat’s consent to the act was re-
solved without further political or legal arguments, and the Bundesrat can be 
considered to not have been a veto barrier for the government.  
Overall, this allows us to characterize the veto barriers in both the pay con-
tinuation case and the codetermination case as low, even though the social-
liberal government faced some challenges regarding the legislation’s constitu-
tionality in the codetermination case. 
The Level of Institutional Discretion 
The level of institutional discretion typically describes how much freedom of 
action institutional rules leave for rule takers in implementing or interpreting 
said rules. In the analysis of architectural policy design strategies, the concept 
more specifically refers to institutional discretion as describing how much 
“room to maneuver” previous legislation on a particular issue leaves to politi-
cal actors for a reform of this legislation or to the passage of new legislation 
on the issue in question.  
For the pay continuation case, the level of institutional discretion was com-
paratively low. As the historical overview of legislation on sickness benefits 
will show in section 7.2, an established system for compensating sick workers 
had already existed before the 1969 Pay Continuation Act. This system of sick 
pay was deeply rooted in the German social insurance system, where health 
funds covered workers’ sick pay since the late 19th century. It was continuously 
adapted to rising demands of workers and political criticism from Social Dem-
ocrats and the labor movement. Important involved actors, in particular em-
ployers, had vested interests in its continuity, and it granted workers – with 
only few limitations – the same rights and benefits as legislation pertaining to 
salaried employees. Hence, in 1969 policy makers could not exploit a regula-
tory gap, nor was the existing system for workers’ sick benefits easy to change 
without disturbing the current arrangement. In their efforts to formulate a re-
form in 1969, policy makers were therefore in a context of low discretion 
where the existing policy sets rather narrow limitations to reforms.  
For the codetermination case, the level of institutional discretion was com-
paratively high. As the historical overview of legislation on codetermination 
will show in section 6.2, there was a considerable regulatory gap in codeter-
mination legislation. While previous acts at first sight covered the largest part 
of the German labor force, the extent and depth of employee rights varied 
drastically between sectors covered by different laws. For example, the Works 
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Constitution Act of 1952 was broad in its coverage, but the extent of codeter-
mination rights and the depth of regulation were rather limited.62 The Works 
Constitution Act of 1972, as another example, focused exclusively on regulat-
ing codetermination on the firm level but did not address employee participa-
tion on the company level. Hence, limited coverage, restrictions in the extent 
of codetermination and lacking depth of legislation in combination add up to 
a comparatively high level of institutional discretion for policy makers aiming 
for a reform of codetermination. 
 
                                               
62 Only two out 89 paragraphs in the act concerned employee participation on the company 
level, leaving many regulatory issues unaddressed. In contract, the later 1976 Codetermina-
tion Act contained 41 paragraphs. 
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6. The Codetermination Act of 1976 
6.1 Introduction to the Case Study 
The subsequent sections present the first case study of architectural policy de-
sign, following the structure outlined at the beginning of Part III, and investi-
gate the Codetermination Act of 1976. The reform was selected as an ideal in-
strumental case of architectural policy making because it was situated in a 
context evaluated as most conducive to architectural policy design (cf. section 
4.2.3).  
The Issue of Codetermination 
Codetermination means, broadly speaking, that employees and management 
participate in determining business policy and is a central element of labor 
relations regulation. More specifically, one can understand codetermination 
as the 
direct influence of employees on the management of economic processes. Direct 
means that employees exercise this influence within the economic system itself in 
their role as employees and not in their role as citizens in the political system 
through parties, parliaments, governments and bureaucracies. […] Influence 
means every form of influencing the economic process, every step with which em-
ployees transcend the complete dependence on the management’s will and with 
which they set their own will in opposition to the management’s will, from the 
most moderate complaint or information request up to the participation in firm 
management itself. (Oertzen 1965: 7, italics added; in Barthel and Dikau 1980: 9) 
Hence, the regulation and extent of codetermination goes to the heart of the 
economic system. It addresses the question of who decides on business poli-
cies and the balance or imbalance of power between capital and labor (i.e. 
shareholders and employees). For the labor movement, the issue of codeter-
mination is of exceptional importance because it is the closest it will get to a 
socialist economic and societal order. The conflict between capital and labor 
has characterized modern societies like Germany since the onset of the indus-
trial revolution, and it is still reflected in party systems and in the structure of 
the interest group landscape. Codetermination can be understood as a means 
for taming or resolving this conflict, even though codetermination itself has 
long been highly contested. Codetermination can tame the conflict between 
capital and labor in different ways depending on how the concept is inter-
preted and fleshed out with concrete regulatory content.  
In a simplified fashion, one can make out two poles in the interpretation of 
codetermination and the way it can resolve the conflict between capital and 
labor: one is by integrating the workforce into a capitalist economy, the other 
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by democratizing the capitalist economy and overcoming the capitalist system 
(cf. on concepts and degrees of codetermination: Mayer 1976: 37-41). The first 
pole understands codetermination as a means to resolve the conflict between 
capital and labor by allowing for employee participation in economic decision 
making without harming shareholders’ right to make final decisions. From the 
perspective of the labor movement, this means “sedating” employees and “lur-
ing” them into a model of partnership with shareholders that does not grant 
them substantial rights but that guarantees a “functional” economy, as busi-
ness representatives would say. The goal is to contain and cool down the con-
flict between capital and labor in a model of social partnership that prevents 
employees from fundamentally questioning or opposing the economic order 
but that stabilizes the capitalist economic system.  
The second pole understands codetermination as anti-capitalistic and rad-
ical-democratic and sees it as one of many means necessary for limiting the 
influence and power of capital owners and their disposal over employees. Co-
determination, in this perspective, serves the creation of an effective, counter-
vailing power of the labor movement that can control capital owners and op-
pose their claim to power. Codetermination then goes hand in hand with the 
socialization of big corporations and national economic planning systems and 
helps to overcome the capitalist economic order to the benefit of workers’ self-
management.  
Codetermination in Germany 
Codetermination cannot only be understood in different ways, it can also be 
applied at different levels of the employee-employer relationship, namely the 
shop-level and the corporate level. In the German context, codetermination 
on both those levels is a core characteristic of the labor market, corporate gov-
ernance and labor relations.  
First, on the shop level, employees in almost all companies have the right 
to elect work councils (Betriebsrat) that represent their rights towards the em-
ployer in social, personnel and economic matters. In personnel and social 
matters, work councils practically have the possibility to block employer deci-
sions (due to the mandatory consent between partners; Konsenspflicht), and 
rights are therefore more extensive than in economic matters, where work 
councils cannot block decisions but have the right to be consulted and in-
cluded in dealing with consequences of, e.g., shop closures. In the public sec-
tor, employees are able to participate via a similar scheme through so-called 
staff councils (Personalrat). Second, on the corporate level, employees have 
the right to elect representatives for corporate supervisory boards (Aufsichts-
rat). Depending on the number of employees, they can elect either a third or 
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half of the board members. Through supervisory boards, employees partici-
pate in corporate decision-making, in the election of the members of the board 
of directors (Vorstand) and in the control of the management of the company.  
Both levels of codetermination have early roots in the late 19th and early 20th 
century. In the Federal Republic, major codetermination reforms that pre-
scribed the above regulations were implemented in the 1950s and 1970s (e.g. 
Works Constitution Act of 1952 and Works Constitution Act of 1972; cf. section 
6.2). While the two levels of codetermination are closely related to each other, 
the case study follows the political-legislative separation between corporate 
level codetermination and shop level codetermination and focusses on the Co-
determination Act of 1976 alone. 
Architectural Policy Design in German Codetermination Politics 
The broad spectrum of how one can understand the concept of codetermina-
tion allows for a variety of different political positions on codetermination that 
the political debate in Germany in the 1960s and ‘70s also reflected. Roughly 
speaking, the constellation of positions was as follows (cf. section 6.3 for a 
more detailed description): First, Social Democrats were – supported by the 
labor movement – clearly in favor of far-reaching codetermination regula-
tions. Their aim was to introduce codetermination with “full parity” (i.e. an 
equal number of seats for employee and shareholder representatives) in big 
corporations in all sectors of the economy, similar to previous legislation on 
codetermination in the mining and steel industry.  
Second, the Liberals were, despite their recent shift towards social liberal-
ism, skeptical of far-reaching codetermination rights for employees and there-
fore preferred a solution that extended the rights of the middle management 
as a “third factor” in labor relations, i.e. elevating the middle management as 
a distinct third player next to employees and shareholders. Since Liberals and 
Social Democrats formed a government coalition, the parties faced the chal-
lenge of finding a compromise between their conflicting positions.  
Third, the Christian Democrats were, as described earlier, split into two 
wings. The employee wing favored a reform along the lines of the Social Dem-
ocrats’ position; the employer wing stood closer to the position of the Liberals 
and opposed too far-reaching codetermination rights for employees. As a 
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whole, the party therefore eventually argued for an extension of codetermina-
tion, but in a weaker form compared to the 1952 legislation, i.e. without full 
parity (ensuring shareholders the decisive, final vote).63  
At a first glance, the differences between these proposals quickly boil down 
to the immediate, substantial consequences they would have for employees 
and shareholders, in particular, the question of how extensive the rights 
granted to employees would be. Because this question is of great importance, 
the reform debate was often heated and highly confrontational through the 
1960s and 70s.64 Important points or questions of conflict were, for example: 
How many seats should employee representatives receive? Should employee 
representatives effectively be able to veto management decisions or “only” to 
voice their opinion? Are extensive codetermination rights in line with the con-
stitution, or do they violate shareholders’ property rights? What status should 
managerial employees have? Should they be treated as a distinct, third group 
and receive “their own” seats on supervisory boards?  
However, questions like the above, the intensity of the political conflict, the 
animosity between the counterparts, and the focus on the immediate effects 
of a reform can easily obscure another more “subterranean” dimension of the 
political conflict. This subterranean dimension concerns the long-term impli-
cations that different reform options and policy designs would have on future 
dynamics of codetermination and labor relations politics. While these long-
term implications are less obvious to the uninformed observer, they were on 
the minds of policy makers and played an important role during policy mak-
ing. In this regard, the important question is why and how the differences be-
tween the three reform options – some of them only technical at first sight – 
affect the politics of codetermination and labor relations in the long term. For 
example, how does codetermination policy affect the influence and organiza-
tional strength of unions? How does it affect inter- and intra-union relations? 
How does it affect employees’ awareness, desire, and possibility to organize 
and seek representation? How does it affect the balance or imbalance of power 
between employees and shareholders? 
The answers to these questions and to how policy makers thought about 
them will be given in the subsequent case study. From the perspective of the 
                                               
63 The actual number of reform proposals extended well beyond the count of three. In addi-
tion to the Social Democrats, Liberals and Christian Democrats, several interest groups, in-
dividual members of parliament, and groupings within the three parties made their own 
proposals to influence the political debate. 
64 Cf. e.g. the plenary debates in the Bundestag on the reform of codetermination: Bundestag 
Printed Matter 07/230: Bundestag plenary debate, 2nd and 3rd reading of Codetermination 
Act, 18.03.1976; Bundestag Printed Matter 07/110: Bundestag plenary debate, 1st reading of 
Codetermination Act, 20.06.1974. 
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theoretical framework on architectural policy design, the guiding case-specific 
research question asks how or to what extent the politics of codetermination 
can be a case of architectural policy design? In other words, were policy mak-
ers aware of the different political implications of the competing reform de-
signs at the time of policy formulation, and if so, how did strategic consider-
ations of these implications shape the policy formulation and design? 
Preview of the Argument and Contribution 
The answer to the above research question is not a simple one-liner. The case 
study presented in the following chapters responds to this question based on 
a thorough investigation of the available empirical material described earlier 
in section 4.3. In doing so, it will substantiate the two analytical claims made 
in chapter 1. To reiterate briefly, the second analytical claim argued that the 
disaggregation of policies into policy instruments and design characteristics 
and the fine-grained investigation of the design process gives us a better un-
derstanding of how policy feedback effects emerge and whether and how pol-
icy-makers can (try to) design these intentionally.  
Typically, policy feedback studies would seek to identify feedback effects 
that originate in past labor regulation policies in order to explain the persis-
tence of the codetermination model, which has been largely unchanged since 
the 1976 Codetermination Act. These studies would point to factors that sus-
tained the policy regime over time, e.g. the adaptive behavior of involved ac-
tors, feelings of entitlement to codetermine in the workforce or participation 
in economic decision-making by worker representatives. They would trace 
these effects back to critical junctures in policy development and path-gener-
ating reforms in order to explain path dependence.  
However, the studies would not investigate the design process or explain 
whether these formative choices were strategically made, nor would they in-
vestigate whether and how policy instrumentation and design characteristics 
shaped feedback effects. The argument proposed here is not that traditional 
approaches to policy feedback are not able to uncover and identify feedback 
effects correctly, but that they cannot tell us, for example, whether or to what 
degree policy feedback is caused by strategic policy making, which elements 
of policy design actually create and shape feedback effect, or whether the feed-
back effects that materialize match those anticipated or intended by policy 
makers at the time of policy design. In order to substantiate this claim and 
respond to the research question, the case study delves into the design process 
of the Codetermination Act and investigates policy makers’ struggle over slight 
modifications in the design of the act and the architectural policy design strat-
egies they followed. 
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The first analytical claim argued that attention to feedback effects helps 
remedy the functionalist bias in policy design studies and improve our under-
standing of the potentials, challenges, political struggles, and real-world pat-
terns of strategic policy design. Typically, policy design studies in the policy 
sciences would investigate the Codetermination Act’s suitability for solving 
the challenge of organizing employee participation in economic decision-mak-
ing. Studies would inquire whether actors rationally followed existing 
knowledge when selecting instruments, how mixes of different policy instru-
ments work together, whether the final policy design was effective and effi-
cient, or how the act related to legislation elsewhere.  
However, these studies would typically not investigate the political consid-
erations during the design process but sideline them as aspects of “non-de-
sign”. More political perspectives on policy design, as discussed in section 2.2, 
would typically not include considerations of policy feedback effects among 
potential political factors shaping policy design or be based on well-developed 
concepts of strategic policy making.  
In sum, policy design studies would therefore not explain the political strug-
gle and strategic conflict between the involved parties during the four-year ne-
gotiations and only offer a partial understanding of the design process and 
outcome. In order to substantiate the second claim and respond to the re-
search question, the case study investigates more closely the political skir-
mishing around policy design characteristics that offhand may seem trivial but 
that policy makers expect to be of great importance for ensuing feedback ef-
fects. 
The case study presented in this chapter argues that the debate on codeter-
mination featured two strategies of architectural policy design that were sup-
posed to either unify the labor movement and strengthen unified trade unions 
like the DGB or to fragment the labor movement and weaken unified trade 
unions65. As discussed in chapter 3, architectural policy design strategies are 
not completely static but develop and change throughout the political debate 
as policy makers adapt to changing environments and incentives. The short 
description here and the extensive empirical investigation in sections 6.4 and 
6.5 aim to identify the essential features of policy makers’ design strategies. 
This means that the descriptions of parties’ overall design strategies do not 
match exactly one specific policy proposals or reconstruct a secret master 
                                               
65 The term unified trade unions (Einheitsgewerkschaften) refers to “trade unions open to 
all workers regardless of their ideological leanings or political convictions”, as opposed to 
so-called Richtungsgewerkschaften, i.e. “trade unions with more concrete ideological or po-
litical party links” (Dribbusch and Birke 2012: 2). For simplicity, the dissertation typically 
refers to unified trade unions as trade unions/labor unions but indicates when Richtungs-
gewerkschaften are discussed.  
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strategy paper produced by government or opposition at a specific point dur-
ing the design process, but that they analytically try to get to the core of policy 
makers strategies in the design process.  
 The first strategy was followed by the Social Democratic-led government 
(supported by the labor movement) and represented a compromise between 
Social Democrats and Liberals. The government’s policy design included full 
parity on supervisory boards, the introduction of intermediate electoral com-
mittees, the inclusion of external union representatives, limited group rights 
for the middle management66, and the installment of a labor director on the 
board of directors. Policy makers anticipated that this would create four types 
of policy feedback effects (self-reinforcement effects, infection effect, spillover 
effect, entrenchment effect) that would shape the political dynamics in code-
termination politics and labor relations towards a more unified labor move-
ment with powerful unified trade unions.  
The second strategy was followed by the Christian Democrats (supported 
by employer federations) and included the introduction of group rights for the 
middle management, direct elections of supervisory boards, a rejection of ex-
ternal union representatives and codetermination “below” full parity, i.e. with 
a guaranteed shareholder majority. This design was envisioned to create four 
types of feedback effects (precedence effect, spillover effect, entrenchment ef-
fect, self-reinforcement effect) that would facilitate a political development to-
wards a fragmented labor movement and weakened unified trade unions.67  
By uncovering and investigating these policy design strategies, this study 
contributes to the existing literature and shows that policies are designed not 
only based on concerns for optimal problem solution and or short-term polit-
ical benefit, as most literature typically assumes, but also based on considera-
tions of their long-term effects on political dynamics. It thereby improves our 
understanding of which types and elements of policy design may produce 
which types of policy feedback effects from the perspective of policy makers 
                                               
66 The role of the middle management in codetermination was an important point of conflict 
between Social Democrats and Liberals and of particular importance regarding anticipated 
long-term policy effects. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 discuss this issue in detail since Liberals and 
Social Democrats ideally proposed policy designs that would lead to opposite policy feedback 
effects.  
67 The Liberals are not ascribed a distinct policy design strategy, but their influence on the 
Social Democratic-Liberal government is discussed throughout the case study. Ideologically 
closer to the Christian Democrats on the issue of codetermination, the Liberals’ role as small 
coalition partner limited their ability to push through their own policy proposal. However, 
the Liberals successfully curtailed the Social Democrats’ “ideal” design strategy and moved 
the government’s joint reform proposal closer to the position of the Christian Democrats and 
thereby made it easier for government and opposition to eventually reach a compromise be-
tween their conflicting reform proposals. 
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(cf. Part IV). The study thereby helps to outbalance the functionalist bias in 
policy design studies and give a better understanding of the real-world pat-
terns, struggles, potentials and challenges of strategic policy design.  
These contributions and the two broad architectural policy design strategies 
are substantiated in a more fine-grained analysis of specific policy feedback 
dynamics that policy makers considered in the reform of codetermination. In 
particular, the analysis shows policy makers’ explicit consideration and at-
tempt to influence the structure of the system of interest representation 
through public policy making. The study thus also goes beyond previous re-
search that has shown that public policy does influence the structure of inter-
est representation in the long term through policy feedback effects (e.g. 
Campbell 2003, 2012; Mettler 2002; Mettler and Welch 2004) or policy lega-
cies (Döhler 1995). It also goes beyond research on the impact of parties’ po-
litical strategies in shaping society, political mobilization and long-term policy 
development (cf. e.g.: Rothstein 1996; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984) in 
that it shows based on a detailed empirical analysis of archival documents how 
policy makers try to realize long-term political strategies in and through the 
design of political reforms. Thus, it adds stronger evidence of policy makers’ 
strategic consideration of feedback effects during policy design and their at-
tempts to design long-term feedback effects intentionally.  
6.2 Legislation on Codetermination Prior to 1976 and the Provisions 
of the Codetermination Act of 197668 
The reform of codetermination was the second big reform project of the Social 
Democratic-Liberal government in the field of labor relations. Four years ear-
lier, the new coalition had already passed the Works Constitution Act of 1972, 
which had reorganized and extended employee participation on the shop level. 
The joint goal of both reforms was pushed in particular by the Social Demo-
crats and was to reform the structure of labor relations in post-war Germany 
and to extend the influence of employees in the economy. Today, both reforms 
qualify as milestones in German labor relations legislation.  
Prior to the 1970s, three legislative acts shaped labor relations and workers’ 
participation in corporate decision making in the Federal Republic: the Works 
Constitutions Act of 1952, the Coal and Steel Codetermination Act of 1951, and 
the Codetermination Amendment Act of 1956. The historical roots of codeter-
mination date even further back. Already in the mid- to late-19th century were 
                                               
68 Cf. e.g. Kißler et al. (2011); Lauschke (2006); Page (2011); Thum (1982); cf. also: ACDP, 
07-001-19002: memo for federal minister Heck (CDU) on codetermination, 24.07.1967, and 
https://www.boeckler.de/34796.htm (last access: April 27, 2018). 
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voluntary forms of employee participation through work councils a part of la-
bor law. Throughout the first half of the 20th century, these regulations were 
gradually extended to cover more, i.e. smaller, firms and oblige firms to estab-
lish worker councils (instead of only spelling out the possibility to do so). Un-
der the Nazi Regime, all forms of codetermination were abolished and could 
only be reestablished after the defeat of Germany in World War II. 
The three acts that regulated codetermination in the early Federal Republic 
before the 1970s were limited in their scope. First, the Coal and Steel Codeter-
mination Act of 1951 and the Codetermination Amendment Act of 1956 only 
targeted companies, as the title indicates, in the mining and steel industry with 
more than 1000 employees as well as parent companies whose objectives were 
defined by their daughter companies in the mining and steel industry. The acts 
prescribed what is known in Germany as paritätische Mitbestimmung, that 
is, codetermination based on “full parity” (i.e. an equal number of seats on 
supervisory boards) between employee representatives and shareholder rep-
resentatives. While the passage of the first act in 1951 was a major victory for 
the labor movement, the act did not apply to large parts of the German econ-
omy and was therefore, from the perspective of the labor movement, only an 
intermediate step towards full workers’ participation as advocated by most 
unions.  
Second, the Works Constitution Act of 1952 encompassed all sectors of the 
economy and regulated shop level codetermination in all companies with 
more than four employees, but regulations regarding codetermination on the 
corporate level covered only larger companies with more than 500 employees 
and prescribed only so-called Drittelparität, literally meaning “one-third-par-
ity”. According to the act, workers’ representatives received only one third of 
the seats on company supervisory boards while shareholder representatives 
occupied the other two thirds. Hence, for the bigger part of the German econ-
omy, the regulations regarding workers’ participation fell well behind what the 
labor movement had achieved in the coal and steel industry. Therefore, unions 
continuously lobbied for a reform and an extension of codetermination legis-
lation into other sectors of the economy.  
The labor movement achieved a first success in 1972 when the newly elected 
Social Democratic-Liberal government introduced major changes in employee 
participation with the reform of the Works Constitution Act. While the reform 
extended employee rights in shop-level codetermination, the coalition delib-
erately excluded codetermination on the corporate level from the reform. The 
government announced that it was planning to introduce separate legislation 
to regulate workers’ participation in companies’ supervisory boards in the fol-
lowing legislative period. It could only fulfill this promise four years later in 
1976 when it passed the Codetermination Act of 1976 after an unusually long 
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legislative process. Before presenting the key provisions of the act in more de-
tail, Table 6.1, below, gives a summary of key legislation on codetermination 
prior to 1976.  
Table 6.1: Key Legislation on Codetermination Prior to 1976 (Selection) 
Year Act Key Provisions 
1891 
Commercial Code of the German Reich  
(Novelle zur Reichsgewerbeordnung, 
01.07.1891) 
Voluntary establishment of worker councils 
(Arbeiterausschüsse) 
early 
19th c.  
e.g. Prussian Mining Act (Gesetz vom 
05.07.1905 betreffend die Abänderung des 
Allg. Berggesetzes vom 24.06.1865/92); Act 
on the Delegation of Work Council Members 
to Supervisory Councils (Gesetz über die 
Entsendung von Betriebsratsmitgliedern in 
den Aufsichtsrat, 15.02.1922) 
Obligatory establishment of worker coun-
cils in mining companies with more than 
100 employees; Delegation of 1-2 members 
of worker councils to supervisory boards 
1951 
Coal and Steel Codetermination Act (Gesetz 
über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer 
in den Aufsichtsräten und Vorständen der 
Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen 
und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie, BGBl. 1951, 
Nr. 24, 23.05.1951) 
“Full parity” on supervisory boards in cor-
porations in coal and steel industry with 
more than 1000 employees 
1952 
Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfas-
sungsgesetz, BGBl. 1952, Nr. 43, 14.10.1952) 
Shop-level Codetermination in all sectors 
of the economy in firms with more than 4 
employees; one-third-parity on supervisory 
boards (outside coal and steel industry) 
1956 
Codetermination Amendment Act (Gesetz zur 
Ergänzung des Gesetzes über die Mitbes-
timmung der Arbeitnehmer in den 
Aufsichtsräten und Vorständen der Un-
ternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und 
Stahl erzeugenden Industrie, BGBl 1956, Nr. 
38, 08.08.1956) 
Extension of regulations of the 1951 Act to 
parent companies whose objectives are de-
fined by those companies covered by the 
1951 Act 
1972 
Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfas-
sungsgesetz, BGBl. 1972, Nr. 2, 18.01.1972) 
Extension of codetermination regulations 
of 1952; Regulation of codetermination on 
the corporate level left to subsequent re-
form 
 
The Key Provisions of the Codetermination Act of 1976 
Besides the continuous lobbying efforts of the labor movement, two other fac-
tors opened a window of opportunity and facilitated a reform of codetermina-
tion. First, the political and economic climate of the 1960s and 1970s led to a 
changed approach to economic policy and gave unions more leverage in policy 
making (cf. chapter 5). The establishment of an expert commission on code-
termination was a part of this changed approach. The commission submitted 
its final report in 1970 shortly after the election of the new Social Democratic-
Liberal government. In the report, it argued for an extension of codetermina-
tion beyond the legislation of 1952, but not to the extent of codetermination 
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with full parity in the mining and steel industry.69 Second, the newly elected 
Social Democratic Chancellor Brandt ran a campaign that promised progres-
sive social reforms and more opportunities for participation for employees. 
With the Social Democrats in government, post-war Germany also got its first 
center-left government, which was comparatively more labor-friendly than 
the previous governments. 
After long-lasting negotiations between government and opposition as well 
as within the government coalition, a reform of codetermination on the cor-
porate level was passed in 1976. The Codetermination Act of 1976 extended 
codetermination rights for employees substantially compared to earlier legis-
lation. Important stipulations concerned in particular five issues: First, the act 
regulated in detail the election procedure for employee representatives on su-
pervisory boards, introducing different election procedures for big and small 
companies. Both procedures were based on proportional representation of 
three different employee groups: workers, salaried employees,70 and middle 
managers.71 Second, the act entitled the middle management to mandatory 
representation and granted it group rights in the election procedure and other 
stipulations. Third, the act regulated the composition and internal order of 
supervisory boards and prescribed an equal division of seats between em-
ployee and shareholder representatives. The seats of employee representatives 
were divided into “external seats” (for external union representative) and “in-
ternal seats” (for members of the corporation’s workforce), which had to rep-
resent the three employee groups proportionally. Fourth, the act regulated the 
resolution of potential impasses on supervisory boards by giving a double vot-
ing weight to the chairperson in case of an impasse. Fifth, the act introduced 
a so-called labor director as an equal member of the board of directors. Con-
trary to previous legislation, the act did not define particular tasks and respon-
sibilities or a particular election procedure for the labor director. Table 6.2, 
below, summarizes the key provisions of the 1976 Codetermination Act. 
  
                                               
69 Bundestag Printed Matter 06/334: report by expert commission on codetermination 
(“Mitbestimmung im Unternehmen"), 04.02.1970. 
70 Cf. section 7.1 on the distinction between workers and salaried employees. 
71 Middle managers (leitende Angestellte) are employees with managerial functions, e.g. the 
power to hire and fire employees or to act and sign on behalf of the firm.  
 136 
Table 6.2: Key Provisions of the Codetermination Act of 1976 
Election procedure: 
- direct elections in companies with under 
8000 employees, intermediate electoral 
committee in companies with more than 
8000 employees 
- proportional representation of workers, sal-
aried employees and middle management 
on electoral committee; separate election of 
delegates 
- high quotes for candidate proposals 
- election of supervisory board members 
based on proportional representation 
- proportional representation of all employee 
groups on supervisory boards 
- external union representatives on supervi-
sory boards elected based on proportional 
election 
Labor director: 
- introduction of “labor director” as member 
of the board of directors 
- no specification of tasks, competences or 
election procedure (as in legislation of 1951) 
Middle management: 
- mandatory representation of middle 
management on supervisory boards 
- group rights for middle management in 
election procedure 
Composition of supervisory boards: 
- 50 % of seats for employee representa-
tives, 50 % for shareholder representa-
tives 
- mandatory external union representa-
tives 
- proportional representation of different 
employee groups among internal em-
ployee representatives 
- chairman and vice chairman elected by 
2/3 majority (if no 2/3 majority: share-
holders elect chairperson, employees 
elect vice-chair by simple majority) 
Impasse resolution: 
- double voting weight for chairperson in 
case of impasse 
 
6.3 The Programmatic Positions of Social Democrats, Liberals and 
Christian Democrats on the Reform of Codetermination 
The legislative process of the 1976 Codetermination Act, during which Social 
Democrats, Liberals and Christian Democrats tried to find a political compro-
mise between their conflicting programmatic positions, stretched over an ex-
ceptionally long period of almost four years. This section briefly highlights the 
key differences between the positions of the three parties on the reform of co-
determination in order to prepare the analysis of architectural policy design 
strategies in section 6.4. 
The Social Democrats‘ Position 
Codetermination had long been a core political goal for the Social Democrats, 
and nearly all election programs and party platforms since 1949 list demands 
for its introduction or extension (SPD 1949, 1953, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1965, 1969, 
1972, 1976). In the early years of the Federal Republic, the political fight for 
codetermination had been linked to demands for central economic planning 
and the socialization of big industries like coal and mining. Only at the end of 
the 1950s did the Social Democrats turn towards a more moderate policy path. 
In the new party platform, they emphasized in particular the role of unions in 
the economy and in codetermination. The party pointed out the positive role 
of unions for and in the democratic society, their contribution to workers’ fight 
for democratic and economic participation, and highlighted the employees’ 
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right to organize in unions and unions’ right to call for strike. Codetermination 
on the shop and the corporate level was seen as an essential element of dem-
ocratic societies and the Coal and Steel Codetermination Act of 1951 as the 
appropriate starting point for an extension of codetermination to other sectors 
of the economy.  
During the grand coalition, the Social Democrats followed up on their party 
platform by presenting a draft bill on “corporate constitution” (Unterneh-
mensverfassung).72 In the proposal, the Social Democrats laid out their vision 
of a reform of codetermination. The draft proposed the introduction of a so-
called Unternehmensversammlung, UV (a council of up to 200 employee rep-
resentatives elected by the workforce), in big corporations. The UV was to elect 
employee representatives to supervisory boards and enjoy information and 
consultation rights in corporate management. Supervisory boards were com-
posed of an equal number of employee and shareholder representatives with 
an additional “neutral man” who neither belonged to the employee side nor to 
the shareholder side. Half of the employee representatives were to be external 
union representatives. Lastly, the proposal prescribed that among employee 
representatives, salaried employees and workers had to be represented “ap-
propriately”. 
The proposal later became part of the Social Democrats’ election campaign 
(SPD 1969), which brought the party into office together with the Liberals. Af-
ter the inauguration, the new SPD chancellor Brandt announced in his first 
government statement that the Social Democratic-led coalition would aim for 
a reform of codetermination on both the shop level and the corporate level 
based on previous draft bills and the outstanding report of the expert commis-
sion on codetermination instituted by the previous coalition (Brandt 1969).  
The Liberals‘ Position 
In the preparation of this reform project, the Social Democrats had to find a 
compromise with their coalition partner, the Liberals. During their years in 
opposition from 1966-69, the Liberals had reoriented themselves, and the in-
ternal power balance had tilted towards the progressive wing, which led the 
party on a social-liberal path. However, the conservative party wing still dom-
inated the party’s economic and social policy profile, which caused conflicts 
with the Social Democrats. The Liberals’ standpoint on codetermination illus-
trated the party’s programmatic-ideological belief in the self-fulfillment and 
self-determination of the individual. The party argued for an extension of the 
individual rights of employees rather than collective rights of the workforce 
                                               
72 Bundestag Printed Matter 05/3657: proposal for an Act on Corporate Constitution, Social 
Democratic Party. 
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and/or labor unions. The Liberals therefore also suggested strengthening shop 
level codetermination as legislated by the Works Constitution Act of 1952 and 
encouraging joint responsibility and cooperation between employees and firm 
management while avoiding a concentration of union power. Furthermore, 
the Liberals opposed full parity in codetermination and emphasized the rights 
of minorities within the workforce (FDP 1969).  
Two years into the new government, the Liberals developed a new party 
platform and a more detailed codetermination proposal (FDP 1971). Here, the 
party reiterated its opposition against an extension of corporate level codeter-
mination in the form of full parity as legislated by the 1951 Steel and Coal Co-
determination Act and demanded by the Social Democrats. For the Liberals, 
this codetermination model showed practical flaws and was inherently incom-
patible with liberal principles like self-fulfillment and self-determination of 
the individual employee.  
The goal of the Liberals’ proposal was to overcome the conflict between 
shareholders and employees by introducing a “third factor”, meaning to grant 
the middle management the right to representation on supervisory boards. 
The role of the middle management was to represent the inherent interests of 
the company as a whole, as opposed to the particularistic interests of both 
shareholders and employees, and to mediate in cases of conflict between the 
two in order to secure the productivity and profitability of the company and 
prevent paralyzing stalemates. More concretely, the Liberals suggested a 6-4-
2 model for the composition of supervisory boards with six seats for share-
holder representatives, four seats for employee representatives (of which none 
were to be external union representatives), and two seats for the middle man-
agement. Based on this proposal, the Liberals went into negotiations with 
their Social Democratic coalition partner to find a coalition compromise. 
The Coalition Compromise of the Social Democratic-Liberal Government  
Due to the differences between Liberals and Social Democrats and the salience 
of the issue, it took the coalition until 1974 to present a first reform draft and 
two more years to revise the draft after a first reading and expert hearing in 
parliament.73 The government’s reform proposal presented in 1974 reflected 
                                               
73 Since the goal of this study is not a detailed analysis of coalition dynamics, this section 
limits itself to outlining the key characteristics of the government’s reform proposal and to 
describing how this relates to Social Democrats’ and Liberals’ individual policy positions. 
Furthermore, the two government parties did act unitarily and introduced a joint reform 
draft into parliament despite important differences between their programmatic positions 
on codetermination. The main conflict in the legislative process was therefore between So-
cial Democratic-Liberal government and the Christian Democratic opposition. Therefore, 
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the Social Democrats’ policy goals, first, in that it prescribed full parity on su-
pervisory boards. Second, it instituted an electoral committee in the election 
of supervisory board members similar to the UV and based the election of 
board members on a simple majority vote. External union members were 
granted three out of ten seats for employee representatives, for which only un-
ions could nominate candidates. With these policy design elements, the Social 
Democrats could include important, labor union-friendly elements of their 
original proposal into the government’s joint proposal.  
At the same time, the Liberals’ fingerprint shows in the government’s pro-
posal. In particular, the Liberals managed to guarantee the middle manage-
ment certain group rights in the election of the electoral committee and super-
visory board members. In the former, the middle management was entitled to 
set up separate lists for delegates; in the latter, the middle management had 
to be represented by at least one board member. Furthermore, a majority of 
employee representatives had to come from the workforce itself.  
Due to strong opposition from the Christian Democrats and doubts about 
the constitutionality of the first government proposal and due to the Liberals’ 
increasingly critical stance on codetermination, the government revised the 
proposal in the following two years. The updated proposal represented a 
“weaker” extension of codetermination than the first proposal. For example, 
the middle management was not only allowed to set up lists of delegates for 
the electoral committee; elections were held separate for workers and salaried 
employees (incl. the middle management), increasing the middle manage-
ment’s own influence on who represented their interests. 
The Christian Democrats‘ Position 
In its 1968 party platform, the Christian Democrats expressed a reluctant ap-
proval of codetermination (CDU 1968c). The party supported an extension of 
codetermination in the spirit of partnership, not conflict. In particular, it ar-
gued for a better utilization of the 1952 Works Constitution Act, opposed the 
schematic transfer of the 1951 Coal and Steel Codetermination Act to other 
sectors of the economy and criticized the increased influence of labor unions. 
However, this vague compromise between employer and employee wing only 
held for a limited time. 
After the election defeat in 1969, the Christian Democrats decided to update 
the party platform, and since the influence of the employer wing had steadily 
grown within the party, the updated platform took a more critical stance on 
                                               
the Social Democrats and Liberals are not attributed individual policy design strategies, but 
a Social Democratic-Liberal design strategy is discussed in section 6.4. 
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codetermination (CDU 1971b; cf. CDU 1971a). Rather than employees’ partic-
ipation, it emphasized the importance of an efficient and competitive econ-
omy. The Christian Democrats clearly opposed full parity and argued for a 
shareholder majority on supervisory boards. A maximum of two external un-
ion representatives was allowed but had to be elected by the workforce. The 
adoption of the updated platform marked a clear defeat for the employee wing. 
The following 1972 election program continued on this path and repeated the 
rejection of full parity (CDU 1972). Even more, the party explicitly denounced 
the Social Democrats’ proposal for codetermination and this increased the 
conflict with the government. 
Encouraged by the disappointing election result and growing awareness of 
the need for an organizational and programmatic reform, the employee wing 
fought harder for a more codetermination-friendly position. At a party con-
vention in 1973, the employee wing introduced a proposal in open confronta-
tion with the employer wing, which was, however, not willing to back down 
either. Since the party faced a showdown at the convention, the leadership in-
tervened and introduced a compromise model that was meant to satisfy both 
wings and portray the party as reform-friendly. This was made easier because 
the new party leadership no longer viewed a reform of codetermination as a 
central political topic but as an issue that should be taken off the agenda as 
soon as possible because the party image suffered under the constant confron-
tation between the employee and employer wing.  
The compromise model adopted by the party convention formally proposed 
full parity on supervisory boards (a concession to the employee wing) but en-
sured shareholder dominance in cases of impasse (a concession to the em-
ployer wing). Furthermore, the influence of unions was limited to proposing 
external candidates who then had to be elected in direct elections by the work-
force instead of delegating them directly to supervisory boards (CDU 1975; cf. 
also: CDU 1973a; CDU 1973b). The compromise model ended a yearlong 
struggle between different wings of the party and allowed the party to have 
more influence on the final Codetermination Act of 1976, as the subsequent 
analysis will show.  
Summary 
Table 6.3, below, summarizes the parties’ programmatic positions on codeter-
mination based on party and election programs as well as reform proposals 
introduced into parliament that spelled out party positions more specifically. 
As discussed in earlier, party positions are not steady, and they are not always 
supported by all factions of a party. In particular, the Christian Democrats 
were internally split and could only find a compromise after years of internal 
conflicts. Similarly, Social Democrats and Liberals were under pressure to not 
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only articulate their own position but also allow for a compromise with the 
coalition partner. The table attempts to summarize the essential characteris-
tics of the parties’ positions on codetermination. Furthermore, party positions 
also reflected the positions of important interest groups. Labor unions mainly 
supported their political ally, the Social Democrats, whereas employer feder-
ations supported the Christian Democrats and Liberals. 
 
Table 6.3: The Programmatic Positions of Social Democrats, Liberals and 
Christian Democrats on Codetermination 
 
6.4 Architectural Policy Design Strategies in the Reform of 
Codetermination 
The programmatic differences between Social Democrats, Liberals and Chris-
tian Democrats reflect what different policy options were debated and which 
option policy makers deemed the “best solution” for the problem or challenge 
of codetermination reform. They reflect considerations regarding the imme-
diate effects of different reform designs, in particular the extent of rights 
granted to employees in corporate management. Both perspectives are also 
typical for the literature on policy design and policy instruments, which often 
aims to compare policy instruments and designs based on their efficiency (cf. 
section 2.2). Furthermore, the programmatic differences also reflect and add 
up to different long-term strategies in codetermination and labor relations 
politics.  
These strategies can be distinguished, first, by the different end goals that 
parties pursued. The Christian Democrats aimed to fragment the labor move-
ment and weaken big, unified trade unions as a political and economic player. 
The Social Democrats, on the other side, worked (to the extent possible in the 
coalition with the union-critical Liberals) for a reform that would strengthen 














Position on  
Codetermina-
tion 
strong support for far-
reaching codetermina-
tion rules and strong 
role of trade unions in 
codetermination 
group rights and special 
role for managerial em-
ployees; limitation of 
union influence; empha-
sis on profitability and 
competitiveness of cor-
porations 
support for extension of co-
determination while main-
taining shareholder domi-
nance and constraining union 
influence 
 142 
labor unions and unify the labor movement. Second, the strategies can be dis-
tinguished by the policy feedback effects they relied on. These feedback effects 
can, for example, be based on the creation of vested interests in a constituency 
(called entrenchment effect), the generation of legislative experience among 
government elites regarding policy design and implementation (experience ef-
fect), or the stimulation of expectations for further reforms among the public 
(spillover effect).  
Eight types of policy feedback effects considered by policy makers were 
identified during the investigation of both cases, and their empirical manifes-
tations will be described in detail throughout both case studies. Following the 
abductive design of the study, the empirical investigation will be followed by 
a theoretical discussion of the different types of feedback effects in Part IV, 
which will also set them in relation to each other in a typology of anticipated 
feedback effects. The discussion of different types of anticipated feedback ef-
fects will also reflect that policy makers themselves need not be aware of what 
analytical type of feedback effect they anticipate, but that they have a working 
understanding of the political dynamics that different policy designs facilitate 
(cf. section 3.2).  
In the codetermination case, the Christian Democratic strategy built on en-
trenchment effects, self-reinforcement effects, spillover effects and prece-
dence effects. The strategy of the Social Democratic-Liberal coalition built on 
self-reinforcement effects, infection effects, spillover effects and entrench-
ment effects. Below, Figure 6.1 and Table 6.4 illustrate and summarize both 
strategies and the feedback effects they built upon. Figure 6.1 illustrates the 
various policy feedback effects that policy makers attributed to different ele-
ments of the policy designs. Table 6.4 provides more details on the respective 
policy design elements and feedback effects and includes a list of references to 
empirical manifestations of the anticipated feedback effects in the analyzed 
archival material. Both Figure 6.1 and Table 6.4 show the feedback effects that 
are central to the parties’ strategies in black and less important feedback ef-
fects in grey.  
Before diving deeper into the analysis of the parties’ policy design strategies, 
five qualification are in order: First, discussing a “Social Democratic-Liberal” 
and a “Christian Democratic” architectural policy design strategy serves the 
purpose of using adequate labels for two competing, long-term architectural 
policy design strategies. However, it does not mean that any one party had a 
copyright on these strategies or that real-world strategies are always neat and 
tidy and easily ascribed to a specific political actor. In particular, the Social 
Democratic-Liberal strategy described here was already the product of exten-
sive negotiations between the coalition partners and therefore presents nei-
ther the Social Democrats’ nor the Liberals’ strategy in their pure form. In the 
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presentation of the policy design strategies, the case study aims to strike a bal-
ance between the pure, idealistic strategies policy makers might have wanted 
to pursue (e.g. the Social Democrats’ reform proposal of 1968) and the more 
pragmatic, realistic strategies they actually followed during policy making (i.e. 
the government proposal of 1974/76).  
Second, interest groups like labor unions and employer federations fol-
lowed and supported in part the same strategies, with the labor unions stand-
ing on the side of the Social Democrats and the employer federations on the 
side of the Christian Democrats. Third, the comparison of the two strategies 
does not mean that both parties always stood uniformly behind these strate-
gies, as especially the discussion of the Christian Democrats and the compet-
ing employer and employee wing has shown. Fourth, while the two strategies 
are composed of different types of policy feedback effects, one does not need 
to assume that those feedback effects are necessarily fully understood by pol-
icy makers in their analytical sense, but that policy makers have a working 
understanding of the political dynamics that different policy design facilitate 
(cf. section 3.2).  
Fifth, overall architectural policy design strategies as depicted in Figure 6.1 
are imposed on the empirical material after a fine-grained investigation of the 
individual elements of the design strategies (i.e. the links between policy de-
sign elements, anticipated feedback effects, and the long-term goal). That 
means that the investigation is based on the assumption that policy makers 
have a working understanding of what feedback effects different design ele-
ments might produce, but that policy makers did not necessarily devise a 
“master plan” in some secret, undiscovered document for an architectural pol-
icy design strategy that compares all possible feedback effects and prioritizes 
certain effects over others. While policy makers do not necessarily develop this 
kind of strategy, the empirical material shows that certain considerations 
(those depicted in black in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.4) seemed more important 
to policy makers than others (those depicted in grey), which will be reflected 
throughout the following discussion.  
The structure of section 6.4 is as follows: first, sections 6.4.1 (on the Social 
democratic-liberal policy design strategy) and 6.4.2 (on the Christian Demo-
cratic policy design strategy) introduce an overview of the different antici-
pated feedback effects that made up the parties’ design strategies, since those 
effects are the analytically interesting category. Then, the sections conduct a 
fine-grained empirical analysis along different policy design elements that 
policy makers assumed could produce these feedback effects. The empirical 
analysis reflects how policy makers think about potential policy feedback ef-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.4.1 The Social Democratic-Liberal Policy Design Strategy: Strengthening 
and Unifying the Labor Movement 
The policy design strategy of the Social Democratic-Liberal government had 
one central goal that was pushed mainly by the Social Democrats and re-
mained contested between the coalition partners. The goal was to implement 
a reform that would strengthen the role of labor unions in codetermination, 
labor relations and economic decision-making. This was to be achieved by im-
mediately granting employees more participatory rights in corporate manage-
ment and by ensuring unions’ crucial influence in the participation of employ-
ees in firm management through seeming technicalities in the policy design. 
However, since the Liberals’ political convictions were critical towards exten-
sive union influence, they tried to “water down” the Social Democrats’ pro-
posals. The government’s eventual policy design strategy described below 
therefore represents a classic political compromise and exemplifies that poli-
cies often do not only bear one but competing logics, interpretations and in-
centives.  
The Policy Feedback Effects of the Social Democratic-Liberal Policy Design 
Strategy in Brief 
The Social Democratic-Liberal policy design strategy was based on four types 
of policy feedback effects – an infection effect, a spillover effect, an entrench-
ment effect, and two self-reinforcement effects – of which the latter two types 
were more central to the design strategy than the former two types. 
First, the government could expect a so-called infection effect, meaning that 
the mentioning of a “labor director” (a member of the board of directors with 
particular responsibility for personnel matters) would “infect” the Codetermi-
nation Act with the meaning, interpretation and expectations linked to this 
particular term. The term had already been used in previous codetermination 
legislation in the coal and steel industry where it was tied to more specific, 
union-friendly stipulations on the election procedure for labor directors. 
Without introducing these potentially conflictual stipulations into the new co-
determination act, the government could hope to create a union-friendly po-
litical dynamic that would draw on previous frames provided by other legisla-
tion. 
Second, the government could expect a so-called spillover effect. The spill-
over effect means that the government could hope – and that the Christian 
Democrats did fear – that any extension of codetermination in big corpora-
tions would create expectations among employees and/or the mass public that 
further extensions of employee participation in smaller companies were to 
come as well. Even worse for the opposition, codetermination could lead to 
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some form of employee or union participation in national economic decision-
making. Hence, the Codetermination Act had the potential to spill over into 
other political issues and lead to more participatory rights for employees there 
as well. Thus, it would substantially affect the structure and political dynamics 
of labor relations and the power (im-)balance between labor and capital in the 
long term. 
Third, the government could expect a so-called entrenchment effect. This 
type of feedback effect means that the codetermination reform will be hard to 
retrench due to vested interests and a sense of entitlement among employees 
and unions. The strategic facilitation of this type of feedback effect conforms 
with the short-term goal of granting rights to employees and unions in a 
straightforward way. However, it goes beyond it in expecting that these rights 
will create a sizeable constituency that would develop a sense of entitlement 
to certain rights, which would be extremely hard to work against politically in 
the future.  
Fourth, the government could expect self-reinforcement effects, meaning 
that the codetermination act would create coordination effects and adaptive 
expectations that would reinforce its own logic over time. For example, the 
particular formulation of the election procedure and the internal order and 
composition of supervisory boards would create incentives for employees to 
join and vote for big unions, increase group solidarity and a common identity 
of the workforce and empower unions structurally. Similarly, the government 
expected limited rights for the middle management to be decisive for such self-
reinforcing dynamics.  
Together with the entrenchment effect, the self-reinforcement effects built 
the core of the government’s architectural policy design strategy for a unified 
and strengthened labor movement. At the same time, the design elements to 
which these effects were attributed were the most contested issues between 
Social Democrats and Liberals. The very reason for this might lie in the com-
bination of the two parties’ different programmatic positions on codetermina-
tion and policy makers’ awareness of the political implications that these de-
sign elements might produce in the long term. While it is hard to determine to 
which degree each party succeeded in pushing through its own design ideas, 
it seems fair to characterize the government’s overall strategy as dominated 
by the Social Democrats and curtailed by the Liberals.  
The Policy Design Elements of the Social Democratic-Liberal Reform 
Proposal and the Feedback Effects Policy Makers Attributed to Them 
The four anticipated policy feedback effects of the Social Democratic-Liberal 
policy design strategy were linked to four elements of the policy design: (1) the 
introduction of a labor director; (2) the extension of codetermination; (3) the 
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electoral procedure and internal order and composition of supervisory boards; 
and (4) the limitation of group rights for the middle management. 
(1) The Introduction of a Labor Director and the Attributed 
Infection Effect 
The first policy design element that policy makers considered to have an im-
pact on future political dynamics was the introduction of a labor director. As 
mentioned above, a so-called labor director was prescribed by the 1951 Coal 
and Steel Codetermination Act, which stipulated that the labor director had to 
be an equal member of the board of directors and could not (unlike other 
boards members) be elected against the votes of employee representatives on 
supervisory boards. Though not spelled out in the 1951 act, the labor director’s 
primary responsibility was “personnel matters”, i.e., to broaden the economic-
technical orientation of the board of directors with regard to the personnel 
policy dimension and to incorporate personnel and social aspects in the com-
pany policy and board decisions.74 The government’s reform proposal in 1974 
now took the opposite approach and defined the responsibilities of the labor 
director more precisely but did not prescribe a particular election procedure 
that was different from that of other board members.  
The government might have hoped to avoid political conflict and public op-
position to the proposal while at the same time “infusing” the new Codetermi-
nation Act with the meaning and expectations that were linked to the earlier 
legislation. According to this infection effect, the term labor director would tap 
into the discursive frame of previous legislation that granted unions more in-
fluence precisely because the labor director could not be elected without the 
approval of employee representatives. The expectation – or fear – of an infec-
tion effect was particularly strong among the Christian Democrats, who criti-
cized the government’s proposal in clear terms because of this potential feed-
back effect.  
A Christian Democratic policy maker noted in a parliamentary committee 
meeting that “the term labor director is linked to particular expectations 
among employees”.75 The policy maker goes on to respond to a Social Demo-
crat who criticized the Christian Democrats for wanting to “keep codetermi-
nation out of the board of directors”76, if “the labor director is to be interpreted 
                                               
74 Cf. website: https://www.boeckler.de/5544_33349.htm (last access: May 2018). 
75 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 22: Bundestag committee on economic 
affairs, committee meeting, 11.02.1976, p. 78/40; cf. also Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 
VII 400 lfd. 44: Bundestag committee on labor and social policy, committee meeting, 
18.02.1976, p. 97/71). 
76 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 22: Bundestag committee on economic 
affairs, committee meeting, 11.02.1976, p. 78/40. 
 150 
as a means of codetermination, then something is said here [in the committee 
negotiations; PP] that is not written in the act, but that is supposed to be 
brought into the act via the term labor director”.77 Therefore, one must as-
sume that the government had “other intentions” than the ones written in the 
government proposal and that “the labor director should have dependencies 
different to those of other board members”,78 namely those spelled out in the 
legislation of 1951. 
The Christian Democrat’s suspicion is likely based on his knowledge of the 
labor movement’s and Social Democrats’ long-standing support for the insti-
tute of the labor director,79 and he is obviously assuming that the govern-
ment’s true strategy was to copy, if not the wording, then at least the effects of 
the 1951 legislation. However, Social Democrats and labor unions themselves 
seemed to be more skeptical of the impact of this strategy. For example, the 
labor unions’ internal evaluation of the coalition proposal was critical, stating 
that the introduction of the labor director “merely had semantic meaning”.80 
Policy makers from the Christian Democrats’ employee wing, who supported 
the unions in the fight for codetermination, also feared that the mere termi-
nological introduction of the labor director would not fulfill the employees’ 
expectations and demanded that the accompanying stipulations regarding the 
election of the labor director should be included in the new act.81  
These statements show that maybe not all policy makers thought that em-
ployees’ expectations to the term labor director would have enough impact on 
the implementation of the act in corporations and on how labor directors 
would be elected in practice. Nevertheless, the empirical material shows that 
potential feedback effects linked to the term labor director were part of policy 
makers’ considerations and that these considerations influenced policy de-
sign. In this regard, the example of the labor director provides valuable ana-
lytical insight into policy makers’ considerations of feedback effects, but the 
importance of the labor director as policy design element in the government’s 
policy design strategy should not be overstated. 
                                               
77 Ibid., italics added. 
78 Ibid., p. 78/39. 
79 E.g. Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 13b: supplementary document, DGB 
leaflet “Mitbestimmung jetzt – und keine halben Sachen”, 1974; AdsD/DGB archive, 
5/DGAK000042: position paper 06.03.1974; AdsD/DGB archive, 5/DGAK000042: posi-
tion paper 23.01.1974. 
80 AdsD/DGB archive, 5/DGAK000042: memo on coalition compromise on codetermina-
tion on Dec. 9, 1975, 22.12.1975; AdsD, 2/BTFG000606: letter from Vetter (head of DGB) to 
Wehner (head of SPD parliamentary group), 02.02.1976. 
81 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 44: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, committee meeting, 18.02.1976, p. 97/71. 
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(2) The Extension of Codetermination and the Attributed 
Spillover and Entrenchment Effects 
The second policy design element that policy makers considered to have an 
impact on future political dynamics concerned the extension of codetermina-
tion rights more generally, i.e. the overall policy goal of the government’s re-
form proposal.  
Policy makers anticipated that the extension of codetermination rights 
would spill over into other policy fields or issues, i.e. that a spillover effect 
would occur. This expectation or fear was again particularly pronounced 
among the Christian Democratic opposition. Already in the late 1960s, when 
the debate on a reform of codetermination was heating up, Christian Demo-
crats were aware of a potential spillover effect. For example, an internal memo 
for the Christian Democrats’ general secretary warned that the extension of 
codetermination from the coal and steel industry to other sectors was only a 
first step, and that an extension to small companies was to be expected.82 This 
view was supported by the fact that the “purely schematic extension of code-
termination from the coal and steel industry to big corporations in other sec-
tors of the economy”83 that unions and Social Democrats demanded was al-
ready an instance of such a spillover effect. Employer and industry represent-
atives expressed similar concerns, fearing that the codetermination reform 
would create demands for more employee participation in smaller firms and 
potentially on the national level concerning economic planning, and that it 
would harm free collective bargaining (Tarifautonomie), which was based on 
a balance of power between unions and employer federations.84  
Policy makers also anticipated an entrenchment effect, meaning that the 
extension of codetermination would create an irreversible concentration of 
power in the hands of unions, deeply entrench the policy and render it irrevo-
cable. Many policy makers acknowledged that the conflict around codetermi-
nation was essentially a power-political struggle pursued by the labor move-
ment, which was fighting for more political and economic influence in the long 
term. Unions themselves openly confirmed that they wanted “to break the pre-
                                               
82 ACDP, 07-001-19002: memo for federal minister Heck (CDU) on codetermination, 
24.07.1967. 
83 ACDP, 07-001-19002: memo for federal minister Heck (CDU) on codetermination, 
16.10.1968. 
84 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 30: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, public expert hearing, 16.10.1974, p. 3-6; ACDP, 07-001-1446: meeting be-
tween CDU presidium and German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (ZDH) on codetermina-
tion, 24.3.1965. 
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dominance of capital” and “to push employee interests through via codetermi-
nation”.85 Employer federations shared the impression and criticized that co-
determination had become a deeply power-political question.86 The profes-
sional association of the middle management was most vocal about the feared 
consequences of the extension of codetermination, stating that “the effective 
shift of power to their [the unions’; PP] benefit was not justifiable from a po-
litical or societal standpoint and […] eventually irreversible.”87 Hence, the po-
litical conflict between labor and capital, between government and opposition 
concerned not only whether the rights given to employees and unions were too 
extensive, but whether these rights would be deeply entrenched in the long 
term and therefore practically irrevocable.  
(3) The Electoral Procedure, the Composition and Internal Order 
of Supervisory Boards and the Attributed Self-Reinforcement 
Effect 
The third policy design element that policy makers thought to have an impact 
on future political dynamics was the electoral procedure and the composition 
and internal order of supervisory boards. Policy makers assumed that these 
policy design elements would not only entrench the Codetermination Act but 
create a self-reinforcing effect by empowering unions structurally, increasing 
group solidarity and creating/strengthening a common identity among em-
ployees, and by incentivizing employees to join and vote for big, unified trade 
unions.  
This political dynamic would come at the expense of smaller unions or pro-
fessional associations like the ULA, the association of the middle manage-
ment. A Christian Democratic policy maker therefore accused the govern-
ment’s proposal for the election procedure of being an “instrument of manip-
ulation in order to disenfranchise the workforce”88 seeing that it incentivized 
employees to vote for big trade unions. In particular, Christian Democrats crit-
icized that high quota for candidate lists and majority votes for members of 
                                               
85 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 13b: supplementary document, DGB leaf-
let “Mitbes-timmung jetzt – und keine halben Sachen”, 1974. 
86 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 30: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, public expert hearing, 16.10.1974, p. 4-6. 
87 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 30: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, public expert hearing, 16.10.1974, p. 8; Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 
400 lfd. 31 (supplementary document): position paper from the association of the middle 
management (ULA), 03.12.1974, italics added. 
88 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 13: Bundestag plenary debate, 1st reading 
of Codetermination Act, 20.06.1974, p. 7470; Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 
lfd. 10: plenary debate, Bundesrat, 05.04.1974, p. 114, italics added. 
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the supervisory board did not provide appropriate protection and representa-
tion for minorities like the middle management and that the electoral com-
mittee would harm the direct influence of employees on their representa-
tives.89 The Christian Democrats claimed that the government followed a 
“nebulous ideology of solidarity”90 that did not recognize the plurality and di-
versity of interests within the workforce but wanted the workforce to unite as 
one.91 In an internal meeting with the Social Democrats, a trade union repre-
sentative confirmed this strategy, stating that “choosing the right approach, 
the middle management could be won over for the trade unions”.92 In an ex-
pert hearing, a ULA representative explicitly criticized that the government 
proposal would “privilege the unions [i.e. unified trade unions]” and cause an 
“effective shift of power” from associations like the ULA to bigger unions, and 
that this shift would be irreversible in the long run.93  
The Christian Democrats also argued that the government’s design of the 
composition and internal order of supervisory boards would reinforce an ag-
glomeration of power on the side of unions. For example, they feared that un-
ions would no longer be dependent on the support and confidence of employ-
ees if external union representatives were guaranteed seats on supervisory 
boards without having to compete with internal candidates from the work-
force, as the government proposed.94 This reflected the Social Democrats’ in-
tentions quite well. A resolution from a conference of the Social Democrats’ 
working group for employee matters stated that external union representa-
tives must be represented on supervisory boards because they are “independ-
ent of internal matters” and can “represent the interest of the whole workforce 
                                               
89 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 49: Bundestag plenary debate, 2nd and 3rd 
reading of Codetermination Act, 18.03.1976, p. 16021, 16024-25; Parliament Archive, PA-
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mination, 25.09.1974. 
93 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 30: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, public expert hearing, 16.10.1974, p. 8; Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 
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07.11.1974, p. 32-33, 36, 46, italics added. 
94 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 43: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, committee meeting, 11.02.1976. 
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in corporate politics.”95 The special role and privilege given to big trade unions 
would allow them to “remote control” the German economy and create an “in-
dependent power basis”, which was a horror scenario for most Christian Dem-
ocrats and employer federations.96  
The most drastic accusation in the debate went so far as to call the govern-
ment’s proposal an “enabling act”, a historically laden term in Germany that 
inevitably caused a political outcry.97 While such statements certainly carried 
some political rhetoric and bluster, they are valuable expressions of political 
positions and concerns that help identify which long-term effects policy mak-
ers ascribe to different policy design elements. In the codetermination case, 
Christian Democrats’ concerns pertained to the anticipated gain in power for 
trade unions that would result from the governments’ policy design. In es-
sence, Christian Democrats feared that the government design would grant 
unions too extensive rights in codetermination, unify workers in opposition to 
shareholders and incentivize them to join trade unions and start a self-rein-
forcing dynamic to unify and strengthen the labor movement. 
(4) The Limitation of Group Rights for the Middle Management 
and the Attributed Self-Reinforcement Effect 
The last policy design element policy makers considered to have important 
implications for future policy development was the role and rights of the mid-
dle management. For policy makers from all parties, this was one of the central 
questions in the reform of codetermination. The issue of how to deal with the 
middle management in the reform cut across several design elements and was 
therefore closely linked to the above discussed policy design elements (2) and 
(3) and their anticipated feedback effects. Due to the significance and contro-
versial nature of the issue, also within the government, it deserves a separate 
discussion.  
The central feedback effect that policy makers attributed to this design ele-
ment was a self-reinforcement effect. For Social Democrats and the labor 
movement, limited group rights for the middle management would incentivize 
all employees, especially the middle management, to seek representation via 
unified trade unions instead of particularistic professional associations. This 
would create a self-reinforcing dynamic that would strengthen the power base 
of those trade unions and make it even more attractive for employees to join 
                                               
95 AdsD, 2/PVCO00079: federal conference of SPD working group on employee matters, 19.-
21.10.1973. 
96 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 30,: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, public expert hearing, 16.10.1974, p. 4. 
97 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 33: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, public expert hearing, 16 07.11.1974. 
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them. For the Liberals, the political hope was contrary, namely that more ex-
tensive group rights would incentivize the middle management to build and 
strengthen their own interest organization. This would weaken unified trade 
unions as a political force but ensure employee participation the way the Lib-
erals wanted it to be. The final coalition proposal considered these contrary 
positions and included a compromise solution. The middle management was 
to be represented proportionally in the election process and allowed to make 
own candidate proposals, and at least one representative on supervisory 
boards had to come from the middle management. 
This proposal was not satisfactory for Christian Democrats and professional 
associations like the ULA because it still bore dangerous long-term implica-
tions. The opposition accused the government of ignoring minority rights and 
favoring a concentration of power in the hands of big unions. The ULA did not 
want to be “lumped together” with the general workforce, where the majority 
of employees was organized in bigger unified trade unions but wanted recog-
nition of the middle management as a distinct group of employees. What the 
ULA feared was the unified trade unions’ claim to sole employee representa-
tion, as expressed drastically by one traded union representative: “It is our 
goal to reduce all societal forces to the conflict between capital and labor. All 
‘third factors’ [like the ULA] will be fought without mercy.’”98  
The Christian Democrats shared the ULA’s concerns. Since the interests of 
the middle management were often closer to shareholders’ interests than to 
the interests of the general workforce, the Christian Democrats’ sided with the 
ULA and tried to limit trade unions’ influence and defend shareholders’ dom-
inance on supervisory boards. The Christian Democrats therefore also argued 
that the interests of the middle management were ignored and criticized that 
big trade unions were given the sole responsibility for employee representa-
tion99. The Christian Democrats’ found that middle management’s interests 
were “thrown overboard”100 and the reform was tailored to big unions’ 
needs,101 which would privilege and empower these in the long term.  
A representative of the smaller Christian Trade Union Federation (CGB) 
criticized the privileging of big trade unions through the election procedure 
                                               
98 ACDP, 04-004-109-2: draft speech written by head of the association of the middle man-
agement (VfLA), 01.05.1976. 
99 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 13: Bundestag plenary debate, 1st reading 
of Codetermination Act, 20.06.1974, p. 7511CD. 
100 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 13: Bundestag plenary debate, 1st reading 
of Codetermination Act, 20.06.1974, p. 7521C. 
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and warned explicitly against the effects of the policy design. “The conse-
quence of this artfully crafted election procedure would in the opinion of the 
CGB be that candidates [not coming from unified trade unions] will be in a 
hopeless position if they do not preemptively adapt to the will of the unionized 
majority in a firm. […] As soon as the futility of the election will be demon-
strated, these candidates will refrain from taking part in the election and 
leave the field to those who have gained enough support by pleasing big trade 
unions.”102 Here, the CGB representative clearly pointed out that the election 
procedure would create incentives for employees to seek representation via 
big trade unions while strongly discouraging organizing through other associ-
ations or smaller unions. 
The Social Democrats were not fully satisfied with the coalition compromise 
on the role of the middle management but acknowledged that “a compromise 
[on the Codetermination Act] with Liberals was not possible without granting 
the middle management participatory rights”.103 The party was happy that the 
middle management was not treated as an entirely separate group of employ-
ees but as a sub-group of salaried employees, because this would “protect em-
ployee interests”104 on supervisory boards from particularistic interest repre-
sentation and contribute to achieving the Social Democrats’ long-term goal.  
6.4.2 The Christian Democratic Policy Design Strategy: Weakening and 
Fragmenting the Labor Movement 
In contrast to the policy design strategy of the Social Democratic-Liberal gov-
ernment, the Christian Democrats’ design strategy aimed to undermine uni-
fied trade unions, fragment organized labor and thereby weaken the labor 
movement as a political player in codermination and labor relations politics. 
This goal was to be achieved by directly denying employees participatory 
rights and by undercutting unified trade unions’ influence and status among 
the workforce while empowering smaller, more particularistic interest organ-
izations through the design of the codetermination act. Hence, government 
and opposition had squarely opposite long-term goals and ideals of how code-
termination and labor relations politics should develop, which helps explain 
the intensity of the political debate. 
                                               
102 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 33: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, public expert hearing, 07.11.1974, p. 31-53, esp. 35, italics added. 
103 AdsD, 2/BTFG000604: description and evaluation of coalition compromise in codeter-
mination, no date, p. 6-7. 
104 Ibid. 
 157 
Types of Policy Feedback Effects behind the Christian Democratic Policy 
Design Strategy 
The Christian Democrats’ policy design strategy was based on three types of 
anticipated feedback effects – a spillover effect, an entrenchment effect, and a 
self-reinforcement effect – of which the latter two were most central to the 
design strategy. 
First, the Christian Democrats could hope to create a self-reinforcement ef-
fect that would strengthen the group identity of the middle management and 
encourage its members to organize outside unified trade unions. This strategy 
resembled the government’s attempt to create coordination effects and adap-
tive expectations that would reinforce themselves over time, except that what 
was to be reinforced was employee organization and representation via 
smaller, more professionalized associations, not via unified trade unions. Both 
extensive group rights for the middle management and the specific stipula-
tions for the electoral procedure and the composition and internal order of 
supervisory boards were anticipated to contribute to such a self-reinforcement 
effect. 
Second, the Christian Democrats could also expect an entrenchment effect 
to emerge through extensive group rights for the middle management. The 
effect is similar to the self-reinforcement effect, but the emphasis lies on 
vested interests and a sense of entitlement among the middle management to 
specific groups rights that would be hard to retrench in the future. The en-
trenchment effect and self-reinforcement effect together built the core of the 
Christian Democrats’ architectural policy design strategy.  
Third, and lastly, granting the middle management extensive group rights 
could also be expected to create a spillover effect. If the middle management 
is granted group rights in corporate level codetermination, the consequence 
could be that it would also demand group rights in shop level codetermination, 
where the 1972 Works Constitution Act denied the middle management of 
representation and participation. 
The feedback effects attributed to the Christian Democrats’ policy design 
largely mirror the feedback effects attributed to the Social Democrats’ design, 
as Figure 6.1, p. 144, illustrates. For the Social Democrats, limited group rights 
for the middle management were important for creating a self-reinforcing dy-
namic and entrench a trade union-friendly codetermination reform. For the 
Christian Democrats, extensive group rights for the middle management were 
important for creating a self-reinforcing dynamic and entrench a reform to the 
benefit of smaller employee organizations. In both strategies, these feedback 
effects were also supported by stipulations of the electoral procedure and the 
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internal order and composition of supervisory boards (direct elections vs. elec-
toral committee; shareholder majority vs. full parity; no external union repre-
sentatives vs. obligatory external union representatives).  
The Design Elements of the Christian Democrats’ Reform Proposal and the 
Feedback Effects Policy Makers Attributed to Them 
The three policy feedback effects of the Christian Democrats’ policy design 
strategy were linked to two elements of the policy design: (1) extensive group 
rights for the middle management and (2) the stipulations of the electoral pro-
cedure and the composition and internal order of supervisory boards. 
(1) Extensive Group Rights for the Middle Management and 
Three Attributed Feedback Effects 
The first policy element that policy makers considered to have an impact on 
future political dynamics concerned the introduction of extensive group rights 
for the middle management. As mentioned, the anticipated effects of this pol-
icy design element in the Christian Democrats’ design strategy mirrored the 
anticipated effects discussed in connection with the Social Democratic-Liberal 
design strategy with limited group rights for the middle management.  
First, policy makers anticipated a self-reinforcement effect to emerge that 
would strengthen the group identity of the middle management and encour-
age its organization outside unified trade unions. The Social Democrats were 
worried that this potential split within the workforce and labor movement 
would reinforce itself over time. The party therefore argued that employee rep-
resentatives on supervisory boards had to represent the whole workforce and 
not only special interests of subgroups of the workforce, i.e. that the middle 
management should not have a special representative.105, 106 Granting the mid-
dle management too many rights, as proposed by the Christian Democrats, 
would harm the balance of power between capital and labor,107 could lead to 
                                               
105 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 12: cf. Bundestag Printed Matter 07/2172, 
p. 24; Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 10: plenary debate, Bundesrat, 
05.04.1974. 
106 As the discussion above has shown, the Social Democrats themselves had to agree to an 
obligatory representative of the middle management on supervisory boards in the govern-
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middle management but of all salaried employees. 
107 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 13: Bundestag plenary debate, 1st reading 
of Codetermination Act, 20.06.1974, p. 7464D, 7465AB. 
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shareholder dominance108 and, thus, stand in contrast to the Social Demo-
crats’ goals in the reform of codetermination.  
Union representatives supported the Social Democrats and argued that 
group rights for specific employee groups could lead to internal conflicts 
within the workforce and harm solidarity among employees.109 In an internal 
memo, a trade union representative criticized that “special rights for the mid-
dle management are […] worrisome because they split the workforce and 
harm unified interest representation”.110 Group rights for the middle manage-
ment would furthermore lead to an “organizational stabilization of the 
ULA”,111 a development that would threaten trade unions’ established role in 
codetermination and labor relations. In a personal letter to a leading Social 
Democrat, a union leader complained that the current debate about group 
rights for the middle management would “relativize the principle of unified 
trade unions in an unprecedented form. Instead, it seems that more and more 
are inclined to strengthen tendencies that undermine unified trade unions.”112 
These statements clearly show that policy makers were afraid that extensive 
rights for the middle management would initiate a dynamic that would 
weaken unified trade unions and strengthen smaller professional organiza-
tions in interest representation.  
Social Democrats and labor unions also feared that the strengthening of the 
middle management would spill over into other policy fields. Only four years 
before the adoption of the Codetermination Act, the government passed the 
1972 Work Constitution Act, which regulated codetermination on the shop 
level and excluded the middle management from representation. Now, union 
representatives feared that the introduced group rights for the middle man-
agement “would not make it easier to counter the demand for shop level code-
termination for the middle management”.113 In a drafted speech, a representa-
tive of the Christian Democrats’ employer wing points out that the gentle but 
steady recognition of the middle management as a distinct group of employees 
would now justify recognizing the middle management officially and granting 
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it special group rights.114 That this process would not necessarily end with the 
Codetermination Act, but that it could even render possible the legal recogni-
tion of the middle management’s professional organization as a union that 
could proposes candidates for the seats of external union representatives, was 
another concern expressed by union representatives.115 
Lastly, policy makers linked an entrenchment effect to the granting of ex-
tensive groups rights for the middle management. This as most clearly ex-
pressed by a union leader, who – in an almost desperate way in a coordination 
meeting with the Social Democrats said: “If the ‘institute of the middle man-
agement’ was established now [meaning if the middle management was rec-
ognized as a distinct employee group with codetermination rights], this would 
have incalculable consequences. How should one be able to get away from 
that again later?”116 Social Democrats and unions furthermore saw the danger 
of a long-lasting “division of the workforce”117 that would harm the unitary 
representation of employee interests. Clearly, the expectation was that the 
recognition of the middle management and the granting of group rights were 
steps that could not easily be rewound later, since that would mean to actively 
disenfranchise a group of employees.  
(2) The Electoral Procedure, the Composition and Internal Order 
of Supervisory Boards and the Attributed Self-Reinforcement 
Effects 
The second policy design element of the Christian Democrats’ design strategy 
that policy makers considered to have an impact on future political dynamics 
was the electoral procedure and the composition and internal order of super-
visory boards. Again, the anticipated feedback effect mirrored what policy 
makers attributed to the Social Democratic-Liberal policy design strategy, just 
in the opposite direction. This means that policy makers expected a self-rein-
forcing feedback effect that would strengthen the group identity of the middle 
management, encourage its organization and empower it structurally.  
The Social Democratic-Liberal government criticized the Christian Demo-
crats’ proposal vehemently. It argued that the proposed election procedure 
would intentionally harm employee representation because direct candidates 
would not be able to present themselves to a workforce that is spread over 
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agement (VfLA), 01.05.1976. 
115 2/BTFG000606 BTF 7. WP Brief Vetter and Wehner, 02.02.1976, p. 5. 
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mination, 25.09.1974. 
117 AdsD/DGB archive, 5/DGAO001325: memo on meeting between representatives of the 
DGB and the Social Democrats, 30.10.1964. 
 161 
multiple work places in the country.118 The government saw its own concept 
of an electoral committee as necessary precondition for transparent elections 
of supervisory board members.119 Low quota for candidate lists, as proposed 
by Christian Democrats, would lead to a fragmentation of the interests of em-
ployees and harm their democratic representation in the electoral committee 
and on supervisory boards,120 while the principal purpose of the electoral pro-
cedure was “to prevent the danger of a fragmentation of interests”121 from the 
Social Democrats’ point of view. A Social Democratic parliamentarian criti-
cized that the “actual political goals and purposes” of CDU/CSU were to allow 
marginal, ineffective splinter groups to gain seats in electoral committees or 
supervisory boards in order to empower small associations like the ULA, hin-
der employee representation via big DGB unions, and, thus, make effective 
codetermination of the whole workforce improbable.122 With this fragmenta-
tion, the risk of extreme groups and opinions endangering democratic repre-
sentation would rise.123 
Union representatives sided with the government in criticizing the Chris-
tian Democrats’ proposal, since its experience with direct elections showed 
that these led to conflicts within the workforce, which “affect the cohesive rep-
resentation of employees on supervisory boards negatively”124. Hence, policy 
makers clearly expressed their anticipation that the stipulations of the Chris-
tian Democrats’ proposal, in particular the rules of the electoral procedure, 
would fragment the workforce, empower and strengthen smaller interest or-
ganizations and thereby weaken unified trade unions. In addition, this devel-
opment would be facilitated by the composition and internal order of supervi-
sory boards. The Social Democrats claimed that the Christian Democrats’ pro-
posal would harm the unions’ position in codetermination because it would 
                                               
118 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 31: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, public expert hearing, 04.11.1974, p. 31. 
119 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 49: Bundestag plenary debate, 2nd and 
3rd reading of Codetermination Act, 18.03.1976, p. 16022-4. 
120 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 10: plenary debate, Bundesrat, 
05.04.1974, p. 112. 
121 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 49: Bundestag plenary debate, 2nd and 
3rd reading of Codetermination Act, 18.03.1976, p. 16025. 
122 Ibid.  
123 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 10: plenary debate, Bundesrat, 05.04.1974. 
124 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 33: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, public expert hearing, 07.11.1974, p. 43. 
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effectively hinder external union representatives from being elected to super-
visory boards because they would compete with internal candidates.125 Over-
all, the analyzed material shows that Social Democrats and unions expected 
the Christian Democrats’ design to lead to a fragmentation of the workforce, 
incentivize workers, in particular the middle management, to join small, spe-
cialized unions instead of big DGB unions, and therefore erode the solidarity 
among employees and their effective interest representation. 
6.5 The Political Skirmish around the Codetermination Act of 1976: 
Policy Design as Strategic Political Struggle 
Following the fine-grained empirical analysis of the architectural policy design 
strategies, this section “zooms out” of the micro-political details again and fo-
cuses on a broader interpretation of how the Christian Democrats’ and the 
government’s policy design strategies played out during the political skirmish 
around the design of the Codetermination Act. It discusses, for example, 
which priorities the parties set, which compromises they had to make, and 
which policy design eventually emerged from the debate. The section responds 
in particular to the first analytical claim made in chapter 1, which argued that 
attention to policy makers’ considerations of feedback effects helps remedy 
the functionalist bias in policy design studies and improve our understanding 
of the potentials, challenges, political struggles, and real-world patterns of 
strategic policy design. 
As discussed in the earlier, parties’ political-ideological roots can help ex-
plain the design of competing reform proposals. They shape the perception of 
policy problems, which policy design actors perceive as suitable, instrumental 
solutions to the problem of codetermination and, thus, the selection of policy 
instruments and policy design. Sections 6.3 and 5.2 have shown how the de-
sign proposals in the codetermination case are rooted in parties’ program-
matic positions and political-ideological orientations. For example, the Social 
Democrats’ traditional emphasis on democratic socialism, equity and solidar-
ity let the party stress the role of collective interest representation and strong, 
unified trade unions in codetermination. On the other side, the Liberals’ tra-
dition and emphasis on self-responsibility and self-determination let the party 
stress individual rights rather than collective rights in codetermination and 
helps explain why it opposed external union representatives on supervisory 
boards and supported the representation of the middle management as a dis-
tinct group within the workforce. Policy design, however, is not solely instru-
                                               
125 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd. 43: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, committee meeting, 11.02.1976 (MP Gansel). 
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mental, and compromise seeking in politics not only about finding an effec-
tive, efficient, instrumental solution. It is also about “thinking two moves 
ahead” in the “iterative game of politics” (Soss and Schram 2007: 111). In other 
words, policy design strategies are not solely rooted in political-ideological ori-
entations but involve strategic political considerations. 
Table 6.5, p. 166, offers an overview of the codetermination proposals made 
by Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Liberals, compares those to the 
final design 1976 Codetermination Act, and includes the key characteristics of 
parties’ political-ideological roots. The table shows again that parties’ political 
goals on codetermination differed substantially. Christian Democrats showed 
moderate support for an extension of employee rights while preserving share-
holders’ rights and interests, aiming to please their different constituencies as 
center-right catch-all party. However, the Christian Democrats were strongly 
polarized and internally split, and over time, codetermination became a prag-
matic issue for the party leadership that it wanted to remove from the party’s 
internal debates. The Social Democrats, on the other side, showed clear, 
united support for an employee- and union-friendly regulation of codetermi-
nation. Codetermination was of fundamental importance to the party’s self-
image rooted in democratic socialism and the pursuit of freedom, equity, and 
solidarity. The Liberals had a more skeptical position on codetermination. De-
spite a recent shift towards social liberalism and the entrance into a coalition 
with the Social Democrats, the party was a longstanding representative of eco-
nomic interest and the German Mittelstand (mid-sized business) and empha-
sized self-responsibility, self-determination and individual rights of collective 
rights for workforces and unions. 
In order to understand how the final Codetermination Act emerged from 
these opposing positions, the following section discusses the strategic situa-
tions of Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Liberals in the political 
debate, which priorities the parties set, which compromises they accepted, and 
which role long-term considerations played in these strategic decisions. 
Even though the Social Democrats were heading government, they were 
substantially limited in what they could achieve politically in the reform of co-
determination due to the coalition with the Liberals, who had a very different 
position on codetermination. These differences expressed themselves both in 
more short-term, immediate considerations, e.g. how many group rights the 
middle management should be granted, and in more long-term, strategic con-
siderations regarding the role of unions in codetermination and labor rela-
tions. There was a substantial conflict between the Liberals’ emphasis on in-
dividual freedom and responsibility and the Social Democrats’ emphasis on 
the importance of the collective representation of employees’ interest in the 
face of employers’ predominance.  
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The Social Democrats were well aware of the constraints imposed by the 
coalition with the Liberals, and both coalition proposals consequently show 
considerable differences to the Social Democrats’ original codetermination 
proposal presented in 1968. As mentioned, the Social Democrats knew that “a 
compromise [on the Codetermination Act] with Liberals was not possible 
without granting the middle management participatory rights”.126 Still, the So-
cial Democrats were not willing to give up the issue but negotiated hard to 
limit the middle managements’ group rights. Union representatives also pres-
sured them to do so, e.g. arguing that the introduction of a labor director 
“could not be viewed as compensation” in regard to the role of the middle 
management, and that the “problem of the middle management needs to be 
discussed with the Liberals again”.127 Eventually, the Social Democrats had to 
make substantial concessions to the Liberals to hold the coalition together and 
to the Christian Democrats in order to get the Codetermination Act safely past 
the second chamber of parliament, where the opposition held a majority, and 
strengthen its position in a potential lawsuit in the constitutional court.128  
Yet, the Social Democrats still evaluated the coalition compromise as a suc-
cess: “The new coalition agreement brings what is now and in the near future 
achievable with the coalition partner. While the result might not convince 
from the social democratic perspective of equal codetermination, it is never-
theless a success considering the current political environment.”129 The code-
termination act’s final design was also not a complete defeat for the Social 
Democrats and the labor movement, despite frustration with the outcome. For 
example, the Social Democrats successfully insisted on the introduction of ex-
ternal union representatives and of electoral committees for big companies 
and high quota for candidates, stipulations that advantaged unions in em-
ployee representation and shaped, as discussed above, feedback effects and 
mobilization patterns to the benefit of big unions, contributing to the path de-
pendence of the Codetermination Act.  
Overall, the final Codetermination Act prescribed a codetermination model 
that was based largely on a proposal made by the Christian Democrats in 1973. 
It extended codetermination substantially in regard to the coverage of firms 
and the extent of employee rights, granted employees 50 percent of seats on 
                                               
126 AdsD, 2/BTFG000604: description and evaluation of coalition compromise in codeter-
mination, no date, p. 6-7. 
127 AdsD, 2/PVAS000599: protocol coordination group between SPD and DGB on codeter-
mination, 25.09.1974. 
128 AdsD/DGB archive, 5/DGAO001325: memo on meeting between representatives of the 
DGB and the Social Democrats, 30.10.1964. 
129 Ibid. 
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supervisory boards, gave board seats to external union representatives and in-
stalled electoral committees for their election. At the same time, it secured 
shareholders’ dominance by favoring them in the election of the board chair 
and granting the middle management seats among employee representatives.  
The Christian Democrats’ proposal could serve as a blueprint for an agree-
ment between government and opposition since the Christian Democrats 
themselves were challenged with finding an intra-party compromise between 
the party’s two wings. In the early 1970s, the party had been ridden by intense 
conflicts between its employer- and employee-wing, and the party’s internal 
debate functioned as a proxy for the conflict between all parties. While the 
employer-wing remained structurally stronger, the party leadership was 
forced to seek a compromise that was also bearable for its more social-demo-
cratically oriented employee-wing. With its final proposal, the Christian Dem-
ocratic party leadership succeeded in two regards. Not only was it able to take 
the topic, which threatened the party’s internal unity, of the party’s political 
agenda. It also offered its employee-wing and the Social Democrats an ac-
ceptable model with substantial extensions of employee rights while trying to 
ensure its own political success by limiting feedback effects that would em-
power unions.  
The Christian Democrats did so by pushing through that the middle man-
agement, whose interests were often aligned with those of the shareholders, 
received board seats on the side of employee representatives and by favoring 
shareholders in the election of the board chair, who furthermore had double 
voting weight in case of a tie. With these specifications in the policy design, 
the Christian Democrats tried to ensure shareholders’ dominance on supervi-
sory boards despite the formal introduction of full parity and to curtail feed-
back effects that would advantage unions. For example, until today, no em-
ployee representative and union member has ever been elected chairman of a 
supervisory board, depriving unions of valuable prestige, ideational resources, 
and influence on economic decision making. Had the Social Democrats’ orig-
inal proposal, according to which the middle management did not receive own 
representatives and shareholders were not favored in the election of the board 
chair, been implemented, unions would likely be able to draw on such idea-
tional and decision making resources in their work and be in a stronger posi-
tion today. 
In sum, the discussion shows that the final policy design of the Codetermi-
nation Act cannot be explained by solely drawing on instrumental reasoning 
of policy makers shaped by their political-ideological beliefs. Parties’ codeter-
mination proposals are rooted in their political-ideological orientation, but 
this link is influenced by strategic political factors. Among these strategic po-
litical factors, considerations of policy feedback effects play an important role 
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because policy makers try to anticipate and steer how policy design shapes 
future political dynamics. 
Table 6.5: The Proposed Policy Designs of Social Democrats, Liberals and 
Christian Democrats on the Reform of Codetermination Reform and the Final 
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7. The Pay Continuation Act of 1969 
7.1 Introduction to the Case Study 
The subsequent sections present the second case study of architectural policy 
design, following the structure outlined at the beginning of Part III, and inves-
tigate the Pay Continuation Act of 1969. The reform was selected because it 
showed a medium-level evaluation and thus increased diversity of the investi-
gated cases. It allowed for potentially new learning opportunities and insights 
due to its lower evaluation than the Codetermination Act while making likely 
that the phenomenon of interest could be studied (cf. section 4.2). 
The Organization of Sickness Benefits: Sick Pay and Pay Continuation 
Pay continuation, or sick pay, refers to provisions made for periods when em-
ployees are unable to work due to sickness. Today, such schemes are integral 
in many welfare states to varying degrees and in different forms. They differ, 
for example, regarding the level and duration of sickness benefits or the mon-
itoring of sickness absence, and patterns of sickness and disability policies 
largely reflect welfare typologies and welfare regime taxonomies developed 
elsewhere in the literature, e.g. Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare 
(Esping-Andersen 1990). From a comparative perspective, sickness benefits 
in Germany are relatively generous and easily accessible, and coverage is al-
most universal (OECD 2010). In fact, Germany’s expenditure for sickness pro-
grams is more than 50 % higher than the OECD average of 0.8% of the GDP, 
even though the recent decrease in sickness programs in Germany has been 
more pronounced than the OECD average (ibid.: 58).  
A crucial design characteristic of sickness benefits concerns the funding 
mode or source and the obligations and burdens that employees and/or em-
ployers have to bear via taxes, social insurance contributions, or direct fund-
ing. There are two different types of sickness benefits: sick pay and pay con-
tinuation. Both types can practically mean the same for sick employees in 
terms of the level, accessibility and duration of benefits they receive during 
periods of sickness, but the two labels describe legal provisions of different 
characters. (1) Sick pay means that employees receive wage compensation 
during periods of sickness in the form of social benefits directly from the state 
or through a social insurance scheme, e.g. statutory health insurance, in order 
to compensate for the loss of wage or salary. These benefits may be paid from 
the first day of sickness or after a waiting period; they may compensate for the 
full wage or salary or a certain percentage thereof; and they may be paid for 
different lengths of time. (2) Pay continuation means that employers are 
obliged to continue wage or salary pay during periods of sickness. Similar to 
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sick pay, these schemes may also differ in terms of potential waiting periods, 
the level of wage or salary payments, and the duration of pay continuation. 
Additionally, they may or may not include compensation schemes for employ-
ers’ expenses that cover employers and their expenses to different extents.  
Sickness Benefits in Germany 
Germany is an interesting case in regard to sickness benefits because both 
schemes existed simultaneously for over three decades. Before the passage of 
the Pay Continuation Act in 1969, workers had been covered by a sick pay 
scheme as part of the statutory health insurance system, while salaried em-
ployees had already been entitled to pay continuation (cf. section 7.2). The 
parallel existence of the two schemes is a consequence of a long-standing di-
vision of the German labor market. Historically, a distinction between blue-
collar, wage-earning workers (Arbeiter) and white-collar, salaried employees 
(Angestellte) has characterized the German labor market, based on the idea 
that workers did manual work, while salaried employees did mental work 
(Meine 2005). Both groups were for a long time treated differently in many 
matters of social legislation and labor law (for example, the two groups paid 
into different health and retirement funds) as well as in tariff agreements. In 
most matters, this was to the disadvantage of workers, who had, e.g., shorter 
notice periods for job termination and significantly lower levels of compensa-
tion during sickness until the 1960s. Only about 10 years ago, in 2005, did the 
Bundestag remove the last remaining legal differences between both groups 
(ibid.). 
The distinction between workers and salaried employees reflects Germany’s 
corporatist, status-segregated social policy, which was designed to reward loy-
alty and traditional privilege and discourage wage-earner unification. As 
Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1984) highlight, the political right has histori-
cally favored such “attempts to divide the population through the creation of 
separate programs and institutions for different sectors and groups”, while the 
labor movement strived for institutions and policies that unified as large sec-
tors of the population as possible into one context (p. 181). Hence, the distinc-
tion between workers and salaried employees not only disadvantaged individ-
ual workers but it also weakened the labor movement in general. Whether the 
political left succeeded or failed in unifying the labor movement was therefore 
not only influenced by its relative strength towards employers; it also shaped 
the distribution of power resources in social policy making.  
The pay continuation debate was thus part of a long-lasting, fundamental 
political conflict between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, where 
any reform would bear important implications on how and to whose ad-
vantage this conflict evolved. The subsequent case study will show that the 
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strategies of the political left and right described by Esping-Andersen and 
Korpi hold true not only from a macro-comparative perspective on social pol-
icy making but also in an empirical investigation of architectural policy design 
strategies on the micro-level, where Social and Christian Democrats’ strategic 
considerations of policy feedback effects will be uncovered. 
Lastly, the issue of pay continuation/sick pay was not only a matter of labor 
politics but also a matter of health politics, since the German sick pay scheme 
for workers used to be administered by the occupationally and regionally or-
ganized health funds. Hence, the pay continuation debate was situated within 
an inherently complex policy field with multiple stakeholders, diverse interest 
and competing or contradicting political goals and values. 
Architectural Policy Design in Pay Continuation Politics 
Due to, first, the linkage of sick pay with the statutory health insurance and, 
second, the long-standing division of the German labor market into workers 
and salaried employees covered by two different schemes of sickness benefits, 
the pay continuation debate was loaded with much symbolic meaning and 
caused intense conflicts around the immediate effects of a reform. Further-
more, an eventual reform would have important long-term political implica-
tions. Indeed, the key argument for a reform of sickness benefits supported by 
all involved actors, even the opponents of pay continuation, was that the equal 
treatment of workers and salaried employees in sickness compensation was 
long overdue. While all actors therefore recognized the need for a reform, the 
how of a reform was not uncontested.  
Basically, two reform options were available: (1) a further extension and 
adaption of the sick pay scheme to reduce remaining inequalities between 
workers and salaried employees, or (2) the introduction of pay continuation 
for workers, potentially alongside a more substantive reform of the statutory 
health insurance system. At first glance, the differences between both options 
seem – on the substantive level – like nothing more than different ways of 
financing benefits for sick employees who can receive equally high or low ben-
efits through either of the two schemes. Indeed, the political debate to a large 
extent focused on very immediate effects of a potential reform: How high 
would the financial burden on employers be if pay continuation were intro-
duced for workers, and could they bear it? Should pay continuation be tax-
exempt in order to lower the financial burden on employers? How would a 
reform affect economic growth? Would inflation rise if pay continuation were 
introduced? If the statutory health insurance were reformed, how high could 
or should copayments be? How much should patients contribute to their own 
healthcare coverage? How would a reform influence the demand for and the 
quality and effects of medical treatment? 
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Policy makers had other considerations on their minds during policy for-
mulation. The political debate on pay continuation and the short-term effects 
of a reform misses the political dimension of a reform of sickness benefits and 
the long-term implications different reform options and policy designs would 
have on future pay continuation and healthcare politics. The question is why 
and how seemingly unimportant technical differences between reform pro-
posals matter for the politics of sickness benefits. Is the difference between 
sick pay and pay continuation just a technicality regarding the funding mode 
of sickness benefits, or does it set the health insurance system on a particular 
reform path? Does it really matter what type of cost sharing is introduced in 
the statutory health insurance, and if so, how? Or, what are the implications 
of different reform designs for the strength of employers and unions, for em-
ployment and industrial relations, or for health politics, and were policy mak-
ers aware of these implications?  
The answers to these questions will be given in the subsequent case study. 
From the perspective of architectural policy design, the case-specific research 
question for the empirical investigation asks how or to what extent the politics 
of sickness benefits can be a case of political architecture? In other words, 
were policy makers aware of the different political implications of the com-
peting reform designs at the time of policy formulation, and if so, how did 
strategic considerations of these implications shape the policy formulation 
and design? 
Preview of the Argument and Contribution 
As for any how-question, the answer to the above research question is not sim-
ple. The case study presented in the following chapters responds to this ques-
tion based on a thorough investigation of the available empirical material de-
scribed earlier. It will substantiate the two analytical claims made in chapter 
1: first, that attention to feedback effects helps remedy the functionalist bias 
in policy design studies and improves our understanding of the potentials, 
challenges, political struggles, and real-world patterns of strategic policy de-
sign; second, that the disaggregation of policies into policy instruments and 
design characteristics and the fine-grained investigation of the design process 
improves our understanding of how policy feedback effects emerge and 
whether and how policy-makers can (try to) design these intentionally. 
Substantially, the case study argues that the debate around the Pay Contin-
uation Act featured two overall architectural policy design strategies that 
were supposed to either lead towards a citizenship-based health insurance 
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system or towards a reimbursement system with direct copayments.130 The 
first strategy was followed by Social Democrats, unions, and in part supported 
by the Christian Democrats’ employee wing. The design strategy included the 
introduction of pay continuation for workers and a simultaneous extension of 
rights for salaried employees in the statutory health insurance without any 
further reforms, in particular cost-sharing measures, to the statutory health 
insurance. This policy design was envisioned to create four types of policy 
feedback effects (precedence, spillover, entrenchment, cover-up) that would 
shape the political dynamics in health politics towards a reform path leading 
to a citizenship-based health insurance system. The second strategy was fol-
lowed by the Christian Democrats, employer federations, and in parts received 
sympathy from the Liberals. Here, the policy design featured the introduction 
of pay continuation with a simultaneous reform of the statutory health insur-
ance system, in particular the introduction of specific cost-sharing measures. 
Through this policy design, policy makers hoped to create two types of feed-
back effects (experience and kick-off) that would create and facilitate a reform 
path leading towards a reimbursement system with direct copayments.  
By uncovering and investigating these policy design strategies, this case 
study contributes to the existing literature by showing that policies are de-
signed not only based on concerns for optimal problem solution and or short-
term political benefit, as most literature typically assumes, but also based on 
considerations of their long-term effects on political dynamics. It also gives us 
a better understanding of which types and elements of policy design may pro-
duce which types of policy feedback effects from the perspective of policy mak-
ers. The study thereby helps to outbalance the functionalist bias in policy de-
sign studies and improve our understanding of the real-world patterns, strug-
gles, potentials and challenges of strategic policy design. 
These contributions and the two broad architectural policy design strategies 
are substantiated in a more fine-grained analysis of specific policy feedback 
dynamics that policy makers considered. First, whether employers are obliged 
to continue wage pay during sickness or sick employees receive cash benefits 
from the state or through a social insurance scheme was assumed to matter 
not only materially for employees but also to shape feelings of entitlement. 
Importantly, employees may not simply feel generally entitled to some form 
of compensation during sickness but may “direct” this entitlement at a specific 
                                               
130 Since the Liberal party was without much political influence during the grand coalition 
(cf. section 5), it did not introduce a comprehensive reform proposal but demonstrated its 
position via individual motions to amend that stood no chance of being realized. Therefore, 
the Liberals are not ascribed a distinct policy design strategy here and play a subordinate 
role in the analysis of architectural policy design strategies in this case. 
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addressee, e.g. their employer or the broader social insurance community. 
Such feelings of entitlement created by policies can implicate subsequent po-
litical debates and therefore also policy makers’ reform considerations. Be-
yond that, this study shows that policy makers can be aware of such effects 
and strategically consider them during policy formulation. 
Second, symbolic policy effects also affect beneficiaries’ perceptions of self-
worth and political efficacy and shape political demands. That is, whether sick 
employees are made supplicants who need to apply for sick benefits from the 
state or social insurance, or whether policies make them both feel legally enti-
tled and also factually legally entitled to continued pay from their own em-
ployers affects their sense of political influence and efficacy. This may even be 
more true if not all employees fall under the same regulations, but some re-
ceive sick pay while others receive pay continuation, offering employees a di-
rect and visible comparison to a potentially better way of being treated than 
they are. Overall, both symbolic and potential material inequalities in sickness 
compensation can shape political demands, mobilization and conflicts be-
tween and within unions, employers, and political parties.  
Third, the analysis shows policy makers’ awareness and consideration of 
the lock-in effects of different policy designs and their potential to create path-
dependent policy developments. By linking the issues of sickness compensa-
tion to a broader reform of health insurance, policy makers intended to take 
the first step towards a specific policy path where incremental reforms would 
help to reach a more substantial policy change in the long run.  
Fourth, and lastly, the analysis gives insights into policy makers’ awareness 
of two distinct types of “path dependence effect” of policies: On one side, pol-
icy makers take into account that social benefits create strong stabilizing or 
self-reinforcing feedback effects that make a policy hard to withdraw. On the 
other side, they assume that social burdens should be introduced gradually in 
the beginning in order to create adaption effects among the constitu-
ency/mass public and to allow for political learning among the bureaucracy 
and government, so that the intended long-term policy goal can be reached. 
7.2 Legislation on Sickness Benefits Prior to 1969 and the Provisions 
of the Pay Continuation Act of 1969131 
As discussed above, the debate around sickness benefits culminated in the late 
1960s but was in fact part of a long-standing political conflict between the po-
                                               
131 Cf. Clade (1969); Immergut (1986); Meine (2005); Ruhnke (2005); Webber (1988, 1989); 
ACPD 08-001-296/2: short protocol of the Parliament Committee on Labor, Statement of 
Ministerial director Schelp (Federal Ministry of Labor), 19.03.1963; AdsD, 669: letter from 
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litical left and the political right. Therefore, it is important to provide an over-
view of the regulation and reforms of sickness benefits before 1969 in order to 
understand the conflict lines and reform discussion in 1969. 
Prior to the 1969 Pay Continuation Act, workers were considerably disad-
vantaged compared to salaried employees when it comes to sickness benefits. 
Already in 1861, salaried employees gained the right to two weeks of continued 
pay in case of sickness. Similar regulations had existed since the mid-19th cen-
tury but were not mandatory and could be varied by agreements between em-
ployers and unions/employees. For workers, sickness benefits were not legally 
prescribed but were subject to negotiation with their employers, and sickness 
was often followed by an immediate cancellation of the contract. In 1930/31, 
pay continuation for salaried employees was extended to 6 weeks by two emer-
gency decrees of the Reich president, mainly in order to improve the financial 
situation of the statutory health insurance.132 Workers remained without legal 
claim to sickness compensation from their employers. In contrast to the regu-
lations on pay continuation for salaried employees, blue-collar workers were 
referred to the statutory health insurance, which paid them 50 % of their reg-
ular previous wage as sick pay (Krankengeld) after a waiting period of three 
days.  
After World War II, the regulations on workers’ sick pay were gradually im-
proved, the level of sick pay raised and the waiting period reduced, but equal 
treatment for blue-collar workers and salaried employees was not achieved 
until 1969. In 1955, the Social Democrats introduced a bill to the Bundestag, 
which aimed to introduce six weeks of pay continuation for workers, but the 
bill was rejected by the conservative-liberal government majority. In reaction 
to this, the metal workers’ union in the northern state of Schleswig-Holstein 
started one of Germany’s longest strikes in order to push for better protection 
of sick workers.133 The strike lasted 16 weeks and led to a reform that substan-
tially improved workers’ sick pay. According to the 1957 reform, workers con-
tinued to receive sick pay through health insurance funds, but the level of sick 
pay was raised to 65 % of their regular previous wage and the waiting period 
shortened to two days. Additionally, employers were to supplement health 
funds’ sick pay, which brought workers’ benefits up to 90 % of their regular 
                                               
MP Schellenberg (head of SPD working group on social policy) to SPD parliamentary group, 
20.03.1969. 
132 ACDP, 08-001-296/2: short protocol of the Parliament Committee on Labor, 19.03.1963. 
133 Website: https://www.fes.de/archiv/adsd_neu/inhalt/stichwort/metallarbeiterstreik.htm 
(last access: Feb. 2., 2018). 
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previous net wage. In another reform in 1961, the waiting period was short-
ened to one day, and the employer supplement raised to 100% of the regular 
previous net wage.  
Hence, workers now had the same protection as salaried employees in 
terms of the level and length on sick benefits, with the exception of one waiting 
day. Besides the waiting period of one day, a few other differences remained, 
e.g. the fact that workers contributed to the funding of their own sick pay 
through their contribution to health funds, while pay continuation for salaried 
employees was entirely funded by employers. Additionally, sick pay for work-
ers did not cover contributions to the statutory pension scheme, meaning that 
workers were disadvantaged in the calculation of their pensions compared to 
salaried employees. A beneficial effect of sick pay for workers was that they 
could under certain circumstances benefit from longer periods of sickness 
through the annual adjustment of their income tax (Lohnsteuerjahresaus-
gleich).  
Nevertheless, unions and Social Democrats kept on arguing for the intro-
duction of pay continuation for workers in order to achieve equal treatment of 
workers and salaried employees during periods of sickness. The conservative–
liberal government acknowledged the need for a reform and responded to the 
political pressure from Social Democrats and unions by introducing a reform 
proposal. However, this first attempt to introduce pay continuation for work-
ers failed in 1965 after two years of negotiations because the government in-
sisted – despite strong public and political opposition – on the simultaneous 
reform of child benefits and the statutory health insurance, in particular the 
introduction of copayments, alongside the introduction of pay continuation. 
Social Democrats and the labor movement therefore continued their cam-
paign for workers’ pay continuation in the following years, and the formation 
of the grand coalition between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats 
only one year after the failed 1965 reform provided a new window of oppor-
tunity, and the German Bundestag finally passed the Pay Continuation Act of 
1969.  
Table 7.1, below, gives an overview of key acts and provisions on sickness 






Table 7.1: Key Legislation on Sickness Benefits prior to 1969 (Selection) 
Year Act Key Provisions 
1861 
German Commercial Code (Allgemeine 
Deutsche Handelsgesetzbuch; Gesetz 
vom 24.06.1861, Art. 60, GS Preußen 
1861, 449 (491)) 
Six weeks’ pay continuation for clerks if pre-




e.g. Civil Code §616 (§616 BGB) 
Extension to all white-collar employees, not 
mandatory 
1930/31 
Emergency decrees of the Reich presi-
dent, 01.12.1930 and 05.06.1931 (RGBl. I, 
S. 517 and RGBl. I, S. 279) 
Six weeks’ pay continuation for all white-collar 
employees now mandatory; blue-collar employ-
ees receive 50 % of their regular wage as sick 
pay via health funds after a 3-day waiting pe-
riod 
1955/57 
Act on the Improvement of Workers‘ Pro-
tection in Case of Sickness (Gesetz zur 
Verbesserung der Sicherung der Arbei-
ter im Krankheitsfalle; Arbeiterkrank-
heitsgesetz, BGBl. 1957, Nr. 28, 
28.06.1957) 
Sick pay increased to 65 % of previous wage; 
supplemented by employer contribution to 
90 % of previous wage; waiting period reduced 
to 2 days 
1961 
Amending Act (BGBl. 1961, Nr. 50, 
18.07.1961) 
Employer supplement increased to 100 % of 
previous wage; waiting period reduced to 1 day 
1963/65 Social Package (Sozialpaket)  
Attempted introduction of pay continuation 
(failed), copayments in statutory health insur-
ance (failed), reform of child benefits (adopted) 
1969 
Pay Continuation Act (Gesetz über die 
Fortzahlung des Arbeitsentgelts im 
Krankheitsfalle und über Änderungen 
des Rechts der gesetzlichen Krankenver-
sicherung, BGBl. 1969, Nr. 67, 
30.07.1969) 
Six weeks’ pay continuation for workers; co-
cost sharing introduced in statutory health in-
surance 
 
The Pay Continuation Act of 1969 and its Key Provisions 
The Pay Continuation Act of 1969, which was passed by parliament only 
briefly before the end of the grand coalition’s turn, was a great victory for So-
cial Democrats and the labor movement. In the last year of the government’s 
term, the Social Democratic Minister of Economic Affairs, Schiller, put the 
topic back on the political agenda, arguing at a union congress that the current 
government should now solve the issue of pay continuation since it fit the eco-
nomic landscape (Clade 1969: 14). What followed was a short but intense po-
litical debate that revived old conflict lines regarding a reform of sickness ben-
efits and the statutory health insurance between Social Democrats, the labor 
movement, and the CDU employee wing on one side, and employers’ federa-
tion, Liberals, and the CDU employer wing on the other side. At the end of the 
political negotiations (described in more detail in section 7.5), the 1969 Pay 
Continuation Act was passed by parliament following a controversial debate 
at the beginning of which Social Democrats and Christian Democrats intro-
duced own proposals instead of a joint government proposal. 
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The 1969 act stipulated, first, that workers were legally entitled to six weeks 
of continued wage pay by their employers in case of sickness, similar to sala-
ried employees. According to the act, employers were obliged to pay the full 
gross wage including social insurance contributions to all sick workers except 
those on contracts shorter than four weeks or with less than 10 hours per week 
or 45 hours per month without a waiting period. On the third day of sickness, 
workers were obliged to provide a sick note to their employer in order to prove 
their inability to work. Insurance funds were obliged to initiate an examina-
tion of workers’ inability to work in cases of doubt regarding the inability to 
work or when it was necessary to ensure the restoration of the workers’ ability 
to work. Furthermore, the act introduced a compensation scheme for employ-
ers with max. 20 employees, who were to pay into a compensation fund that 
reimburses them for 80 % of their expenses related to pay continuation. 
Second, the act introduced a number of changes to the statutory health in-
surance mainly due to pressure from the Christian Democrats, who wanted to 
enter a “first phase of healthcare reform”. Therefore, the act raised copay-
ments for prescription medicine and introduced a contribution refund 
scheme, meaning that insured persons could receive a limited refund of their 
contributions if they did not use their insurance for three months (Beitrags-
rückerstattung). Furthermore, it raised the income ceiling for compulsory in-
surance of salaried employees, meaning that more salaried employees were 
entitled to employer contributions to their healthcare (Versicherungspflicht-
grenze134).  
Table 7.2: Key Provisions of the Pay Continuation Act of 1969 
Pay Continuation for Workers: 
- Duration: six weeks 
- Waiting period: none 
- Coverage: all workers except those on contracts 
shorter than four weeks or with less than 10 
works hours per week/45 hours per month 
- Employer compensation scheme: 
o obligatory for employers with max. 20 em-
ployees; employers with min. 20 employees 
may apply for inclusion 
o employers reimbursed for 80 % of expenses 
due to pay continuation 
o compensation scheme funded by partaking 
employers 
Reforms of the Statutory Health  
Insurance (selection): 
- Income ceiling for compulsory insur-
ance of salaried employees raised 
- Contribution refund for insured in 
case of non-use of health insurance 
- Co-payments for prescription medi-
cine 
 
                                               
134 The Versicherungspflichtgrenze determines from which level of the annual salary a sala-
ried employee does not need to be insured in the statutory health insurance but can choose 
to be insured either privately or in the statutory health insurance. 
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7.3 The Programmatic Positions of Christian Democrats, Social 
Democrats and Liberals on the Reform of Sickness Benefits 
As indicated in section 7.1, the passage of the Pay Continuation Act was not 
the result of a conflict-free political process. This section briefly highlights the 
key differences between the positions of Christian Democrats, Social Demo-
crats and Liberals on the reform of sickness benefits in order to prepare the 
analysis of architectural policy design strategies in section 7.4. 
The Christian Democrats’ Position 
As the above description of the Christian Democrats showed (cf. section 5.2), 
the party was historically more pragmatically oriented towards preserving its 
position in government. It frequently avoided taking clear-cut positions on in-
dividual policy issues and instead worked out compromises that pacified often 
contradictory interests within the party. The party therefore only presented an 
official position on sickness benefits in its 1968 party program, shortly before 
the political debate on pay continuation reached its peak, whereas previous 
party or election platforms did not touch upon the topic (CDU 1953, 1947, 
1949, 1957, 1961, 1965).  
In the Berlin program, the party proclaimed that equal treatment of workers 
and salaried employees in case of sickness could only be achieved via a simul-
taneous reform of the statutory health insurance and that employers’ expenses 
should be compensated via equalization funds. The program text itself did not 
explicitly state whether equal treatment of workers and salaried employees 
was to be achieved via pay continuation or increased sick pay. However, the 
debates on the party convention in Berlin and an earlier draft of the program 
(CDU 1968c: Nr. 84, 88, 89; 1968b: Nr. 59; 1968a), which formulated a clear 
position in favor of pay continuation, demonstrated that the CDU had already 
acknowledged that it could not prevent the implementation of pay continua-
tion against the Social Democrats and its own employee wing. The employer 
wing successfully insisted on linking pay continuation to a reform of the stat-
utory health insurance, where the party argued that individual responsibility 
should take precedence over collective risk insurance, a principle the party 
aimed to implement in all branches of the social insurance system. Conse-
quently, the party program argued for the transparency of health insurance 
contributions, benefits, rights and expenses, and for the introduction of bear-
able copayments for the insured, so that contributions to collective health 
funds could be lowered. This position was also repeated in the 1969 election 
program, after the Pay Continuation Act had already been passed in parlia-
ment (CDU 1969: Nr. 19).  
Hence, the programmatic position of the Christian Democrats on pay con-
tinuation reflected the strategic dilemma of the party, which despite strong 
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doubts of the employer wing against pay continuation could not risk alienating 
voters and the employee wing and potentially cause the introduction of pay 
continuation by an alliance between Social Democrats and the employee wing. 
To outbalance the acceptance of pay continuation, the party therefore empha-
sized the need for a simultaneous reform of the statutory healthcare system.  
The Social Democrats’ Position 
Consistent with their ideological orientation, the Social Democrats argued in 
their party programs for equal treatment of workers and salaried employees 
almost from the beginning of the Federal Republic. In their 1957 election plat-
form and the 1959 party manifesto of Bad Godesberg, the Social Democrats 
stated that it was time to treat workers and salaried employees equally (SPD 
1957), and that medical care in case of sickness was to be supplemented by full 
economic protection (SPD 1959). In the election programs of 1961 and 1965, 
the Social Democrats formulated a more detailed position on healthcare and 
healthcare reform, clearly opposing copayments for the insured that CDU and 
FDP argued for (SPD 1961, 1965).  
In the 1965 platform, the Social Democrats furthermore granted the issue 
of pay continuation its own chapter, demonstrating how important the issues 
were to the party. The party emphasized that a Social Democratic-led govern-
ment would introduce pay continuation for workers based on three principles: 
first, expenses for employers would be fully covered through a equalization 
fund; second, pay continuation would not be linked to other reforms of the 
social insurance system like direct or indirect copayments; third, a social med-
ical service in collaboration with the attending physician would assess sick 
workers’ ability to work. In the 1969 election platform, the Social Democrats 
highlighted their fight for pay continuation and equal treatment of workers 
and salaried employees. However, the party avoided the previously clear state-
ments against any form of direct or indirect copayments in the statutory health 
insurance, potentially fearing that it would have to break this promise if it 
came to lead the government.  
The Liberals’ Position 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Liberals made few explicit statements on 
sickness benefits or health insurance reform. However, the general statements 
regarding limited state activity and the protection of individual freedom and 
entrepreneurial activity in the programs illustrate the party’s opposition 
against pay continuation and its preference for cost sharing and a reimburse-
ment system instead of a benefits-in-kind system (FDP 1957, 1961, 1969, 
1953). During the reform debate on sickness benefits under the grand coali-
tion, the Liberals therefore did not produce a coherent reform proposal but 
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worked on the basis of motions to amend that the party introduced in parlia-
ment in order to clarify its positions on individual aspects of the reform. Only 
in the election campaign of 1969, just after the introduction of pay continua-
tion, did the FDP clearly formulate that the “solidarity principle in statutory 
healthcare is to be rebuilt, e.g. through a reimbursement scheme or a contri-
bution refund system” (FDP 1969).  
Summary 
Table 7.3, below, summarizes the parties’ positions on a reform of sickness 
benefits based on party and election programs as well as reform proposals in-
troduced into parliament that spell out party positions more specifically. As 
discussed earlier, party position here means the majority position of a party. 
In particular the Christian Democrats were internally split, and the employee 
wing strongly sympathized with the positions of the Social Democrats. The 
employer wing of the Christian Democrats, on the other side, sympathized 
with the position of the Liberals. Furthermore, party positions match the po-
sitions of important interest groups, with Social Democrats and unions (and 
the Christian Democrats’ employee wing) on one side and Christian Demo-
crats (in particular the employers’ wing), Liberals and employer federations 
on the other side.  
Table 7.3: The Programmatic Positions of Social Democrats, Christian 
Democrats and Liberals on Sickness Benefits 
 
7.4 Architectural Policy Design Strategies in the Reform of Sickness 
Benefits 
The programmatic differences between Christian Democrats, Social Demo-
crats and Liberals reflect the different policy options that were debated and 
which option policy makers deemed the “best solution” for the problem or 
challenge of sickness benefits reform is. Moreover, they reflect considerations 
regarding the immediate effects of different reform designs, e.g. the financial 












catch-all center right 
self-responsibility and self-








strong support for pay 
continuation for workers 
and equal treatment of 
workers and salaried em-
ployees in all respects; 
strong opposition to cost 
sharing in healthcare 
reluctant acceptance of 
pay continuation; 
strong emphasis on 
cost-sharing reforms in 
healthcare as compen-
sation 
opposition to financial bur-
dens for employers and 
schematic-legalistic equali-
zation of workers and sala-
ried employees; support for 




burden on employers, as highlighted in the introduction to this case study. 
Both are also a typical perspective in the literature on policy design and policy 
instruments, which often aims to compare policy instruments and design 
based on their efficiency (cf. chapter 2.2).  
The programmatic differences also reflect and add up to different long-term 
strategies in health politics. These strategies can be distinguished, first, by the 
different end goals the parties pursued. The Christian Democrats aimed at 
transforming the statutory health insurance from a benefits-in-kind system to 
a reimbursement system with direct co-payments in the long run.135 The Social 
Democrats worked for a reform that would in the long run render a citizen-
ship-based health insurance system more easy to achieve, and they tried to 
implement a pay continuation reform that was hard to retrench. Second, the 
strategies can be distinguished by the policy feedback effects they utilized. The 
Christian Democratic strategy built on experience effects, kick-off effects and 
a cover-up effect, even though the design proposal was also linked to entrench-
ment and spillover effects favored by the Social Democrats. The Social Demo-
crats’ strategy built on precedence effects, entrenchment effects, a spillover 
effect, and a cover-up effect. Below, Table 7.4 and Figure 7.1 illustrate both 
strategies.  
Before diving deeper into the analysis of the strategies, four qualifications 
are in order as in the case study of the Codetermination Act above: first, dis-
cussing a “Social Democratic” and a “Christian Democratic” architectural pol-
icy design strategy serves the purpose of using apt labels for two competing, 
long-term political strategies, but it does not mean that the parties had a cop-
yright on these strategies, so to speak. In fact, the Social Democrats’ strategy 
was largely shared by labor unions, and the Christian Democrats were sup-
ported by employer federations and could count on the sympathy of the Lib-
erals regarding their long-term goals. Second, the comparison of the two strat-
egies does not mean that both parties always stood uniformly behind these 
strategies, as especially the discussion of the Christian Democrats and the 
competing employer and employee wing has shown. Third, while the two 
strategies relied on different types of policy feedback effects, those feedback 
effects are not necessarily fully understood by policy makers in their analytical 
meaning. The assumption that policy makers have a working understanding 
(cf. section 3.2) of the feedback effects of different types of policy design is 
sufficient for the subsequent analysis. 
                                               
135 In a benefit-in-kind system, the insured receive medical treatment from medical profes-
sionals who directly charge the responsible health fund. In a reimbursement system, the in-
sured first pay for treatment and are reimbursed in full or partially for their expenses later 
(meaning direct copayments). 
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Fourth, overall architectural policy design strategies as depicted in Figure 
7.1 are imposed on the empirical material after a fine-grained investigation of 
the individual elements of the design strategies. The investigation is based on 
the assumption that policy makers have a working understanding of what 
feedback effects different design elements might produce, but that policy mak-
ers do not necessarily devise a “master plan” for an architectural policy design 
strategy that compares all possible feedback effects and prioritizes certain ef-
fects over others (cf. section 3.2). While policy makers do not necessarily de-
velop this kind of master strategy, the empirical material shows that certain 
considerations (those depicted in black in Figure 7.1 and Table 7.4) seemed 
more important to policy makers than others (those depicted in grey), which 
will be reflected throughout the following discussion. 
The structure of section 7.4 is as follows: sections 7.4.1 (on the Christian 
Democrats’ architectural policy design strategy) and 7.4.2 (on the Social Dem-
ocrats’ architectural policy design strategy) first introduce overviews of the 
different anticipated feedback effects that made up the parties’ design strate-
gies, since those effects are the analytically interesting category. Then, the sec-
tions conduct a fine-grained empirical analysis along different policy design 
elements that policy makers assumed could produce these feedback effects. 
The empirical analysis reflects how policy makers think about potential policy 
feedback effects, starting from different design elements going to potential 
feedback effects. Following the discussion of the Christian Democrats’ and the 
Social Democrats’ policy design strategies, section 7.4 briefly discusses antic-
ipated feedback effects that were linked to policy design elements that neither 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.4.1 The Christian Democrats’ Architectural Policy Design Strategy: 
Setting the Statutory Health Insurance on a Reform Path towards a 
Reimbursement System with Cost Sharing 
The Christian Democrats’ strategy can be qualified as an attempt to kick off a 
self-reinforcing reform process that would eventually lead to a transition to a 
reimbursement system with direct copayments in Germany’s statutory health 
insurance. Since the Christian Democrats realized that it was hopeless to op-
pose pay continuation in general due to the potential alliance of Social Demo-
crats with the CDU’s employee wing, the party’s strategic focus was henceforth 
on realizing as much of their reform ambitions regarding the statutory health 
insurance system as possible. In this struggle, the Christian Democrats not 
only faced opposition from the Social Democrats but also had to secure a nec-
essary level of internal party unity since the CDU employee wing was critical 
of far-reaching cost-sharing measures. Furthermore, the Christian Democrats 
were aware of the substantial political and practical hurdles to a paradigmatic 
health insurance reform in the current legislative term and to a major reform 
in general.  
The Christian Democrats’ strategy therefore built on the idea of a perma-
nent reform. The aim was a paradigmatic shift from the benefits-in-kind sys-
tem to a reimbursement system with direct copayments through a gradual, 
incremental reform process involving numerous small reforms and adaptions 
of health insurance policies. This strategy relied on “activating” three types of 
feedback effects that will be briefly outlined and then investigated in more de-
tail. 
The Policy Feedback Effects of the Christian Democrats’ Policy Design 
Strategy in Brief 
First, the Christian Democrats hoped that an experience effect would emerge 
after the implementation of at least some form of cost-sharing measure. That 
is, future governments would be able to draw on practical and legislative ex-
perience with the introduction of cost sharing and could utilize that experience 
in extending cost sharing and eventually transforming the benefits-in-kind 
into a reimbursement system. The Christian Democrats also hoped to that the 
insured through exposure to gentle cost-sharing measures would learn to un-
derstand the high costs of medical treatment and their own responsibility in 
not overburdening the insurance community. The party evaluated which 
type(s) of cost-sharing measures would be most effective in achieving these 
experience effects, as the more detailed analysis below will show. 
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Second, and closely related to experience effects, the Christian Democrats’ 
strategy was built on a kick-off effect: They aimed to design the Pay Continu-
ation Act in a way that would facilitate political experience among government 
elites and the population in order to develop a pool of knowledge for further 
reforms; and they aimed to design the reform in a way that would start this 
permanent reform process. For example, policy makers envisioned (but failed 
to implement) an expert committee that would accompany a reform process 
in the future and could, once established, keep a reform process going. An-
other possibility would be to base a kick-off effect on positive evaluations of 
the first reform step that would make subsequent reform steps easier to im-
plement. Both the kick-off effect and the experience effects were crucial to the 
Christian Democrats’ design strategy.  
The third feedback effect, the cover-up effect, was less important than the 
former two. That means that, at least in the eyes of the Social Democrats, the 
Christian Democrats hoped that the introduction of cost-sharing measures 
would conceal structural problems in the statutory health insurance like its 
limited coverage of, in particular, well-paid, often privately insured, groups. 
The implementation of some form of cost sharing would, from this perspec-
tive, help frame the problems of the statutory health insurance in terms of 
more/less cost sharing instead of more/less private insurance. 
The final design proposal of the Christian Democrats furthermore sup-
ported a spillover and an entrenchment effect that were actually an original 
part of the Social Democrats’ design strategy. The reason lies in the above-
mentioned strategic dilemma of the Christian Democrats, who feared an alli-
ance between Social Democrats and their own employee wing and therefore 
had to take over a part of the Social Democrats reform design, i.e. accept the 
introduction of pay continuation. The Christian Democrats therefore contrib-
uted to establishing policy feedback effects that ran counter to their own long-
term goals and instead facilitated political dynamics in favor of the Social 
Democrats’ agenda (discussed in more detail in section 7.4.2). 
The Design Elements of the Christian Democrats’ Reform Proposal and 
Which Feedback Effects Policy Makers Attributed to Them 
The Christian Democrats based their design strategy on one specific policy de-
sign element that was supposed to facilitate the policy feedback dynamics out-
lined above, and that is the introduction of cost-sharing measures. During the 
reform debate, the potential introduction of some form of cost sharing led to 
intense political conflicts between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. 
Crucially, this was not only due to immediate consequences of cost sharing 
like the financial burden on low-paid parts of the population but also due to 
the long-term political implications of such cost-sharing measures. From the 
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perspective of the Christian Democrats, cost sharing produced a kick-off ef-
fect, an experience effect and, though less crucial, a cover-up effect that would 
lead towards a reimbursement system with direct copayments in the statutory 
healthcare system. Furthermore, the Christian Democrats consciously priori-
tized cost-sharing measures that would create beneficial, long-term feedback 
dynamics over measures that would introduce more far-reaching cost sharing 
immediately.  
As discussed in section 7.3, the Christian Democrats insisted on linking the 
introduction of pay continuation to a so-called “first step of healthcare re-
form”. What they effectively meant was the introduction of cost-sharing 
measures and not, for example, structural reforms of the statutory health in-
surance. In particular, the employer wing of the Christian Democrats insisted 
on only passing pay continuation in a package deal together with some cost-
sharing measures.136 Just as Social Democrats could be sure of the unions’ 
support in opposing cost sharing, the Christian Democrats knew that repre-
sentatives of mid-sized business, employer federations and “all economic 
forces” were on their side in the fight for cost sharing.137 The Christian Demo-
crats therefore originally proposed the introduction of three different 
measures of cost sharing or, respectively, cost transparency: copayments for 
prescriptions, copayments for hospital treatment, and a contribution refund 
scheme according to which the insured received a share of their health insur-
ance contributions back if they did not use their health insurance for more 
than one year.  
The goal of these measures was, as the Christian Democrats argued publicly, 
to make citizens more aware of the cost of medical treatment so that they 
would be incentivized to use their health insurance more conservatively, for 
example by paying a fixed percentage of the total expenses.138 Since this ped-
agogical effect would be stronger the more costs insured would have to cover 
and only weak for the contribution refund scheme where no actual costs were 
levied on the insured, the Christian Democrats’ original preference in the ne-
gotiations was to achieve the introduction of copayments. In March 1963, a 
leading member of the Christian Democrats’ employers wing called copay-
ments for hospital treatment a “conditio sine qua non” when negotiations with 
                                               
136 See e.g. a press release of the employer wing (MIT) from July 28, 1969 (ACDP 08-008-
246/2) or a resolution proposal for an MIT delegate conference on September 27, 1969 
(ACDP 04-004-005/5). 
137 ACDP, 08-008-264/2: memo from MP Kalinke (CDU) to MP Müller-Herrman (CDU), 
14.01.1969. 
138 ACDP, 08-005-060/2: BDA paper, no date. 
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the Social Democrats were at their peak.139 In another memo, the same MP 
concluded that a reform proposal (which did not include copayments but only 
a contribution refund scheme) simply was “not a first step of healthcare re-
form”.140  
However, the Social Democrats were strongly opposed to copayments due 
to their social consequences. They were more flexible in negotiating a contri-
bution refund scheme since that would mean a relief for some insured (though 
typically upper class) without an increase for all insured.141 The final Pay Con-
tinuation Act therefore included a compromise and did not introduce copay-
ments for hospital treatment, limited copayments for prescription medicine 
to 20 % and a maximum of 2.50DM, and introduced a contribution refund 
scheme.  
As mentioned, policy makers considered three types of policy feedback 
linked to the introduction of cost sharing: a kick-off effect, an experience ef-
fect, and a cover-up effect. First, the introduction of cost-sharing measures 
was supposed to produce a kick-off effect. In practice, this means that Chris-
tian Democrats aimed at gently introducing cost sharing in order to steer the 
path of health insurance reform towards their intended long-term goal. A 
commission on pay continuation of the parliamentary group of CDU/CSU 
concluded, for example, that the 
[…] first step [of a reform] should include elements of cost sharing and not hinder 
further reforms in that direction or in its practicalities an agreement with the co-
alition partner. […] In the long run, a permanent reform should be the goal, ac-
cording to the ideas of the minister accompanied by a board of advisers on health 
insurance reform.142 
The excerpt shows that policy makers wanted the Pay Continuation Act to not 
hinder further reforms in the direction of cost sharing and reimbursement. 
Hence, the party prioritized long-term goals over potential short-term politi-
cal gains, which can also be seen in another memo. Here, a CDU/CSU working 
group explicitly states that “considering the political circumstances [i.e. the 
danger of the SPD introducing a pay continuation reform without any linked 
health insurance reform], there is a very strong tendency to accept a moderate 
                                               
139 ACDP, 08-008-264/2: letter from MP Ruf (Wirtschaftsrat/MIT) to MP Gewandt (DKM 
head), 17.03.1969. 
140 ACDP, 01-858-027/2: protocol attachment, 07.01.1969. 
141 ACDP, 08-005-060/2: memo for MP Barzel, 12.11.1968. 
142 ACDP, 08-005-061/1: commission report on Pay Continuation, 04.02.1969, italics added. 
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first step of healthcare reform. It is, however, essential that this step is imple-
mented in such a way that it can form the basis for further health insurance 
reforms”.143 
Therefore, policy makers considered the introduction of a contribution re-
fund scheme beneficial in the long run, even though it meant that the Christian 
Democrats would not achieve direct copayments to the extent they hoped for 
in the short run. A working paper on health insurance reform from the 
CDU/CSU parliamentary working group on social policy illustrates these con-
siderations well. It says that the “contribution refund scheme [as a form of cost 
sharing; PP] is – in a benefits-in-kind system – the more practical way of cost 
sharing and can contribute to preparing the transition towards a reimburse-
ment system with direct copayments”144 because the insured will be made 
aware of the real costs of medical treatment regularly, incentivized to econom-
ical usage of their insurance and acceptance of their individual responsibility 
to the insurance community.145 Hence, policy makers carefully considered the 
implications of different cost-sharing measures in the short and long term and 
how these could affect a reform process towards more cost sharing and, even-
tually, a reimbursement scheme with direct copayments. Importantly, in this 
calculation process, policy makers seemed to have consciously prioritized a 
policy design with beneficial long-term implications instead of fighting for a 
design that would represent a bigger political victory immediately after its pas-
sage, for example including co-payments for hospital treatment. 
Second, policy makers considered an experience effect, which is closely 
linked to the kick-off effect. After the passage of the final reform, when the 
Christian Democrats were under criticism due to the limited cost-sharing 
measures, the party justified and defended the value of the Pay Continuation 
Act by pointing towards this experience effect. In the eyes of CDU/CSU, the 
first reform step would help to leave the level of “merely theoretical consider-
ations” and instead make real and practical experiences necessary for the im-
plementation of the overall reform in the future.146 Already before the 1969 act 
was passed and the policy design still debated, Christian Democrats pointed 
towards this experience effect. For example, an argumentation paper from 
April 1969 defends the Christian Democrats’ reform design and argues that 
“the CDU/CSU proposal offers the opportunity to gather experience and 
makes it easier for the legislative branch to take further steps on the way to a 
                                               
143 ACDP, 08-005-061/1: memo from commission on Pay Continuation 17.01.1969, italics 
added. 
144 ACDP, 08-005-092/3: paper “on the reform of health insurance”, no date, no author, 
italics added. 
145 Ibid. 
146 ACDP, 07-001-19701: Rentnerdienst 1969. 
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permanent reform of health insurance in the coming legislative period”.147 
Hence, policy makers were aware of the practical experience the implementa-
tion of their policy design would help create, anticipating that further reforms 
in the direction of a reimbursement system with direct copayments would be 
easier to adopt and implement if legislators could draw on the legislative, ad-
ministrative and practical experiences of previously passed cost-sharing re-
forms.  
Third, policy makers considered a cover-up effect. This cover-up effect 
means that an introduction of at least some form of cost sharing would be able 
to conceal structural problems of the statutory healthcare system and thereby 
decrease the pressure to address those problems. This effect, however, seems 
less important to Christian Democratic policy makers since the analyzed em-
pirical material shows it less frequently and less clearly. Nevertheless, the ma-
terial shows that Social Democrats saw the danger of a cover-up effect. As a 
Social Democratic parliamentarian argued in a committee debate, “the in-
crease of copayments for prescriptions does not stimulate a health insurance 
reform. On the contrary, it could create the impression that in principle a step 
in the right direction has already been made”.148 Importantly, the cover-up ef-
fect does not necessarily conceal “real” structural problems in the statutory 
health insurance (even though that is surely possible). Instead, the effect illus-
trates that policy formulation is also a struggle over the framing of problems 
and potential solutions and that each policy design comes with a particular 
frame that may suppress other frames.  
Overall, the Christian Democrats hoped the introduction of cost sharing 
would be the start of a “permanent reform process”.149 Instead of aiming to 
reform the statutory health insurance in one big reform, the Christian Demo-
crats tried to start a gradual reform process that was supported by the three 
described feedback effects, in particular a kick-off effect and an experience ef-
fect, and would ultimately lead to their desired goal, a reimbursement system 
with direct copayments. 
                                               
147 ACDP, 08-005-061/1: argumentation paper, 12.04.1969, italics added. 
148 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 V368 lfd. 11: Bundestag committee on social policy, 
commit-tee meeting, 24.04.1969, p. 28. 
149 ACDP, 08-005-061/1: commission report on Pay Continuation, 04.02.1969; ACDP, 08-
005-061/1: argumentation paper, 12.04.1969; ACDP, 08-005-061/1: memo from commis-
sion on Pay Continuation 17.01.1969. 
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7.4.2 The Social Democrats’ Architectural Policy Design Strategy: 
Protecting Achieved Victories and Broadening the Statutory Health 
Insurance towards a Citizen Insurance System 
The Social Democrats’ architectural policy design strategy had two goals. First, 
it attempted to implement and protect a pay continuation reform that would 
be hard to retrench. Second, it aimed to facilitate a reform path that would 
broaden the statutory health insurance in the direction of a citizen insurance 
system that would not distinguish between workers and employees and would 
potentially overcome the occupationally and regionally segregated structure 
of the statutory health insurance. The Social Democrats’ strategy therefore 
had a more “defensive” character than the Christian Democrats’ strategy, 
which was more “offensive” or “transformational” at its core in regard to 
healthcare reform (even though the Christian Democrats were in a strategi-
cally weaker position). As discussed in previous chapters, the Social Demo-
crats were more united as a party than the Christian Democrats and enjoyed 
the support of the labor movement in the pay continuation debate. In 1969, 
the party was in a strategically advantageous position knowing that the Chris-
tian Democrats’ employee wing shared their goal of introducing pay continu-
ation for workers. This strength of the Social Democrats is also reflected in the 
final policy design of the Pay Continuation Act, where the party was able to 
successfully implement pay continuation and limit cost-sharing measures to a 
tolerable degree (cf. chapter 7.5).  
The Policy Feedback Effects of the Social Democrats’ Policy Design Strategy 
in Brief 
The Social Democrats’ policy design strategy was based on four types of policy 
feedback: a precedence effect, a spillover effect, an entrenchment effect, and a 
cover-up effect. 
First, the Social Democrats counted on a precedence effect, meaning that 
the introduction of pay continuation without or with only limited cost-sharing 
measures would be a signal that progressive, egalitarian social policy could be 
successfully passed without too many political sacrifices. For future, similar 
reform attempts, such a precedence case could be a political advantage in ne-
gotiations with opponents, and it could motivate and mobilize the Social Dem-
ocrats’ followers and supporters, even when the parties’ strategic situation is 
less advantageous.  
The second feedback effect was a spillover effect. The spillover effect means 
that Social Democrats could hope, and that Christian Democrats feared, that 
a worker-friendly introduction of pay continuation would have effects on re-
lated political issues. Specifically, granting workers rights and benefits that 
were previously limited to salaried employees would likely increase demands 
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among salaried employees to subsequently be granted those benefits and 
rights to which only workers were previously entitled. Hence, the Pay Contin-
uation Act had the potential to spill over into other political issues and create 
a domino effect that would lead to more egalitarian treatment of workers and 
salaried employees and, thus, contribute to the transformation of the occupa-
tionally segregated health insurance system towards a citizenship-based in-
surance system. 
The third effect that the Social Democrats’ strategy incorporated was an en-
trenchment effect. This feedback effect conformed well to the Social Demo-
crats’ more short-term focus on the introduction of pay continuation after 20 
years of political struggle for it. Nevertheless, policy makers were well aware 
of the obstacles to abolishing existing social benefits. The Pay Continuation 
Act would immediately create a sizeable constituency that came to enjoy its 
benefits as well as a sense of entitlement on the side of workers that would be 
extremely hard to work against in the future. This sense of entitlement can be 
understood in a material sense as “entitlement to social benefits” and in an 
ideational sense of “entitlement to fair and equal treatment of workers with 
salaried employees”. The spillover effect and the entrenchment effect com-
bined formed the core of the Social Democrats’ architectural policy design 
strategy. 
Fourth, and last, Social Democrats counted on a cover-up effect. The Social 
Democrats’ cover-up effect mirrors the cover-up effect discussed above for the 
Christian Democrats. That means that, at least in the eyes of the Christian 
Democrats, the Social Democrats hoped that the introduction of pay continu-
ation and the raise of the income ceiling for compulsory insurance of salaried 
employees without cost-sharing measures would conceal structural problems 
in the statutory health insurance, e.g. the sharp increase in costs for medical 
care. From this perspective, the raised income ceiling and the failure to intro-
duce cost sharing would help frame the problem of the statutory health insur-
ance as one of a too narrow insurance base instead of one of uncontrolled ex-
penses.  
The Design Elements of the Social Democrats’ Reform Proposal and Which 
Feedback Effects Policy Makers Attributed to Them 
The policy feedback effects of the Social Democratic policy design strategy 
were linked to several design elements: the introduction of pay continuation, 
the raised income ceiling for compulsory insurance of salaried employees, and 
the limitation of or opposition to cost-sharing measures.  
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(1) The Introduction of Pay Continuation and the Attributed 
Spillover and Entrenchment Effects 
The first policy design element that Social Democrats considered to have sub-
stantial implications for future politics concerns the introduction of pay con-
tinuation combined with a raised income ceiling for salaried employees. As 
discussed above, the Social Democrats had supported the introduction of pay 
continuation for workers since the early 1950s, while Christian Democrats 
only accepted it in the late 1960s when the party realized its strategic dilemma. 
The skepticism and resistance of the Christian Democrats, in particular its em-
ployer wing, to the introduction of pay continuation and the hesitation to com-
promise with the Social Democrats on the issue can be understood more easily 
when one considers the long-term feedback effects that policy-makers at-
tributed to it. Two feedback effects were particularly concerning to Christian 
Democrats: a potential spillover effect and an entrenchment effect. 
(1) The spillover effect concerns the equal treatment of workers and salaried 
employees. Both groups were traditionally treated differently in many matters 
of social legislation and labor law, and workers were typically disadvantaged 
compared to salaried employees. In the pay continuation debate, all involved 
parties supported ending this unequal treatment of workers and salaried em-
ployees. The Social Democrats wanted to introduce pay continuation and raise 
the income ceiling for compulsory health insurance for salaried employees 
substantially, so that more salaried employees were entitled to employer con-
tributions to their health insurance.150, 151 The Social Democrats aimed to grant 
workers rights that previously only salaried employee enjoyed and vice versa.  
Christian Democrats, Liberals, and employer federations also acknowl-
edged and supported equal treatment of workers and salaried employees, but 
their strategic behavior suggested that they did so with less conviction and 
tried to limit the rights that either group would be granted. The danger of in-
troducing pay continuation for workers, i.e. taking a first step towards equal 
treatment of workers and salaried employees, was that this measure would 
spill over into other areas of unequal treatment and lead to demands for more 
                                               
150 See, e.g., a letter from MP Schellenberg (head of working group on social policy) to the 
SPD parliamentary group from May 08, 1969, in which Schellenberg reports that Social 
Democrats and Christian Democrats agreed on a compromise regarding the raise of the in-
come ceiling for salaried employees. For the Social Democrats, this compromise did not go 
far enough, and the question of how high the income ceiling should be raised became a topic 
in the upcoming election (AdsD, 1535). 
151 Only if salaried employees’ income was below this ceiling were they entitled to employers’ 
contribution to their health insurance. Workers had the right to receive employer contribu-
tions to their health insurance irrespective of the level of their salary. 
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equal treatment, e.g. regarding a further increase of the income ceiling for 
compulsory insurance.  
A letter from the consortium of local handicraft organizations in Germany’s 
largest state, North Rhine-Westphalia, to the head of the CDU Discussion 
Group on Mid-Sized Business (DKM) in October 1968, expressed this concern 
in a straightforward way: 
A further indirect burden [on employers] was unavoidable after the introduction 
of pay continuation, since salaried employees will demand equal treatment with 
workers in regard to employer contributions to health insurance, as already an-
nounced now. Employers will then have to pay half of the health insurance con-
tributions for salaried employees earning more than 900DM a month.152 
Certainly, this fear was not unfounded. Already in 1963, Social Democratic 
policy makers considered the implication of an introduction of pay continua-
tion, stating that “through the introduction of pay continuation, the system of 
[occupationally and regionally segregated] health funds would have to be liq-
uidated in the long run” in favor of a single health fund (Einheitskasse).153 In 
addition, the union federation DGB deemed a link between the introduction 
of pay continuation and an increase in the income ceiling necessary, so that as 
few as possible salaried employees were excluded from employers’ contribu-
tion to their health insurance, a right that all workers already enjoyed.154  
During the reform debate under the grand coalition, Social Democrats still 
considered the introduction of pay continuation and demands for equal treat-
ment of workers and salaried employees in the statutory health insurance (i.e. 
raising or abolishing the income ceiling for the latter) “inextricably linked”,155 
as a position paper of an SPD district in the Social Democrats’ heartland West-
ern Westphalia shows. Hence, even if the Social Democrats did not succeed in 
raising the income ceiling for salaried employees as high as they wished, the 
introduction of pay continuation was certainly considered a first step towards 
equal treatment of workers and salaried employees that could spill over to 
other fields and create demands for raising the income ceiling further later on. 
(2) A second concern for Christian Democrats regarding the Social Demo-
crats’ policy design related to the potential entrenchment effect of the pay con-
                                               
152 ACDP, 08-008-264/2: letter from crafts association representatives to MP Gewandt, 
29.10.1968, italics added. 
153 AdsD, 2/BTFD000198: undated memo from the materials of the Social Democrats work-
ing group on social policy in the 4. Bundestag (1961-65). 
154 AdsD/DGB archive, 5/DGAO001325: memo on meeting between representatives of the 
DGB and the Social Democrats, 30.10.1964. 
155 AdsD, 667: position paper from local SPD branch in Westliches Westfalen, no date. 
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tinuation reform. Here, Christian Democrats were aware of the obstacles pol-
icy makers generally face in taking back reforms that grant benefits to a size-
able population. That this in the literature broadly discussed type of feedback 
effect is a real concern for policy makers becomes apparent in a number of 
written replies by the Christian Democrats’ national party bureau sent to vot-
ers in the impending election campaign of 1969.156 In the letters, the Christian 
Democrats tried to defend the coalition compromise to introduce pay contin-
uation for workers by highlighting that “taking back once introduced progres-
sive regulations is almost impossible in politics.” The letters go on, “if pay con-
tinuation for salaried employees cannot be rolled back into sick pay, then sick-
ness compensation for workers must take over the pay continuation princi-
ple.”  
Even though it was not the original goal of the Christian Democrats to in-
troduce pay continuation for workers, these letters show policy makers’ 
awareness of the political obstacles of retrenching pay continuation once it is 
introduced. Thereby, they also highlight the extent of the Christian Democrats’ 
defeat in the pay continuation debate because not only did they lose the con-
flict around pay continuation in 1969, they would not be able to reverse the 
result of this conflict.  
While there is no direct evidence in the Social Democrats’ materials on an 
intentional, strategic design of this entrenchment effect, it is reasonable to as-
sume that policy makers from all parties are aware of the hurdles they face 
when attempting to retrench social benefits, both in the specific case of the 
pay continuation act and in general. That policy makers were aware of the im-
portance of the introduction of pay continuation for workers is also apparent 
in the parliamentary debates. Here, several members of parliament high-
lighted the historical significance of the reform for workers,157 e.g. referring to 
it as a “historical milestone”, a wording that policy makers would likely not 
use if they considered a reform easily “retrenchable”.  
Together with the spillover effect, the entrenchment effect can be consid-
ered the core of the Social Democrats’ architectural policy design strategy. The 
spillover effect is the most “offensive” feedback effect that emerges from the 
Social Democrats policy designs, with which the party could try to shape sub-
sequent policy development beyond the Pay Continuation Act itself. On the 
other side, the entrenchment effect is a strong “defensive” tool to protect pay 
continuation beyond the passage of the reform in 1969.  
                                               
156 ACDP, 07-001-19701: election correspondence 1969. 
157 Bundestag Printed Matter 05/237: Bundestag plenary debate, 3rd reading of Pay Contin-
uation Act, 12.06.1969, p. 13147D. 
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(2) The Avoidance of Cost-Sharing and the Attributed Precedence 
and Cover-Up Effects 
Two additional, though less crucial, policy feedback effects were produced by 
a second policy design element: the avoidance of cost-sharing measures. As 
discussed above, Social Democrats as well as unions had traditionally opposed 
any form of cost sharing and therefore tried to limit it as much as possible if 
they could not prevent it. Due to their advantageous strategic position in 1969, 
Social Democrats succeeded in “cutting down” the Christian Democrats’ pro-
posals on cost-sharing considerably, avoiding any copayments for hospital 
treatment, reducing copayments for prescriptions and accepting a contribu-
tion refund scheme, which had the smallest negative impact on typical Social 
Democratic voters in the working class.  
Two feedback effects were linked to an avoidance of cost-sharing measures: 
a precedence effect and a cover-up effect. (1) First, the introduction of pay con-
tinuation without the simultaneous introduction of cost sharing would create 
a precedence effect that would lead to further demands for equal treatment of 
workers and employees and, thus, lead the way towards a citizenship-based 
health insurance system instead of a reimbursement system with copayments.  
The Christian Democrats feared this development and saw an almost natu-
ral link between the introduction of pay continuation and equal treatment of 
salaried employees and workers in terms of employer contributions to the 
statutory health insurance.158 The Christian Democrats were especially afraid 
that the occupationally segregated, multi-payer health insurance system 
would be replaced over time by a more centralized, egalitarian healthcare sys-
tem that the Social Democrats wanted to achieve, if pay continuation was im-
plemented on its own.  
The essence of the precedence effect lies in the fact that the Social Demo-
crats would create the experience that a progressive welfare reform to the ben-
efit of workers (the introduction of pay continuation) can be successfully im-
plemented without having to make substantial concessions in other fields (in-
troduction of cost-sharing). This effect builds less on rising expectations 
among salaried employees (as the spillover effect discussed above) than on the 
positive experience of Social Democratic lawmakers in achieving this reform. 
While the empirical material does not offer direct evidence for this distinction 
between raised awareness in the public and gained experience for policy mak-
ers, the importance of the policy issues to Social Democrats suggests that pol-
icy makers knew that its successful implementation would leave a lasting mark 
on the parties’ history and that it could be used in the future to motivate fol-
lowers and policy makers. 
                                               
158 ACDP, 08-005-092/3: paper “on the reform of health insurance”, no date, no author. 
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(2) The avoidance of cost-sharing measures was also linked to a cover-up 
effect. This cover-up effect would work as the one discussed above for the 
Christian Democrats but in the opposite direction. That means that the intro-
duction of pay continuation and the raise of the income ceiling for compulsory 
insurance of salaried employees without any cost-sharing measures would 
conceal structural problems (from the perspective of Christian Democrats, 
Liberals and employers) in the statutory health insurance like the sharp in-
crease in costs for medical care. The increase in the income ceiling and the 
avoidance of cost-sharing measures would then help frame the problem of the 
statutory health insurance as one of a too narrow insurance base instead of 
one of uncontrolled expenses.  
For example, an interest organization of small- and mid-sized firms warned 
that the passage of the pay continuation act “would probably jeopardize the 
chances of a real reform [of the statutory health insurance; PP]”, criticizing 
that the introduction of pay continuation alone could not solve the financial 
problems of the statutory health insurance.159 In the same vein, a magazine 
published by the insurance industry argued that the pay continuation act 
would substantially decrease the prospects for a structural health insurance 
reform, not least because it would give away the compensation (i.e. pay con-
tinuation) for such a reform that would burden the insured with some form of 
cost sharing.160 Hence, a successful introduction of pay continuation with only 
limited cost-sharing measures (or none at all) would not only prevent cost 
sharing at that moment but also lower the likelihood of an introduction of cost 
sharing in the future.  
Policy Design Elements and Attributed Feedback Effects Not Entailed in the 
Christian Democrats’ or the Social Democrats’ Design Strategy 
Before summarizing the Christian Democrats’ and the Social Democrats’ de-
sign strategies, this section briefly discusses another potential feedback effect 
that policy makers considered but that was not part of either of the two dis-
cussed strategies. Instead, this feedback effect was linked to an early ministe-
rial draft that included a proposition to establish a federal equalization fund 
that would compensate employers for their expenses in relation to pay contin-
uation for workers. As discussed above, the purpose of the equalization fund 
was to make the economic burden employers had to carry in case of the intro-
duction of pay continuation more predictable. The equalization fund was to be 
                                               
159 AdsD, 669: position paper from the association of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(Deutscher Gewerbeverband), 18.03.1969. 
160 AdsD, 667: article from the German insurance journal (Deutsche Versicherungs-
zeitschrift), October 1968. 
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financed solely by employers and, depending on policy proposal, to cover all 
employers and refund their full expenses (according to the Social Democrats’ 
proposal) or only small businesses with max. 20 employees and only 80 % of 
their expenses (according to the Christian Democrats’ proposal). The Chris-
tian Democrats furthermore proposed substantial federal aid to subsidize the 
equalization fund in the first years of its operation. Administratively, both pro-
posals recommended that each health fund would operate its own equalization 
fund and that employers would receive compensation from the fund operated 
by the respective sick workers’ health fund.  
In replicating the structure of multi-payer healthcare system, both parties 
opted for a policy design that avoided a potential precedence effect. This is 
because the other potential solution for the administrative set-up of the equal-
ization fund(s) that was suggested by an early ministerial draft161 – establish-
ing a single, independent equalization fund on the federal level that would use 
existing health funds only as “payment agencies” – would set a precedent for 
the centralization of Germany’s multi-payer social insurance system.  
The Confederation of German Employers Associations (BDA) warns about 
this potential development in a response to the ministerial draft that outlined 
different options for the administrative structure of an equalization fund.162 
According to the BDA, a federal equalization fund that “degraded” health 
funds to mere payment agencies that are unable to set contribution fees for 
employers independently taking into account sickness rate in individual firms 
and the health funds’ membership would be a danger for the German multi-
payer healthcare system in the long run. In the BDA’s word, “[t]aking into ac-
count the current trend of centralization in the whole social insurance system, 
such a federal equalization fund would without a doubt be a dangerous prec-
edent for the abolishment of the multi-payer healthcare system,” so the BDA, 
which also questions the constitutionality of a federal equalization fund.163 In 
the expert hearing on the Christian Democrats’ and the Social Democrats’ pro-
posal, BDA representatives added that the establishment of an equalization 
mechanisms across companies and under public law for the compensation of 
private wage claims would have unknown consequences for the legal sys-
tem.164 
                                               
161 ACDP, 08-008-264/2: BDA statement on Ministerial draft of Dec. 17, 1968; early 1969; 
also: ACDP, 01-858-027/2: protocol attachment, 07.01.1969. 
162 Ibid. 
163 ACDP, 08-008-264/2: BDA statement on Ministerial draft of Dec. 17, 1968; early 1969, 
italics added. 
164 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 V368 lfd. 20: Bundestag committee on labor policy, 
public expert hearing on pay continuation, 05.05.1969, p. 30. 
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While the empirical material does not show whether it was the BDA’s argu-
ments that prevented Social and Christian Democrats from supporting a fed-
eral equalization fund, the BDA’s statements in the parliamentary expert hear-
ing and to the ministerial draft demonstrate the organization’s – and likely 
also policy makers’ – awareness and consideration of the potential long-term 
implications of such a federal equalization fund. Furthermore, the example of 
the ministerial draft strengthens this dissertation’s analytical claim that policy 
makers consider potential long-term feedback effects of different policy de-
signs, not only as part of their own policy design strategy but also in evaluating 
potential alternative design options. 
7.5 The Political Skirmish around the Pay Continuation Act of 1969: 
Policy Design as Strategic Political Struggle 
The first analytical claim made in Chapter 1 said that attention to policy mak-
ers’ considerations of feedback effects helps remedy the functionalist bias in 
policy design studies and improve our understanding of the potentials, chal-
lenges, political struggles, and real-world patterns of strategic policy design. 
In order to substantiate this claim, this section offers an overall discussion of 
how the Social and Christian Democrats’ strategies played out during the po-
litical skirmishing around the design of the Pay Continuation Act. The chapter 
discusses which priorities the parties set, which compromises they had to 
make, and which policy design eventually emerged from the debate as Pay 
Continuation Act of 1969.  
Policy design studies in the policy sciences would typically investigate the 
Pay Continuation Act’s suitability for or efficiency in solving the challenge of 
compensating sick employees (cf. chapter 1). Studies would inquire whether 
policy makers rationally followed existing knowledge when selecting policy in-
struments, how mixes of different policy instruments work together, whether 
the final policy design was effective and efficient, or how the act related to ex-
isting legislation. However, these studies would typically not investigate the 
political considerations during the design process but sideline these as aspects 
of “non-design”. More political perspectives on policy design would typically 
not include considerations of policy feedback effects among potential political 
factors that shape policy design, or they would not be based on well-developed 
concepts of long-term strategic policy making. In sum, policy design studies 
would therefore not explain the political struggle and strategic conflict be-
tween the involved parties during the negotiations around the Pay Continua-
tion Act and therefore only offer a partial understanding of the design process 
and its outcome. 
In contrast to this common approach, this chapter summarizes the previous 
discussion of architectural policy design strategies and investigates more 
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closely the political skirmishing around seemingly trivial design characteris-
tics that policy makers expected to be of great importance for ensuing feed-
back effects. In particular, the chapter discusses two questions: First, can one 
explain final policy design solely by drawing on policy makers’ instrumental 
reasoning or are there other factors that influence policy design? Second, 
which role might considerations of policy feedback effects play among such 
factors? 
From the outset, the positions of the Social Democrats, the Christian Dem-
ocrats and the Liberals represented the broad spectrum of preferences on sick-
ness benefits. The Liberals advocated for a reform of the statutory health in-
surance in the direction of a reimbursement system with direct copayments, 
opposed the “schematic-legalistic” equal treatment of workers and salaried 
employees, and criticized the financial burden on employers. These positions 
were well in line with the parties’ basic political-ideological orientation that 
emphasized self-responsibility and self-determination of the individual. As 
discussed above, the party was, however, without much political influence 
during the grand coalition and therefore had no chance of implementing its 
policy goals. Consequently, the Liberals abstained from introducing a full-
fledged reform proposal into the legislative process and instead worked with 
a number of motions to amend that nevertheless gave the party a chance to 
illustrate its policy position to the public and to its opponents.  
The Social Democrats’ position on codetermination had been clear since the 
establishment of the Federal Republic. The party consistently argued for the 
introduction of pay continuation for workers and extended this position to ar-
gue also for equal treatment of workers and salaried employees in the statu-
tory health insurance. Furthermore, the party strictly opposed cost sharing as 
a form of individualizing the risks of medical treatment to the disadvantage of 
those in need.  
The Christian Democrats went through a more difficult process before set-
tling on their position on pay continuation. As in the codetermination case, 
the party was split between its employer and employee wing. Roughly speak-
ing, the employer wing had the same position as the Liberals; the employee 
wing the same as the Social Democrats. The latter also actively threatened 
their own party to side with the Social Democrats and introduce pay continu-
ation for workers if the Christian Democrats would not develop an acceptable 
position on the issue. 
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Table 7.5, below, offers a detailed overview of the reform proposals made 
by the Social and Christian Democrats and the motions to amend introduced 
by the Liberals. Furthermore, the table shows the final design of the Pay Con-
tinuation Act of 1969 that the Bundestag eventually adopted. The overview is 
structured along four key elements of the proposed policy designs: the mode 
of sickness benefits, the equalization fund, the income ceiling for compulsory 
insurance of salaried employees, and cost-sharing measures. In order to un-
derstand how the final Pay Continuation Act emerged from these opposing 
reform proposals, the following paragraphs discuss the strategic situations of 
Social Democrats and Christian Democrats in the political debate, which pri-
orities the parties set, which compromises they accepted, and which role long-
term considerations played in these strategic decisions. As discussed above, 
the Liberals are excluded from the discussion since they played no major role 
in the design of the final Pay Continuation Act. 
For the Social Democrats, there was little pressure to make substantial con-
cessions to their coalition partner. Since the party knew about the Christian 
Democrats’ employee wing’s sympathy for its own proposal, the Social Demo-
crats never showed a sign of doubt regarding the introduction of pay continu-
ation. The introduction of pay continuation was not only the essence of the 
reform with substantial, immediate effects on workers, but also created im-
portant feedback effects in the long run, as the discussion above showed. In 
this respect, Social Democrats counted especially on an entrenchment effect 
and a spillover effect that were meant to protect the reform from potential re-
trenchment and to carry its underlying goal and principles into other areas of 
social policy.  
On the other side, the Social Democrats showed some willingness to com-
promise with the Christian Democrats in regard to cost sharing and raising 
the income ceiling for compulsory insurance for salaried employees. This was, 
first, because the Social Democrats knew that the Christian Democrats might 
themselves find a compromise that would prevent their employee wing from 
siding with the Social Democrats. Hence, despite their strategic advantage, the 
Social Democrats could not insist on 100 % of their demands. Second, it was 
because the feedback effects associated with abstinence from cost sharing 
were less important to the Social Democrats. That means that, as discussed 
above, the Social Democrats’ design strategy was more focused on the poten-
tial entrenchment and spillover effect than on a precedence and cover-up ef-
fect. Lastly, the Social Democrats were able to enforce a compromise regard-
ing cost sharing that limited copayments while introducing a contribution re-
fund scheme with no immediate negative effects on their voters. Overall, this 
means that the Social Democrats prioritized certain policy feedback effects 
over others in their long-term, architectural policy design and that they were 
 202 
willing to partially sacrifice the less important long-term effects for short-term 
political gain.  
The Christian Democrats were in a more defensive situation. Due to the po-
tential alliance between its own employee wing and the Social Democrats, the 
party had to accept the introduction of pay continuation. As discussed above, 
this was not only a major political defeat in the short run but in the long run 
since the Christian Democrats knew of the hurdles to retrenchment once pay 
continuation was introduced. At the same time, the party tried to “make the 
best” out of its difficult situation and immediate defeat.  
First, it enforced some design elements that were of little importance to the 
Social Democrats but that the Christian Democrats could advertise as com-
pensation for its immediate defeat. An important example is the equalization 
fund for employers, where the final Pay Continuation Act took over (with 
slight modifications) the proposal made by the Christian Democrats. As far as 
the income ceiling for compulsory insurance of salaried employees, the Chris-
tian Democrats could also put the Social Democrats off with a more modest 
increase compared to what the Social Democrats originally demanded.  
Second, the party tried toy “optimize” the long-term effects of a policy de-
sign negotiated with the Social Democrats. Here, the party tried to implement 
a measure of cost sharing that was more acceptable to the Social Democrats 
but still produced important feedback effects like a kick-off effect and an ex-
perience effect. Hence, the Christian Democrats sacrificed potential short-
term gains in order to achieve a long-term goal because they prioritized the 
introduction of a contribution refund scheme over the introduction of more 
extensive copayment, e.g. for hospital treatment.  
The Pay Continuation Act of 1969 thus combined the introduction of pay 
continuation for workers with an employer equalization fund, modest cost-
sharing measures, and a modest increase of the income ceiling for compulsory 
insurance of salaried employees. Both Christian Democrats and Social Demo-
crats could agree to this compromise because it included elements that were 
important to the two parties. For the Social Democrats, short-term political 
losses (cost sharing) were minimized while certain long-term effects where 
maximized (via entrenchment and spillover effects). For the Christian Demo-
crats, short-term political losses had to be accepted (introduction of pay con-
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Sources: Bundestag Printed Matter 05/3983: proposal on Pay Continuation Act introduced by So-
cial Democratic Party, 1969; Bundestag Printed Matter 05/3985: proposal on Pay Continuation Act 
introduced by Christian Democrats, 1969; Bundestag Printed Matter 05/236: Bundestag plenary 
debate, 2nd reading of Pay Continuation Act, 11.06.1969; Bundestag Printed Matter 05/237: Bun-
destag plenary debate, 3rd reading of Pay Continuation Act, 12.06.1969 
* limit for the statutory pension scheme in 1969: 20.400DM, in 1972: 25.200DM 
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PART IV: IMPLICATIONS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLU-
SION 
The dissertation explains a key dimension of public policy making, namely 
whether and how policy makers strategically try to shape policy feedback 
effects during policy design and how such attempts influence the design of 
policies. It aims to understand the potentials, political struggles, challenges, 
and real-world patterns of long-term strategic policy making and to explain 
the strategic choices policy makers make during policy design. As discussed in 
chapter 1, the existing literature is not able to explain this key dimension of 
public policy making. It fails to understand the role of agency in policy feed-
back processes and to enrich our understanding of real-word political strug-
gles around policy design and the strategic choices policy makers face during 
policy design because of pervasive images of politicians as myopic, policy mak-
ing as incomprehensibly complex, and policy design as a rational, instrumen-
tal process.  
In consequence, the literature cannot answer basic questions about public 
policy making. For example, it cannot explain why policy makers choose one 
policy design over another, even though both designs might be instrumental 
in pursuing the same policy goal, what reasons policy makers have for such 
choices and what role strategic considerations of policy feedback effects play 
in these decisions. The literature also cannot explain how policy makers weigh 
long-term and short-term political benefits and instrumental and political 
motivations during policy making, when they prioritize one over the other or 
how they try to maximize both, and why policy makers may be willing to give 
up certain elements of a policy design but not others in negotiations with their 
opponents. Lastly, the literature cannot explain how, under what conditions, 
or to what degree policy makers are actually successful in strategically design-
ing policies and anticipating policy feedback effects to achieve long-term pol-
icy goals, and when they fail in such attempts. 
The theoretical and methodological framework of the dissertation provides 
means and tools that help answer these questions. The empirical and theoret-
ical results of the dissertation are an important step along the way and give 
relevant insights into dynamics of long-term strategic policy making. First, the 
dissertation demonstrates that policy makers do consider long-term implica-
tions of different policy designs and that they try to anticipate and strategically 
shape policy feedback effects through policy design. Policy makers’ consider-
ations of policy feedback effects help explain policy makers’ strategic design 
choices, why they favor particular policy designs over other solutions and 
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which priorities they set in negotiations and bargaining with their political op-
ponents.  
Second, policy makers are not solely myopic and focused on winning the 
next election but try to achieve long-term political goals while being electorally 
successful. In a weak bargaining situation, policy makers accept necessary 
compromises to contain damage and simultaneously try to influence policy 
design so that it creates favorable political dynamics for reaching their long-
term policy goal. In a strong bargaining position, policy makers not only cele-
brate a short-term victory but also try to design policies to be resistant to fu-
ture retrenchment.  
Third, policy makers try to design policies strategically both in incremental 
policy making and in the case of paradigmatic policy reforms, but they do so 
in different ways to respond to different challenges and goals of incremental 
and paradigmatic policy making. In incremental policy making, policy makers 
mainly consider outward-oriented feedback effects (i.e. feedback effects of a 
policy on other policies/issues/policy fields) because they aim to create a ben-
eficial reform process. In paradigmatic policy making, policy makers mainly 
consider inward-oriented feedback effects (i.e. feedback effects of a policy on 
its own further development) because their primary focus is on designing a 
stable, resistant policy that will endure future political attacks.  
Fourth, policy makers anticipate policy feedback effects in relations to par-
ticular elements or instruments included in policy designs. Policy makers need 
not be strategic masterminds who follow a grand design plan and evaluate the 
exact interplay of different, potential policy feedback effects but they have pre-
cise expectations regarding the effects of particular elements or instruments 
of policy designs. Increasing complexity could therefore be a challenge for pol-
icy makers’ success in long-term strategic policy design. 
Fifth, the dissertation demonstrates that researchers risk drawing false con-
clusions when they do not investigate design processes and policy makers’ 
long-term design strategies. As mentioned, policy makers may “give in” in a 
political debate if they are in a weak bargaining position, but they can hold on 
to their original policy goal and try to influence policy design deliberately in 
order to achieve this goal in the long run via strategically designed policy feed-
back effects that are intended to create political dynamics in their favor. 
Hence, researchers should not deduct policy makers’ policy goals quickly from 
the positions they take during political debates and negotiations but investi-
gate their design strategies in detail in order to understand what their long-
term goals are. Doing so can also help researchers uncover when policy mak-
ers accept short-term losses in order to achieve long-term goals and to avoid 
misinterpreting strategic decisions in public policy making. 
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The architectural policy design approach presented in the dissertation lays 
out a script researchers can follow to dig deeper into policy design processes, 
to explain why policy makers choose certain designs or design elements over 
others, and to uncover the long-term design strategies they follow and the pol-
icy feedback effects they try to shape.  
By providing these analytical tools, the dissertation wants to facilitate an 
agency turn in policy-feedback research. An agency turn in policy-feedback 
research is necessary because the field has so far not paid appropriate atten-
tion to long-term strategic policy making because it tends to view policy mak-
ers as notoriously myopic, policy making as incomprehensibly complex, and 
policy design as a rational, instrumental process. It therefore relegates the 
causal impact of agency on policy development to critical junctures and treats 
policy feedback effects as unintended byproducts of policy making.  
In practice, an agency turn means that researchers should take long-term 
strategic policy making seriously, investigate policy makers’ strategic calcula-
tions regarding policy feedback effects, scrutinize how policy makers weigh 
long-term and short-term gains and losses, and evaluate the causal impact of 
such strategic considerations on what design is adopted eventually. Research-
ers should also take policy makers’ own perspective on policy-feedback dy-
namics more seriously, develop and apply analytical categories of policy-feed-
back effects that reflect policy makers’ own experience, knowledge and as-
sumptions about long-term implications of policies. As the dissertation 
demonstrates, such an approach helps develop productive and applicable an-
alytical categories that show what types of strategic considerations policy 
makers have in different policy-design situations and increase our under-
standing of policy-design processes and public policy making. 
The contribution of the dissertation is summarized and condensed in a ty-
pology of policy-feedback effects anticipated by policy makers during policy 
design. With the typology, the dissertation specifically responds to the two an-
alytical claims developed in chapter 1. First, the typology and its application 
in two case studies demonstrate that the architectural policy design approach 
helps us understand the strategic choices policy makers make during policy 
design better. It helps us understand what types of long-term reform implica-
tions they consider, how they try to design policies strategically in order to 
achieve long-term political gains, how they weigh short-term and long-term 
benefits of policies during policy design and how they try to maximize both.  
Second, it demonstrates that the fine-grained investigation of policy-design 
processes and the disaggregation of policies into policy-design elements helps 
us to a better understanding of how policy makers try to design policy feed-
back effects strategically and from which policy-design elements feedback ef-
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fects might emerge. Specifically, it shows what types of feedback effects (in-
ward/outward-oriented) policy makers consider in different design situations 
(incremental/paradigmatic reforms).  
The Structure of Part IV 
The structure of Part IV is as follows: Chapter 8 discusses relevant theoretical, 
methodological and empirical implications of the study. The main emphasis 
lies on the typology of anticipated feedback effects, presented in section 8.1. 
Section 8.2 discusses three relevant methodological implications of the disser-
tation: how traces of strategic policy making can be identified in empirical ma-
terial; how contexts conducive to strategic policy making can be identified 
building on the selection of instrumental cases; and how research can respond 
to the Janus-faced character of policy-design strategies as both subject and 
object of design processes. Section 8.3 discusses the empirical implications of 
the study and shows what insights the architectural policy design approach 
produces in empirical analyses of public policy making. Chapter 9 summarizes 
the main contributions of the dissertation, rounds it off with a discussion of 
agency in policy feedback dynamics and argues for an agency turn in policy 
feedback research.  
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8. Theoretical, Methodological and Empirical Impli-
cations 
8.1 Theoretical Implications: A Typology of Policy Feedback Effects 
Anticipated by Policy Makers 
This section discusses the key output of the dissertation: a typology of policy 
feedback effects anticipated by policy makers. The two case studies in chapters 
6 and 7 conducted detailed empirical analyses of parties’ architectural policy-
design strategies in the reform of codetermination and sick benefits. The case 
studies showed in particular how policy makers linked specific elements of 
proposed policy designs to specific political dynamics that these elements 
would facilitate, i.e. policy makers anticipated certain policy-feedback effects 
to emerge after reform passage. The dissertation argued and showed that pol-
icy makers need not be political masterminds, follow an ingenious design 
strategy and have an exact analytical understanding of the mechanisms that 
link policy design and long-term policy-feedback effects. What they need is a 
“sense” of the implications of different policy designs, i.e. a working under-
standing of policy-feedback effects that informs their decisions and strategic 
choices during policy design (cf. section 3.2). For example, policy makers may 
sense that granting rights to a particular group of the population in one policy 
domain might create demands by that group in another policy field as well. Or 
policy makers may sense that granting benefits to a significant part of the pop-
ulation may be a decision that will be hard to reverse in the future. 
This section brings together different types of policy feedback effects that 
policy makers anticipate during policy design and that were discovered and 
described in detail in the two case studies. In doing so, the section weaves to-
gether the insights gained in empirical analyses into an analytical template, a 
typology of feedback effects anticipated by policy makers organized along a 
dimension of inward/outward-orientation of feedback effects. The typology 
describes the core characteristics of anticipated feedback effects, gives a useful 
and concise definition, carves out the mechanisms behind them and gives 
short empirical examples that illustrate how the feedback effects would look 
like in other contexts. The different types of anticipated feedback effects are 
organized along the dimension of inward/outward-orientation of feedback ef-
fects already mentioned above. An inward orientation describes feedback ef-
fects of a policy on its own further development, an outward orientation de-
scribes feedback effects of a policy on other policies/issues/policy fields. 
The typology prioritizes diversity over parsimony. That means that some of 
the described feedback effects share the same key characteristic or that key 
characteristics can be similar, but all feedback effects are based on different 
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mechanisms or combinations of mechanisms. The benefit of this diversity ori-
entation is that the typology provides many connecting points for related or 
further research on long-term strategic policy making because it presents a 
fine-grained “breakdown” of different feedback effects policy makers antici-
pate during policy design. At the same time, the typology is as a tool for future 
research open to revision, restructuring or simplification if applied in different 
contexts. 
Table 8.1 under gives an overview of the typology. Section 8.1.1 first intro-
duces the organizing dimension of the typology, the distinction between in-
ward- and outward-orientated feedback effects. Section 8.1.2 describes the 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8.1.1 Inward- and Outward-Oriented of Feedback Effects Anticipated by 
Policy Makers 
As mentioned above, the typology distinguishes between inward- and out-
ward-oriented anticipated feedback effects. The following sections explain the 
distinction between the two kinds of feedback effects, suggest which contexts 
are conducive to anticipations of inward- or outward-oriented feedback effects 
and relate the approach to common typologies of feedback effects in the liter-
ature, and argue for its usefulness in policy feedback research. 
Distinguishing Inward- and Outward-Oriented Feedback Effects 
On one side, the distinction captures anticipations of inward-oriented feed-
back effects like self-reinforcement or entrenchment that concern the future 
development of a policy itself. That is, these feedback effects describe how 
policy makers imagine the policy they are currently designing will evolve in 
the future.  
An important motivation for policy makers to follow architectural policy-
design strategies is their ambition to render policies ‘robust’ to attacks from 
political opponents (cf. section 3.2). It is therefore not surprising that they de-
vote considerable time and energy to anticipate the fate of a policy they are 
designing and whether it will entrench itself or even self-reinforce its own 
logic. Furthermore, it is logical that these strategic long-term considerations 
concern positive feedback effects like entrenchment and self-reinforcement, 
i.e. feedback effects that strengthen the designed policy.  
The empirical investigation of the Pay Continuation Act and the Codetermi-
nation Act provides evidence for policy makers’ primary concern with positive 
feedback effects (both inward- and outward-oriented; see below). Both case 
studies only uncovered positive feedback effects but no reactive or self-under-
mining feedback effects, which the literature has discussed more extensively 
in recent years (cf. e.g.: Jacobs and Weaver 2010, 2014; Mahoney 2000; 
Oberlander and Weaver 2015; Skogstad 2017; Weaver 2010). There are three 
reasons for expecting that the assumption that policy makers mainly consider 
positive feedback effects during policy design also holds beyond the two case 
studies of the dissertation: limited cognitive capacities, unforeseeable future 
developments and policy makers’ motivations, which will be explained below 
just after the discussion of outward-oriented feedback effects. 
On the other side of the inward/outward-distinction lie outward-oriented 
feedback effects like the infection effect, the spillover effect, the kick-off effect, 
the precedence effect and the experience effect. For these types, policy makers’ 
anticipations of the feedback effects concern how the policy that is being de-
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signed could affect other policies/issues/policy fields and not its own devel-
opment. As for inward-oriented feedback effects, the two case studies have 
only uncovered anticipations of positive outward-oriented feedback effects. 
That is, all anticipated outward-oriented feedback effects illustrate policy 
makers’ considerations of how a policy could either facilitate a reform process 
that leads in a particular direction in line with the original policy/policy goal 
or how the policy/policy goal could be transferred to other policies/issues/pol-
icy fields. For example, policy makers consider how a policy generates experi-
ence (regarding legislation and implementation) with a particular type of pol-
icy instruments that can then be applied more broadly in the future, or they 
consider how the successful implementation of that policy or policy instru-
ment can support a subsequent reform process by demonstrating its political 
feasibility. Similar to the above, limited cognitive capacities, unforeseeable fu-
ture developments, and policy makers’ motivations give reasons to believe that 
policy makers mainly consider positive outward-oriented feedback effects also 
in other cases.  
Inward- and Outward-Oriented Feedback Effects as Positive Feedback 
Effects 
There are three good reasons to believe that the assumption that policy makers 
mainly consider positive feedback effects during policy design also holds be-
yond the two studied cases.  
First, the anticipation of negative or self-undermining feedback effects 
challenges policy makers’ cognitive capacities because it demands a more re-
fined understanding of the political dynamics that might emerge from a re-
form than a simple working understanding. That is because positive feedback 
effects have a clear target in that they strengthen the very policy policy makers 
are in the process of designing or that they facilitate one specific reform path 
with a defined policy goal. In contrast, negative, self-undermining feedback 
dynamics increase complexity, create new uncertainties and demand new so-
lutions. For policy makers, it is less challenging to design a policy and antici-
pate its implications if the policy is supposed to be stable or reinforcing in the 
long term or create a specific reform path. It is more challenging to design a 
policy and anticipate its implications if the policy will undermine itself, dimin-
ish in the long term and demand new solutions to emerging problems.165 Take 
the example of pay continuation. If policy makers designed a policy with low 
                                               
165 Here, it is important not to confuse undermining policy feedback effects with self-under-
mining policy feedback effects. For example, Hertel-Fernandez (2018) demonstrates the 
strategic use of policies by advocacy groups and policy makers to undercut the political op-
ponents’ political base. Hence, undermining feedback effects which do have a clear target 
may well be part of policy makers’ strategic “toolkit” during policy design.  
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benefit levels, that policy might not create a stabilizing group of supportive 
recipients with vested interests but instead lead to public disappointment that 
could undermine support for the policy. What would the implications of that 
be? How would beneficiaries and the population react, what new solutions 
would they demand, what new coalitions would form? For policy makers, such 
open developments are harder to anticipate and less convenient to (try to) 
steer than positive feedback dynamics that reinforce an existing policy or re-
form path. 
Second, some negative or self-undermining feedback effects like menu ex-
pansion can be nearly impossible to anticipate in advance for policy makers 
because they are the result of unforeseeable future events. New solutions to 
political, societal, economic or environmental problems can arise, for exam-
ple, from the diffusion of expertise or experimentation in subordinate/cultur-
ally proximal units without this being foreseeable at an earlier point (cf. 
Jacobs and Weaver 2014). How these developments might affect a policy al-
ready in place, underlying coalitions of supporters and involved actors’ inter-
ests is therefore equally impossible to anticipate for policy makers and cannot 
be taken into account during policy design. 
Third, as noted above, an important motivation for policy makers to con-
duct architectural policy design is their ambition to render policies ‘robust’ to 
attacks from political opponents (cf. chapter 3.2). Policy makers therefore 
likely consider positive feedback effects generally more than negative feedback 
effects because positive feedback effects help render a policy robust, while 
negative feedback effects render it more vulnerable.  
In principle, positive outward-oriented feedback effects leave room for sim-
ultaneous negative inward-oriented feedback effects, i.e. a policy could facili-
tate a certain reform process or transfer its goal to a different policy while it is 
undermined itself. However, since policy makers consider positive feedback 
effects not for the sake of the policy itself but in order to achieve a certain pol-
icy goal, one can assume that when policy makers anticipate positive outward-
oriented feedback effects, they simultaneously expect that the original policy 
itself will stay in place. This is illustrated by the cover-up effect that combines 
inward- and outward-orientation in a positive way. The cover-up effect shows 
an outward-orientation in that policy makers expect that a policy will suppress 
other reform options. At the same time, it shows an inward-orientation and 
the anticipation is that a policy will stabilize or protect itself and the original 
policy goal (cf. section 8.1.2). 
Overall, the results of the dissertation suggest that the policy-feedback lit-
erature should pay attention to the varying impact of agency and long-term 
strategic policy design in relation to positive/self-reinforcing feedback dynam-
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ics and negative/self-undermining feedback dynamics instead of only investi-
gating the simultaneous existence and balance between the two types of feed-
back dynamics (e.g. Skogstad 2017; Weaver 2010).  
Conducive Contexts for Anticipations of Inward- and Outward-Oriented 
Feedback Effects 
Different contexts, or policy design situations, are more conducive to inward- 
than for outward-oriented feedback effects, and vice versa. The dissertation 
proposes that policy makers are more concerned with inward-oriented feed-
back effects when they consider a reform to be of paradigmatic significance, 
i.e. reforms that signify radical changes in the overarching terms of policy dis-
course, including changes in instrument settings, instruments and the hierar-
chy of policy goals behind a policy (Hall 1993; cf. Palier 2010a: 29). When pol-
icy makers consider a reform to be an incremental step in a longer, gradual 
reform process that works on the level of policy instruments and setting but 
with potentially transformative outcomes (cf. Streeck and Thelen 2005a), then 
they are more concerned with outward-oriented feedback effects (cf. Table 
8.2, under). 
Table 8.2: Conducive Contexts for Anticipations of Inward- and Outward-
Oriented Policy Feedback Effects 
Conducive Context /  
Policy Design Situation 
Dominant Type of  
Anticipated Feedback Effect 
Design of a paradigmatic reform Inward-oriented  
Design of an incremental reform Outward-oriented  
 
The two case studies presented in Part III illustrate this pattern. The Pay Con-
tinuation Act included elements of incremental policy making in regard to the 
reform of statutory health insurance and elements of paradigmatic policy 
making in regard to the introduction of pay continuation for workers. Policy 
makers’ design strategies were mainly outward-oriented. They included one 
inward-oriented anticipated feedback effect (entrenchment), four outward-
oriented feedback effects (spillover, kick-off, experience, precedence) and two 
simultaneously inward/outward-oriented feedback effects (2 x cover-up ef-
fect). Of the four anticipated feedback effects, most are outward-oriented. Dis-
tinguishing between the paradigmatic and the incremental elements of the re-
form, one can observe the following pattern. For the paradigmatic element of 
the reform (the introduction of pay continuation), policy makers considered 
one inward- and one outward-oriented feedback effect (entrenchment, spillo-
ver). For the incremental element of the reform (reform of statutory health 
insurance), policy makers considered three outward-oriented feedback effects 
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(kickoff, experience, precedence) and two inward/outward-oriented feedback 
effect (2 x cover-up). Overall, this means that the Pay Continuation Act shows 
an uneven pattern of anticipated inward- and outward-oriented feedback ef-
fects where anticipations of outward-oriented feedback effects were more 
closely linked to incremental policy making.  
The Codetermination Act can be categorized as a case of paradigmatic pol-
icy making where all policy makers were aware of the historical significance of 
the act and its likely formative impact. Policy makers’ design strategies were 
mainly inward-oriented. They included anticipations of three outward-ori-
ented feedback effects (infection, 2 x spillover) and four inward-oriented feed-
back effects (2 x entrenchment, 2 x self-reinforcement). Of the four antici-
pated feedback effects that were central to policy makers’ design strategies, all 
were inward-oriented feedback effects. Overall, this means that the Codeter-
mination Act is an example of paradigmatic policy making with anticipations 
of inward-oriented policy feedback effects.  
There are good reasons to believe that this pattern also holds in other cases. 
First, it seems natural that policy makers will be strongly concerned about the 
fate of a policy and try to protect it against potential future retrenchment when 
they are aware of the historical significance and potential formative impact of 
the policy on future politics. Furthermore, political conflict and the lack of a 
clear majority for one policy design (both characteristics that render a context 
more conducive to architectural policy design) can increase policy makers’ 
doubt about the longevity of the reform and incentivize them to consider and 
design positive, inward-oriented feedback effects. In such situations, policy 
makers’ considerations of potential policy feedback effects are therefore likely 
more inward-oriented concerning entrenchment and self-reinforcement than 
they are outward-oriented concerning spillover, experience, etc.  
Second, when policy makers consider a reform to be only a step in a longer 
incremental reform process, it seems natural that they are less preoccupied 
with the fate of this exact reform than with the overall reform process. Hence, 
their considerations of feedback effects likely show a stronger outward orien-
tation than, e.g., concerns about whether the policy facilitates or induces a re-
form process successfully or whether the policy goal is successfully transferred 
to another policy/issue/policy field.  
Investigations of other paradigmatic reforms confirm this pattern. For ex-
ample, the case of Obamacare confirms the conjunction between anticipations 
of inward-oriented feedback effects and paradigmatic policy making. Propo-
nents of the historic act were expecting an entrenchment effect, potentially 
even a self-reinforcement effect, once millions of Americans would come to 
enjoy the benefits provided by the act. Democrats even actively tried to design 
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the act so that such inward-oriented feedback effects would materialize 
(Oberlander and Weaver 2015).  
Researchers interested in policy feedback dynamics and the role of agency 
and long-term strategic policy making can use the proposed relationship be-
tween paradigmatic reform and anticipations of inward-oriented feedback ef-
fects and incremental reforms and anticipations of outward-oriented feedback 
effects to achieve a better understanding of the long-term strategic concerns 
and motivations policy makers have during policy design. Furthermore, the 
proposition points out what types of long-term strategies policy makers follow 
in “ordinary”, incremental policy making and makes it easier to identify and 
investigate agency in gradual policy change. The historical-institutionalist lit-
erature tends to see agency matter for policy development mainly at critical 
junctures (cf. e.g. Capoccia 2015, 2016a; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) or does 
not conceptualize the role of agency properly in periods outside these critical 
junctures (Mahoney and Thelen 2010a; see the discussion in chapter 3). How-
ever, the dissertation shows that policy makers spend a great deal of time and 
effort trying to shape future policy development during periods of incremental 
policy making and provides a guideline for the investigation of agency in grad-
ual change processes by outlining specific feedback dynamics policy makers 
consider.  
Conducive Contexts for Architectural Policy Design 
Besides the proposed differences in what types of policy feedback effects pol-
icy makers anticipate in different contexts, the dissertation proposes charac-
teristics of policy-making situations that make these more conducive to long-
term strategic policy making in general. In particular, the dissertation pro-
poses that contexts are conducive to long-term strategic policy making when 
they are characterized by resourceful policy makers, policies that policy mak-
ers consider impactful and a lack of political consensus and a clear majority. 
Regarding long-term strategic policy making, Anzia and Moe (2016: esp. 776) 
suggest that policy makers have more incentives to strategically “make poli-
tics” when the political consequences, i.e. policy feedback effects, are policy-
specific, as opposed to when they involve the larger balance of power between 
political parties. By proposing the three above characteristics, the dissertation 
goes beyond this broad argument about when one can expect to observe long-
term strategic policy making and specifies which characteristics of policy-
making situations render contexts conducive to long-term strategic policy 
making. 
The resourcefulness of policy makers is related to their capability for archi-
tectural policy design. It concerns whether policy makers possess the neces-
sary resources to conduct long-term strategic policy design. Resources can be 
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financial resources (can policy makers financially afford to devise policies 
and/or evaluate policy drafts?), personnel resources (are policy makers 
and/or their staff capable of/qualified to devise and/or evaluate policy 
drafts), networks and access to formal decision making (are policy makers 
included or heard in formal decision-making processes?), and the ability to 
create political pressure (can policy makers create political pressure on for-
mal decision makers?). If policy makers command such resources, the policy-
design situation is more conducive to long-term strategic policy making. 
The second characteristic that makes policy-making situations more con-
ducive to long-term strategic design concerns policy makers’ assumptions 
about how likely it is that a policy will affect the future development in the 
policy field. Such assumptions may concern the redistributive impact of the 
policy (whether or to what degree a policy redistributes resources like bene-
fits and social rights among citizens), the reconfigurative impact of the policy 
(whether or to what degree a policy reconfigures the political landscape and 
affects actors’ resources), and the timing of policy making (does policy mak-
ing take place in a “window of opportunity” that allows policy makers to im-
plement unusually far-reaching policy reforms?). If policy makers believe a 
policy has a strong impact on future policy development, the policy design sit-
uation is more conducive to long-term strategic policy making. 
The third characteristic concerns whether policy makers assume a policy is 
vulnerable to future withdrawal. The potential vulnerability of a policy is cru-
cial since it likely increases the attention policy makers pay to the long-term 
effects of a policy, as well as their strategic consideration of how those effects 
can render a policy more resistant to withdrawal. Vulnerability of a policy con-
cerns issues of control over a policy (do policy makers fear losing control over 
“their” policy, e.g. after losing the next election or because they might be ex-
cluded from formal decision making?) and contestation (how contested is a 
policy issue, are there political alternatives, and is the issue salient to vot-
ers?). 
Below, section 8.2.2 discusses in more detail how the three characteristics 
were identified in continuation of the selection of instrumental cases of archi-
tectural policy design. The Appendix, p. 274, provides a more detailed descrip-
tion of the three characteristics and of indicators that help to evaluate whether 
policy-making situations show them. 
The Distinction between Inward- and Outward-Oriented Feedback Effects 
as Relevant Criterion for the Investigation of Long-Term Strategic Policy 
Making 
Returning to the distinction between inward- and outward-oriented feedback 
effects, the typology of anticipated feedback effects presented here contributes 
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to the policy-feedback research in an important way. As discussed in chapter 
1, the policy-feedback literature is guided by the distinction between interpre-
tive and resource/incentive effects made 25 years ago by Pierson (1993). Re-
source/incentive effects focus on policies as packages of resources that affect 
interest groups, state capacities and mass publics; interpretive effects focus on 
policies as new sources of information that affect patterns of cognition, under-
standing and meaning. This distinction has been applied widely and has in-
spired a great deal of research on policy-feedback dynamics (cf. section 2.1). 
Some authors have adapted it and added “institutional supports” as a third 
feedback mechanism (Patashnik and Zelizer 2013) or contributed with the 
conceptualization of self-undermining feedback effects as opposed to self-re-
inforcing feedback effects (cf. section 2.1).  
However, the literature lacks a conceptualization and categorization of pol-
icy feedback effects grounded in policy makers’ anticipations to policy-feed-
back effects that may emerge from a reform (cf. chapter 1). The typology pre-
sented above is grounded in policy makers’ assumptions about feedback dy-
namics and therefore has great potential to advance the ongoing debate on 
agency in historical institutionalism (e.g. Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; 
Capoccia 2015, 2016b, 2016a; Hay 1995; Hay and Wincott 1998; Hall and 
Taylor 1998; Hay 2009; Mahoney and Thelen 2010b), contribute to the 
emerging research agenda on the role of agency in policy feedback processes 
(Anzia and Moe 2016; Hertel-Fernandez 2018) and improve our understand-
ing of long-term strategic policy making.  
In short, it helps us understand policy makers’ strategic choices in policy-
design processes by pointing towards different anticipations of long-term 
feedback effects policy makers have. In particular, the architectural policy de-
sign perspective sheds light on policy makers’ strategic calculations regarding 
policy-feedback effects and the weighting of long-term, indirect effects of re-
forms and – sometimes contrary, sometimes conforming – short-term, sub-
stantive effects of reforms. Chapter 9 delves deeper into the discussion of 
agency in policy-feedback processes and historical institutionalism and carves 
out how the dissertation contributes to this discussion. First, section 8.1.2 pre-
sents the eight different types of feedback effects in detail, section 8.2 presents 
relevant methodological implications of the study, and section 8.3 discusses 
empirical implications of the architectural policy-design approach. 
8.1.2 The Different Types of Policy-Feedback Effects Anticipated by Policy 
Makers 
Eight types of anticipated feedback effects have been identified in the two case 
studies and mentioned in the above discussion: a self-reinforcement effect 
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and an entrenchment effect as inward-oriented feedback effects; an experi-
ence effect, a kick off-effect, a precedence effect, a spillover effect, and an in-
fection effect as outward-oriented effects; and a cover-up effect as simultane-
ously inward- and outward-oriented feedback effect. This section describes 
the eight types in the above order, gives an intuitive definition of each effect 
and carves out their key analytical characteristics and basic mechanisms. This 
section thus enables researchers to identify anticipations of different policy-
feedback effects in other cases and investigate long-term strategic policy mak-
ing. 
(1) The self-reinforcement effect describes policy makers’ anticipation that 
a policy will strengthen its own logic over time. In the codetermination reform, 
policy makers expected such a feedback effect to emerge from the specific for-
mulation of the electoral procedure and the internal order and composition of 
supervisory boards, which could incentivize employees to join either unified 
trade unions or smaller, professional interest organizations. The more em-
ployees would do one or the other, the more the effect would grow in strength 
and reinforce the policies logic. Hence, the key characteristic of the self-rein-
forcement effects is increasing returns, extensively discussed elsewhere and 
an often-used concept in the policy-feedback literature (Pierson 2000a; cf. 
also: Boas 2007; Drezner 2005; Gingrich 2015). Four features are typically 
discussed in relation to increasing returns: large set-up or fixed costs, learning 
effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations. Based on the investi-
gation of the Codetermination Act, policy makers seem to pay particular at-
tention to adaptive expectations and coordination effects, which are the mech-
anisms behind particular patterns of employee mobilization policy makers 
linked to different designs of the Codetermination Act. Another example of an 
anticipated self-reinforcement effect is subsidy policies, e.g. for solar energy. 
Subsidies for a new industry can facilitate its growth, establish a network of 
actors that coordinate with each other, shape investment decisions and busi-
ness plans, etc. (cf. Schmidt et al. 2018).  
(2) The entrenchment effect describes policy makers’ anticipation that a 
policy will be hard to retrench in the future. In the case of the Pay Continuation 
Act, policy makers anticipated an entrenchment effect in connection with the 
introduction of pay continuation for workers, which would establish irreversi-
ble social benefits for workers that could not be taken away from them later. 
Hence, the key characteristic of the entrenchment effect is the protection of an 
achieved policy/policy goal. The mechanisms to achieve this are vested inter-
ests or a sense of entitlement among a policy’s target population. Other exam-
ples concern, e.g., contributory retirement schemes, in which contributors de-
velop a sense of entitlement and strong reasons to protect the policy from any 
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reform since this might endanger their retirement level (cf. Moe 2015; Pierson 
1996).  
Both the self-reinforcement effect and the entrenchment effect are inward-
oriented feedback effects that concern the future development of a policy it-
self. The following five types of anticipated feedback effects (infection effect, 
spillover effect, kick-off effect, precedence effect, experience effect) are out-
ward-oriented feedback effects and concern how the policy that is being de-
signed could affect other policies/issues/policy fields and not its own develop-
ment. 
(3) The experience effect describes policy makers’ anticipation that a policy 
will facilitate further reforms in a particular direction. The Pay Continuation 
case illustrated this type of anticipated policy feedback effect in connection to 
the introduction of cost sharing measures. Here, the Christian Democrats 
strategically sacrificed more far-reaching cost-sharing measures and instead 
focused on pushing through some modest cost-sharing initiatives, hoping that 
practical experience with the introduction and implementation of cost sharing 
would ease further reforms in the same direction. Hence, the key characteris-
tic of this type of feedback effect is the facilitation of a particular reform pro-
cess through a first reform that generates experience regarding policy design 
and implementation (as mechanism). A different example is the stepwise pri-
vatization of certain public services, for example the widespread privatization 
of national telecommunication companies, which provides experience for the 
privatization of other sectors (e.g. railway companies). The above example of 
prestigious pilot projects can also be a source of design and implementation 
experience if a government intends to use the gathered experience strategi-
cally to proceed on a long-term reform path. The fact that pilot projects can 
serve as an example of both the cover up and the experience effect also illus-
trates that policy reforms or policy-design elements can be the sources of dif-
ferent feedback effects. Which of those materialize might depend on the 
broader packaging of the policy design and a variety of internal and external 
circumstances. Which effect is anticipated or intended by policy makers to 
materialize can be investigated by applying the perspective of architectural 
policy design. 
(4) The kick-off effect describes policy makers’ anticipation that a policy will 
start or facilitate further reforms in a particular direction. In the reform of pay 
continuation, the Christian Democrats were hoping that this type of feedback 
effect would kick in after the introduction of a “first step of healthcare reform” 
that was meant to facilitate a constant reform process in the healthcare system 
towards a reimbursement system with cost sharing. The key characteristic of 
the kick-off effect is the inducement of a reform process. The mechanism is a 
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combination of generation of experience regarding policy design and imple-
mentation (similar to the experience effect) and demonstration of the political 
feasibility of a reform (similar to the precedence effect, discussed below). An 
example is the introduction of a private pension pillar alongside the public 
pension system with the goal to replace the public system in the long run. The 
kick-off and the experience effect share many characteristics. The remaining 
difference is that the kick-off effect lies earlier in a gradual reform process than 
the experience effect and that it is based on demonstrating political feasibility, 
since it is the first reform of a certain type (e.g. private old-age provisions). 
The kick-off effect includes an experience effect but shows additional features 
similar to the precedence effect.  
(5) The precedence effect describes policy makers’ anticipation that a policy 
will set an example and be copied in another policy field. Chapter 7 featured 
the example of the introduction of pay continuation without an accompanying 
cost-sharing reform, which demonstrates the feasibility of reforms with an 
egalitarian aim. The key characteristic of this type of feedback effect is the 
transfer of a policy or policy goal from one policy to another, and it is based 
on creating awareness of the political feasibility of certain policy goals or pol-
icy “blueprints” among government elites. Another example of a precedence 
effect has already been given above and concerns the privatization of public 
services. Here, the privatization of, for example, a national telecommunication 
provider can provide a blueprint for the privatization of the energy sector.  
(6) The spillover effect describes policy makers’ anticipation that a policy 
reform (or an element thereof) will be “copied” in another policy field. This 
policy-feedback effect is similar to the precedence effect, but it is based on a 
different type of mechanism. The example of the codetermination reform il-
lustrates this difference. Here, policy makers anticipated that the introduction 
of group rights for middle management in the codetermination reform would 
create expectations for more group rights for middle management in other 
policy fields (e.g. firm-level codetermination). Hence, the key characteristic of 
this feedback effect is also the transfer of a policy or policy goal, but the effect 
is based on the stimulation of expectations among the public more than it is 
based on creating awareness of political feasibility among government offi-
cials, even though both can be present simultaneously. Another example of a 
spillover effect is subsidies or social benefits for a certain constituency (e.g. 
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childcare institutions) that not only create an entrenchment effect in that con-
stituency but may also create and foster demands among other constituencies 
(e.g. demands for financial compensation for stay-at-home parents).166  
(7) The infection effect describes policy makers’ anticipation that a policy 
will import a discursive frame from another policy. For example, in the reform 
of codetermination, Christian Democrats feared that the mere mentioning of 
a “labor director” would “load” the Codetermination Act with meaning and 
expectations linked to this particular term that were created through previous 
codetermination legislation, without actually copying this previous legisla-
tion. The key characteristic of the infection effect is therefore the transfer of a 
frame from one policy to another. The new policy is then framed drawing on 
the previous policy’s frame. Strictly speaking, the infection effect is an “odd 
man out” since it does not concern anticipation of a policy-feedback effect that 
might emerge from the policy being designed but how this policy itself might 
draw on previous policy and be the endpoint of a policy-feedback effect. Nev-
ertheless, it is included in the discussion since it reflects a type of anticipation 
of policy feedback held by policy makers. Other examples of a spillover effect 
is the conscious use of social constructions in policy designs, which import a 
pre-existing set of meaning and expectations into new policies (cf. Schneider 
and Ingram 1993, 1997, 2005). 
(8) The last type of anticipated feedback effect, the cover-up effect, is sim-
ultaneously inward- and outward-orientated. It describes policy makers’ an-
ticipation that a policy will conceal the need for another/a different reform. In 
the pay continuation case, policy makers anticipated that the introduction of 
pay continuation for workers without a simultaneous introduction of cost-
sharing measures would conceal structural problems in the statutory health 
insurance by relieving health funds from a substantial amount of their ex-
penses without addressing the health funds’ inherent problems (e.g. bureau-
cratic structures; ageing insured population). Hence, the key characteristic of 
this anticipated policy-feedback effect is the diversion of attention from the 
need for another/a different reform towards the benefits of the adopted re-
form or by eliminating the grounds for the other/different reform entirely. The 
mechanism behind this feedback effect is the suppression of awareness among 
the public regarding the need for further reforms or the elimination of argu-
ments that political opponents could use to argue for further/different re-
forms. Other examples of a cover-up effect is the popular thesis of diversionary 
foreign policy, where international interventions cover up domestic political 
                                               
166 For a different use of the term spillover effect, see Cruz et al. (2018) and Moynihan and 
Soss (2014: 324), who use it to describe how effects of citizens’ bureaucratic experiences spill 
over to affect citizens’ broader political lives. 
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problems (cf. Mueller 1970) or, from the field of public policy, the introduction 
of prestigious new pilot projects or policy ideas that disguise that some struc-
tural problems are not approached. For instance, with the German “excellence 
initiative”, the state introduced a public competition among universities for 
extra funding for excellent research without addressing the structural under-
funding of German universities (Kehm 2013; Kehm and Pasternack 2009). 
The cover-up effect is outward-oriented in that policy makers expect that a 
policy will suppress other reform options, and it is inward-oriented in that the 
policy will stabilize or protect itself and the original policy goal. 
8.2 Methodological Implications: Empirical Footprints, Conducive 
Contexts and Dynamic Design Processes 
The following sections link back to chapter 1, which described the methodo-
logical framework of the dissertation, and present three relevant methodolog-
ical reflections regarding the investigation of architectural policy design strat-
egies. Section 8.2.1 starts with a discussion of how architectural policy design 
strategies and anticipations of different policy feedback effects can be identi-
fied in empirical material on policy-making processes. Section 8.2.2 discusses 
how conducive contexts for long-term strategic policy making (discussed 
above) can be identified. Section 8.2.3 discusses how researchers can tackle 
the Janus-faced character of policy design strategies as both subject and object 
of policy design processes. 
8.2.1 Empirical Footprints of Architectural Policy Design in Data Material 
Anticipations of policy-feedback effects can be hard to identify in empirical 
material. As section 3.2 discussed, policy makers need not be political master-
minds who devise grand theories for policy design, and they need not have a 
deep analytical understanding of the actual mechanisms through which poli-
cies shape politics. However, it can be hard to identify policy makers’ working 
understanding of the implications of difference policy designs, since it is not 
clearly expressed in empirical material of policy-design processes, irrespective 
of which type of source, material or evidence (cf. sections 4.3 and 4.4) the re-
searcher works with.  
The dissertation is able to contribute to research on long-term strategic pol-
icy making with specific advice on how to identify policy makers’ anticipations 
of feedback effects in empirical material. Through the abductive approach to 
research that understands the practical methods of analysis as evolving 
throughout the research process and, thus, allows for emergent methodologi-
cal insights (cf. section 4.1), competences and techniques for identifying policy 
makers’ anticipations of feedback effects could be improved through critical 
reflection throughout the analytical process and the various readings of the 
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empirical material (cf. section 4.4). Consequently, this section can give spe-
cific, advanced advice on analytical strategies for identifying policy makers’ 
considerations regarding political implications of policy reforms.  
The proposed strategy is the search for verbs and nouns describing pro-
cesses. When policy makers express anticipations or assumptions concerning 
policy-feedback effects, they often use verbs, nouns or verbal nouns that de-
scribe processes. Especially when policy makers use nouns or verbal nouns, 
the inexperienced researcher might overlook at first sight that policy makers 
actually refer to particular political dynamics they expect to unfold without 
explicating these dynamics in length or detail. An example from the codeter-
mination case illustrates this point. In an expert hearing in parliament, a high-
ranking union representative commented on the role of the middle manage-
ment and stated verbatim:  
Because of this, we think that middle managers as defined by the Federal Labor 
Court do not belong on supervisory boards as employees. For the big segment of 
lower-level salaried employees […], we think that they can represent their inter-
ests much better if they are integrated in the workforce and that we should not 
allow a split because that would also cause complications between groups within 
the workforce […]167 
The crucial word in this statement from the perspective of architectural policy 
design is split. It indicates that the union representative expects that the par-
ticular policy design he is referring to will actively contribute to splitting the 
workforce into potentially conflicting subgroups. Drawing on the broader 
knowledge of the case, the researcher can then deduct how the policy design 
(from the perspective of the union representative) might alter incentive struc-
tures and interests that would cause such a split and conflict between interest 
groups. In the example, the policy maker likely anticipates that, once middle 
managers have their own representative on supervisory boards, this incentiv-
izes middle managers to organize outside unified trade unions and express 
their own distinct interest in firm management more clearly, irrespective of 
what the interests of the broader workforce are. 
Hence, when analyzing archival material, interview transcripts or partici-
pant-observational notes, researchers should pay particular attention to verbs 
and nouns that describe processes. An advisable additional strategy is to keep 
a logbook of the verbs and nouns identified in the material and of the pro-
cesses they describe. The logbook can help keep track of the different dynam-
ics policy makers anticipate and support the systematic, focused reading of the 
material in later stages of the analytical process (cf. section 4.4.1). 
                                               
167 Parliament Archive, PA-DBT 4000 VII 400 lfd.33: Bundestag committee on labor and 
social policy, public expert hearing, 07.11.1974, p. 7. 
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8.2.2 Conducive Contexts for Architectural Policy Design 
The second methodological reflection goes one step further and develops a 
proposition regarding how contexts that are conducive to long-term strategic 
policy making can be identified. This section links back to the case-selection 
procedure presented in chapter 1, which addressed an important shortcoming 
in the case-study literature, developed and explicated a detailed procedure for 
case selection in theory-building research, for which the literature hitherto 
gave no advice. The benefits of the developed selection procedure for positive, 
instrumental case studies extend beyond the identification of cases for empir-
ical investigation of architectural policy design and methodological transpar-
ency. The method also provides a springboard for the identification of condu-
cive contexts (via scope conditions) for architectural policy design. This sec-
tion explains how the developed case selection method helps identify condu-
cive contexts in the concrete example of architectural policy design and for-
mulates these insights as general methodological advice (cf. Table 8.3 and Fig-
ure 8.1, under). 
As discussed in section 8.1.1, the dissertation goes beyond existing claims 
that policy makers have more incentives to strategically “make politics” when 
the political consequences are policy-specific, as opposed to when they involve 
the larger balance of power between political parties (Anzia and Moe 2016: 
esp. 776). It argues that conducive contexts for long-term strategic policy mak-
ing are characterized by three factors: resourceful policy makers, policies that 
policy makers consider impactful, and a lack of political consensus and a 
clear majority.  
Section 4.2.3 identified these contextual characteristics in the search for in-
strumental cases for the development of the concept of architectural policy 
design and its empirical investigation. As Ragin highlights, causally relevant 
features of a case can be interpreted as conditions for the operation of a cause 
or as a cause (Ragin 2000: 56). Similarly, attributes of a phenomenon of in-
terest (i.e. a core concept) can serve as defining characteristics of that phe-
nomenon (attributes of the concept) or they can serve as scope conditions that 
help describe conducive contexts for the occurrence of said phenomenon of 
interest.  
In the case of architectural policy design, this means, for example, that the 
item “resourceful policy makers” can be a defining attribute of the concept of 
architectural policy design, or it can be a scope condition circumscribing con-
ducive contexts for architectural policy design. In the former, architectural 
policy design is defined as an activity that only resourceful policy makers can 
carry out; in the latter, one assumes that architectural policy design is more 
likely to be carried out if policy makers are resourceful than if they are not. 
Furthermore, this opens up the possibility of different types of architectural 
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policy design/different specifications of the concept; one carried out by re-
sourceful policy makers, another by policy makers who are not resourceful. 
In general methodological terms, this means that the selection strategy for 
positive, instrumental case studies developed in section 4.2 can be extended 
to include three further steps regarding the identification of conducive con-
texts. In addition to the five steps developed earlier, one can use, likely after 
having conducted a first investigation of the phenomenon of interest (Step 6), 
the categorized/systemized indicator list (Step 7) to identify conducive con-
texts. Then, one can conduct a comparative case study that investigates the 
phenomenon of interest in different contexts in order to evaluate the condu-
civeness of certain scope conditions or develop sub-varieties of the core con-
cept. Table 8.3, below, shows all eight steps in the selection of positive instru-
mental cases and the identification of conducive contexts. Figure 8.1, further 
under, illustrates the intertwinement of concept formulation and the identifi-
cation of conducive contexts and shows how concept attributes can become 
scope conditions, and vice versa. 
Regarding the example of architectural policy design, the investigations of 
the Pay Continuation Act and the Codetermination Act (Step 6 in Table 8.3) 
confirm that positive or promising evaluations based on the indicators devel-
oped during the case selection procedure help identify conducive contexts and 
lead to insightful investigations of architectural policy design.  
Table 8.3: The Selection of Positive, Instrumental Cases and the Identification 
of Conducive Contexts 
Step 1 Clarify main concept and underlying assumptions 
Step 2 Develop indicator list through cursory literature reviews 
Step 3 Systematize/categorize indicators 
Step 4 Develop evaluation scheme 
Step 5 
Systematically evaluate cases through cursory literature reviews and select 
best evaluated cases for in-depth study 
Step 6 Conduct investigation(s) of best evaluated case(s) 
Step 7 
Identify scope conditions for conducive contexts via categorized/systemized 
indicator list (Step 3) 
Step 8 
Conduct comparative case study to evaluate conduciveness of identified scope 
conditions and/or develop sub-varieties of the core concept 
Notes: Extension of Table 4.1. 
 
Following the proposed procedure, future research on long-term strategic pol-
icy making could select cases for comparative studies taking the list of de-
scribed indicators, dimensions and sub-dimensions in section 4.2.3 as a start-
ing point (Step 7 and 8). In doing so, researchers could determine if indicators 
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are conducive to architectural policy design or if they are necessary or suffi-
cient conditions. While comparative studies of long-term strategic policy mak-
ing in different countries, policy fields, or times pose significant challenges 
and demand careful research designs, the potential insights gained through 
such research make the effort worthwhile.  
One relevant question comparative studies could investigate is which char-
acteristics of policies render context more conducive to architectural policy 
design. More concretely, does the (anticipated) redistributive impact of a re-
form create more incentives for policy makers to strategically “make politics” 
than the (anticipated) reconfigurative impact, because the latter is harder to 
identify and anticipate for policy makers? Or is it the other way around and 
policy makers have more incentives to use policy to make politics when they 
only have a slight suspicion that a policy might reconfigure the political land-
scape? This could be because such reconfigurative effects, e.g. on decision-
making structures, are more meaningful to policy makers than feedback ef-
fects that are channeled through the mass public, e.g. entrenchment effects of 
social benefits. The results of such research could tell us whether policy mak-
ers are more inclined to use “rules about rules” (Sheingate 2010) as long-term 
policy-design strategy and as means to achieve long-term political goals or 
whether they rather instrumentalize the mass public and its reaction to poli-
cies for that purpose.  
Figure 8.1: The Intertwinement of Concept Formulation and the Identification 







8.2.3 Policy-Design Strategies as Subject and Object of Policy-Design 
Processes 
The third and final methodological reflection broadens the perspective on ar-
chitectural policy design strategies. So far, architectural policy-design strate-
gies have been discussed as a potential causal influence on policy designs. 
However, policy-design strategies are themselves shaped in and throughout 
the process of policy design because policy makers constantly update their 
preferences, interests and goals in reaction to changes in the strategic envi-
ronment. In short, one can look at policy-design strategies as both subject of 
design processes (steering the process) and object of design processes (being 
shaped by the processes).  
This Janus-faced nature of policy-design strategies demands methodologi-
cal and analytical awareness when one investigates long-term strategic policy 
making and when one tries to make statements about causal relationships in 
design processes. Below, two responses to this challenge are outlined. The first 
looks at policy-design strategies as subjects of design processes, the second 
looks at them as objects. Depending on the goal of research, both approaches 
can be combined to form a more complete picture of a case. 
First, one can treat design strategies as subject and carve out the “essence” 
of a policy design strategy. Here, essence means those central elements of a 
policy design strategy that remain constant throughout the design process 
even though the design strategy is adapted to changing situational contexts. 
Central, constant elements can be crucial policy goals or ideals, specific policy 
instruments, or the direction of policy development aimed for with the design. 
In many cases, a suitable way to identify and carve out the essence of a policy 
design strategy is to contrast multiple design strategies, set them in relation 
or opposition to each other and thereby identify the distinguishing elements 
of the individual strategies.  
This approach was also applied in the two case studies in Part III, where 
policy design strategies of the Christian and Social Democrats were distin-
guished along different long-term goals (and the policy design and feedback 
effects supposed to achieve these goals). The advantage of this approach is that 
one is able to treat policy design strategies as subjects in the design process 
and as causal influences on the resultant policy design that eventually emerges 
from the design process. It also allows one to highlight the role of agency in 
policy-design and policy-feedback processes and underline the causal influ-
ence of strategic policy design on policy feedback and policy development.  
Second, one can treat policy-design strategies as objects that change 
throughout the design process. The case studies presented in Part II have done 
so to a limited degree by illustrating what programmatic positions parties had 
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on the issues of codetermination and pay continuation and which compro-
mises they had to agree to in order to find a policy design that could gain a 
majority in parliament. If one was more interested in understanding how de-
sign strategies developed throughout the design process and what caused 
them to change, one could zoom in on which reasons policy makers give for 
adapting their strategies. If such an investigation was to be based on archival 
material, the researcher would reasonably first have to develop a solid under-
standing of the essence of a design strategy. Then, the researcher could estab-
lish a timeline of changes in design proposals and more purposefully try to 
identify empirical material that can shed light on the reasons behind changes 
in policy makers’ strategies. Such material could be, for example, protocols of 
internal party meetings, materials from the party leadership, or protocols of 
meetings with interest groups that might exert pressure on policy makers.  
Research following this approach could help answer a number of relevant 
questions for our understanding of public policy making and democratic ac-
countability: For example, how much influence do organized interests have on 
policy makers design strategies? Do policy makers shape their design strate-
gies more along the interests of powerful organized groups, or do they con-
sider the opinion of the mass public, their voters or party base? In an era in 
which political campaigns receive more and more funds from private donors 
and business organizations and associations, research pursuing this line of in-
quiry could provide valuable insights into the effects of such contributions and 
patterns of accountability in the political process that run counter to demo-
cratic ideals. 
8.3 Empirical Implications: The Importance of Architectural Policy 
Design Strategies in Public Policy Making 
The case studies of the Pay Continuation Act and the Codetermination Act 
show how the architectural policy design approach can be applied in empirical 
investigations and demonstrate that it can contribute to a refined understand-
ing of policy design processes and long-term strategic policy making. Primar-
ily using the case of the Pay Continuation Act as example, this section high-
lights general empirical implications of the dissertation; in particular that re-
searchers ought to pay more attention to policy makers’ long-term strategies 
in policy making. 
Researchers should do so because policy makers spend a great deal of time 
and energy considering potential feedback effects – also, importantly – in con-
texts of incremental policy making. However, the literature tends to neglect 
agency as an influential factor for policy development and therefore cannot 
explain how strategic policy makers attempt to shape policy development. 
Furthermore, researchers should pay more attention to policy makers’ long-
 231 
term strategies because policy makers’ anticipations of potential feedback ef-
fects seem to be quite accurate in terms of which political dynamics will 
emerge after reform passage.168  
If researchers neglect policy makers’ long-term design strategies, they risk 
drawing false conclusions about policy makers’ strategic decisions during pol-
icy design. For example, they might misinterpret policy makers’ decisions in 
political negotiations and see it as a defeat when policy makers “give in” in a 
weak bargaining position and overlook how policy makers might hold on to 
their original policy goal and try to influence policy design strategically in or-
der to achieve this goal in the long run. Hence, what can seem like a political 
defeat could be a political victory in the long term.  
Today, the introduction of pay continuation for workers in 1969 is often 
considered a milestone in German social legislation. Pay continuation is an 
important characteristic of the German welfare state and symbolizes its rela-
tive generosity compared to sickness benefits in other countries (OECD 2010: 
ch. 3.2). For the labor movement, the Pay Continuation Act is of high symbolic 
value since it represents an important victory in the fight for equal treatment 
of workers and salaried employees (cf. e.g. Meine 2005: 78). Below, two policy 
developments that policy makers already anticipated and debated in the de-
sign process of the Pay Continuation Act will be discussed briefly: the en-
trenchment of pay continuation policy and the stepwise privatization of health 
care costs.  
The Entrenchment of Pay Continuation 
Since 1969, barely any attempt to reform the core of the Pay Continuation Act 
(the introduction of pay continuation for workers) has been made, which 
speaks for the existence of a strong entrenchment effect that keeps the policy 
in place. Such an entrenchment effect was already anticipated by policy mak-
ers in 1969 and part of the Social Democrats’ design considerations. Not even 
employer federations, who strongly opposed the introduction of pay continu-
ation for workers in the 1950s and 1960s, insisted on the retraction of the act 
in the years after its adoption.169  
In fact, it took almost 25 years for pay continuation to come under serious 
political pressure. In 1993, the sitting Christian Democratic-Liberal govern-
ment proposed a reform of pay continuation as part of a larger legislative pack-
age. Justified by court rulings that declared elements of the existing legislation 
                                               
168 This section points towards relevant policy developments in health politics since the 
adoption of the Pay Continuation Act in 1969. However, it is beyond the scope of this disser-
tation to conduct a detailed empirical analysis of policy development and feedback effects in 
health politics since 1969. 
169 ACDP, 08-005-060/3, Memo to MP Schäuble (CDU), 08.12.1977. 
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unconstitutional, the government attempted to cut back pay continuation and 
(re-)introduce a waiting period of two days in order to reduce abuse of the 
scheme and increase the competitiveness of German companies on interna-
tional markets. However, the government’s proposal provoked strong re-
sistance and was eventually withdrawn and replaced by a weakened proposal, 
which only reduced pay continuation minimally in case of sickness on public 
holidays (Ruhnke 2005: 18-20). 
Only two years later, the government launched another attack on pay con-
tinuation and proposed a reduction of pay continuation to 80 % of the previ-
ous wage and the introduction of a four-week waiting period for newly em-
ployed. Again, the proposal created strong opposition among unions, Social 
Democrats and the Christian Democrats’ employee wing while employer fed-
erations, Liberals and the Christian Democrats’ employer wing supported a 
reform. Despite strong opposition and public protests, the government suc-
ceeded this time, and parliament passed the proposed substantial cutbacks in 
pay continuation (Ruhnke 2005: 20; Zohlnhöfer 2001: ch. 6.2). However, the 
reform lasted only briefly and was retracted by the newly elected Social Dem-
ocratic-Green government in 1998. The Social Democrats had used the issue 
of pay continuation already during their election campaign and promised to 
cancel cutbacks in social benefits introduced by the Christian Democratic-Lib-
eral government (Egle and Henkes 2003: 74). 
This short abridgement of the development of pay continuation politics sug-
gests that a strong entrenchment effect, which was part of the Social Demo-
crats’ design strategy, materialized after the implementation of the Pay Con-
tinuation Act. Workers had grown accustomed to a generous pay continuation 
system with broad coverage and low entry thresholds and reacted to potential 
retrenchment with protest and opposition. The labor movement and Social 
Democrats stood side by side to defend its previous victory and vested inter-
ests and consistently opposed retrenchment plans throughout the 1990s. Con-
sequently, the new Social Democratic-led government cancelled the previous 
government’s cutbacks only a few weeks after coming into office.  
The argument is not that the entrenchment effect was the only factor shap-
ing policy development. For example, party competition and electoral dynam-
ics can render cutbacks more or less likely. Similarly, entrenchment effects can 
potentially be “overridden” by other factors like problem pressure due to weak 
economic performance and high unemployment (as the brief retrenchment 
between 1996 and 1998 indicates), especially when the government itself is 
ideologically not inclined to protect the policy. However, the strong opposition 
to retrenchment plans in the 1990s and the immediate retraction of the 1996 
reform indicate the importance of a strong entrenchment effect in pay contin-
uation politics. Hence, the case of the Pay Continuation Act gives reasons to 
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believe that policy makers are capable of correctly anticipating possible in-
ward-oriented feedback effects like an entrenchment effect in cases of para-
digmatic policy making.170 
Furthermore, the example demonstrates that researchers might misinter-
pret policy feedback effects as coincidental side effects of public policy making 
that happen to emerge from critical junctures during which policy makers’ 
choices weigh heavily, even though policy makers might strategically shape 
these feedback effects. Hence, they do not see the crucial influence of strategic 
policy makers on feedback effects and are not able to explain these policy mak-
ers’ decisions and policy development if they do not go back in time to inves-
tigate the policy design strategies policy makers followed during policy design. 
The Gradual Privatization of the Health Care Costs 
The second relevant policy development concerns the slow but steady increase 
in co-payments in the German healthcare system (cf. e.g. Carrera et al. 2008; 
Gerlinger 2010; Gerlinger and Schmucker 2009; Rosenbrock and Gerlinger 
2009). Observers often date a paradigmatic shift in German healthcare policy 
back to the mid-1990s. Gerlinger (2010: 118-120) assesses that risk and cost 
privatization in health care started in the mid-1970s and accelerated in the 
mid-1990s mainly due to external pressures and internal problem accumula-
tion.  
However, the literature typically does not view reforms from before the 
1990s or mid-1970s, like the Pay Continuation Act, as important elements of 
this policy development. Moreover, the literature does not inquire whether the 
seeds of such long-term developments might already have been sown long be-
fore such incremental developments gained attention and whether policy 
makers had the intention to strategically create these developments. Instead, 
external development like rising unemployment and financial pressure are of-
ten identified as driving factors of early, smooth privatization measures (e.g. 
Hinrichs 2010; Palier 2010b). 
                                               
170 To find out how much an entrenchment effect of the Pay Continuation Act of 1969 actually 
influenced policy makers’ choices, researchers could conduct a detailed empirical investiga-
tion of legislative records of the reform attempt of 1993, the reform of 1996 and its retraction 
in 1998. Such an investigation could ask: Did policy makers refer to previous legislation in 
committee debates or internal party documents? Did they mention public resistance to cut-
backs or feelings of entitlement as a reason to consider different reform options? Did, maybe, 
Social Democrats internally accept the Christian Democrats’ premise that employers were 
burdened by excessive expenses and that cutbacks in pay continuation could solve this prob-
lem, but at the same time acknowledge that they could not support such measures because 
employees were too accustomed to and felt too entitled to the existing regulations? Empirical 
evidence of a positive answer to these questions would be strong evidence of the impact of 
an entrenchment effect produced by the Pay Continuation Act. 
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The results of the investigation of the design process behind the Pay Con-
tinuation Act give reason to question this common picture in the literature. As 
the case study shows, in particular the Christian Democrats strategically de-
bated which forms of co-payments to fight for in the reform debate in order to 
achieve a transformation of the statutory health insurance in the long term. 
Even though the party knew that it was in a politically weak position in the pay 
continuation debate, it carefully considered which type of co-payment instru-
ment could secure a long-term policy development in their interest and there-
fore pushed for a contribution refund scheme (cf. section 7.4.1). Surely, the 
Christian Democrats’ design strategy did not get the party to its long-term 
goal, a reimbursement system with direct co-payments. This could be because 
the effects linked to the chosen co-payment instruments were too weak to fa-
cilitate more paradigmatic reforms because they did not change incentive 
structures or produce new coordination effects. However, the German health-
care system has experienced a number of privatization reforms since the 
1970s, and the financial burden shifted towards the insured, which speaks for 
some success of the Christian Democrats’ design strategy.171 
Generally, the case study of the Pay Continuation Act gives reasons to be-
lieve that the developments in German health politics were not only due to 
external pressures (as the literature often assumes), but that policy makers 
work strategically also in the design of small, incremental reforms in order to 
achieve long-term political goals. Researchers should therefore investigate 
agency and strategic policy making in incremental reforms in more detail, ask 
which long-term strategies policy makers follow, which feedback effect they 
intend to design and how incremental reforms are strategically designed to 
shape subsequent policy development. As demonstrated by this dissertation, 
the architectural policy design approach and the typology of feedback effects 
anticipated by policy makers are helpful analytical tools in this endeavor. The 
typology presented above provides a well-developed analytical guideline for 
empirical investigations of strategic policy making because it spells out which 
types of feedback effects policy makers likely consider in contexts of paradig-
matic and incremental policy making.  
If the literature does not apply the approach, it risks misinterpreting policy 
developments and policy makers’ decisions during policy design. What can 
                                               
171 In order to evaluate the strength of feedback effects that emerged from the Pay Continu-
ation Act, researchers could investigate whether or how policy makers referred to the act 
during subsequent reform debates. For example, researchers could evaluate an experience 
effect and try to determine whether or to what degree the concrete experience with early 
cost-sharing legislation as prescribed in the Pay Continuation Act shaped policy makers’ de-
sign choices and potentially prepared and enabled further privatization reforms (as outlined 
by the Christian Democrats’ design strategy). 
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seem like a political defeat at first sight might turn out to be a victory in the 
long term if policy makers successfully influence policy design in a way that 
creates beneficial policy-feedback effects for them even when they have to ac-
cept short-term losses and agree to a compromise with the political opponent. 
Furthermore, the literature might overlook the important influence of strate-
gic policy makers and their design strategies on gradual policy development, 
i.e. when policy makers strategically develop policy incrementally but try to 
achieve more paradigmatic long-term policy goals.  
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9. Discussion and Conclusion: The Contributions of 
the Dissertation and a Plea for an Agency Turn in 
Policy Feedback Research 
The aim of this dissertation was to explain a key dimension of public policy 
making, namely whether and how policy makers strategically try to shape 
policy feedback effects during policy design and how such attempts influence 
the design of policies. The dissertation aimed to help the literature to under-
stand better the potentials, political struggles, challenges, and real-world pat-
terns of long-term strategic policy making and to explain the strategic choices 
policy makers make during policy design. In response to these goals, the dis-
sertation makes two main contributions. Section 9.1 presents these two con-
tributions. Section 9.2 concludes the dissertation with a plea for an agency 
turn in policy feedback research. 
9.1 The Two Key Contributions of the Dissertation 
Contribution 1: Policy makers do consider and try to strategically 
design policy feedback effects during policy design. They antici-
pate different types of effects in different policy design situations 
based on their working understanding of policy feedback effects 
and try to maximize both short-term and long-term political 
gains. 
The first contribution of the dissertation concerns the insights it provides into 
dynamics and patterns of long-term strategic policy making. The dissertation 
demonstrates that policy makers do consider long-term implications of differ-
ent policy designs and that they try to strategically shape policy feedback ef-
fects through policy design. It shows that policy makers link anticipated feed-
back effects to particular elements of policy design and that they consider dif-
ferent types of feedback effects in different types of policy design situations 
based on the challenges these situations pose. In incremental policy making, 
policy makers mainly consider outward-oriented feedback effects (i.e. feed-
back effects of a policy on other policies/issues/policy fields) because they 
want to create a beneficial reform process. In paradigmatic policy making, pol-
icy makers mainly consider inward-oriented feedback effects (i.e. feedback ef-
fects of a policy on its own further development) because their primary focus 
is on designing a stable, resistant policy that will endure future political at-
tacks.  
The dissertation also demonstrates that policy makers are not solely myopic 
but try to achieve long-term policy goals while being electorally successful. 
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This helps us understand policy makers’ strategic decisions during policy de-
sign and how they try to maximize long-term and short-term gains in bargain-
ing with the political opponents. Policy makers in a weak bargaining situation 
may accept necessary compromises to contain damage but simultaneously try 
to influence policy design so that it creates favorable political dynamics for 
reaching their long-term policy goal. Policy makers in a strong bargaining po-
sition not only celebrate a short-term victory but may also try to design poli-
cies to be resistant to future retrenchment.  
Furthermore, the dissertation demonstrates that researchers risk drawing 
false conclusions when they do not investigate design processes and policy 
makers’ design strategies in detail. Policy makers may “give in” in a political 
debate if in a weak bargaining position, as just said, but they can hold on to 
their original policy goal and try to influence policy design deliberately in or-
der to achieve this goal in the long run. Researchers should therefore not de-
duct policy makers’ policy goals quickly from their positions during political 
debates and negotiations but investigate policy-design strategies in detail in 
order to understand the policy makers’ long-term goals. Doing so can also help 
researchers uncover when policy makers accept short-term losses in order to 
achieve long-term goals and avoid misinterpreting strategic decisions in pub-
lic policy making. 
Contribution 2: The existing literature relies implicitly or explic-
itly on problematic assumptions about the nature of policy mak-
ers and policy making and has therefore not developed an analyt-
ical toolkit for the investigation of long-term strategic policy 
making. The theoretical and methodological framework of archi-
tectural policy design provides a solution to this problem that can 
improve our understanding of patterns and dynamics of public 
policy making and policy makers’ strategic decisions during pol-
icy design. 
The second contribution of the dissertation lies in the cogent problematization 
of the existing literature on policy feedback and policy design and the devel-
opment of a novel analytical framework of architectural policy design. The dis-
sertation carves out problematic assumptions in the existing literature and 
thereby explains what prevents policy feedback and policy design research 
from understanding the key dimension of long-term strategic policy making. 
Because of pervasive images of politicians as myopic, policy making as incom-
prehensibly complex, and policy design as a rational, instrumental process, 
the literature has failed to investigate when or how policy makers strategically 
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choose between different policy designs because of the specific feedback ef-
fects these policies produce and to develop analytical tools for the investiga-
tion of long-term strategic policy making. 
By purposefully identifying problematic assumptions in the existing litera-
ture, the dissertation also demonstrates the benefits of the problematization 
approach and abductive research compared to gap-spotting in the develop-
ment of new theories and frameworks and the advancement of existing re-
search.  
Based on the problematization of the literature, the dissertation develops a 
novel theoretical and methodological framework for the investigation of long-
term strategic policy making. The methodological framework contributes to 
the existing literature by outlining a detailed script for the investigation of 
long-term strategic policy making. It provides guidelines for case selection, 
data generation and data analysis and advice for the identification of condu-
cive contexts for long-term strategic policy making and for the handling of 
policy design strategies as subjects and objects of design processes. The meth-
odological framework also demonstrates how political scientists can fruitfully 
engage in archival research and that valuable insights can be generated from 
digging deep into archival records.  
Furthermore, the methodological framework makes a specific contribution 
to the case selection literature and the literature on abductive research by 
providing systematic guidelines for case selection in theory-building research 
and early phases of research projects, when researchers start engaging with 
empirical material while developing core concepts and theoretical assump-
tions. 
The theoretical framework of the dissertation is based on two analytical 
claims developed in response to the critical review of the literature. The first 
claim is that paying attention to feedback effects can help remedy the func-
tionalist bias in policy design studies, help researchers better understand the 
potentials, challenges, political struggles, and real-world patterns of strategic 
policy design, and develop a clear concept of long-term strategic policy making 
and an analytical framework for policy-design studies that take anticipated 
policy-feedback effects into account. The second claim is that the disaggrega-
tion of policies into policy instruments and design characteristics and the de-
tailed investigation of design processes can help researchers better under-
stand how policy feedback effects emerge and whether and how policy makers 
can (try to) design these intentionally.  
The theoretical framework combines insights from the policy feedback and 
the policy design literature. It can do so because the policy design literature 
can shift the policy feedback literature’s focus from policies as broad catego-
ries to policy design elements and, thus, help investigate how policy feedback 
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effects emerge and how policy makers can try to design them strategically. The 
policy feedback perspective helps render the policy design more political by 
counterbalancing its functionalist bias on instrument selection with attention 
to the political consequences of policies and the political struggles around in-
strumentation and policy design.  
Three elements form the analytical core of the theoretical framework. It is 
based on (1) a historical-institutionalist understanding of policies as im-
portant rules that structure subsequent policy development and on (2) a con-
flict-oriented understanding of politics that sees institutions and policies as 
arenas of conflict in which actors constantly try to (re-)shape and (re-)inter-
pret them and bend them towards their priorities and preferences. Further-
more, it is based on (3) a refined understanding of strategically selective con-
texts and strategic actors that bring about strategic action as driver of change.  
Based on these elements, the theoretical framework develops a concept of 
architectural policy design. Architectural policy design means intentional pol-
icy making by strategic, reflexive, conscious, policy-driven and goal-oriented 
policy makers who aim to shape society in the long term by realizing policy 
goals that motivate their action. Policy making and policy makers’ preferences, 
goals and actions are always influenced by the effects of previous policy, and 
considerations of such effects influence policy design. Policy makers engage in 
architectural policy design because they want to gain political advantages and 
decrease the chance that their decisions are overturned after just one electoral 
cycle. They thereby steer and guide future policy makers’ courses of action via 
policy feedback effects. The concept of architectural policy design puts policy 
makers’ long-term strategic action in the center of policy design studies and 
enables the literature to better understand and explain how policy affect poli-
tics.  
In sum, theoretical framework contributes to the existing literature by 
providing an analytical lens that makes agency and long-term strategic action 
in policy feedback processes and policy design visible, analytically tangible 
and open to categorization and classification. Furthermore, the theoretical 
framework is a strong reminder of the need for an agency turn in policy feed-
back research.  
9.2 A Plea for an Agency Turn in Policy Feedback Research 
The role of agency has long been neglected in policy feedback research, and 
only few authors have recently recognized the need for more engagement with 
the strategic use of policies to make politics. The dissertation argues for an 
agency turn in policy feedback research and makes concrete suggestions for 
improving our understanding of policy feedback dynamics, long-term policy 
development and real-world policy making.  
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Concretely, it argues that researchers should take long-term strategic policy 
making seriously. That means they should investigate policy makers’ strategic 
calculations regarding policy feedback effects, scrutinize how policy makers 
weigh long-term gains or losses in relation to short-term gains or losses, and 
evaluate the causal impact of such strategic considerations on policy designs. 
Furthermore, researchers should take policy makers’ own perspective on feed-
back effects seriously. That is, they should develop and apply analytical cate-
gories of policy feedback effects that reflect policy makers’ own experience, 
knowledge and assumptions about long-term implications of policies. As the 
dissertation has demonstrated, such an approach helps develop productive 
and applicable analytical categories that show what types of strategic consid-
erations policy makers have in different policy design situations and increases 
our understanding of policy design processes.  
Researchers can employ manifold approaches to explain the outcomes and 
dynamics of reform processes, but often these approaches do not go beyond 
accounting for the overall direction of reforms. For example, researchers in-
vestigate quantitatively when political parties prioritize public investments 
(Kraft 2018), which types of policy instruments governments use in welfare 
state expansion or welfare state cutbacks (Jensen et al. 2017), or what social 
policies unions favor as opposed to left-wing governments (Jensen 2012). 
While these studies show which factors make certain policy outcomes more 
likely, they do not dig deeper into the policy design process itself and explain, 
for example, why a left-wing government chooses a particular type/design of 
old-age pension or why unions support certain types/designs of unemploy-
ment protection but not others. More case-oriented studies of public policy 
making may offer richer accounts of instances of public policy making and ex-
plain actors’ motives and strategies (e.g. Jordan and Matt 2014; Oberlander 
and Weaver 2015; Soss and Schram 2007). However, these studies lack a con-
ceptual framework and analytical focus that puts strategic action at its center 
and advances agency-oriented approaches to policy-feedback research. 
An agency turn in policy feedback research is necessary to address these 
deficits and because the field so far has not paid attention to and does not un-
derstand long-term strategic policy making. As discussed earlier, historical in-
stitutionalists tend to understate the impact of agency on political develop-
ments, limit it to critical junctures, or portray actors as mere mediators with-
out real agency that translate structural conditions into political or institu-
tional change. Policy feedback research more specifically tends to see narrow 
constraints on policy makers’ chances of influencing long-term political devel-
opments due to, e.g., the short time horizons policy makers face in electoral 
politics, their limited cognitive capacity in the face of increasingly complex 
policy making, and the scarcity of reliable information (cf. chapter 2.1).  
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However, as Anzia and Moe (2016: 763) argue, if policy makes politics, ra-
tional politicians have reasons and opportunities to use policy for their own 
political advantage. Surely, policy makers are not strategic masterminds, they 
may be myopic, face information scarcity, or be unaware of their chances and 
possibilities to make politics via policy, or they may fail in their attempt to do 
so (cf. section 2.3 and 3.2). However, policy makers will often have incentives 
to at least try to use policy to make politics (ibid.: 765-6). Yet, as Anzia and 
Moe correctly assess, this dimension of long-term strategic policy making has 
gone almost entirely unexplored. Indeed, works that translate the central 
claim of policy feedback research, namely that policy makes politics, into an 
agency-based research program and investigate how policy makers can use 
policies to make politics are scarce and each has its weaknesses (e.g. Anzia and 
Moe 2016; Oberlander and Weaver 2015; Patashnik 2008; Patashnik and 
Zelizer 2013; Soss and Schram 2007; cf. section 2.3 for a more detailed 
discussion). 
The policy feedback literature is therefore not equipped to answer questions 
of elementary relevance not only for understanding policy feedback processes 
but for a sound understanding of public policy making and policy develop-
ment in general. Do policy makers use policy to make politics? If so, under 
what conditions? How does this affect the choices policy makers make during 
design processes and the policy designs that emerge? How successful or un-
successful are policy makers in using policy to make politics? 
The architectural policy design approach lays out a script researchers can 
follow to dig deeper into policy design and explain why policy makers choose 
certain designs or design elements over others. The case studies presented in 
Part III have demonstrated the empirical contributions that can be made us-
ing the approach and investigating long-term strategic policy making in detail. 
Take the Pay Continuation Act of 1969 and its regulations on the reform of the 
statutory health insurance as an example. Why did the Christian Democrats 
agree to introduce a contribution refund scheme instead of more far-reaching 
copayments for hospital treatment or higher copayments for prescription 
medicine, as described in sections 7.4 and 7.5? All three policy instruments 
make the individual insured accountable and responsible for expenses related 
to her or his health care.  
Yet, they have different political consequences. Copayments burden pa-
tients directly with a share of the costs of their medical treatment, making this 
form of privatization highly visibly, likely unpopular, and therefore politically 
vulnerable. A contribution refund scheme incentivizes potential patients to re-
frain from using their insurance, not by the threat of copayments, but by fi-
nancial benefits in case of non-treatment. It has the same substantive goal (to 
reduce public expenses for medical treatment) but it pursues this goal without 
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putting visible burdens on a particular constituency and is therefore politically 
more stable and defensible. Therefore, it made sense for the Christian Demo-
crats to favor this policy instrument since it would still help them reach their 
long-term goal while raising less opposition from the Social Democrats. 
At first sight, the introduction of a contribution refund scheme in the Pay 
Continuation Act of 1969 could easily be interpreted as a big defeat for the 
Christian Democrats because it did not introduce a visible cost shift from the 
statutory health insurance to the insured individual. As the case study has 
shown, such a conclusion is premature. The Christian Democrats were far 
away from giving up their political agenda, and the introduction of a contribu-
tion refund scheme was not a total defeat but also the result of a long-term 
political strategy. That is, the Christian Democrats tried to respond strategi-
cally to the situational context, adapt their long-term strategy, and change 
their design proposal accordingly. 
The example illustrates that false conclusions can arise when researchers 
do not look into the long-term strategic design process behind adopted poli-
cies. First, giving up specific policy instruments or design elements during the 
process of policy design (potentially even before formulating an official policy 
draft) does not necessarily mean that a party shifted its policy goal. Instead, it 
might mean a shift in strategy and situationally adaptable preferences while 
the actual policy goal remains. This means that one should refrain from de-
ducing policy makers’ goals from the reforms they pass or proposals they make 
and instead go back in time and investigate the design strategies policy makers 
followed during policy formulation.  
Second, policy makers may accept short-term losses for achieving long-
term goals (cf. (Jacobs 2011, 2016). Again, research risks misinterpreting po-
litical decisions when deducing policy goals and preferences from passed leg-
islation or official policy drafts because policy makers might intentionally sac-
rifice short-term political benefits (in the above example: copayments) in or-
der to achieve a long-term goal (the reduction and individualization of health 
care costs) through alternative means (the contribution refund scheme). 
The example also illustrates that researchers should carefully investigate 
agency and long-term strategic policy making in order to understand what 
feedback effects policy makers consider, what design choices they make, and 
how those affect what reforms are adopted. If researchers take into account 
long-term policy design strategies, they can get a better understanding of how 
policies come about, how policy makes politics, and how policy makers use 
policy to make politics. 
As dissertation shows, putting the analytical focus on long-term policy de-
sign strategies means two things. First, it means to investigate empirically how 
policy makers try to realize long-term policy goals in and through the design 
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of policies instead of deducing policy makers’ strategies and goals from 
adopted policies. Second, it means that researchers should take policy makers’ 
own perspective on feedback effects into account. That is, they should develop 
and apply analytical categories of policy feedback effects that reflect policy 
makers’ own experience, knowledge and assumptions about long-term impli-
cations of policies.  
As the dissertation has demonstrated, taking such an approach helps de-
velop productive and applicable analytical tools that uncover what types on 
strategic considerations policy makers have in different policy making con-
texts and thereby increase our understanding of public policy making, policy 
design and policy feedback processes. 
The above example demonstrates the benefits of an agency turn in policy 
feedback research. The dissertation is a first step in that direction. It aims to 
provide a theoretical and methodological framework for the investigation of 
long-term strategic policy making and proposes a typology of policy feedback 
effects anticipated by policy makers. As analytical tools, the framework and 
typology help researchers understand which types of strategic long-term con-
siderations policy makers have in different policy design situations and un-
cover how policy makers weigh long-term feedback effects and political gains 
in relation to – sometimes contrary, sometimes conforming – short-term pol-
icy effects and political gains. 
In sum, an agency turn in policy feedback research is a needed response to 
widespread weaknesses in the literature. Taking long-term strategic policy 
making and policy makers’ own perspectives on policy feedback effects seri-
ously can advance our understanding of crucial choices policy makers make 
during policy design, how those choices affect what policy is adopted, what 
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Archive for Christian-Democratic Policy (Archiv für Christlich-
Demokratische Politik, ACDP): 
ACDP, 01-858-027/2: protocol attachment, 07.01.1969 
ACDP, 04-004-005/5: resolution proposal for delegate conference of the MIT, 27.9.1968 
ACDP, 04-004-109-2: draft speech written by head of the association of the middle man-
agement (VfLA), 01.05.1976 
ACDP, 04-013-066/2: draft statement of the CDA, 1963 
ACDP, 04-014-042/2: letter from MP Blüm (head of CDA) to MP Barzel (chair of 
CDU/CSU parliamentary group), 21.02.1969 
ACDP, 07-001-1446: meeting between CDU presidium and German Confederation of 
Skilled Crafts (ZDH) on codetermination, 24.3.1965 
                                               
173 Bundestag Printed Matters are available online: http://pdok.bundestag.de/ (last access: 
May 2018). 
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ACDP, 07-001-1642: summary of a conference of the heads of parliamentary groups of the 
CDU in the Bundesländer, 05.-07.02.1969 
ACDP, 07-001-19002: memo for federal minister Heck (CDU) on codetermination, 
24.07.1967 
ACDP, 07-001-19002: memo for federal minister Heck (CDU) on codetermination, 
16.10.1968 
ACDP, 07-001-19701: election correspondence 1969 
ACDP, 07-001-19701: Rentnerdienst 1969 
ACDP, 07-001-8708: correspondence/letters, no date 
ACDP, 07-001-9072: DKM press release, 03.12.1968 
ACDP, 08-001-296/2: short protocol of the Parliament Committee on Labor, 19.03.1963 
ACDP, 08-005-060/2: BDA paper, no date 
ACDP, 08-005-060/2: memo for meeting with DGB representatives, 11.10.1968 
ACDP, 08-005-060/2: memo for MP Barzel (head of CDU/CSU parliamentary group), 
02.10.1968 
ACDP, 08-005-060/2: memo for MP Barzel, 12.11.1968 
ACDP, 08-005-060/3: memo to MP Schäuble (CDU), 08.12.1977 
ACDP, 08-005-061/1: argumentation paper, 12.04.1969 
ACDP, 08-005-061/1: commission report on Pay Continuation, 04.02.1969 
ACDP, 08-005-061/1: memo from commission on Pay Continuation 17.01.1969 
ACDP, 08-005-061/1: memo from the Commission on Pay Continuation, 17.01.1969 
ACDP, 08-005-092/3: paper “on the reform of health insurance”, no date, no author 
ACDP, 08-008-246/2: MIT press release 28.07.1969 
ACDP, 08-008-264/2: BDA statement on Ministerial draft of Dec. 17, 1968; early 1969 
ACDP, 08-008-264/2: letter from crafts association representatives to MP Gewandt, 
29.10.1968 
ACDP, 08-008-264/2: letter from MP Gewandt (head of DKM) to MP Barzel (head of 
CDU/CSU parliamentary group), 09.06.1969 
ACDP, 08-008-264/2: letter from MP Ruf (MIT) to MP Gewandt (DKM chair), 17.03.1969 
ACDP, 08-008-264/2: letter from MP Ruf (Wirtschaftsrat/MIT) to MP Gewandt (DKM 
head), 17.03.1969 
ACDP, 08-008-264/2: memo from MP Kalinke (CDU) to MP Müller-Herrman (CDU), 
14.01.1969 
ACPD, 08-001-296/2: Short protocol of the Parliament Committee on Labor, Statement of 
Ministerial director Schelp (Federal Ministry of Labor), 19.03.1963 
Archive of Social Democracy (Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie, 
AdsD) 
AdsD, 1535: letter from MP Schellenberg (head of SPD working group on social policy) to 
SPD parliamentary group, 08.05.1969 
AdsD, 2/BTFD000198: undated memo from the materials of the Social Democrats working 
group on social policy in the 4. Bundestag (1961-65) 
AdsD, 2/BTFG000604: description and evaluation of coalition compromise in codetermi-
nation, no date 
AdsD, 2/BTFG000606: letter from Vetter (head of DGB) to Wehner (head of SPD parlia-
mentary group), 02.02.1976 
AdsD, 2/PVAS000599: protocol coordination group between SPD and DGB on codetermi-
nation, 25.09.1974 
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AdsD, 2/PVCO00079: description and evaluation of coalition compromise in codetermina-
tion, 09.12.1975 
AdsD, 2/PVCO00079: federal conference of SPD working group on employee matters, 19.-
21.10.1973 
AdsD, 667: article from the German insurance journal (Deutsche Versicherungszeitschrift), 
october 1968 
AdsD, 667: position paper from local SPD branch in Westliches Westfalen, no date 
AdsD, 669: letter from MP Schellenberg (head of SPD working group on social policy) to 
SPD parliamentary group, 20.03.1969 
AdsD, 669: position paper from the association of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(Deutscher Gewerbeverband), 18.03.1969 
AdsD/DGB archive, 5/DGAK000042: memo on coalition compromise on codetermination 
on Dec. 9, 1975, 22.12.1975 
AdsD/DGB archive, 5/DGAK000042: position paper 06.03.1974 
AdsD/DGB archive, 5/DGAK000042: position paper 23.01.1974 
AdsD/DGB archive, 5/DGAO001325: memo on meeting between representatives of the 
DGB and the Social Democrats, 30.10.1964 
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Overview of Accessed Empirical Material  
Accessed Archival Records: Parliamentary Archives of the 









Bill / Publication Title and Date in the Federal Law Ga-
zette (Bundesgesetzblatt, BGBl.) 
...V368 1969 2 Pay Continuation Act (Gesetz über die Fortzahlung des Ar-
beitsentgelts im Krankheitsfalle und über Änderungen des 
Rechts der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung vom 27. Juli 
1969, Bundesgesetzblatt vom 30.07.1969) 
...V/324 1969 9 22. Act to Change the Federal Law (Zweiundzwanzigstes Gesetz 
zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes vom 12. Mai 1969, Bun-
desgesetzblatt vom 14.05.1969) 
...VI/234 1972 9 Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz vom 15. 
Januar 1972, Bundesgesetzblatt vom 18.01.1972) 
...VI/323 1972 11 Pension Reform (Gesetz zur weiteren Reform des gesetzlichen 
Rentenversicherung und über die fünfzehnte Anpassung der 
Renten aus den gesetzlichen Rentenversicherungen sowie über 
die Anpassung der Geldleistungen aus der gesetzlichen Un-
fallversicherung (Rentenreformgesetz – RRG) vom 16.10.1972, 




1974/6 3 Reform of Paragraph 218 (Fünftes Gesetz zur Reform des 
Strafrechts (5. StrRG) vom 18. Juni 1974, Bundesgesetzblatt 
vom 21.06.1974, Fünfzehntes Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz vom 
18. Mai 1976, Bundesgesetzblatt vom 21.05.1976) 
...VII/366 1976 10 Framework Act for Higher Education (Hochschulrahmengesetz 
(HRG) vom 26. Januar 1976, Bundesgesetzblatt vom 
29.01.1976) 
...VII/400 1976 6 Codetermination Act: (Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Ar-
beitnehmer (Mitbestimmungsgesetz – MitbestG), Bun-
desgesetzblatt vom 08.05.1976) 
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...X/125 1985 4 Employment Promotion Act (Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz 
1985 (BeschFG 1985) vom 26. April 1985, Bundesgesetzblatt 
vom 30.04.1985) 
...X/182 1985 2 The Child-Raising Allowance Act (Gesetz über die Gewährung 
von Erziehungsgeld und Erziehungsurlaub (Bundeser-
ziehungsgeldgesetz –BerzGG) vom 6. Dezember 1985, Bun-




Material Accessed in the Archive for Christian-Democratic Policy 
(Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, ACDP) 
 
ARCHIVE SIG.  TIME 
FRAME 
SHORT DESCRIPTION 
CDU National party  
07-001:1446 1962-66 CDU presidium, documents 
07-001:1551 1960-68 CDU presidium, contact meetings 
07-001:1642 1969 Conferences of chairmen of parliamentary groups 
07-001:19002 1967-68 Political departments 
07-001:19701 1968-70 Social policy department 
07-001:19702 1968-70 Social policy department 
07-001:3047 1952-62 Documentation on labor market policy 
07-001:3050 1959 Documentation on site groups 
07-001:3105 1953-61 Documentation on health insurance 
07-001:5122 1968-69 Federal election 1969, press material 
07-001:8708 1960-63 Working group on social policy 
07-001:8711 1963-68 Working group on social policy 
07-001:8712 1964-65 Working group on social policy 
07-001:8713 1965-66 Working group on social policy 
07-001:9072 1968-70 Commission on codetermination 
CDU/CSU Parliamentary group in the German Bundestag 
08-001:1038/1 1974 Meeting protocols 
08-001:1039/1 1974 Meeting protocols 
08-001:1043/2 1975 Meeting protocols 
08-001:296/2 1963 Labor rights 
08-001:345/2 1969-70 Correspondence 
CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag: Working group 
IV (i.a. Social Policy) 
08-005:060/1 1960-64 Pay continuation 
08-005:060/2 1968 Pay continuation 
08-005:060/3 1971-77 Pay continuation 
08-005:061/1 1969 Pay continuation 
08-005:092/3 1955-69 Pay continuation 
08-005:120/1 1971-73 Pay continuation 
Christian Democratic Employees Association (Christlich-Demokrat. Arbeit-
nehmerschaft, CDA) 
04-013:030/2 1966-67 Working group on social policy and family policy 
04-013:042/2 1-5/1969 General correspondence 
04-013:053/2 1962,69-72 Chairman Hans Katzer 
04-013:063/3 1969-73 Chairman Hans Katzer 
04-013:066/2 1962-63 “Social package” proposed by federal government  
04-013:070/1 1959-63 “Social package” proposed by federal government 
04-013:079/2 1959-65 Working group Christian Democratic DGB trade union-
ists 
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ARCHIVE SIG.  TIME 
FRAME 
SHORT DESCRIPTION 
04-013:016/1 1961-63 10. Annual meeting  
04-013:017/1 1963 10. Annual meeting 
04-013:006/2 1963-65 Federal board meetings 
Small- and Medium-Sized Business Association of CDU/CSU (Mittelstands- 
und Wirtschaftsvereinigung der CDU/CSU, MIT) 
04-004:109/2 1974-76 Advisory board middle management 
04-004:178/1 1971-72 Drafts, chairman Lampersbach 
04-004:187/5 1976-77 Middle management and codetermination 
04-004:014/1 1971-73 Ad-hoc-commission codetermination/works constitution 
04-004:016/1 1969-72 Advisory board middle management 
04-004:016/2 1972 Advisory board middle management 
04-004:016/3 1972-73 Advisory board middle management 
04-004:013/4 1971-73 Ad-hoc-commission on pay continuation  
04-004:005/5 1968 13. Annual Meeting 
04-004:013/5 1970-71 Ad-hoc-commission codetermination/works constitution 
Discussion Group Small- and Medium-Sized Business (Diskussionskreis 
Mittelstand, DKM) 
08-008:259/3 1974-76 Codetermination 
08-008:260/3 1970-74 Codetermination 
08-008:260/4 975-80 Codetermination 
08-008:260/5 1969-82 Pay continuation 
08-008:263/1 1971-74 Codetermination 
08-008:264/2 1965-69 Pay continuation 
Personal collections 
01-221:026 1967 
“Who should we trust?“ (”Wem sollen wir noch ver-
trauen”) (Würmeling, Franz Josef) 
01-416:033/1 1969-71 CDA (Müller, Adolf) 
01-416:033/2 1971-73 CDA (Müller, Adolf) 
01-416:036/2 1967-76 Correspondence (Müller, Adolf) 
01-416:046/3 1973-80 Middle Management (Müller, Adolf) 
01-483:024/1 1957-59 Correspondence (Schröder, Gerhard) 
01-491:014/2 1967-69 Correspondence (Zink, Otto) 
01-491:058 1972-82 Pay continuation (Zink, Otto) 
01-561:002/3 1955-82 CDA (Deus, Franz) 
01-858:027/2 1968-69 
German economic council (Wirtschaftsrat der CDU e.V.) 
(Scheufelen, Klaus) 
01-858:041 1981-82 
German economic council (Wirtschaftsrat der CDU e.V.) 
(Scheufelen, Klaus) 




Material Accessed in the Archive of Social Democracy (Archiv 






German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) 
5/DGAI000006 1956-68 Federal board, Chairman Richer 
5/DGAI000015 1969 Federal board, Chairman Vetter 
5/DGAK000021 1971-73 Social policy division, advisory council on social policy 
5/DGAK000040 1972-73 
Social policy division, working group on codetermina-
tion 
5/DGAK000041 1973-74 Social policy division, correspondence, codetermination 
5/DGAK000042 1973-76 Social policy division, codetermination act 
5/DGAK000059 1972-75 
Social policy division, working group on codetermina-
tion 
5/DGAK000166 1973 
Social policy division, internal correspondence Heinz 
Vetter 
5/DGAK000192 1971 Social policy division, internal correspondence 
5/DGAK000264 1974-75 Social policy division, correspondence, codetermination 
5/DGAK000284 1971-73 Social policy division, correspondence, codetermination 
5/DGAK000601 1968-73 
Social policy division, correspondence, codetermination 
staff 
5/DGAO000811 1961-63 
Federal board, social policy division, commission on 
pay cont. 
5/DGAO000847 1953-66 Federal board, social policy division, pay continuation 
5/DGAO000857 1962-67 Federal board, social policy division, pay continuation 
5/DGAO001055 1968-69 Federal board, social policy division, pay continuation 
5/DGAO001066 1956-57 Federal board, social policy division, pay continuation 
5/DGAO001083 1961-63 Federal board, social policy division, pay continuation 
5/DGAO001092 1960-67 Federal board, social policy division, pay continuation 
5/DGAO001259 1963-69 Federal board, social policy division, pay continuation 
5/DGAO001271 1969-71 Federal board, social policy division, pay continuation 
5/DGAO001319 1969 Federal board, social policy division, circulars 
5/DGAO001325 1962-66 Federal board, social policy division, pay continuation 
5/DGAO001345 1958-69 
Federal board, social policy division, health insurance 
reform 
5/DGAO001353 1954 Federal board, social policy division, pay continuation 
5/DGAO001704 1968-69 Federal board, social policy division, pay continuation 
5/DGAO001705 1964 Federal board, social policy division, pay continuation 
5/DGAY174 1958-66 Federal board, bargaining politics division 
5/DGCU000078 1969-70 Federal board member Stephan 
5/DGCY000113 1957-66 Federal board, Tacke, talks with BDA 
                                               






SPD Parliamentary group in the German Bundestag 
2/BTFC000624 1960-61 Federal elections 1961, Willy Brandt 
2/BTFC000631 1960-61 Federal elections 1961, Willy Brandt 
2/BTFC000645 1960-61 Federal elections 1961, FDP 
2/BTFE001534-
5 
1969 Pay continuation (working group VII: judiciary) 
2/BTFE001935 1967-69 Office Herbert Wehner, correspondence  
2/BTFE001992 1965-69 Office Herbert Wehner 
2/BTFG000001 29.11.1972 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000004 18.12.1972 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000032 24.10.1973 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000043 22.01.1974 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000045 19.02.1974 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000050 19.03.1974 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000077 08.10.1974 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000079 15.10.1974 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000081 12.11.1974 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000088 14.01.1975 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000096 08.04.1975 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000101 13.05.1975 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000104 01.06.1975 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000105 17.06.1975 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000109 23.09.1975 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000113 04.11.1975 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000124 10.02.1976 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000128 16.03.1976 Short protocol of group meeting, codetermination 
2/BTFG000603 1974 Office Herbert Wehner, codetermination 
2/BTFG000604 1974-76 Office Herbert Wehner, codetermination 
2/BTFG000605 1975 Office Herbert Wehner, codetermination 
2/BTFG000606 1975-76 Office Herbert Wehner, codetermination 
2/BTFG000607 1976 Office Herbert Wehner, codetermination 
2/BTFG003790 1973 SPD party convention in Hannover 
2/BTFG003793 1974 Documentation SPD 
272 (old sig-
nuature) 
1967-69 Parliamentary management board 
1535 1969 material from SPD working group on Law 
 SPD Parliamentary Group: Working Group III Economic Policy 
2/BTFG002335 1973 Working group on codetermination 
2/BTFG002336 1973 Working group on codetermination 
2/BTFG002337 1974 Working group on codetermination 
2/BTFG002338 1976 Working group on codetermination 
 SPD Parliamentary Group: Working Group IV Social Policy 
2/BTFC000085 1958 Working group meetings 






2/BTFC000171 1959-61 Magazine Sozialer Fortschritt 
2/BTFD000198 1963-65 Social policy of the government 
2/BTFD000199 1962-63 CDU/FDP negotiations on „social package“ 
2/BTFD000216 1963 Health policy, health insurance 
2/BTFD000217 1962-64 Health policy, health insurance 
2/BTFD000218 1962-64 Health policy, health insurance 
2/BTFE000671 1969 Health policy, health insurance 
2/BTFE000711 1966 Codetermination 
2/BTFE000712 1967 Codetermination 
2/BTFE000713 1-11/1968 Codetermination 
2/BTFE000714 12/1968 Codetermination 
2/BTFE000715 12/1968 Codetermination 
2/BTFE000716 12/1968 Codetermination 
2/BTFE000717 1968-69 Codetermination 
2/BTFE000718 1969 Codetermination 
631 1968 Correspondence Schellenberg / Bartholomäi 
661 1965-66 Health policy / statutory health insurance 
662 1966 Health policy / statutory health insurance 
666 1968 Health policy / statutory health insurance 
667 1968 Health policy / statutory health insurance 
668 1969 Health policy / statutory health insurance 
669 1969 Health policy / statutory health insurance 
670 1969 Health policy / statutory health insurance 
671 1969 Health policy / statutory health insurance 
SPD executive board 
2/PVBY000078 1976 AfA conference 
2/PVAI000642 1966-67 
Commission on codetermination and works constitu-
tion  
2/PVAI000643 1968 
Commission on codetermination and works constitu-
tion  
2/PVAS000592 09.09.1973 Federal party board meeting 
2/PVAS000599 08.02.1974 Federal party board meeting 
2/PVAS000602 08.03.1974 Federal party board meeting 
2/PVAS000618 16.02.1975 Federal party board meeting 
2/PVAS000640 20.02.1976 Joint meeting of different party boards 
2/PVCO00079 1973-1976 AfA conferences, documents and correspondence 





Overview of Edited or Digitalized Archival Material 
Meeting protocols of parliamentary groups have been edited and published, 
based on the original archival documents, by the Kommission für Geschichte 
des Parlamentarismus und der Politischen Parteien e.V. (KGParl) as part of 
the series Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen 
Parteien: Vierte Reihe: Deutschland seit 1945. Protocols can also be accessed 
online via the website www.fraktionsprotokolle.de for selected periods. 
 
Edited or Digitalized Material from the Christian Democrats: edited 
volumes for the 1st to 6th Bundestag (1949-1972), digitalized for the 4th to 6th 
Bundestag (1961-72). 
Edited or Digitalized Material from the Social Democrats: edited vol-
umes for the 1st to 6th Bundestag (1949-1972), digitalized for the 4th to 6th Bun-
destag (1961-72). 
Edited or Digitalized Material from the Liberals: edited volumes for 
1st to 5th Bundestag (1949-1969), digitalized for 1th to 4th Bundestag (1949-69). 
Additionally: edited volumes of the Party’s Federal Board (Bundesvorstand) 
for 1st to 4th Bundestag (1949-1965). 
Reference list for individual volumes: 
Volume 7/I: FDP-Bundesvorstand. Die Liberalen unter dem Vorsitz von Theodor Heuss und 
Franz Blücher 1949–1954. Edited by Udo Wengst. Leinen, Düsseldorf 1990. ISBN 3-
77400-5159-9 
Volume 7/II: FDP-Bundesvorstand. Die Liberalen unter dem Vorsitz von Thomas Dehler 
und Reinhold Maier 1954–1960. Edited by Udo Wengst. Leinen, Düsseldorf 1991. ISBN 
3-7700-5163-7 
Volume 7/III: FDP-Bundesvorstand. Die Liberalen unter dem Vorsitz von Erich Mende 
1960–1967. Edited by Reinhard Schiffers. Leinen, Düsseldorf 1993. ISBN 3-7700-5175-0 
Volume 8/1: Die SPD-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1949–1957. 
Edited by Petra Weber. Leinen, Düsseldorf 1993. ISBN 3-7700-5171-8 
Volume 8/II: Die SPD-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1957–1961. 
Edited by Wolfgang Hölscher. Leinen, Düsseldorf 1993. ISBN 3-7700-5172-6 
Volume 8/III: Die SPD-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1961–1966. 
Edited by Heinrich Potthoff. Leinen, Düsseldorf 1993. ISBN 3-7700-5177-7 
Volume 8/IV: Die SPD-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1966–1969. 
Edited by Bettina Tüffers. Leinen, Düsseldorf 2009. ISBN 3-7700-5177-7 
Volume 8/V: Die SPD-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1969–1972. 
Edited by Sven Jüngerkes. Leinen, Düsseldorf 2016. ISBN 978-3-7700-5334-6 
Volume 11/1: Die CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1949–
1953. Edited by Helge Heidemeyer. Leinen, Düsseldorf 1998. ISBN 3-7700-5206-4 
Volume 11/II: Die CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1953–
1957. Edited by Helge Heidemeyer. Leinen, Düsseldorf 2003. ISBN 3-7700-5211-0 
Volume 11/III: Die CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1957–
1961. Edited by Reinhard Schiffers. Leinen, Düsseldorf 2004. ISBN 3-7700-5212-9 
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Volume 11/IV: Die CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1961–
1966. Edited by Leinen, Düsseldorf 2004. ISBN 3-7700-5253-6 
Volume 11/V: Die CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1966–
1969. Edited by Stefan Marx. Leinen, Düsseldorf 2011. ISBN 3-7700-5298-1 
Volume 11/VI: Die CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1969–
1972. Edited by Kathrin Zehender. Leinen, Düsseldorf 2016. ISBN 978-3-7700-5332-2 
Volume 15/I: Die CSU-Landesgruppe im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1949–
1972. Edited by Andreas Zellhuber and Tim B. Peters. Leinen, Düsseldorf 2011. ISBN 978-
3-7700-5307-0 
Volume 16/I: Die FDP-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1949–1969. 
Edited by Volker Stalmann. Leinen, Düsseldorf 2017. 978-3-7700-5338-4
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Description of Indicators for the Evaluation of Potential Cases 
Resource Dimension 
Indicators in the resource dimension ask whether political actors possess re-
sources that enable them to conduct long-term, strategic policy design. Spe-
cifically, one can think of four kinds of resources.  
(1) The first concerns actors’ funding. The question is can they financially 
afford to devise policies and/or evaluate policy drafts? Since policy making 
is a highly complex process, and policy makers face great uncertainty and 
complexity, the process of devising and evaluating policies or policy drafts re-
quires substantial financial resources, for instance to pay for qualified staff 
that evaluates previous policies, looks beyond national borders in attempts to 
learn from experiences, failures, and successes elsewhere, or consults with 
other experts or researcher. All these tasks require time and sufficient funding. 
Big unions or parties, for example, can run their own think tanks or founda-
tions that develop and evaluate policy concepts, while small NGOs or newcom-
ers in parliament will lack the means to be on par in this regard. 
(2) The second kind of resource concerns the personnel, and the question 
is whether political actors are capable/qualified to devise and/or evaluate 
policy drafts. As suggested above, financial resources are not sufficient for 
long-term, strategic policy design, but collective political actors also need 
qualified staff that can carry out the complex task of policy design. The intri-
cacies of the design process and the potential, anticipated, or intended effects 
of policies require extensive expertise, knowledge, and qualifications that not 
all parties or interest groups can provide. 
(3) The third kind of resource concerns networks, or whether or to what 
degree actors are included or heard in formal decision making processes. 
Simply put, good funding and qualified staff are helpful for drafting and eval-
uating policies, but political actors also need to be able to feed their ideas and 
suggestions into the formal political system. Sometimes, big unions might 
have well-developed political concepts, possibly even ready-to-use policy 
drafts, but they can be shut out of decision making if a more employee-friendly 
government does not consider their position or objections. 
(4) In such cases, it can also be helpful to consider a fourth kind of resource 
that I call political and that asks whether or to what degree actors can create 
political pressure on formal decision makers. One example is mobilization 
potential. Can a union, even if shut out of the decision-making process, create 
political pressure by bringing its members and supporters on the streets? Or 
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are actors influential due to their long affiliation with established political ac-
tors, as one can for example assume is the case in many countries for churches 
and conservative parties, or for unions and social-democratic parties. 
Combined, these four elements should give a good impression of the re-
sources political actors possess regarding long-term, strategic policy design in 
concrete cases of policy-making. The indicators may overlap in certain cases, 
for example regarding funding and personnel. At the same, time they allow for 
a differentiation between different kinds of resources that political actors 
might possess or not. 
Impact Dimension 
The impact dimension asks how likely it is that a policy will affect the future 
development in the policy field. This complex question can be broken down 
into three sub-dimensions that look at redistribution, reconfiguration, and 
timing. 
(1) Indicators on redistribution try to answer whether or to what degree a 
policy redistributes resources among citizens. Redistribution is important for 
long-term policy development in its own right since it greatly affects the living 
conditions and future prospects of citizens. Redistributive policies are there-
fore likely to receive much public attention and political discussion about their 
long-term effects. But redistributive policies can also affect the future devel-
opment of a policy field in more indirect ways. They can affect, for example, 
mobilization patterns by disadvantaging certain parts of the population. Or 
they can create meaning and identities by turning citizens into recipient of a 
specific benefit, implicitly encouraging self-organization and network build-
ing among previously independent groups.  
Specifically, we can think of three indicators regarding the redistributive ef-
fects of policies. (1.1) The first indicator concerns access to benefits and asks 
whether a reform affects or changes citizens’ access to benefits. Does a re-
form, for example, change eligibility requirements for unemployment insur-
ance or another social service? (1.2) The second indicator concerns broader 
social rights and asks whether a reform affects or changes citizens’ social 
rights. For example, does a reform increase or decrease training opportunities 
for unemployed? Does it change reintegration support for sick or disabled 
people? (1.3) The third indicator concerns the level of benefits and asks 
whether a reform changes or affects the level of benefits citizens receive. Does 
a reform, for example, increase or decrease the level of unemployment support 
or pension payments? Combined, these indicators give a good impression of 
how large a distribute impact a reform has on citizens and subsequently pos-
sibly on the development of the policy field. 
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(2) Indicators on reconfiguration try to answer whether or to what degree 
a policy reconfigures the political landscape. They concern more directly the 
impact of a policy reform on the political dynamics in a policy field and are 
essentially about policy feedback effects. As discussed above, it is impossible 
for political actors involved in policy making to fully anticipate and design the 
effects of a policy. Equally, it is impossible for any researcher to look at a policy 
at the time of policy making and objectively and correctly assess its future ef-
fects.  
Nevertheless, we can specifically think of how a policy affects the resources 
political actors possess and theorize four different indicators on reconfigura-
tion. (2.1) The first indicator concerns funding and asks whether or to what 
degree a reform affects or changes the financial base of a government agency 
or of organized interests. Does a reform, for example, cut down funding for a 
government agency responsible for monitoring CO2 emissions and, thus, 
harm its ability to effectively monitor and implement climate protection poli-
cies? Or does a reform affect the funding base of an organized interest group, 
for example by changing the taxation of income through membership contri-
butions? (2.2) The second indicator concerns the personnel and asks whether 
or to what degree a reform affects or changes bureaucratic or organizational 
capacities. For example, does a reform not just cut funding for a government 
agency but also staff? Or does it extend or decrease the scope of an agency’s 
responsibilities and tasks? (2.3) The third indicator concerns network re-
sources and ask whether or to what degree a reform affects or changes deci-
sion making procedures. Does a policy, for example, include or exclude third 
parties from consultation processes? Or does it change actors’ roles in such 
processes, for example from participation to approval? (2.4) The fourth indi-
cator concerns politics, or mobilization, and asks whether or to what degree 
a reform changes or affects mobilization prospects or patterns. Does a policy, 
for example, politicize an issue, increase protests and civil engagement, and 
thereby strengthen some political actors against others? All in all, the four in-
dicators on reconfiguration give a valuable impression of a policy’s potential 
impact on the future dynamics in a policy field. 
(3) Lastly, the impact dimension contains an indicator on timing that asks 
whether a “window of opportunity” allows for unusually far-reaching policy 
reform. Has a new government won by a landslide victory that allows it to 
push far-reaching reforms through parliament, assisted by public support? Or 
does a government control both houses of parliament or rule by a two-third 
majority? Alternatively, external circumstances may frame a window of op-
portunity, for example when an economic down-turn allows actors to push for 
more far-reaching reforms than just incremental adjustments. 
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Combined, the three sub-dimensions and their nine indicators in the impact 
dimension should give a good impression of whether a policy is likely to affect 
the future development in a policy field. Importantly, I want to reiterate that 
the goal is not to definitely assess the exact, future effects and impact of a pol-
icy but to get a sense of and grip on what effects potentially flow from a policy. 
Conflict Dimension 
Finally, indicators in the last dimension, the conflict dimension, try to assess 
whether or to what degree a policy is vulnerable to future withdrawal. The 
potential vulnerability of a policy is crucial since it likely increases the atten-
tion political actors pay to the long-term effects of a policy, as well as their 
strategic consideration of how those effects can render a policy more resistant 
to withdrawal. We should therefore confront policies in the initial phase of 
case selection with questions regarding control and contestation. 
(1) Indicators on control ask whether actors fear losing control over “their” 
policy. Specifically, this concerns electoral considerations and whether actors 
fear being voted out of positions with formal decision-making power, as well 
as network considerations and whether actors fear being excluded from for-
mal decision making processes. Is a government, for example, facing declin-
ing support rates and low prospects of reelection? Or are organized interests 
concerned that a future government might abolish their participation rights in 
the legislative process? In both cases, actors are likely to want to secure cur-
rent achievement and make “their” policies resistant. 
(2) Indicators on contestation ask how contested a policy issues is. Specif-
ically, this concerns issue salience, i.e. whether a policy issue is of high im-
portance to voters, and the existence of political alternatives, i.e. are there 
viable alternatives that could replace a policy. For example, if a government 
is able to pass a reform on an issue that is highly salient to the public, and 
political opponents suggest an alternative solution, the government would 
likely fear future withdrawal and replacement of their policy. Hence, they can 
try to secure their policy by strategically designing its policy effects. If the gov-
ernment is in a strong position and will likely be reelected, or if a reform is 
passed by a grand coalition between government and opposition, such strate-
gic policy design is less needed.  
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Overview of Preliminary Case Evaluations 
The following case evaluations are a work product of the case selection pro-
cess. They were written in Step 5 of the case selection process (cf. section 4.2) 
prior to conducting the empirical investigations presented in Part III of the 
dissertation. The table below, taken from section 4.2, gives an overview of the 

































































































































































































































 Funding ++1 ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ o ++ + a 
Personnel ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ - ++ + b 
Networks ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++ c 
































Benefit access ++ -- -- -- ++ ++ -- -- -- e 
Social rights ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ -- ++ f 
Benefit level + -- -- -- ++ ++ -- -- -- g 
Funding ++ ++ -- ++ ++ -- - ++ ++ h 
Personnel -- ++ ++ - -- - - ++ ++ i 
Networks -- + ++ - -- -- -- ++ ++ j 
Mobilization o ++ ++ ++ + - - -- + + k 







Electoral o ++ o + ++ + ++ -- ++ m 
Network o ++ ++ o -- o ++ -- ++ n 
Policy alternative ++ ++ ++ o ++ o ++ o + o 
Issue salience + ++ ++ ++ ++ o ++ -- o p 
Overall evaluation o2 + + o + o - - o  
Notes:  
1) Indicator evaluation: ++ = positive, + = positive to ambiguous, o = ambiguous, – = negative 
to ambiguous, -- = negative;  
2) Overall case evaluation: + = ideal, +o = promising to ideal, o = promising, -o = suitable to 
promising, – = suitable;  
3) Grey shaded columns show the two selected cases. 
The Works Constitution Act of 1972 
The 1972 Works Constitution Act (WCA) (Borowsky 2002; Emmenegger 
2014; Faulenbach 2011; Hockerts 2011; Metzler 2003; Ruf 1971a, 1971b) re-
formed one of the central pieces of legislation regulating the cooperation and 
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coordination between employers and workers, and their respective repre-
sentative bodies. The WCA was first introduced in 1952 and regulated the role 
of work councils in firms, their composition, election procedure and responsi-
bilities, the cooperation between work councils and employers, the participa-
tion of workers’ representatives in supervisory boards of companies, etc. Even 
though it granted workers substantial rights, the labor movement considered 
the 1952 WCA a step back compared to regulation in force earlier in the 20th 
century. Twenty years after the passage of the WCA, the Social Democrats led, 
for the first time in post-war Germany, a coalition government with the Liberal 
Party and placed huge emphasis on a “politics of inner reforms” and “daring 
more democracy”, thus, fueling unions’ hopes to achieve major improvements 
in work-place regulation. Furthermore, both Social Democrats and Christian 
Democrats acknowledged the need for a reform of the law. Despite this shared 
acknowledgement and extensive inter-party negotiations, the final act was not 
passed unanimously but was opposed by the Christian Democrats in parlia-
ment. 
I now evaluate the reform along the list of theorized indicators. Overall, the 
cursory investigation of the case suggests that it is an ideal case since it can be 
evaluated positively on most indicators. In the resource dimension, which 
concerns the resources political actors possess for long-term, strategic policy 
design, I evaluate the case positively on all four indicators. The main actors in 
policy making in this case, as in labor-market politics in general, are the gov-
ernment, formed by Social Democrats and Liberals, the opposition, formed by 
Christian Democrats, and unions and employers and their respective collec-
tive organizations. I expect all these actors to possess the financial means to 
engage in policy design and evaluation (a),175 to be staffed with qualified, ex-
perienced personnel (b), to be or have access to formal decision makers (c), 
and to be able to create political pressure on formal decision makers (d). The 
three parties, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and Liberals, are well-
established political players with consolidated membership bases (a), parlia-
mentary experience (a, b, c), varying degrees of governing experience (b) and 
affiliated party foundations that engage in political education and consulting.  
Even though the coalition government (1969-1972) under Chancellor 
Brandt was the first headed by the Social Democrats, the party is one of the 
two Volksparteien, it has consistently won more than 30 percent of parliament 
                                               
175 For reasons of analytical transparency, comprehensibility, and accountability, I indicate, 
whenever possible, in brackets to which specific indicator I link an aspect of a case. However, 
in this cursory investigation of cases, the evaluation of individual indicators may often also 
be based on the overall impression gained through the literature review as well as on com-
mon knowledge about political actors and/or policy fields. 
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seats since 1961, and gained experience in the previous Grand Coalition from 
1965 to 1969 (b). For the first time, the Christian Democrats were not in gov-
ernment, but they still formed the biggest group in parliament with substan-
tial policy-making experience and political influence (b, d). Overall, none of 
the involved parties were newcomers to the political business lacking prior ex-
perience, political expertise, influence, or organizational resources (a, b, c, d), 
and I therefore expect them to possess the resources to engage in long-term 
strategic policy design.  
The main political actors outside legislative and executive are the unions 
and employers, as well as their respective federations. They are backed by mil-
lions of workers, respectively thousands of well-heeled member companies 
(a), and are traditionally considered to be important actors in the field of labor 
market policy (b) with a good standing that enables them to pressure political 
parties both directly in policy-making and publicly through protests or media 
campaigns (c, d). They have close ties to each of the main parties; unions are 
more closely affiliated with the Social Democrats, and employers with the 
Christian Democrats and the Liberals (c). I therefore consider them to have 
the financial resources, the organizational experience and expertise, and the 
relevant access and political influence to engage in long-term, strategic policy 
design.  
In the impact dimension, I evaluate most indicators positively as well. 
While the WCA reform does not concern citizens’ access to certain benefits or 
benefit levels (e, g), codetermination directly affects fundamental social rights 
for millions of workers, i.e. their representation and collaboration in firm 
management (f). Furthermore, the reform seems to likely impact the future 
development in the policy field. Regulations on codetermination directly affect 
unions’ organizational and financial strength (h, i) because they affect their 
ability to influence managerial decisions and to organize, recruit, and mobilize 
members. Consequently, they also impact unions’ strength vis-à-vis employ-
ers and political decision makers (j, k). Employers, on the other side, fear a 
curtailment of managerial freedoms, harmed economic growth (h), a weaken-
ing of their position vis-à-vis unions (k), and subsequently a loss of influence 
and prestige in the policy field (j, k). Regarding the timing of the reform, I 
assume that the circumstances were rather friendly towards far-reaching re-
forms. As noted earlier, the need for reform was generally acknowledged by 
all big parties. Furthermore, the Social-Liberal coalition coincided with a gen-
eral breakup of the German society that was shaken up by student protests, 
and with a political climate that favored steps towards a democratization of 
workplace relations (l).  
Finally, I evaluate the case positively on all indicators in the conflict dimen-
sion. The Social-Liberal coalition was the first of its kind, but while it did fit 
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the zeitgeist, Social Democrats and Liberals won the election only by a slight 
margin. The Christian Democrats still formed the biggest group in parliament 
(m), and the Social-Liberal government and policies were far from unchal-
lengeable both in the moment and in the future (n). Additionally, the reform 
was high on the political agenda, had been discussed for years, and was of di-
rect relevance for millions of workers (p), and different policy options were 
proposed by government and opposition (o).  
Overall, the cursory description and evaluation of the 1972 WCA reform 
suggests that it is an ideal case of political architecture. All eight indicators in 
the resource and conflict dimension are evaluated positively, as are a majority 
of the indicators in the impact dimension. 
The Pay Continuation Act of 1969 
The Pay Continuation Act of 1969 (Borowsky 2002; Ck. 1969; Immergut 1986; 
Trieschmann 1969; Webber 1988) stipulated that employers have to continue 
to pay full wages to workers during the first 6 weeks of sickness. The act was 
one of the major structural reforms in social protection enacted under the 
Grand Coalition (1966-69) in 1969, taking effect in 1970 just after the election 
of the first Social-Liberal Coalition. Before its enactment, social protection for 
sick workers had been improved incrementally, and multiple reforms in the 
1950s and 1960s raised the amount of sick payments to workers to 100 percent 
of net wages. However, the sick pay for workers was mainly financed by sick-
ness funds, and employers only subsidized the payments. For white-collar em-
ployees, a regulatory scheme had been implemented as early as 1931 that re-
quired employers to continue wage payments to sick employees for six weeks. 
These differences in the financing and organizational structure of the two 
schemes led to a number of undesirable consequences that Social Democrats 
and Christian Democrats wanted to address before the general election of 
1969. Particularly, workers, compared to white-collar employees, suffered 
from lower pensions (since their contributions were paused during sick times) 
and higher payments to their health care funds (since these had to finance the 
lion’s share of sick payments to workers). 
Assessing the reform indicator by indicator, the overall evaluation suggests 
a promising case of political architecture. In the resource dimension, I evalu-
ate the case positively on all four indicators. Similar to the two other cases in 
labor market politics just discussed, the main actors are the unions, employ-
ers, and the three political parties in parliament, and I assume all to possess 
the resources for strategic, long-term policy design (a, b, c, d; see the discus-
sion above).  
In the impact dimension, the Pay Continuation Act shows some differences 
to the two previous cases. It directly affects access to benefits (e), benefit levels 
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(g), and social rights (f). The effect on benefit levels is more indirect, however 
(g). Since the level of sick pay had already been raised to 100 percent of the 
net wage through earlier reforms, there are no real implications in this regard. 
But, as noted above, the reform does affect workers’ pension levels as well as 
the level of their payments to health insurance funds (g). In regards to social 
rights, we can see that the reform does not merely concern the access to and 
level of sick payments, but that it is also about equal treatment for workers 
and white-collar employees (f). I therefore evaluate the reform positively or as 
ambiguous to positive on all three indicators on distribution.  
The indicators on reconfiguration give a more mixed picture. The reform 
might improve unions’ ability to collect members’ contributions if their in-
come is not affected negatively by sickness periods, and it affects the employ-
ers’ financial burden in terms of social security, which is why I evaluate the 
reform positively in that regard (h). At the same time, I evaluate the reform as 
not affecting the organizational capacities (i) or decision-making procedures 
(j). Regarding mobilization prospects and patterns, the evaluation is ambigu-
ous (k). The reform does not directly affect the ability to of unions or employ-
ers to mobilize their members. While it increases the financial burden on em-
ployers, other reforms under the Grand Coalition compensated for this bur-
den. Additionally, employers enjoyed record profits due to an economic boom. 
The issue had also already lost some of its mobilization potential since earlier 
reforms had increased sick pay to 100 percent of the net wage and the Pay 
Continuation Act meant little immediate differences for workers (k).  
The timing of the reform was rather beneficial, and I evaluate the reform 
positively on this indicator (l). Both Social and Christian Democrats agreed on 
the need for reform and shared common goals. Additionally, the government 
pursued a consensual, corporatist mode of policy making by including unions 
and employers in the decision-making process from early on. One of the in-
volved policy makers stated that the conditions for a reform had never been as 
favorable (l).  
In the conflict dimension, most evaluations of the case are ambiguous. The 
Pay Continuation Act was passed under a Grand Coalition in which Social 
Democrats and Christian Democrats agreed on the main goals of the reform. 
However, the coalition partners could not reach compromises on all aspects 
of the reform and its individual stipulations, and both parties submitted own 
legislative drafts to the formal vote in parliament (o). Due to these differences, 
I evaluate the two indicators on control as ambiguous (m, n). Practically, it is 
impossible that an opposition government not including any of the two coali-
tion partners would take over and repeal the act, which would suggest a posi-
tive evaluation. However, due to the differences in detail, the parties might not 
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have been entirely sure that their current coalition partner would stick to the 
common agreement in a future center-left or center-right government (m, n). 
As mentioned above, the issue of pay continuation had been discussed for 
years, but earlier reforms had already improved the situation for workers to a 
degree that rendered the direct effects of the act rather negligible to the mass 
of workers, which suggests a negative evaluation in that regard. However, the 
higher ranks of parties and unions showed a continued, substantial interest in 
a reform of sick pay, and I therefore evaluate the case as neutral to positive on 
the indicator (p). 
Overall, the cursory investigation of the Pay Continuation Act of 1969 along 
the theorized indicators suggests a promising case of political architecture. All 
indicators in the resource dimension as well as a majority of the indicators in 
the impact and conflict dimensions are evaluated positively.  
The Codetermination Act of 1976 
The Codetermination Act of 1976 (Borowsky 2002; Faulenbach 2011: 440-45) 
is in many ways a “sibling” of the reform of the WCA. While the original WCA 
of 1952 regulated the relationship between workers and employers both at the 
firm and at the corporate level, the reform of 1972 limited the WCA to regula-
tions pertaining to the firm level. The relationship between workers and em-
ployers at the corporate level was meant to be subject of separate legislation. 
Only in the mining and steel-producing industry, a separate regulatory 
scheme, which granted labor full codetermination in corporate management, 
had been established in the 1950s. For other industries, the WCA of 1952 gave 
labor only one third of the votes on corporate boards. Already in 1967, the 
Grand Coalition commissioned an expert report to evaluate different options 
for regulating codetermination at the corporate level. However, the political 
debate around the issue continued for almost 10 years before the Codetermi-
nation Act was eventually passed in 1976. 
The systematic evaluation of the Codetermination Act largely mirrors the 
evaluation of the 1972 WCA reform. As in the above case, I consider the Code-
termination Act of 1976 to be an ideal case. Since both acts are very similar 
regarding policy issue, the involved actors, the timing of the reform, and the 
political context and discussion, only 3 of 16 indicators are evaluated differ-
ently. In order to not repeat the arguments just made, I will only discuss these 
differences. The first difference regards the potential impact of the reform on 
the funding base of organized interests (h). The 1972 WCA concerns codeter-
mination on the firm level and directly affects unions’ recruitment opportuni-
ties and, hence, their funding base. The Codetermination Act, in contrast, reg-
ulates the relationship between capital and labor on a much more abstract 
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level from the perspective of the normal worker with few implications for un-
ions’ recruitment opportunities and funding base.  
On the other side, the potential impact of the Codetermination Act on po-
litical networks is bigger than that of the WCA (j). The Codetermination Act 
affects the balance of power between capital and labor in corporate manage-
ment, grants unions influential and prestigious roles in corporate manage-
ment, and, hence, affects their status as political player in macro-economic 
policy making more directly. At the same time, employers are afraid of losing 
their role as clear and sole decision makers in corporate management and as 
first contact for political actors.  
The third difference concerns the timing of the two reforms (l). The Code-
termination Act was passed in 1976, four years later than the WCA, under the 
Social-Liberal Schmidt government. While one can argue that the Social-Lib-
eral government had lost some of its reform impetus by 1976, two more im-
portant differences concern coalition dynamics and electoral support. In 1976, 
the government was hindered from pushing a far-reaching reform in one or 
the other direction by internal disagreements on the issues between Liberals 
and Social Democrats. Additionally, the government witnessed an incipient 
decline in electoral support. In the early 1970s, the Social Democrats lost votes 
in a number of state elections, and in the federal election of 1976, the Christian 
Democrats almost won a majority of the seats in parliament on their own. 
Overall, the evaluation of the Codetermination Act of 1976 suggests an ideal 
case of political architecture, since all four indicators in the resource dimen-
sion as well as a majority of the indicators in the impact and conflict dimen-
sions are evaluated positively. 
The Employment Promotion Act of 1985 
The Employment Promotion Act of 1985 (König 1992: 180-215; Zohlnhöfer 
2001: 110-20) was one of the key reforms pushed by the newly elected Chris-
tian Democratic-Liberal Coalition under Chancellor Kohl. After the breakup 
of the Social-Liberal Coalition in 1982, the Liberal Party formed a new coali-
tion with the Christian Democrats, which was strengthened in the advanced 
general elections of 1983. The new government promised an “intellectual and 
moral turnaround” in Germany, with focus on a retreat of the state and a par-
allel strengthening of the market. The state’s role, according to the new gov-
ernment, was to concentrate on regulatory policies, while direct state inter-
ventions in society and economy should be minimized.  
The Employment Promotion Act of 1985 combined a variety of measures in 
labor market policy that were meant to deregulate the labor market and make 
it more flexible. Among other things, the government aimed at changing reg-
ulations on part-time work, temporary work contracts, work cancellation, and 
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overtime. These goals were not only opposed by Social Democrats, who found 
themselves on the opposition benches after 13 years of Social-Democratic 
chancellorship, but also caused debates and negotiations within the coalition 
and within the Christian Democratic party where the “employer wing” voiced 
strong criticism. Additionally, there were conflicts between the federal gov-
ernment and the, also Christian Democratic-dominated, Bundesrat, the sec-
ond chamber of parliament.  
The indicator-by-indicator evaluation of the reform suggests that it is a 
promising case of political architecture with a majority of positive evaluations 
on the individual indicators. As in the cases in the field of labor market poli-
tics, I evaluate the case positively on all four indicators in the resource dimen-
sion (a, b, c, d) since there are no differences between the main actors.  
In the impact dimension, the overall picture is a bit more mixed, but half of 
the evaluations are still positive. The three indicators on redistribution receive 
one positive and two negative evaluations. Concerning benefits access, I eval-
uate the case as negative since many stipulations in the reform do not directly 
affect access to social benefits but pertain to the structure and organization of 
the labor market instead of social benefits (e). However, the reform does have 
implications for the social rights of employees, especially in the sense that the 
deregulation of employment forms renders standard employment relation-
ships, the so called Normalarbeitsverhältnis, harder to achieve (f). Similar to 
benefits access, I evaluate the case negatively on the indicator in benefit levels. 
While the reform includes some stipulations with implications on benefit lev-
els, e.g. on the recognition of the training of apprentices in craft jobs, the ef-
fects on benefits levels are minimal in comparison to other cases evaluated (g).  
The indicators on reconfiguration give a mixed picture. I evaluate the indi-
cator on funding (h) and the indicator on mobilization (k) positively since the 
increase of atypical forms of employment at the expense of standard employ-
ment relationships has implications for the funding of unions, which mainly 
rests on contributions from employees working under such standard employ-
ment relationships (h), and for their mobilization potential since workers in 
atypical forms of employment are likely harder to mobilize in labor conflicts 
(k). On the indicators on personnel (i) and networks (j), I evaluate the reforms 
as negative to ambiguous. The reform does not have direct implications for 
bureaucratic or organizational capacities and does not alter decision-making 
procedures either. However, since effects on funding and mobilization, partic-
ularly for unions, seem likely, these might also spill over and affect their or-
ganizational strength and influence in political decision making, and I there-
fore evaluate the reform as negative to ambiguous on the two indicators (i, k).  
The last indicator in the impact dimension receives a positive evaluation 
again. The timing of the reform was beneficial for the government not only 
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due to its strong results in the 1983 federal election but also because the Chris-
tian Democratic-Liberal coalition could build on a similar majority in the Bun-
desrat, the second chamber of parliament. It therefore did not have to fear a 
blocking minority of the Social Democrats and could push its own policy goals 
(l).  
In the conflict dimension, evaluations are positive to ambiguous. While the 
government was in an exceptionally strong position, the German political sys-
tem and culture are more characterized by frequent changes of government 
between Social Democratic-headed and Christian Democratic-headed govern-
ments, as opposed to, e.g., Austria with its strong tradition of Grand Coalitions 
between the two big parties.176 Therefore, I evaluated the case as positive to 
ambiguous on the electoral indicator (m). On the network indicator, I evaluate 
the reform as ambiguous since it does not affect decision-making procedures 
but might influence the political strength of unions, as discussed above (n). 
The two indicators on contestation are evaluated as ambiguous or positive. 
After the change from a Social Democratic to a Christian Democratic govern-
ment, economic policies and labor-market policy were at the center of the new 
government’s program, and the Employment Promotion Act of 1985 was the 
key policy reform in the legislative period. Therefore, I evaluate the case posi-
tively on the indicator on issue salience (p). The indicator on policy alterna-
tives receives an ambiguous evaluation since the opposition (as well as critical 
groups within the government) favored different policy solutions but did not 
introduce an own, elaborate reform proposal (o). 
Overall, the cursory investigation of the Employment Promotion Act of 1985 
along the theorized indicators suggests a promising case of political architec-
ture. All indicators in the resource dimension are evaluated positively. In the 
impact dimension, half of the indicators receive a positive evaluation while the 
rest receive negative or negative to ambiguous evaluations. In the conflict di-
mension, one indicator is evaluated positively, the rest as ambiguous or am-
biguous to positive.  
The Pension Reform of 1972 
The history of the Pension Reform of 1972 (Borowsky 2002; Hockerts 2011: 
150-180) is characterized by an overbidding contest between Social Demo-
crats and Christian Democrats. Already in 1969, and with the newly formed 
Social-Liberal coalition’s assumption of office, pension policy became a major 
topic in the political debate and the involved actors considered the issue to be 
                                               
176 However, policy making in Germany is often described as rather consensus-oriented ra-
ther than highly conflictual (Schmidt 2015). 
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of significant strategic importance. This is understandable since pension pol-
icy redistributes enormous sums and therefore often gains much political at-
tention.  
The Pension Reform of 1972 does not make an excuse in this regard. On the 
contrary, it was even considered to be the “second big pension reform” since 
World War II. It expanded pension coverage to self-employed and homemak-
ers, introduced a flexible retirement age, and raised low pension expectancies. 
Overall, it constituted a significant expansion of social policy in Germany, an 
expansion that was fueled by intense party competition between Social Dem-
ocrats and Christian Democrats in the light of the oncoming, advanced federal 
elections of 1972. Since prognoses projected that pension funds would accu-
mulate a gigantic surplus of almost 200 billion Deutsch Marks over the fol-
lowing 15 years, both government and opposition tried to distribute these ben-
efits to potential voters and outbid each other with competing proposals, at a 
time when most political actors still trusted the state’s capacity to steer and 
regulate the economic and societal development.  
In parliament, the Christian Democrats were still adjusting to their new op-
position role, and for the time being their philosophy was to try to drive the 
government in front of them by introducing competing reform drafts into the 
legislative process. Since the majority of the Social Democratic-Liberal coali-
tion in parliament was standing on feet of clay, the opposition even succeeded 
in passing some of their reform proposals in the Bundestag against the unsta-
ble government majority. Before the crucial stages of the legislative process, 
the Social-Liberal government changed its strategy and decided to follow a 
more consensual approach and included important aims of the Christian 
Democrats in its own reform proposal. The Pension Reform of 1972 was 
passed almost unanimously in the Bundestag since it combined the “election 
gifts” of both government and opposition. 
The evaluation of the Pension Reform of 1972 suggests that is a promising 
to ideal case of political architecture since it can be evaluated positively on a 
vast majority of the 16 indicators theorized above. In the resource dimension, 
I evaluate the case positively on all four indicators. As in labor-market politics, 
the main political actors are the three parties in parliament and, outside of 
legislative and executive, unions and employers. As discussed above, I con-
sider all these actors to possess the resources to participate in architectural 
policy design (a, b, c, d). 
In the impact dimension, the evaluation is positive overall. The three indi-
cators on redistribution are evaluated positively since pension reforms di-
rectly affect the level of benefits, access to benefits, and regulations and wel-
fare commitments constituting social rights (e, f, g). The evaluation of the case 
on the indicators on reconfiguration is more mixed. I evaluate the reform as 
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positive regarding implications on funding since pension policies affect, 
mainly through contribution rates, the finances of workers and companies, 
i.e., the rank and file of unions and employer federations (h). In contrast, I 
evaluate the case negatively on the indicator in personnel since the reform 
does not affect organizational capacities, neither of unions or employers, nor 
does it affect state capacities (i). Likewise, I do not see an effect of the reform 
on decision-making procedures and therefore evaluate the case negatively in 
this regard (j). The remaining indicator on reconfiguration is evaluated as am-
biguous to positive since the reform, especially through the extension of pen-
sion coverage, has potential implications for mobilization patterns and group 
formation (k). The final indicator in timing is evaluated positively. As the 
above discussion has shown, this was mainly a “race to the top” in which Social 
and Christian Democrats tried to outbid each other, creating a dynamic that 
allowed for an unusually far-reaching pension reform (l), despite intense par-
tisan conflict around the reform.  
In the conflict dimension, I evaluate the reform positively on three of four 
indicators. The case description has shown that the instable majority of the 
Social-Liberal coalition and the upcoming federal election did not provide the 
government a perspective of prolonged decision-making power (m). On the 
other side, employers and unions did not fear being excluded from decision-
making processes since the reform did not affect them (n). Due to the height-
ened partisan conflict and the prominence of the issues on the political agenda 
(o), government and opposition competed by proposing different policy solu-
tions (p), and the government eventually took over key proposals of the Chris-
tian Democrats. 
Overall, this evaluation suggests a promising case with 12 positive, one am-
biguous to positive, and three negative evaluations. 
The Child-Raising Allowance Act of 1985 
With the Child-Raising Allowance Act of 198 (Münch 2004), the newly-elected 
Christian Democratic-Liberal government introduced a major reform in fam-
ily politics that turned out to become one of the most important reforms in the 
policy field enacted in the 16 years of Helmut Kohl’s chancellorship. The re-
form introduced an allowance paid to mothers and fathers who stayed home 
to raise a child. The stay-at-home-parent received 600DM for 18 months and 
had the right to return to his or her old job at the end of the reference period, 
if he or she had worked before.  
Only 6 years after the Social-Liberal coalition introduced a maternity leave 
scheme, the Kohl government thus substantially shifted the emphasis in fam-
ily politics. In contrast to the earlier scheme, the monthly allowance paid out 
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to parents was lower, but the entitlement period was substantially extended, 
and mothers who had not worked previously were also included in the scheme.  
The goal of the Christian Democratic-Liberal government was to reorient 
family politics by emphasizing the role of the family as a whole and a commu-
nity as opposed to the alleged “family member politics” of its Social-Liberal 
predecessor. Hence, while the Christian Democrats had modernized their po-
litical program and become more accepting of a diversity of forms of familial 
cohabitation, they still viewed the traditional family as the most important 
form of community in modern society. With the Child-Raising Allowance Act, 
the government wanted to improve the economic situation of families, 
acknowledge and accredit parents’ efforts in raising their children, reduce the 
number of pregnancy conflicts due to economic circumstances, and react to 
changed employment patterns and new orientations of men and women re-
garding the balance between work and family.  
For the Christian Democrats, family politics was one of a core area where 
they found that an “intellectual and moral turnaround” was necessary after 13 
years of Social-Liberal governance. Naturally, Social Democrats and the newly 
elected Greens opposed the reform. However, especially the Social Democrats 
were not in a strong position in the public debate on family politics. The main 
opposition to the reform therefore came from within the governments’ own 
camp, i.e. the Liberal Party and employers.  
The indicator-by-indicator evaluation of the Child-Raising Allowance Act of 
1985 suggests that it is a promising case for architectural analysis, scoring 
positively on 8 indicators, but also showing negative or ambiguous evaluations 
for 8 out of 16 indicators. In the resource dimension, I evaluate the reform 
positively on all four indicators (a, b, c, d). Even though I discuss the reform 
under the heading of family politics, it is in fact closely linked to labor market 
politics as well. With its aim to reconcile familial obligations with gainful em-
ployment, the reform has direct implications for parents’ employment pro-
spects and for employers’ hiring and firing practices. Actor constellations are 
therefore similar to reforms in labor market politics discussed above, ex-
tended by actors who are more “at home” in family politics, as for example 
churches. Important players in the reform discussion are the parties in parlia-
ment, which, since 1983, also includes the Green Party, as well as unions as 
representatives of working parents and employers and their collective federa-
tions. As the above description has indicated, especially the latter group op-
posed the reform strongly. Similar to evaluations in other cases, I assume that 
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all actors have the resources to participate in long-term, strategic policy-mak-
ing (a, b, c, d).177  
In the impact dimension, 4 out of 8 indicators are evaluated positively, 4 
negatively or as ambiguous to negative. The three indicators on redistribution 
all receive positive evaluations, since the reform directly affects the level of 
child-raising allowance (e) and includes regulations on the access to said al-
lowances, i.e. extending it to women who had not worked before (g). Further-
more, the reform has a social rights dimension since it aims at reconciling fa-
milial obligations with professional careers, thus potentially creating more 
equality between men and women, and since it extends the child allowance 
benefits to women without prior employment (f).  
None of the 4 indicators on reconfiguration receives a positive evaluation. 
The child allowances are not funded by employers’ or employees’ contribu-
tions but through the federal government’s general budget. Hence, the costs 
of the program are widely dispersed, and the financial burden on, e.g., em-
ployers is much smaller than in other cases, e.g. the Pay Continuation Act, 
which is why I evaluate the case negatively on the indicator (h). Similarly, the 
reform likely has no or only few implications on bureaucratic or organizational 
capacities since it merely “extracts” employees from the labor market with a 
guaranteed return option. However, it potentially increases the female work 
force and can in the long run broaden unions’ membership base. This poten-
tial effect was controversially debated, and I therefore evaluate the case as 
negative to ambiguous on this indicator (i). I suggest a similar reasoning and 
evaluation for the indicator in mobilization where direct implications are un-
likely but can unfold over time if the female work force increases (k). The last 
indicator on reconfiguration receives a negative evaluation since the reform 
does not affect decision making procedures (j).  
Finally, the indicator in the impact dimension, the timing indicator, is eval-
uated positively. As in the case of the two reforms in labor market politics dis-
cussed above, I evaluate the Child-Raising Allowance Act positively since the 
Kohl government held a strong position in both houses of parliament, which 
enabled it to aim for a far-reaching reform without having to fear a Social-
Democratic blocking minority (l).  
In the conflict dimension, none of the indicators receives a clear positive 
evaluation. Similar to the case of the Employment Promotion Act of 1985, I 
evaluate the electoral indicator on control as ambiguous to positive, since the 
                                               
177 The Green Party could be mentioned as an exception here, since it was first elected to the 
Bundestag in 1983 and therefore arguably did not have much legislative experience. How-
ever, family politics only played a minor role in the Green’s party program in the 1980s, and 
the party therefore did not play an important role in the reform debate. 
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government is in an exceptionally strong position but aware of this positions’ 
fragility (m). On the indicator on networks, the case receives an ambiguous 
evaluation since the reform does not affect decision-making procedures (n). 
The two indicators on contestation are evaluated as ambiguous. While the 
Kohl government viewed family politics as one of the core areas that needed 
an “intellectual and moral turnaround”, the policy field was still not at the top 
of the political agenda (p). Potentially, this was also due to the limited re-
sistance the Social Democrats were able to generate in the debate, even though 
they introduced an alternative reform proposal (o).  
Overall, this evaluation suggests that the case of the Child-Raising Allow-
ance Act of 1985 is a promising case with 8 positive evaluations, 2 negative 
evaluations, and 6 evaluations in-between.  
The Reform of Paragraph 218 of 1974/1976 
One of the fiercest political debates during the Social-Liberal era concerned 
the reform of the “abortion paragraph 218” (Borowsky 2002; Faulenbach 
2011). Since 1871, abortions at any time during the pregnancy were considered 
a criminal act under German law, unless there was a danger to the life of the 
pregnant woman. In the 1960s and 1970s, a growing progressive and feminist 
movement demanded a reform or abolition of paragraph 218. Critics argued 
that it violated women’s right to self-determination and encouraged illegal 
abortions, either abroad for the more affluent, or in Germany for the less well-
off, often under medically questionable conditions. Proponents of the law 
feared that “abortion counselling” rather than “family or motherhood coun-
selling” would endanger the moral foundations of the family in case of far-
reaching liberalization.  
During the political and public debate, it became obvious that a reform of 
the paragraph was necessary and supported by all parties, but ideas about how 
to reform the law differed substantially. In 1974, the parliament adopted a re-
form with government majority, but shortly after, Christian Democratic Län-
der governments appealed to the constitutional court, which revoked the gov-
ernment’s reform. Two years later, in 1976, a revised reform that conformed 
to the demands of the court took effect. 
The evaluation of the reform along the list of theorized indicators suggest 
that it is a suitable case. In the resource dimension, I rate the case as ambig-
uous on most indicators. Besides the political parties, that is, the Social Dem-
ocratic-Liberal government and the Christian Democratic opposition, interest 
groups or social movements played a large role in the political and public de-
bate. In the 1960s and 1970s, a growing, vocal feminist movement demanded 
a reform of paragraph 218. On the opposite side, the churches, especially the 
Catholic Church, opposed a reform completely or tried to keep the abortion 
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law as strict as possible. While the churches traditionally had close ties to the 
Christian Democrats, the feminist-progressive movement could not build on 
equally established ties but still saw a parliamentary ally in the new Social-
Liberal coalition. However, none of the groups had a formal role or say in the 
decision-making process, and I therefore qualify the reform as ambiguous to 
positive on the network indicator (c). I also qualify the case as ambiguous on 
the funding indicator. The churches possessed substantial financial resources 
that enabled them to engage politically; the feminist movement was very vital 
and vocal but in the funding dimension not comparable to an institution like 
the church (a). On the personnel indicator, I rate the case as negative to am-
biguous. Similar to the above argument, the feminist movement likely did not 
possess extensive policy-making expertise, while the church was a more estab-
lished actor also on the political stage, even though it is likely less capable or 
politically savvy than, for example, unions or employer federations in labor-
market policy (b). The only indicator in the resource dimension on which I 
rate the case positively is the politics indicator. Both groups, the churches and 
the feminist movement, were likely capable of creating substantial political 
pressure on decision makers, the churches both publicly and through their es-
tablished connection to the Christian Democrats, the feminist movement 
mainly through campaigns that frequently created public controversies (d). 
In the impact dimension, I qualify the case negatively on a majority of the 
indicators. Of the three indicators on redistribution, only the social rights in-
dicator scores positively. The right to, or prohibition against, abortion directly 
concerns an elementary civil and social right of women (f), but it does not af-
fect the access to or levels of social benefits (e, g). The indicators on reconfig-
uration receive either negative or negative to ambiguous qualifications. Due 
to the partial liberalization of abortions with the reform of paragraph 218, a 
network of counselling centers for pregnant women and their partners was 
established. Consulting these centers was obligatory before an abortion. I rate 
the case negative to ambiguous on the funding and personnel indicator on re-
configuration since the reform created this new organizational structure with 
qualified staff. However, I do not see these centers as important actors in their 
own right in the political or public debate and, hence, do not assume that their 
creation will have a great effect on future policy developments (h, i). Similarly, 
the reform has no implications for decision-making procedures (j) and at best 
minor implications for the mobilization of interests regarding abortion regu-
lation (k). The second and last positive evaluation in the impact dimension 
concerns the timing of the reform. With the newly elected Social-Liberal gov-
ernment, the emerging feminist movement, and the general breakup and lib-
eralization of the German post-war society, the circumstances were very fa-
vorable for a substantive reform of the abortion law (l).  
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The indicators in the conflict dimension draw a more positive picture of the 
case. The intense, conflictual, and emotionally loaded debate around the re-
form of paragraph 218 suggests that issue salience was exceptionally high (p). 
Furthermore, multiple reforms were debated and pushed by different actors, 
and, not least the interference of the constitutional court forced the govern-
ment to consider different policy solutions in reforming the paragraph 218 (o). 
Lastly, I qualify the reform positively on the two indicators on control. The 
Social Democratic-Liberal coalition was the first of its kind, and while it did fit 
the zeitgeist, Social Democrats and Liberals won the election only by a slight 
margin (m), the Christian Democrats still formed the biggest parliament frac-
tion (m), and the Social-Liberal government and policies were far from un-
challengeable in the moment and in the future (n).  
Overall, the cursory investigation of the Reform of Paragraph 281 of 
1974/76 suggests a suitable case. All indicators in the conflict dimension are 
evaluated positively, while a majority of the indicators in the impact and re-
source dimension is evaluated negatively. 
The 22nd Act to Change the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany of 1969 
The introduction of the federal competence to issue framework legislation 
concerning the higher education system was part of a larger package of legis-
lation enacted under the Grand Coalition (1966-69) (Borowsky 2002; 
Hoymann 2010). The reform package, enacted as the 22nd Act to Change the 
Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic of Germany, restructured the 
responsibilities of the Bundesländer and the federal government and the fi-
nancial relationships between the two. Prior to the act, the federal government 
had practically no say in any matter in education policy because the Basic Law 
of 1949 considered education the sole domain of the states.  
However, The 22. Act to Change the Basic Law granted the federal govern-
ment the competence to issue framework legislation concerning “the general 
principles of higher education” in order to secure comparability and a neces-
sary degree of congruity in higher education in the Bundesländer. The vague 
formulation concealed the lack of a shared definition and understanding of the 
scope of this new federal competence. In fact, the political actors did not even 
agree on what “higher education” included. A reason might be that education 
policy had originally not been within the scope of the reform. It only entered 
the reform debate in 1967 due to a proposal made by the Liberal Party, which 
had been a long-time supporter of more federal responsibilities in education 
policy. However, before the Liberals’ proposal for more federal competencies, 
education policy had already gained increasing attention on the national level 
during the 1960s. Critics proclaimed a state of emergency in education due to 
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insufficient funding and inadequate performance in German schools and uni-
versities. Others considered stronger engagement in education policy imper-
ative since education was a fundamental civic right. Other factors that facili-
tated the reform were the apparent limits of the financial capabilities of the 
Bundesländer, the new experience of economic slow growth in the 1960s, and 
the formation of the Grand Coalition with a marginalized opposition in Bun-
destag or Bundesrat. 
The indicator-by-indicator evaluation of the reform suggests that it is a suit-
able case of political architecture. In the resource dimension, I evaluate the 
case positively on all four indicators. The important actors were the Social and 
Christian Democrats in government, as well as the Bundesländer through 
which the Liberal Party also gained some influence and leverage. Doubtlessly, 
all these actors possessed the financial resources, the expertise, and the organ-
izational experience necessary for long-term, strategic policy design (a, b). The 
Bundesländer, who were the main potential opponents to the federal govern-
ment’s attempt to gain more influence in education policy, had to be included 
in the reform deliberations since changes to the Grundgesetz require approval 
by the second chamber of parliament, the Bundesrat, through which they can 
block legislation or create political pressure on the federal government (c, d). 
The role of other actors and interest groups in education policy seems to have 
been rather negligible, since the reform’s main focus was on restructuring the 
relationship between federal government and Bundesländer and not on sub-
stantive education policy. Only seven years later, the federal government uti-
lized this new competence and passed the actual Framework Act for Higher 
Education.  
In the impact dimension, the indicator-by-indicator evaluation gives a 
mixed picture. As just pointed out, the 22nd Act to Change the Basic Law only 
laid the groundwork for future federal framework legislation regarding higher 
education. Hence, the reform itself did not affect or change citizens’ access to 
benefits (e), the benefit levels (g), or citizens’ social rights (f), and I therefore 
evaluate the three indicators regarding distribution negatively. The indicators 
on reconfiguration give an opposite picture. Except the indicator on mobiliza-
tion prospects (k), I evaluate all indicators positively (h, I, j). Since the reform 
explicitly aims at reconfiguring the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the Bundesländer, there are direct implications for the financial 
strength of the different levels of government, especially the Bundesländer 
(h).178 Therefore, the reform also affects the bureaucratic and organizational 
                                               
178 Here, I refer to the overall scope of the 22nd Act to Change the Basic Law and not specif-
ically to the paragraphs that address the role of the federal government in education policy, 
which do not have immediate financial implications.  
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capacities, especially by granting the federal government more codetermina-
tion rights in education policy, potentially leading to a relocation of capacities 
from the Bundesländer to the federal level (i). The effect of the reform on de-
cision-making procedures is obvious as it subordinates the higher education 
policies of the Bundesländer to a federal framework (j). Regarding mobiliza-
tion prospects or patterns, I evaluate the case negatively. Even though the re-
form does subordinate Bundesländer legislation to a federal framework, the 
overall role of the Bundesländer in the German political landscape and their 
potential to block federal legislation in the Bundesrat do not change substan-
tively (k).  
Lastly, I evaluate the indicator on timing positively. The formation of the 
first Grand Coalition substantially increased the government’s opportunity for 
far-reaching policy reforms. Not only did the government command over a 90 
percent majority in the Bundestag; all Bundesländer governments were 
headed by either Social Democrats or Christian Democrats, which largely 
eliminated party politics from the reform process (l).  
In the conflict dimension, I evaluate most indicators negatively. The explicit 
goal of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats was to agree on a long-term 
restructuring of the federal-Länder relationship that would last more than just 
a few years. Additionally, both parties could assume to stay politically influen-
tial through Bundesländer governments, whose majority would be needed for 
a withdrawal of the reform, even if they were no longer part of the federal gov-
ernment. I therefore evaluate the indicators on control negatively (m, n). Re-
garding political contestation, education policy only entered the reform debate 
around the 22nd Act to Change the Basic law rather late. The reform also had 
few implications for citizens, and the political debate around education was 
not focused on the relationship between Bundesländer and federal govern-
ment but on more substantive policy issues. Issue salience was therefore low 
(p). And while the Liberal Party originally advocated for a more far-reaching 
involvement of the federal government in education policy, this policy alter-
native was discarded by the coalition partners early in the legislative process 
(o). I therefore evaluate the indicators on issue salience as negative (p) and the 
indicator on policy alternatives as ambiguous (o). 
Overall, the cursory investigation of the 22nd Act to Change the Basic Law 
along the theorized indicators suggests a suitable case of political architecture. 
All indicators in the resource dimension are evaluated positively, but a major-
ity of the indicators in the impact dimension and three out of four indicators 
in the conflict dimension are evaluated negatively; the fourth is ambiguous.  
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The Framework Act for Higher Education of 1976 
Seven years after the change of the Basic Law enabled the federal government 
to pass framework legislation on higher education, the Bundestag eventually 
passed the Framework Act for Higher Education (Borowsky 2002; Hoymann 
2010). In fact, the legislative process leading up to the enactment started im-
mediately after the change of the Basic Law in 1969.  
Preparations for a framework act had started under the Grand Coalition, 
but due to immanent federal elections, these preparations were only meant to 
provide some groundwork for the subsequent government. After the election, 
the Social Democratic-Liberal government quickly proceeded with the legisla-
tive process despite fundamental conflict regarding the interpretation of the 
new federal competencies in higher education policy (cf. the discussion 
above). Especially the states under Christian Democratic rule interpreted the 
federal competencies narrowly in order to thwart the Social Democratic-Lib-
eral federal government’s reform ambitions, while the federal government, 
backed by Social Democratic state governments, saw more room and authority 
for federal legislation.  
These formal conflicts partially covered up the substantive points of con-
tention between government and opposition. Specifically, there were disa-
greements regarding the form of representation and co-determination to be 
practiced at universities, the organizational structure of universities, admis-
sion restrictions to manage rising student numbers, introduction of an admin-
istrative law for universities, and reform of academic study programs. Despite 
these conflicts, the legislative process was interrupted in 1972 due to advanced 
federal elections and were reinitiated in 1973 under a strengthened Social 
Democratic-Liberal coalition. At the same time, two decisions of the Constitu-
tional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, regarding two of the contentious 
issues changed the conditions for the political negotiations in important ways.  
In one case, the constitutional court strengthened the role of professors in 
university boards and committees based on the principle of academic auton-
omy and freedom and, thus, set a limit to the government’s intention to de-
mocratize higher education. In another case, the court decided that it was the 
federal government’s responsibility to devise rules and regulations for admis-
sion restrictions at universities in order to guarantee fair and equal treatment 
of applicants and, thus, strengthened the federal government against the 
Christian-Democratic-governed states. With these court decisions in mind, 
the legislative process continued under Chancellors Brandt and Schmidt 
(from 1974 onwards), closely accompanied by alert interest groups whose ex-
pertise was appreciated in parliamentary deliberations, even though their in-
fluence did not go as far as changing political actors’ principal beliefs and 
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ideas. In 1976, the government finally passed the Framework Act for Higher 
Education after seven years of legislative work. 
The evaluation of the Framework Act for Higher Education of 1976 suggests 
that the reform is a promising case of political architecture. In the resource 
dimension, I evaluate the case positively on most indicators. As in the above 
case, the Bundesländer acted as the main opponents of the federal government 
in policy-making. Especially Christian-Democratic state governments de-
manded different political solutions and sometimes even devised rival higher 
education policies for their own state (a, b, c, d). But in contrast to the above 
case, interest groups also played an important role in the reform process. They 
were heard and included in deliberations early on (c), their expertise was val-
ued when getting to the nitty-gritty of policy formulation (b), and particularly 
the student movement was capable of creating substantial public pressure 
through demonstrations (d). Compared to other interest groups like big un-
ions and employer federations in labor market politics, though, many of the 
interest group could not build on established organizational structures and 
only formed during the emerging debate around education policy in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Particularly student and non-professorial academic employees 
were traditionally weakly organized formally, but also professorial interests 
group were often newly formed. I therefore evaluate the case as ambiguous to 
positive regarding funding and personnel (a, b), and as positive regarding net-
works and politics (c, d). 
The evaluation of the nine indicators in the impact dimension is mixed. One 
out of three indicators on redistribution is evaluated positively, two negatively, 
since the Framework Act had direct implications for access to higher educa-
tion and the representation and influence of different status groups at univer-
sities (f) but did not affect benefit levels (g) or access to benefits (e). I evaluate 
all four indicators on reconfiguration positively. With its focus on organiza-
tional reforms and changes in the form of representation and co-determina-
tion, the reform had direct implications for the role of different groups at uni-
versities. Substantial improvements regarding students and non-professorial 
academic employees rights of codetermination and their formal status were 
debated with important implications for their organizational and financial ca-
pacities (h, i). Such improvements would not just ease the collective organiza-
tion of their interests but also affect their standing in political debates (k) and 
change decision-making procedures in higher education and at universities 
(j). On another level, the continuous debate around the scope of the new com-
petencies of the federal government in higher education politics shows the em-
inent implications of the reform for the relationship between states and fed-
eral government and for who sets the tone in the policy field (h, I, j, k).  
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Lastly, I evaluate the indicator on timing as positive to ambiguous. Not only 
did the Social-Liberal government appear strengthened after the 1972 federal 
elections; its principal goals in higher education policy were shared by a, par-
tially radicalized, student movement that was able to create considerable pub-
lic pressure and paralyze many universities temporarily, and that character-
ized the late 1960s and 1970s like few other social movements (l).  
The indicators in the conflict dimension are evaluated as either positive or 
ambiguous to positive. While the Social-Liberal government was strengthened 
in the general election of 1972, the Social Democrats faced a number of defeats 
in state elections in the subsequent years and a growing conservative opposi-
tion in the Bundesrat. These developments likely made the government aware 
of its fragile position (m). The indicators on conflict are evaluated as positive 
or ambiguous to positive. Over the course of the legislative process, various 
proposals had been discussed, and government and opposition clearly had dif-
ferent goals in higher education policy. However, the Christian Democrats did 
not introduce an own policy draft into parliament but instead tried to change 
the government proposal towards their own position. Therefore, I evaluate the 
indicator on policy alternative as ambiguous to positive (o). Issue salience is 
evaluated as ambiguous as well since education policy was an important elec-
tion topic emphasized by the Social-Liberal coalition but not a key issue in the 
political debate (p) 
Overall, the cursory investigation of the Framework Act on Higher Educa-
tion suggests a promising case of political architecture. All indicators in the 
resource dimension are evaluated positively, as is a majority of the indicators 
in the impact and conflict dimension, even though those dimensions also in-




The dissertation investigates policy makers’ strategic use of policies to make 
politics. It asks whether and how policy makers strategically try to shape pol-
icy feedback effects during policy design and how such attempts influence the 
design of policies. Finding answers to these questions is crucial for under-
standing key dynamics, challenges, limitations and opportunities of public 
policy making, for explaining strategic choices policy makers make when they 
design new policies and political struggles they engage in with their oppo-
nents. 
The dissertation makes two key contributions to the policy feedback and 
policy design literature: First, the dissertation finds that policy makers do con-
sider and try to strategically design policy feedback effects when designing 
policies. Specifically, it finds that policy makers anticipate inward-oriented 
feedback effects in paradigmatic policy making and outward-oriented feed-
back effects in incremental policy making. Policy makers’ attempts to strate-
gically design policy feedback effects are based on a working understanding of 
policy feedback dynamics and policy makers' desire to maximize both short-
term and long-term political gains. 
Second, the dissertation finds that the existing literature relies implicitly or 
explicitly on problematic assumptions about the nature of policy makers and 
policy making and that it therefore has not developed an analytical toolkit for 
the investigation of long-term strategic policy making. As a solution to this 
problem, the dissertation develops a theoretical and methodological frame-
work of architectural policy design that improves our understanding of pat-
terns and dynamics of public policy making and policy makers’ strategic deci-
sions during policy design. 
The literature on policy feedback and on policy design, whose job it would 
be to provide an analytical toolkit for the investigation of long-term strategic 
policy making, fails to do so and does not pay sufficient attention to the phe-
nomenon. Instead, the policy design literature focusses analytically on how 
policies can be designed instrumentally to solve objective policy problems, the 
policy feedback literature typically understands policy feedback effects as un-
intended by-products of policy making and focusses analytically on which 
feedback effects policies and institutional contexts actually bring about with-
out investigating the agential sources of these effects.  
In consequence, the literature fails to capture, understand and explain long-
term strategic policy making and cannot answer basic questions about public 
policy making. For example, it cannot explain why policy makers choose one 
policy design over another, even though both designs might be instrumental 
in pursuing the same policy goal, what reasons policy makers have for such 
 300 
choices and what role strategic considerations of policy feedback effects play 
in these decisions. The literature also cannot explain how policy makers weigh 
long-term and short-term political benefits during policy making, when they 
prioritize one over the other, or how they try to maximize both. Lastly, the 
literature cannot explain how, under what conditions, or to what degree policy 
makers are successful in strategically designing policies and anticipating pol-
icy feedback effects to achieve long-term policy goals. 
The architectural policy design perspective developed by the dissertation 
provides a theoretical and methodological framework that helps answer these 
questions. It understands public policies as “rules of the game” that prescribe 
and proscribe behavior and shape the lives and interactions of citizens and 
organizations. Institutions and policies are arenas of conflict in which political 
actors constantly try to (re-)shape and (re-)interpret rules and bend these to-
wards their priorities and preferences. They do so because policies are tools of 
power that shape, restructure, and reconfigure political processes in meaning-
ful ways through policy feedback effects. Hence, policy makers can use policies 
strategically to gain power and control, further their own interests and achieve 
policy goals in the long term.  
The design of policies, the instruments they include and the specific rules 
and stipulations they spell out matter for future policy development because 
they shape what feedback effects can emerge from policies. Policy makers have 
a working understanding of the effects different policy designs further and 
therefore act strategically in the design of policies. They try to design policies 
that bring about beneficial policy feedback effects in order to gain power and 
achieve policy goals in the long term and be electorally successful in the short 
term. Policy makers’ strategic action therefore shapes future policy develop-
ments through strategically designed policies that shape policy feedback ef-
fects. Policy makers’ design strategies themselves are structured by the situa-
tional context of policy making according to which policy makers review, re-
vise and reform the goals they want to achieve and strategies they follow to do 
so. 
The methodological framework lays out a detailed script for the empirical 
application of the architectural policy design perspective. It demonstrates how 
abductive research aimed at building new theory can be conducted practically, 
starting from the critical, systematic problematization of the existing litera-
ture and moving to the development of a novel procedure for case selection in 
theory-building research. Furthermore, the methodological framework in-
cludes a detailed discussion of the collection of empirical material and the pro-
cess and methods of data analysis for the investigation of long-term strategic 
policy making. 
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The dissertation applies and substantiates the architectural policy design 
approach in two case studies of German public policy making. Based on ex-
tensive archival records from the Parliamentary Archives of the German Bun-
destag and the archives of Christian Democratic Party and Social Democratic 
Party, the dissertation reconstructs architectural policy design strategies fol-
lowed by the two parties in the design of the Codetermination Act of 1976 and 
the Pay Continuation Act of 1969. Based on the two cases studies, the disser-
tation presents a typology of policy feedback effects anticipated by policy mak-
ers during policy design, which summarizes and condenses the analytical in-
sights and contributions of the dissertation laid out above. 
By developing the architectural policy design perspective, the dissertation 
wants to facilitate an agency turn in policy-feedback research. An agency turn 
in policy-feedback research is necessary because the field has so far not paid 
appropriate attention to long-term strategic policy making because it tends to 
view policy makers as notoriously myopic, policy making as incomprehensibly 
complex, and policy design as a rational, instrumental process. It therefore 
relegates the causal impact of agency on policy development to critical junc-
tures and treats policy feedback effects as unintended byproducts of policy 
making.  
In practice, an agency turn means that policy feedback researchers should 
take long-term strategic policy making seriously, investigate policy makers’ 
strategic calculations regarding policy feedback effects, scrutinize how policy 
makers weigh long-term and short-term gains and losses, and evaluate the 
causal impact of such strategic considerations on what design is adopted even-
tually. Researchers should also take policy makers’ own perspective on policy 
feedback dynamics into account, develop and apply analytical categories of 
policy feedback effects that reflect policy makers’ own experience, knowledge 
and assumptions about long-term implications of policies. As the dissertation 
demonstrates, such an approach helps develop productive and applicable an-
alytical categories that show what types of strategic considerations policy 
makers have in different policy-design situations and increase our under-




Afhandlingen undersøger politikernes strategiske brug af politikker til “at føre 
politik”. Den spørger, om og hvordan politikere strategisk forsøger at forme 
policyfeedbackeffekter, når de designer politikker, og hvordan sådanne forsøg 
påvirker det endelige politik design. Vi er nødt til at kende svarene på disse 
spørgsmål for at forstå centrale dynamikker, udfordringer, begrænsninger og 
muligheder for politisk beslutningstagning, forklare politiske beslutningsta-
geres strategiske valg når de designer nye politikker og de politiske kampe de 
tager med deres modstandere. 
Afhandlingen leverer to vigtige bidrag til policyfeedback- og policydesign-
litteraturen: For det første finder afhandlingen, at beslutningstagere overvejer 
og forsøger at udforme feedbackprocesser strategisk, når de designer politik-
ker. Specifikt finder den, at politiske beslutningstagere forudser indadrettede 
feedbackeffekter i paradigmatiske politiske beslutningstagninger og udad-
vendte feedbackeffekter i trinvis beslutningstagning. Politiske beslutningsta-
geres forsøg på strategisk at udforme politiske feedbackeffekter er baseret på 
en forståelse af feedbackdynamikker og beslutningstagernes ønske om at 
maksimere både kortsigtede og langsigtede politiske gevinster. 
For det andet finder afhandlingen, at den eksisterende litteratur er implicit 
eller eksplicit baseret på problematiske antagelser om politikere og politisk 
beslutningstagning, og at den derfor ikke har udviklet analytiske værktøjer til 
at undersøge langsigtet strategisk politisk beslutningstagning. Som en løsning 
på dette problem udvikler afhandlingen en teoretisk og metodologisk ramme 
for architectural policy design (arkitektonisk policydesign), der kan give os 
en bedre forståelse af mønstre og dynamikker i politisk beslutningstagning og 
beslutningstagernes strategiske beslutninger, når de designer politikker. 
Litteraturen om policyfeedback og policydesign giver desværre ingen op-
skrift på analyser af langsigtet strategisk politik og har kun begrænset fokus 
på fænomenet. Det analytiske fokus i policydesignlitteraturen er snarere, 
hvordan politikker kan designes målrettet for at løse objektive politiske pro-
blemer. Policyfeedbacklitteraturen forstår typisk policyfeedbackeffekter som 
utilsigtede biprodukter af politisk beslutningstagning og fokuserer analytisk 
på, hvilke feedbackeffekter politikker faktisk producerer uden at undersøge de 
potentielle kilder til disse effekter. 
Konsekvensen er, at litteraturen ikke kan opfange, forstå og forklare lang-
sigtet strategisk politisk beslutningstagning eller svare på grundlæggende 
spørgsmål om offentlig politik, fx hvorfor beslutningstagere vælger et policy-
design over et andet, selvom begge designs peger mod samme politiske mål, 
hvilke grunde politiske beslutningstagere har for sådanne valg, og hvordan 
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strategiske overvejelser om policyfeedbackeffekter påvirker disse beslutnin-
ger. Litteraturen kan heller ikke forklare, hvordan politikere vejer langsigtede 
og kortsigtede politiske gevinster under politisk beslutningstagning, hvornår 
de prioriterer den ene eller den anden, eller hvordan de forsøger at maksimere 
begge dele. Endelig kan litteraturen ikke forklare, hvordan, under hvilke for-
hold, eller i hvilken grad det lykkes politiske beslutningstagere at udforme po-
litikker strategisk og forudse policyfeedbackeffekter for at nå langsigtede po-
litiske mål. 
Afhandlingens perspektiv på political architecture udgør en teoretisk og 
metodologisk ramme, som hjælper os med at besvare disse spørgsmål. Det 
forstår offentlige politikker som "spilleregler", der foreskriver og forbyder ad-
færd og former borgeres og organisationers tilværelse og interaktioner. Insti-
tutioner og politikker er konfliktarenaer, hvor politiske aktører konstant for-
søger at (om)forme og (gen)fortolke regler og bøje disse i forhold til deres pri-
oriteter og præferencer. Politikker er magtværktøjer, der former, omstruktu-
rerer og rekonfigurerer politiske processer på meningsfulde måder gennem 
policy feedbackeffekter, og derfor kan politikere strategisk bruge politikker til 
at opnå magt og kontrol, fremme egne interesser og nå politiske mål på langt 
sigt. 
Udformningen af politikker, de instrumenter de indeholder, og de speci-
fikke regler og bestemmelser som de udspiller, er vigtige for fremtidig politik-
udvikling, fordi de er afgørende for, hvilke feedbackeffekter politikkerne pro-
ducerer. Politiske beslutningstagere har en forståelse af, hvilke effekter for-
skellige politiske designs fremmer, og handler derfor strategisk i udformnin-
gen af politikker. De forsøger at udforme politikker, der skaber fordelagtige 
policyfeedbackeffekter, for at opnå magt, nå politiske mål på langt sigt og hø-
ste stemmer på kort sigt. Politiske beslutningstageres strategiske handlinger 
former derfor fremtidige politiske udviklinger gennem strategisk designede 
politikker, som danner policyfeedbackeffekter. Politiske beslutningstageres 
designstrategier er struktureret af den situationelle kontekst, og baseret på 
denne kontekst gransker og reviderer de mål og strategier. 
Den metodologiske ramme udgør en detaljeret drejebog for empirisk an-
vendelse af det political architecture perspektiv. Abduktiv forskning med hen-
blik på formulering af ny teori starter rent praktisk med kritisk systematisk 
problematisering af den eksisterende litteratur og udvikling af en ny proce-
dure for case udvælgelse i teoribyggende forskning. Endvidere indeholder den 
metodiske ramme en detaljeret diskussion af empirisk dataindsamling samt 
dataanalyseproces og -metoder i studier af langsigtet strategisk politikfrem-
stilling. 
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Afhandlingen anvender og underbygger det political architecture approach 
i to tyske cases vedrørende beslutningstagning inden for offentlig politik. Ba-
seret på omfattende materiale fra den tyske forbundsdags parlamentariske ar-
kiv og det kristelige demokratiske partis og det socialdemokratiske partis ar-
kiver rekonstrueres arkitekturen i de to partiers policydesignstrategier i de-
signprocesserne for medbestemmelsesloven fra 1976 og sygelønsloven fra 
1969. Baseret på de to cases præsenterer afhandlingen en typologi for policy-
feedbackeffekter, som beslutningstagerne anticiperer, når de designer politik-
ker, som opsummerer og komprimerer afhandlingens analytiske indsigter og 
bidrag. 
Ved at udvikle en architectural policy design tilgang til studiet af politik, 
forsøger afhandlingen at facilitere et fokus på agens i policy feedback littera-
turen. Et fokus på politikeres agens er nødvendigt, fordi litteraturen indtil vi-
dere ikke har fokuseret tilstrækkeligt på langsigtet politisk beslutningstag-
ning, da forskere inden for feltet har en tendens til at antage at politikere er 
notorisk kortsigtede, at politiske beslutningsprocesser er uforståeligt kom-
plekse samt at policy design er en rationelle og instrumentel proces. Resultatet 
er, at politikeres agens ift. politikudvikling reduceres til “critical junctures” og 
policyfeedbackeffekter opfattes som uintenderede sideeffekter af politisk be-
slutningstagning.  
I praksis betyder ændret praksis, at policyfeedbackforskere bør tage lang-
sigtede strategiske beslutningsprocesser alvorligt, undersøge politiske beslut-
ningstageres strategiske vurderinger af policyfeedbackeffekter, hvordan de ve-
jer langsigtede og kortsigtede gevinster og tab, og evaluere årsagssammen-
hængen af sådanne strategiske overvejelser om, hvilket design der vedtages i 
sidste ende. Forskere bør også tage politikernes eget perspektiv på politikfeed-
backdynamikker mere alvorligt, udvikle og anvende analytiske kategorier af 
politikfeedbackeffekter, som afspejler politikernes egne erfaringer, viden og 
antagelser om langsigtede konsekvenser af politikker. Som afhandlingen de-
monstrerer, hjælper en sådan tilgang med at udvikle produktive og anvende-
lige analytiske kategorier, der viser, hvilke typer strategiske overvejelser be-
slutningstagere gør sig i forskellige politiske designsituationer, og øge vores 
forståelse af politiske designprocesser og beslutningstagning inden for offent-
lig politik.  
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